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mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deep operation | The Stavka placed these corps at the disposal of army and front commanders for use as mobile groups operating in tandem with older cavalry corps, which by now had also received a new complement of armour. The Stavka employed these new tank corps in an offensive role for the first time in early 1942.
During this time, the Germans launched Operation Kremlin, a deception campaign to mislead the Stavka into believing that the main German attack in the summer would be aimed at Moscow. The Stavka were convinced that the offensive would involve Army Group South as a southern pincer against the Central Front protecting Moscow. To preempt the German assault, the Red Army launched two offensive operations, the Rzhev–Vyazma strategic offensive operation against Army Group Centre, and the Kharkov offensive operation (known officially as the Barvenkovo-Lozovaia offensive) against Army Group South. Both were directly linked as a spoiling offensives to break up and exhaust German formations before they could launch Operation Blue. The Kharkov operation was designed to attack the northern flank of German forces around Kharkov, to seize bridgeheads across the Donets River north east of the city. A southern attack would be made from bridgeheads seized by the winter-counter offensive in 1941. The operation was to encircle the Fourth Panzer Army and German Sixth Army as they advanced towards the Dnepr river. The operation led to the Second Battle of Kharkov.
The battlefield plan involved the Soviet South Western Front. The South Western Front was to attack out of bridgeheads across the Northern Donets River north and south of Kharkov. The Soviets intended to exploit with a cavalry corps (the 3rd Guards) in the north and two secretly formed and redeployed tank corps (the 21st and 23rd) and a cavalry corps (the 6th) in the south. Ultimately the two mobile groups were to link up west of Kharkov and entrap the German Sixth Army. Once this was achieved, a sustained offensive into the Ukraine would enable the recovery of industrial regions.
Outcome: In fact, primarily due to Stalin's overriding his subordinates' suggestions, the Stavka fell for the German ruse. Instead of attacking the southern pincer of the suspected Moscow operation, they ran into heavy concentrations of German forces that were to strike southward to the Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus, the actual aim of Operation Blue.
Although the offensive surprised the Wehrmacht, the Soviets mishandled their mobile forces. Soviet infantry penetrated German defences to the consternation of the German commanders, but the Soviets procrastinated and failed to commit the two tank corps for six days. The corps finally went into action on 17 May simultaneously with a massive surprise attack by First Panzer Army against the southern flank of the Soviet salient. Over the next two days, the two tank corps disengaged, retraced their path, and engaged the new threat. But it was too late. The German counterattack encircled and destroyed the better part of three Soviet armies, the two tank corps and two cavalry corps, totaling more than 250,000 men.
The Kharkov debacle demonstrated to Stalin and Soviet planners that they not only had to create larger armoured units, but they also had to learn to employ them properly.
Operation Uranus and Third Kharkov:
Deep battle plan: The Battle of Stalingrad, by October 1942, was allowing the Soviets an ever tighter grip on the course of events. Soviet strategy was simple: elimination of the enemy field army and the collapse of Army Group South.
In operational terms, by drawing the German Army into the city of Stalingrad, they denied them the chance to practice their greater experience in mobile warfare. The Red Army was able to force its enemy to fight in a limited area, hampered by the city landscape, unable to use its mobility or firepower as effectively as in the open country. The German Sixth Army was forced to endure severe losses, which forced the OKW to strip its flanks to secure its centre. This left its poorly equipped Axis allies to defend its centre of gravity—its operational depth. When Soviet intelligence had reason to believe the Axis front was at its weakest, it would strike at the flanks and encircle the German Army (Operation Uranus). The mission of the Red Army, then, was to create a formidable barrier between the cut off German army and any relief forces. The aim of the Soviets was to allow the German army to weaken in the winter conditions and inflict attrition on any attempt by the enemy to relieve the pocket. When it was judged the enemy had weakened sufficiently, a strong offensive would finish the enemy field army off. These siege tactics would remove enemy forces to their rear.
Having practised the deep battle phase which would destroy the enemy tactical units (the enemy corps and divisions) as well as the operational instrument, in this case the Sixth Army itself, it would be ready to launch the deep operation, striking into the enemy depth on a south-west course to Rostov using Kharkov as a springboard. The occupation of the former would enable the Red Army to trap the majority of Army Group South in the Caucasus. The only escape route left, through the Kerch Peninsula and into Crimea, would be the next target. The operation would enable the Red Army to roll up the Germans' southern front, thereby achieving its strategic aim. The operation would be assisted by diversion operations in the central and northern sector to prevent the enemy from dispatching operational reserves to the threatened area in a timely fashion.
Outcome: Operation Uranus, the tactical deep battle plan, worked. However, the General Staff's deep operation plan was compromised by Joseph Stalin himself. Stalin's impatience forced Stavka into offensive action before it was ready. Logistically the Soviets were not yet prepared and the diversion operations further north were not yet ready to go into action.
Nevertheless, Stalin's orders stood. Forced into premature action, the Red Army was able to concentrate enough forces to create a narrow penetration toward Kharkov. However, it was logistically exhausted and fighting an enemy that was falling back on its rear areas. The lack of diversionary operations allowed the German Army to recognise the danger, concentrate powerful mobile forces, and dispatch sufficient reserves to Kharkov. With the Red Army's flanks exposed, the Germans easily pinched off the salient and destroyed many Soviet formations during the Third Battle of Kharkov.
The concept of the deep operation had not yet been fully understood by Stalin. However, Stalin recognised his own error, and from this point onward, stood back from military decision-making for the most part. The defeat meant the deep operation would fail to realise its strategic aim. The Third Battle of Kharkov had demonstrated the importance of diversion, or Maskirovka operations. Such diversions and deception techniques became a hallmark of Soviet offensive operations for the rest of the war.
Kursk:
Deep battle plan: The Battle of Kursk combined both the defensive and offensive side of deep battle. The nature of Soviet operations in the summer, 1943 was to gain the initiative and to hold it indefinitely. This meant achieving permanent superiority in the balance of forces, in operational procedure and maintaining initiative on the battlefield.
The Soviet plan for the defence of the city Kursk involved all three levels of warfare coherently fused together. Soviet strategy, the top end of military art, was concerned with gaining the strategic initiative which would then allow the Red Army to stage further military operations to liberate Soviet territory lost in 1941 and 1942. To do this, the Stavka decided to achieve the goal through defensive means. The bulge in the front line around Kursk made it an obvious and tempting target to the Wehrmacht. Allowing the Germans to strike first at the target area allowed the Red Army the opportunity to wear down German Army formations against pre-prepared positions, thereby shaping the force in field ratio heavily against the enemy. Once the initiative had been achieved and the enemy had been worn down, strategic reserves would be committed to finish off the remaining enemy force. The success of this strategy would allow the Red Army to pursue its enemy into the economically rich area of Ukraine and recover the industrial areas, such as Kiev, which had been lost in 1941. Moreover, Soviet strategists recognised that Ukraine offered the best route through which to reach Germany's allies, such as Romania, with its oilfields, vital to Axis military operations. The elimination of these allies or a successful advance to their borders would deny Germany military resources, or at least destabilise the Axis bloc in the Balkans.
The operational method revolved around outmanoeuvring their opponents. The nature of the bulge meant the Red Army could build strong fortifications in depth along the German axis of advance. Two rifle divisions defended the first belt, and one defended the second. A first belt division would only defend an area of 8–15 kilometres wide and 5–6 kilometres in depth. Successive defence belts would slow German forces down and force them to conduct slow and attritional battles to break through into the operational depths. Slowing the operational tempo of the enemy would also allow the Soviet intelligence analysts to keep track of German formations and their direction of advance, enabling Soviet reserve formations to be accurately positioned to prevent German spearheads breaking through each of the three main defence belts. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deep operation | The elimination of these allies or a successful advance to their borders would deny Germany military resources, or at least destabilise the Axis bloc in the Balkans.
The operational method revolved around outmanoeuvring their opponents. The nature of the bulge meant the Red Army could build strong fortifications in depth along the German axis of advance. Two rifle divisions defended the first belt, and one defended the second. A first belt division would only defend an area of 8–15 kilometres wide and 5–6 kilometres in depth. Successive defence belts would slow German forces down and force them to conduct slow and attritional battles to break through into the operational depths. Slowing the operational tempo of the enemy would also allow the Soviet intelligence analysts to keep track of German formations and their direction of advance, enabling Soviet reserve formations to be accurately positioned to prevent German spearheads breaking through each of the three main defence belts. Intelligence would also help when initiating their own offensives (Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev) once the Germans had been bogged down in Soviet defences. The overwhelming contingent of Soviet armour and mechanised divisions was given to the operational reserves for this purpose.
The tactical level relied heavily on fortified and static defences composed of infantry and artillery. Anti-tank guns were mounted throughout the entire depth of the defences. Few tanks were committed to the tactical zones and the nature of the defences would have robbed them of mobility. Instead, only a small number of tanks and self-propelled artillery were used to give the defences some mobility. They were distributed in small groups to enable localised counterattacks. Such tactics slowed the Germans, forcing them to expend strength and munitions on combating the Soviet forward zones. The Soviets had counted on the Germans being stopped within the tactical zones. To ensure that this occurred, they distributed large numbers of anti-AFV (armoured fighting vehicle) and anti-personnel mines to the defences.
Outcome: The Germans began their offensive, as predicted, on 5 July 1943, under the codename Operation Citadel. The Soviets succeeded in limiting them to a slow advance. In the north, the German 9th Army advanced south from Orel. The Germans failed to breach the main defence lines, stalling at the third belt. The German armies had been forced to commit their mobile reserves to the breakthrough. This allowed the Soviets to conduct the operational and offensive phase of their plan; Operation Kutuzov. Striking the 2nd Panzer Army, the Soviet's fresh operational forces, heavily mechanized, threatened to cut off the German 9th Army. Had they succeeded, nothing would have stood between the Red Army and the strategic depth of German Army Group Centre's front. However the Germans were able to stem the advance by committing their mobile reserves and organize a withdrawal. Still, the two German armies had been worn down, and the Soviet forces in the north had won the strategic initiative.
In the south, the Soviet plan did not work as effectively and the contingency plan had to be put into effect. The German formations succeeded in penetrating all three Soviet defence belts. This denied the Soviets the opportunity to pin them down in the tactical defence belts and release their operational reserves to engage the enemy on favourable terms. Instead, operational forces for Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev that were intended for the southern counteroffensive, were ordered to at and near Prokhorovka. This led to the Battle of Prokhorovka. While the tactical deployment and operational plan had not worked as flawlessly as it had in the north, the strategic initiative had still been won.
Other campaigns: With improved material means and tactical aptitude enabling complicated large-unit maneuvers, the following later campaigns were able to exhibit an improved application of the Deep operation doctrine:
Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive
Operation Bagration
Second Jassy-Kishinev Offensive
Vistula–Oder Offensive
Cold War:
Central Europe: The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies used their massive superiority in numbers and the idea of Deep Battle to intimidate NATO over the Inner German border. Some Western observers predicted that the Warsaw Pact could use a mixture of speed and surprise to overrun Western Europe in around 48 hours. While massive air strikes using enormous numbers of aircraft would devastate NATO infrastructure and reinforcements, VDV (airborne units), Spetsnaz ("special purpose troops", i.e. special forces) and naval infantry would clear the way for the torrent of tank and motor-rifle divisions that would soon cross the border. The forward units of these tank and motor rifle divisions would be given the task, rather unusually, of avoiding engagements with the enemy and simply to advancing as far and as fast as possible, therefore enabling a victory before any replacement aircraft and REFORGER units came to Europe from North America.
Asia: Ever since the 1960s when the Sino-Soviet alliance came to an abrupt end, the Soviet High Command considered invading China by deep battle offensive operations, envisaging a rapid drive deep towards the latter's main industrial centers before they could have a chance to mount a credible defense or even stage a counterattack. However, the extremely vast numbers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and their knowledge of the terrain, coupled with their then-recent possession of nuclear weapons, made such a drive the Soviets were to execute extremely unlikely. Although both sides nearly went to war in three separate occasions in 1968, 1969 and 1979 respectively, the Soviets were rather hesitant to go to war and invade China, thanks to the fact that both possessed huge armed forces and nuclear weapons at their disposal.
21st century: In the spring of 1999 came the crisis in Kosovo and NATO’s Operation Allied Force as a result of R2P doctrine. The combat operations featured no land warfare, and therefore no front line can be said to have existed. The air war over Serbia was a "deep battle" as Air Force bombed strategic targets and fielded forces. Army Major General Robert H. Scales came to the conclusion that the US needed "strategic pre-emption", defined as the "use of airpower to delay the enemy long enough for early arriving ground forces to position themselves between the enemy and his initial operational objectives."
Major proponents: Mikhail Tukhachevsky
Vladimir Triandafillov
Georgii Isserson
Nikolai Efimovich Varfolomeev
Georgy Zhukov
See also: Operational art
Tank Corps (Soviet)
Mechanized Corps (Soviet)
Blitzkrieg
References:
Citations:
Bibliography: Glantz, David M., Col (rtd.) Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991a. ISBN 0-7146-4077-8.
Glantz, David M. (1991b). The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: Spearhead of the Offensive (1. publ. ed.). London u.a.: Cass. ISBN 0-7146-3373-9.
Grant, Rebecca (1 June 2001). "Deep Strife". Air & Space Forces Magazine.
Habeck, Mary. Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939. Cornell University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8014-4074-2
Harrison, Richard W. The Russian Way of War: Operational Art 1904–1940. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001. ISBN 0-7006-1074-X
Krause, Michael and Phillips, Cody. Historical Perspectives of Operational Art. Center of Military History, United States Army. 2006. ISBN 978-0-16-072564-7
Naveh, Shimon (1997). In Pursuit of Military Excellence; The Evolution of Operational Theory. London: Francass. ISBN 0-7146-4727-6.
Simpkin, Richard. Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevsky. London; Washington: Brassey's Defence, 1987. ISBN 0-08-031193-8.
Watt, Robert. Feeling the Full Force of a Four Point Offensive: Re-Interpreting The Red Army's 1944 Belorussian and L'vov-Przemyśl Operations. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. ISSN 1351-8046
External links: Blythe, Wilson C. Jr. “The Conduct of War: Reemergence of Russian Military Strength Warrants Study of Soviet Operational Theory in the Interwar Era”, in The Officer (Winter 2015), accessible online at: https://www.academia.edu/31966162/The_Conduct_of_War_Re_emergence_of_Russian_Military_Strength_Warrants_Study_of_Soviet_Operational_Theory_in_the_Interwar_Era
The Evolution of Operational Art by Georgii Isseson, 1936 – PDF, available on United States Army Combined Arms Center's website
"Georgii Isserson: Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II": Video on YouTube, a lecture by Dr. Richard Harrison, via the official channel of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Defeat in detail | Use: In military strategy and tactics, a recurring theme is that units are strengthened by proximity to supporting units. Nearby units can fire on an attacker's flank, lend indirect fire support such as artillery, or maneuver to counterattack. Defeat in detail is the tactic of exploiting failures of an enemy force to coordinate and support the various smaller units that make up the force. An overwhelming attack on one defending subunit minimizes casualties on the attacking side and can be repeated a number of times against the defending subunits until all are eliminated.
An attacker can successfully conduct the tactic of defeat in detail by exploiting the absolute weaknesses or comparative disadvantages in the deployment or structure of defending troops, as well as advantages such as maneuvering speed that the defender cannot match. In an asymmetric support structure, A can support B, but unit B cannot support unit A. For example, during World War I, when horse cavalry was still in use to some extent, aircraft could support cavalry, but cavalry had little or no ability to support aircraft.
Thus, if a unit is equally suited for use against cavalry and aircraft, using it to eliminate enemy aircraft would have benefits that would last well into future engagements against enemy cavalry units weakened by their lack of support. However, using it against enemy cavalry, while leaving the enemy aircraft intact for subsequent engagements, would bring benefits only during that specific engagement.
Weaknesses of defenders: Dug-in units that are spread out over so wide a distance that the maximum effective range of their weapons is significantly shorter than the distance between units, which prevents those units from supporting the flanks of neighboring units.
Defending units on opposite sides of physical barriers such as hills, forests or rivers (but see the "reverse slope defence", now rendered obsolete by crewed and uncrewed aircraft, for a historically attested deliberate tactic).
Defending units whose artillery support is too far to the rear and so cannot effectively engage attackers.
Defending units that have no effective communications with their command structure and so cannot request assistance.
Enabling methods: The following methods can enable the attacker to defeat the enemy in detail:
Attacking one unit faster than other defending units can move to counter-attack.
Attacking faster than the defending intelligence, communications, command or control systems can respond (exploiting the OODA loop).
Disabling or disrupting systems required for one defending unit to support another (as by attacking communications, command, or control systems with air strikes, artillery attacks, or radio jamming).
Examples:
Strategic campaigns: 1796–1797: Napoleon Bonaparte's first campaign in Italy during the French Revolution, in which the French army of 37,000 men defeated 52,000 Piedmontese and Habsburg troops by rapid advances, which prevented the two nations' armies from combining.
10–15 February 1814: the Six Days' Campaign was a final series of victories by the forces of Napoleon, as the Sixth Coalition armies closed in on Paris.
1862: Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign, in which Jackson defeated three Union commands (a total of 60,000 men) with his own command (of 17,000 men), by fighting each of the enemy columns in turn while the Union commands were separated from each other by impassable terrain or a significant distance.
1912–1913: The Balkan League's victory over the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War.
1914: The Battle of Tannenberg and the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes, with the Germans exploiting the geography of the Masurian Lakes and the personal antipathy between the Russian commanders to defeat the Russian Second Army and later the Russian First Army.
1941: Operation Compass, when the British defeated an Italian force more than four times larger in North Africa by exploiting the fact that the Italian defenses could not support each other.
Tactical examples: The Battle of Gaugamela, in which Alexander the Great used his Companion Cavalry to charge Darius III
Gallic tribes tried and nearly succeeded in defeating Julius Caesar's army in detail at the Battle of the Sabis.
In the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, an army of Germans under Arminius exterminated Legio XVII, Legio XVIII and Legio XIX, Roman legions under Publius Quinctilius Varus.
The Battle of Sluys, a naval battle fought on 24 June 1340 between England and France.
The Battle of Pavia (1525), during the Italian War of 1521-1526
The Battle of Pratapgarh in which Shivaji defeated the army of Afzal Khan
The Battle of the Little Bighorn (1876), in which George Armstrong Custer essentially orchestrated his own defeat by dividing his regiment in four portions, allowing the Sioux and Cheyenne to annihilate half of the 7th Cavalry
The Battle of Raate Road, in Finland (1940)
The Battle of Savo Island, a naval battle fought on 8-9 August 1942 in which Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa of the Imperial Japanese Navy was able to defeat Allied naval forces in detail, with only light damage to his own.
See also: Horatii
Big Wing
Strategy of the central position
Battle of annihilation
Swarming (military)
Lanchester's laws
Battle of Cold Harbor
References:
Bay, Austin (December 31, 2002). "Can the U.S. Handle both Korea and Iraq?". StrategyPage. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Defence in depth | Strategy: A conventional defence strategy would concentrate all military resources at a front line, which, if breached by an attacker, would leave the remaining defenders in danger of being outflanked and surrounded and would leave supply lines, communications, and command vulnerable.
Defence in depth requires that a defender deploy their resources, such as fortifications, field works and military units at and well behind the front line. Although attackers may find it easier to breach the more weakly defended front line, as they advance, they continue to meet resistance. As they penetrate deeper, their flanks become vulnerable, and, should the advance stall, they risk being enveloped.
The defence in depth strategy is particularly effective against attackers who are able to concentrate their forces and attack a small number of places on an extended defensive line.
Defenders that can fall back to a succession of prepared positions can extract a high price from the advancing enemy while themselves avoiding the danger of being overrun or outflanked. Delaying the enemy advance mitigates the attacker's advantage of surprise and allows time to move defending units to make a defence and to prepare a counter-attack.
A well-planned defence in depth strategy will deploy forces in mutually supportive positions and in appropriate roles. For example, poorly trained troops may be deployed in static defences at the front line, whereas better trained and equipped troops form a mobile reserve. Successive layers of defence may use different technologies against various targets; for example, dragon's teeth might present a challenge for tanks but is easily circumvented by infantry, while another barrier of wire entanglements has the opposite effects on the respective forces. Defence in depth may allow a defender to maximise the defensive possibilities of natural terrain and other advantages.
The disadvantages of defence in depth are that it may be unacceptable for a defender to plan to give ground to an attacker. This may be because vital military or economic resources are close to the front line or because yielding to an enemy is unacceptable for political or cultural reasons. In addition, the continuous retreats that are required by defence in depth require the defender to have a high degree of mobility in order to retreat successfully, and they assume that the defender's morale will recover from the retreat.
Examples: A possible early example of this came at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, when Hannibal employed this manoeuvre in order to encircle and destroy eight Roman legions, but that is disputed by some historians.
Edward Luttwak used the term to describe his theory of the defensive strategy employed by the Late Roman army in the 3rd and 4th centuries AD.
Later examples of defence in depth might be European hill forts and the development of concentric castles. These castles utilized many layers, including ditches, outer walls, towers, inner walls, and a keep, with some layers like the outer ditch intended to only slow attackers and reduce their coordination. In those examples, the inner layers of defence can support the outer layers with projectile fire and an attacker must breach each line of defence in turn with the prospect of significant losses, and the defenders have the option of falling back to fight again. On a strategic level, defence in depth was employed by the Byzantine military.
In the American Revolutionary War's Battle of Cowpens, the American forces were positioned in three lines which soaked up the shock of the British charge and inflicted heavy casualties before the Americans were able to overrun the British who, at this point, had lost their cohesion.
More recent examples of defence in depth include the multiple lines of trenches of the First World War and the following Turkish War of Independence where the Turks stopped the advance of the Greeks towards Ankara. Also plans for the defence of Britain against a potential German invasion in the Second World War. During the Battle of Normandy, Wehrmacht forces utilized the bocage of the area, flooding of fields, and strategic placement of defences to create successive lines of defences to slow the attacking Allies in hopes that reinforcements would arrive.
The Pacific Theatre also had many examples of defence in depth, with the Japanese inflicting heavy casualties on the Americans in the Battles of Tarawa, Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.
The best modern example of a successful defence in depth is that of the Battle of Kursk. During the battle, the Red Army deliberately drew the Germans into an attritional battle in multiple, well-prepared defensive lines, before launching massive counter-attacks on either side of the 9th Army in the north and the 4th Panzer Army in the south. The initial German offensive never fully penetrated the Red Army lines. By contrast, the subsequent Red Army counter-offensive pushed the front line hundreds of miles westwards.
Colonel Francis J. Kelly discussed the employment of defence in depth in Army Special Forces camps during the Vietnam War. Kelly, a former U.S. Army Special Forces commander and author of Vietnam Studies U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971, stated in his work that the austere Special Forces fighting camps were highly functional and easily defended.
While untested, this was also the planned NATO strategy in Europe during the Cold War at the Fulda Gap. However, by the 1980s, West Germany eventually pressured NATO to abandon this orthodox doctrine as it would have entailed allowing the country to be overrun by Warsaw Pact forces before they would be finally stopped. Instead, NATO agreed to an alternative doctrine of "Forward defence," which was criticized for not only being militarily senseless that would have quickly forced NATO to resort to tactical nuclear weapons when Warsaw Pact broke through with their considerable conventional forces, but also that enemy considered the doctrine so provocative and potentially aggressive that striking first seemed a viable option as a result.
Application to other fields: The concept of defence-in-depth (DiD) is also applied in the fields of life-threatening technologies where it is critical to avoid a disaster, or to save lives.
The safety of nuclear reactors and radioactive waste repositories also fundamentally relies on multiple systems and redundant barriers. The principle of redundancy is essential to prevent the occurrence of dramatic failures and in case where a failure would develop to retard the progression of a potentially disastrous event and to give extra time for taking again the control of the failed system. Ultimately, if a failure cannot be avoided, DiD also contributes to mitigate the consequences and to attenuate the negative impacts of the failure.
Defence-in-depth is required to guarantee the robustness of vital systems, e.g. in nuclear technologies and for aerospace systems where safety is critical. The DiD approach can be applied to any sensitive technology: submarines and naval systems, biotechnology, pharmaceutic industry, informatics, bank and financial systems, etc.
In nature, the immune system of most evolved organisms also appeals to multiple lines of defence in case a pathogen would defeat the first line of defence of cells, tissues and organs.
The robustness of the scientific method also relies on multiple lines of evidence and multiple lines of reasoning: strong claims require strong and multiple evidence. The repeatability and the reproducibility of experimental and calculations results are essential to guarantee their robustness and correctness. This associated with the scientific questioning and a constant interrogative attitude is at the core of the self-correcting process guiding the science.
Academics from Oxford University's Future of Humanity Institute also applied the concept of defence in depth to designing strategies for the prevention of existential catastrophes, especially those involving human extinction.
See also: Bandwagoning
Culminating point
Deep operation
Defence in depth (non-military)
Defense in depth (nuclear engineering)
Defence-in-depth (Roman military)
Hedgehog defence
List of military tactics
Loss of Strength Gradient
Scorched earth
Strategic depth
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Defense ministry | Current ministries by country:
Historical: Department of Defence (1901–21) (Australia)
Department of Defence (1921–39) (Australia)
Department of Defence Co-ordination (Australia, 1939–1942)
Department of Defence Production (Australia, 1951–1958)
Department of Defence Support (Australia, 1982–1984)
Ministry of Defence (Artsakh) (1995–2023)
Ministry of Defence (Czechoslovakia) (1918–1992)
Ministry of National Defence (East Germany) (1956–1990)
Ministry of Defence (Republika Srpska) (1992–2005)
Ministry of Defense (Soviet Union) (1953–1992)
Ministry of Defence (1947–1964) (United Kingdom)
Lists: List of current defence ministers
See also: Chief of defence
Commander-in-chief
War cabinet
Secretariat of National Defense (Mexico)
Ministry of War
Defence diplomacy, refers to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives through the peaceful employment of defence resources and capabilities
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Defensive fighting position | Terminology: Tobruk type positions are named after the system of defensive positions constructed, initially, by the Italian Army at Tobruk, Libya. After Tobruk fell to the Allies in January 1941, the existing positions were modified and significantly expanded by the Australian Army which, along with other Allied forces, reused them in the Siege of Tobruk.
A foxhole is one type of defensive strategic position. It is a "small pit used for cover, usually for one or two personnel, and so constructed that the occupants can effectively fire from it".
It is known more commonly within United States Army slang as a "fighting position" or as a "ranger grave". It is known as a "fighting hole" in the United States Marine Corps, a "gun-pit" in Australian Army terminology, and a "fighting pit" in the New Zealand Army.
In British and Canadian military argot it equates to a range of terms including slit trench, or fire trench (a trench deep enough for a soldier to stand in), a sangar (sandbagged fire position above ground) or shell scrape (a shallow depression that affords protection in the prone position), or simply—but less accurately—as a "trench".
During the American Civil War the term "rifle pit" was recognized by both U.S. Army and Confederate Army forces.
A protected emplacement or concealed post in which one or several machine guns are set up is known in U.S. English as a machine gun nest.
History: During the fighting in North Africa (1942–43), U.S. forces employed the shell scrape. This was a very shallow excavation allowing one soldier to lie horizontally while shielding his body from nearby shell bursts and small arms fire. The shell scrape soon proved inadequate in this role, as the few inches of dirt above the soldier's body could often be penetrated by bullets or shell fragments. It also exposed the user to assault by enemy tanks, which could crush a soldier inside a shallow shell scrape by driving into it, then making a simple half-turn.
After the Battle of Kasserine Pass (early 1943), U.S. troops increasingly adopted the modern foxhole, a vertical, bottle-shaped hole that allowed a soldier to stand and fight with head and shoulders exposed. The foxhole widened near the bottom to allow a soldier to crouch down while under intense artillery fire or tank attack. Foxholes could be enlarged to two-soldier fighting positions, as well as excavated with firing steps for crew-served weapons or sumps for water drainage or live enemy grenade disposal.
Tobruks: The Germans used hardened fortifications in North Africa and later in other fortifications, such as the Atlantic Wall, that were in essence foxholes made from concrete. The Germans knew them officially as Ringstände; the Allies called them "Tobruks" because they had first encountered the structures during the fighting in Africa.
Frequently, the Germans put a turret from an obsolete French or German tank on the foxhole. This gave the Tobruk enhanced firepower and the gunner protection from shrapnel and small arms.
Modern designs: Modern militaries publish and distribute elaborate field manuals for the proper construction of DFPs in stages. Initially, a shallow "shell scrape" is dug, often called a ranger grave, which provides very limited protection. Each stage develops the fighting position, gradually increasing its effectiveness, while always maintaining functionality. In this way, a soldier can improve the position over time, while being able to stop at any time and use the position in a fight.
Typically, a DFP is a pit or trench dug deep enough to stand in, with only the head exposed, and a small step at the bottom, called a fire step, that allows the soldier to crouch on to avoid fire and tank treads. The fire step usually slopes down into a deeper narrow slit called a grenade sump at the bottom to allow for live grenades to be kicked in to minimize damage from grenade fragments.
When possible, DFPs are revetted with corrugated iron, star pickets and wire or local substitutes. Ideally, the revetting will also be dug in below ground level so as to minimise damage from fire and tank tracks. The revetting helps the DFP resist cave-in from near misses from artillery or mortars and tank tracks.
Time permitting, DFPs can be enlarged to allow a machine gun crew and ammunition to be protected, as well as additional overhead cover via timbers.
In training, DFPs are usually dug by hand or in some cases by mechanical trench diggers. On operations, explosives, especially shaped charges ("beehives"), may be used to increase the speed of development.
Developing and maintaining DFPs is a constant and ongoing task for soldiers deployed in combat areas. For this reason, in some armies, infantry soldiers are referred to as "gravel technicians", as they spend so much time digging.
Because of the large expenditure in effort and materials required to build a DFP, it is important to ensure that the DFP is correctly sited. In order to site the DFP, the officer in charge ("OIC") should view the ground from the same level that the intended user's weapons will be sighted from. Normally, the OIC will need to lie on his belly to obtain the required perspective. This ensures that the position will be able to cover the desired sector.
See also: Pillbox (military)
Sangar
Spider hole
Shell scrape
Tett turret
Trench warfare
All-around defense/Perimeter defense
Entrenching tool
Notes:
References: Westrate, Edwin V. (1944). Forward Observer. New York City: Stratford Press.
External links:
U.S. WWII Newsmap, "Foxholes are Life Savers", hosted by the UNT Libraries Digital Collections |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Desert warfare | Properties and tactics: The barrenness of the desert makes the capture of key cities essential to ensure the ability to maintain control over important resources, primarily clean water, and being able to keep a military well supplied. As such, that makes sieges in conventional warfare more frequent, as the defender often prepares entrenched positions to protect the cities that supply them.
Camouflage and cover: Many deserts have limited numbers of noticeable landmarks, which can make maneuvering through a desert difficult in terms of navigation and logistics. A lack of structures and objects can also make effective use of camouflage, cover, and concealment difficult.
Mobility: Mobility is essential to a successful desert war, which explains the heavy use of armor in battles such as in the First and Second Battle of El Alamein during the North African campaign of World War II. It has been noted that mobility is so important in desert warfare that battles can sometimes begin to resemble naval engagements, since the actual possession of territory is less important than the positions of one's tanks (or ships).
Unlike other types of terrain, which depend on roads, movement in deserts is often possible in all directions because of the wide open spaces. However, the resource-scarce desert environment means that availability of supplies can greatly constrict movement. Militaries often make use of cavalry to cross the large expanses of a harsh desert without increasing the exertion of the soldiers, who are already at a higher risk of dehydration because of the high temperatures during the day.
There are many enemies to the desert fighter. They include aircraft and tanks, which can be extremely menacing to desert guerrillas because there is little way to equal such force. Additionally, there are few places to hide from such weapons in the desert environment since there are few obstructions.
Another problem is the sand dunes, which can greatly affect mobility. With no firm and stable ground footing, it is easy to slide down or even get buried.
Water scarcity: Lack of water and extreme heat can also cause complications in engaging in desert warfare. Military personnel consume much higher quantities of water in the desert from perspiration and so troop movements are often limited by water carrying capacity. The scarcity of water may lead to bases moving from one position to another to look for a water source.
Harassing supply lines: In the context of guerilla warfare, the wide expanses of deserts can make it more difficult for large forces to defend their supply lines. Guerilla forces can use ambushes to their advantage and make their adversary deploy forces to protect railways or other infrastructure at great cost. That tactic was successfully used by T.E. Lawrence during the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire.
Health effects:
Body temperature: In desert warfare, an individual's body temperature can reach unusual highs causing fever-like weakness and dehydration.
Dehydration: An individual may have to face conditions of dehydration in desert warfare because of the lack of edible fluids and clean water.
Fatigue: Fatigue and bodily stress caused by the heat can cause very serious discomfort.
Glare: Sunlight can irritate eyesight or reduce visibility.
Examples:
Battles: Hajj caravan raid (924)
Hajj caravan raid (1757)
Battle of the Pyramids (1798)
Battle of Omdurman (1898)
Battle of El-Moungar (1903)
Battle of Beersheba (1917)
Battle of Gazala (1942)
First Battle of El Alamein (1942)
Second Battle of El Alamein (1942)
Battle of Asal Uttar (1965)
Battle of Longewala (1971)
Wars: Muslim–Quraysh War (624–630)
Saadian invasion of the Songhai Empire (1590–1599)
Char Bouba war (1644–1674)
French campaign in Egypt and Syria (1798–1801)
Ottoman–Saudi War (1811–1818)
War of the Pacific in the Atacama Desert (1879–1884)
Anglo-Somali War (1900–1920)
Middle Eastern theatre of World War I (1914–1918)
Military operations in North Africa during World War I (1914–1918)
Second Italo-Senussi War (1923–1932)
Middle Eastern and North African theatres of World War II (1939–1945)
Sand War (1963)
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Six-Day War (1967)
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
Yom Kippur War (1973)
Western Sahara War (1973–1991)
Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)
Chadian–Libyan War (1978–1987)
Gulf War (1990–1991)
Iraq War (2003–2011)
2011 Libyan civil war (2011)
Tuareg rebellion (2012)
War in Iraq (2013-2017)
Current conflicts: Somali Civil War (1991–present)
Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002–present)
Syrian Civil War (2011–present)
Mali War (2012–present)
Nomadic conflict
References:
Further reading: Information site on Desert warfare, Iraq war
Desert warfare: German experiences in WWII - Combined arms Research library |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Desertion | Desertion versus absence without leave: In the United States Army, United States Air Force, British Armed Forces, Australian Defence Force, New Zealand Defence Force, Singapore Armed Forces and Canadian Armed Forces, military personnel will become AWOL if absent from their post without a valid pass, liberty or leave. The United States Marine Corps, United States Navy, and United States Coast Guard generally refer to this as unauthorized absence. Personnel are dropped from their unit rolls after thirty days and then listed as deserters; however, as a matter of U.S. military law, desertion is not measured by time away from the unit, but rather:
by leaving or remaining absent from their unit, organization, or place of duty, where there has been a determined intent to not return;
if that intent is determined to be to avoid hazardous duty or shirk contractual obligation;
if they enlist or accept an appointment in the same or another branch of service without disclosing the fact that they have not been properly separated from current service.
People who are away for more than thirty days but return voluntarily or indicate a credible intent to return may still be considered AWOL. Those who are away for fewer than thirty days but can credibly be shown to have no intent to return (for example, by joining the armed forces of another country) may nevertheless be tried for desertion. On rare occasions, they may be tried for treason if enough evidence is found.
There are similar concepts to desertion. Missing movement occurs when a member of the armed forces fails to arrive at the appointed time and place to deploy (or "move out") with their assigned unit, ship, or aircraft. In the United States Armed Forces, this is a violation of the Article 87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The offense is similar to absence without leave but may draw more severe punishment.
Failure to repair consists of missing a formation or failing to appear at an assigned place and time when so ordered. It is a lesser offense within Article 86 of the UCMJ.
An additional duty status code — absent-unknown, or AUN — was established by the U.S. military in 2020 to prompt unit actions and police investigations during the first 48 hours that a service member is missing.
By country:
Australia: During the First World War, the Australian Government refused to allow members of the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF) to be executed for desertion, despite pressure from the British Government and military to do so. The AIF had the highest rate of soldiers going absent without leave of any of the national contingents in the British Expeditionary Force, and the proportion of soldiers who deserted was also higher than that of other forces on the Western Front in France.
Austria: In 2011, Vienna decided to honour Austrian Wehrmacht deserters. On 24 October 2014, a Memorial for the Victims of Nazi Military Justice was inaugurated on Vienna's Ballhausplatz by Austria's President Heinz Fischer. The monument was created by German artist Olaf Nicolai and is located opposite the President's office and the Austrian Chancellery. The inscription on top of the three step sculpture features a poem by Scottish poet Ian Hamilton Finlay (1924–2006) with just two words: all alone.
Colombia: In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish: FARC) insurgency were highly affected by desertion during the armed conflict with the Military Forces of Colombia. The Colombian Ministry of Defense reported 19,504 deserters from the FARC between August 2002 and their collective demobilization in 2017, despite potentially severe punishment, including execution, for attempted desertion in the FARC. Organizational decline contributed to FARC's high desertion rate which peaked in the year 2008. A later stalemate between the FARC and government forces gave rise to the Colombian peace process.
France: Many individuals who were conscripted by the French First Republic during the French Revolutionary Wars deserted. There were rough estimates to the number of individuals that deserted during the time of the Levée en masse, but due to many factors, like the inability to manage and keep track of all the armies or differentiating between men with similar names, the exact number is unclear. In 1800, the Minister of War (Carnot) reported that there were 175,000 deserters based on the number of individuals that sought the benefits following the amnesty put in place.
From 1914 to 1918 between 600 and 650 French soldiers were executed for desertion. In 2013, a report for the French Ministry of Veteran Affairs recommended that they be pardoned.
Conversely, France considered as highly praiseworthy the act of citizens of Alsace-Lorraine who during WWI deserted from the German army. After the war it was decided to award all such deserters the Escapees' Medal (French: Médaille des Évadés).
Germany: During the First World War, only 18 Germans who deserted were executed. However, the Germans executed 15,000 men who deserted from the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. In June 1988 the Initiative for the Creation of a Memorial to Deserters who deserted the Wehrmacht came to life in Ulm.
Ireland: Ireland was neutral during the Second World War; the Irish Army expanded to 40,000 men, but they had little to do once it became clear in 1942 that invasion (either by Nazi Germany or by the British Empire) was unlikely. Soldiers were put to work cutting trees and peat; morale was low and pay was bad. Of the 60,000 men who passed through the army in 1940–45, about 7,000 men deserted, about half of them deciding to fight on the Allied side, most joining the British Army.
Once the war was over, the EPO 362 order meant deserters were allowed to return to Ireland; they were not imprisoned, but lost rights to an army pension and could not work for the state or claim unemployment benefits for seven years. They were also seen as traitors by some Irish people in their homes.
Decades after, the morality of their actions was debated; on the one hand, they had illegally abandoned their country's armed forces at a time when it was threatened with invasion — indeed, it was argued that their acts were treasonous at a time when Britain may have been planning to seize control of Ireland's ports (see Plan W); on the other hand, they chose to leave a safe if tedious posting in order to risk their lives fighting against fascism, and many were motivated by genuine idealism.
In 2012, the Minister for Justice and Equality Alan Shatter issued a pardon and amnesty to all World War II-era deserters from the Irish Defence Forces.
New Zealand: During the First World War 28 New Zealand soldiers were sentenced to death for desertion; of these, five were executed. These soldiers were posthumously pardoned in 2000 through the Pardon for Soldiers of the Great War Act. Those who deserted before reaching the front were imprisoned in what were claimed to be harsh conditions.
Russia: During the 2022 Russian mobilization, the Putin-controlled State Duma of Russia adopted amendments to include the concepts of mobilization, martial law and wartime in the Criminal Code, and introduced several articles related to military operations. Desertion during a period of mobilization or wartime will be punished by up to 10 years in jail. In December 2022, Kazakhstan deported back to Russia a Russian officer who was trying to avoid the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Soviet Union:
Russian Civil War: In 1919, 616 "hardcore" deserters of the total 837,000 draft dodgers and deserters were executed following People's Commissar Leon Trotsky's draconian measures. According to Figes, "a majority of deserters (most registered as "weak-willed") were handed back to the military authorities, and formed into units for transfer to one of the rear armies or directly to the front". Even those registered as "malicious" deserters were returned to the ranks when the demand for reinforcements became desperate". Forges also noted that the Red Army instituted amnesty weeks to prohibit punitive measures against desertion which encouraged the voluntary return of 98,000-132,000 deserters to the army.
World War II: Order No. 270, dated 16 August 1941, was issued by Joseph Stalin. The order required superiors to shoot deserters on the spot. Their family members were subjected to arrest. Order No. 227, dated 28 July 1942, directed that each Army must create "blocking detachments" (barrier troops) which would shoot "cowards" and fleeing panicked troops at the rear. Over the course of the war, the Soviets executed 158,000 troops for desertion.
Soviet–Afghan War: Many Soviet soldier deserters of the Soviet–Afghan War explain their reasons for desertion as political and in response to internal disorganization and disillusionment regarding their position in the war. Analyses of desertion rates argue that motivations were far less ideological than individual accounts claim. Desertion rates increased prior to announcements of upcoming operations, and were highest during the summer and winter. Seasonal desertions were probably a response to the harsh weather conditions of the winter and immense field work required in the summer. A significant jump in desertion in 1989 when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan may suggest a higher concern regarding returning home, rather than an overall opposition towards the war itself. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Desertion | Over the course of the war, the Soviets executed 158,000 troops for desertion.
Soviet–Afghan War: Many Soviet soldier deserters of the Soviet–Afghan War explain their reasons for desertion as political and in response to internal disorganization and disillusionment regarding their position in the war. Analyses of desertion rates argue that motivations were far less ideological than individual accounts claim. Desertion rates increased prior to announcements of upcoming operations, and were highest during the summer and winter. Seasonal desertions were probably a response to the harsh weather conditions of the winter and immense field work required in the summer. A significant jump in desertion in 1989 when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan may suggest a higher concern regarding returning home, rather than an overall opposition towards the war itself.
Inter-ethnic explanation for desertion: In the beginning of the Soviet invasion, the majority of Soviet forces were soldiers of Central Asian republics. The Soviets believed that shared ideologies between Muslim Central Asians and Afghan soldiers would build trust and morale within the army. However, Central Asians' longstanding historical frustrations with Moscow degraded soldiers' willingness to fight for the Red Army. As Afghan desertion grew and Soviet opposition was strengthened within Afghanistan, the Soviet plan overtly backfired.
The personal histories of Central Asian ethnic groups – especially between Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, caused tension within the Soviet military. Non-Russian ethnic groups easily related the situation in Afghanistan to Communist takeover of their own states' forced induction into the USSR. Ethnic Russians suspected Central Asians of opposition, and fighting within the army was prevalent.
Upon entering Afghanistan, many Central Asians were exposed to the Qur’an for the first time uninfluenced by Soviet propagandist versions, and felt a stronger connection towards the opposition than their own comrades. The highest rates of desertion were found among border troops, ranging from 60 to 80% during the first year of the Soviet invasion. In these areas, strong ethnic clashes and cultural factors influenced desertion.
As Afghan soldiers continued to desert the Soviet army, a united Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan began to form. Moderates and fundamentalists banded together to oppose Soviet intervention. The Islamic ideology solidified a strong base of opposition by January 1980, overriding ethnic, tribal, geographic and economic differences among Afghans willing to fight the Soviet invasion, which attracted Central Asian deserters. By March 1980, the Soviet army made an executive decision to replace Central Asian troops with the European sectors of the USSR to avoid further religious and ethnic complications, drastically reducing Soviet forces.
Soviet disillusionment upon entering the war: Soviet soldiers entered the war under the impression that their roles were primarily related to the organization of Afghan forces and society. Soviet media portrayed the Soviet intervention as a necessary means of protecting the Communist uprising from outside opposition. Propaganda declared that Soviets were providing aid to villagers and improving Afghanistan by planting trees, improving public buildings and "generally acting as good neighbors". Upon entering Afghanistan, Soviet soldiers became immediately aware of the falsity of the reported situation.
In major cities, Afghan youth that originally supported the leftist movement soon turned to Soviet oppositional forces for patriotic and religious reasons. The opposition built resistance in cities, calling Soviet soldiers infidels that were forcing an imperialist Communist invasive government on Afghanistan's people. As Afghan troops continued to abandon the Soviet army to support the mujahideen, they became anti-Russian and antigovernment. Opposition forces emphasized the Soviets' atheism, demanding support for the Muslim faith from civilians. The hostility shown towards soldiers, who entered the war believing their assistance was requested, grew defensive. The opposition circulated pamphlets within Soviet camps stationed in cities, calling for Afghan freedom from the aggressive Communist influence and a right to establish their own government.
The native Afghan army fell from 90,000 to 30,000 by mid-1980, forcing Soviets into more extreme combative positions. The mujahideen's widespread presence among Afghan civilians in rural regions made it difficult for Soviet soldiers to distinguish between the civilians they believed they were fighting for and the official opposition. Soldiers who had entered the war with idealistic viewpoints of their roles were quickly disillusioned.
Problems in Soviet army structure and living standards: The structure of the Soviet army, in comparison to the mujahideen, set the Soviets at a serious fighting disadvantage. While the mujahideen structure was based on kinship and social cohesion, the Soviet army was bureaucratic. Because of this, mujahideen could significantly weaken the Soviet army by the elimination of a field commander or officer. Resistance forces were locally based, more ready to address and mobilize the Afghan population for support. The Soviet army was centrally organized; its regime structure emphasized rank and position, paying less attention to the well-being and effectiveness of its army.
The initial Soviet plan relied on Afghan troops' support in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan. The majority of the Afghan army support crumbled easily as forces lacked strong ideological support for Communism from the beginning.
The Afghan army, comprising 100,000 men before 1978, was reduced to 15,000 within the first year of the Soviet invasion. Of the Afghan troops that remained, many were considered untrustworthy to Soviet troops. Afghans that deserted often took artillery with them, supplying the mujahideen. Soviet troops, to fill Afghan soldiers' place, were pushed into mountainous tribal regions of the East. Soviet tanks and modern warfare was ineffective in the rural, mountainous regions of Afghanistan. Mujahideen tactics of ambush prevented Soviets from developing successful counterattacks.
In 1980, the Soviet army began to rely on smaller and more cohesive units, a response to mirror mujahideen tactics. A decrease in unit size, while solving organizational issues, promoted field leaders to head more violent and aggressive missions, promoting Soviet desertion. Often, small forces would engage in rapes, looting, and general violence beyond what higher ranks ordered, increasing negative sanctions in undesirable locations.
Within the Soviet army, serious drug and alcohol problems significantly reduced the effectiveness of soldiers. Resources became further depleted as soldiers pushed into the mountains; drugs were rampantly abused and available, often supplied by Afghans. Supplies of heating fuel, wood, and food ran low at bases. Soviet soldiers often resorted to trading weapons and ammunition in exchange for drugs or food. As morale decreased and infections of hepatitis and typhus spread, soldiers became further disheartened.
Soviet deserters to the mujahideen: Interviews with Soviet soldier deserters confirm that much of Soviet desertion was in response to widespread Afghan opposition rather than personal aggravation towards the Soviet army. Armed with modern artillery against ill-equipped villagers, Soviet soldiers developed a sense of guilt for the widespread killing of innocent civilians and their unfair artillery advantage. Soviet deserters found support and acceptance within Afghan villages. After entering the mujahideen, many deserters came to recognize the falsity of Soviet propaganda from the beginning. Unable to legitimize the unnecessary killing and mistreatment of the Afghan people, many deserters could not face returning home and justifying their own actions and the unnecessary deaths of comrades. Upon deserting to the mujahideen, soldiers immersed themselves into Afghan culture. Hoping to rectify their position as the enemy, deserters learned the Afghan language and converted to Islam.
United Kingdom: Historically, one who was paid to enlist and then deserted could be arrested under a type of writ known as arrestando ipsum qui pecuniam recepit, or "For arresting one who received money".
Napoleonic Wars: During the Napoleonic Wars desertion was a massive drain on British army resources, despite the threat of court martial and the possibility of capital punishment for the crime. Many deserters were harboured by citizens who were sympathetic to them.
First World War: "306 British and Commonwealth soldiers were executed for...desertion during World War I," records the Shot at Dawn Memorial. Of these, 25 were Canadian, 22 Irishmen and five New Zealanders.
"During the period between August 1914 and March 1920 more than 20,000 servicemen were convicted by courts-martial of offences which carried the death sentence. Only 3,000 of those men were ordered to be put to death and of those just over 10% were executed."
Second World War: Throughout the Second World War, almost 100,000 British and Commonwealth troops deserted from the armed forces. Capital punishment for desertion was abolished in 1930 so most were imprisoned.
Iraq War: On 28 May 2006, the UK military reported over 1,000 absent without leave since the beginning of the Iraq War, with 566 missing from 2005 and that part of 2006. The Ministry of Defence said that levels of absence were fairly constant and "only one person has been found guilty of deserting the Army since 1989". |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Desertion | "During the period between August 1914 and March 1920 more than 20,000 servicemen were convicted by courts-martial of offences which carried the death sentence. Only 3,000 of those men were ordered to be put to death and of those just over 10% were executed."
Second World War: Throughout the Second World War, almost 100,000 British and Commonwealth troops deserted from the armed forces. Capital punishment for desertion was abolished in 1930 so most were imprisoned.
Iraq War: On 28 May 2006, the UK military reported over 1,000 absent without leave since the beginning of the Iraq War, with 566 missing from 2005 and that part of 2006. The Ministry of Defence said that levels of absence were fairly constant and "only one person has been found guilty of deserting the Army since 1989".
United States:
Legal definition: According to the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice, desertion is defined as:
(a) Any member of the armed forces who–
(1) without authority goes or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to remain away therefrom permanently;
(2) quits his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service; or
(3) without being regularly separated from one of the armed forces enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another one of the armed forces without fully disclosing the fact that he has not been regularly separated, or enters any foreign armed service except when authorized by the United States; is guilty of desertion.
(b) Any commissioned officer of the armed forces who, after tender of his resignation and before notice of its acceptance, quits his post or proper duties without leave and with intent to remain away therefrom permanently is guilty of desertion.
(c) Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.
War of 1812: The desertion rate for American soldiers in the War of 1812 was 12.7%, according to available service records. Desertion was especially common in 1814, when enlistment bonuses were increased from $16 to $124, inducing many men to desert one unit and enlist in another to get two bonuses.
Mexican–American War: During the Mexican–American War, the desertion rate in the U.S. Army was 8.3% (9,200 out of 111,000), compared to 12.7% during the War of 1812 and usual peacetime rates of about 14.8% per year. Many men deserted in order to join another U.S. unit and get a second enlistment bonus. Others deserted because of the miserable conditions in camp, or in 1849–1850 were using the army to get free transportation to California, where they deserted to join the California Gold Rush. Several hundred deserters went over to the Mexican side; nearly all were recent immigrants from Europe with weak ties to the United States. The most famous group was the Saint Patrick's Battalion, about half of whom were Catholics from Ireland, anti-Catholic prejudice reportedly being another reason for desertion. The Mexicans issued broadsides and leaflets enticing U.S. soldiers with promises of money, land grants, and officers' commissions. Mexican guerrillas shadowed the U.S. Army, and captured men who took unauthorized leave or fell out of the ranks. The guerrillas coerced these men to join the Mexican ranks—threatening to kill them if they failed to comply. The generous promises proved illusory for most deserters, who risked execution if captured by U.S. forces. About fifty of the San Patricios were tried and hanged following their capture at Churubusco in August 1847.
High desertion rates were a major problem for the Mexican army, depleting forces on the eve of battle. Most of the soldiers were peasants who had a loyalty to their village and family but not to the generals who conscripted them. Often hungry and ill, never well paid, under-equipped and only partially trained, the soldiers were held in contempt by their officers and had little reason to fight the Americans. Looking for their opportunity, many slipped away from camp to find their way back to their home village.
American Civil War: During the American Civil War, both the Union and Confederacy had a desertion problem. From its 2.5 million or so men, the Union Army saw about 200,000 desertions. Over 100,000 deserted the Confederate army, which was less than a million men and possibly as little as a third the size of the Union Army.
New York suffered 44,913 desertions by the war's end, and Pennsylvania recorded 24,050, with Ohio reporting desertions at 18,354. About 1 out of 3 deserters returned to their regiments, either voluntarily or after being arrested and being sent back. Many of the desertions were by "professional" bounty men, men who would enlist to collect the often large cash bonuses and then desert at the earliest opportunity to repeat another enlistment elsewhere. If caught they would face execution; otherwise it could prove a very lucrative criminal enterprise.
The total number of Confederate deserters was officially 103,400. Desertion was a major factor for the Confederacy in the last two years of the war. According to Mark A. Weitz, Confederate soldiers fought to defend their families, not a nation. He argues that a hegemonic "planter class" brought Georgia into the war with "little support from non-slaveholders" (p. 12), and the ambivalence of non-slaveholders toward secession, he maintains, was the key to understanding desertion. The privations of the home front and camp life, combined with the terror of battle, undermined the weak attachment of southern soldiers to the Confederacy. For Georgian troops, Sherman's march through their home counties triggered the most desertions.
Adoption of a localist identity caused soldiers to desert as well. When soldiers implemented a local identity, they neglected to think of themselves as Southerners fighting a Southern cause. When they replaced their Southern identity with their previous local identity, they lost their motive to fight and, therefore, deserted the army.
A growing threat to the solidarity of the Confederacy was dissatisfaction in the Appalachian mountain districts caused by lingering unionism and a distrust of the slave power. Many of their soldiers deserted, returned home, and formed a military force that fought off regular army units trying to punish them. North Carolina lost 23% of its soldiers (24,122) to desertion. The state provided more soldiers per capita than any other Confederate state, and had more deserters as well.
First World War: Desertion still occurred among American armed forces after the U.S. joined the First World War on 6 April 1917. Between 6 April 1917, and 31 December 1918, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) charged 5,584 servicemen and convicted 2,657 for desertion. 24 AEF troops were eventually sentenced to death, but all managed to avoid execution after President Woodrow Wilson commuted their death sentences to prison terms. Deserters were often publicly humiliated. One U.S. Navy deserter, Henry Holscher, later joined a UK regiment and won the Military Medal.
Second World War: Over 20,000 American soldiers were tried and sentenced for desertion. Forty-nine were sentenced to death, though forty-eight of these death sentences were subsequently commuted. Only one U.S. soldier, Private Eddie Slovik, was executed for desertion in World War II.
Vietnam War: According to the Department of Defense, 503,926 United States servicemen deserted during the Vietnam War between 1 July 1966 to 31 December 1973. Some of these migrated to Canada. Among those who deserted to Canada were Andy Barrie, host of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Radio's Metro Morning, and Jack Todd, sports columnist for the Montreal Gazette. Other countries also gave asylum to deserted U.S. soldiers. For example, Sweden allows asylum for foreign soldiers deserting from war, if the war does not align with the current goals of Swedish foreign policy.
Iraq War: According to the Pentagon, more than 5,500 military personnel deserted in 2003–2004, following the Iraq invasion and occupation. The number had reached about 8,000 by the first quarter of 2006. Almost all of these soldiers deserted within the United States. There has been only one reported case of a desertion in Iraq. The Army, Navy, and Air Force reported 7,978 desertions in 2001, compared with 3,456 in 2005. The Marine Corps showed 1,603 Marines in desertion status in 2001. That had declined to 148 by 2005.
Penalties: Before the Civil War, deserters from the Army were flogged; after 1861, tattoos or branding were also used. The maximum U.S. penalty for desertion in wartime remains death, but this punishment was last applied to Eddie Slovik in 1945. No U.S. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Desertion | The number had reached about 8,000 by the first quarter of 2006. Almost all of these soldiers deserted within the United States. There has been only one reported case of a desertion in Iraq. The Army, Navy, and Air Force reported 7,978 desertions in 2001, compared with 3,456 in 2005. The Marine Corps showed 1,603 Marines in desertion status in 2001. That had declined to 148 by 2005.
Penalties: Before the Civil War, deserters from the Army were flogged; after 1861, tattoos or branding were also used. The maximum U.S. penalty for desertion in wartime remains death, but this punishment was last applied to Eddie Slovik in 1945. No U.S. serviceman has received more than 24 months imprisonment for desertion or missing movement after September 11, 2001.
A U.S. service member who is AWOL/UA may be punished with non-judicial punishment (NJP) or by court martial under Article 86 of the UCMJ for repeat or more severe offenses. Many AWOL/UA service members are also given a discharge in lieu of court-martial.
The 2012 edition of the United States Manual for Courts-Martial states that:Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.
Legal status of desertion in cases of war crime: Under international law, ultimate "duty" or "responsibility" is not necessarily always to a "government" nor to "a superior", as seen in the fourth of the Nuremberg Principles, which states:The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
Although a soldier under direct orders, in battle, is normally not subject to prosecution for war crimes, there is legal language supporting a soldier's refusal to commit such crimes, in military contexts outside of immediate peril.
In 1998, UNCHR resolution 1998/77 recognized that "persons [already] performing military service may develop conscientious objections" while performing military service. This opens the possibility of desertion as a response to cases in which the soldier is required to perform crimes against humanity as part of his mandatory military duty.
The principle was tested unsuccessfully in the case of U.S. Army deserter Jeremy Hinzman, which resulted in a Canadian federal immigration board rejecting refugee status to a deserter invoking Nuremberg Article IV.
See also: Barratry (admiralty law)
Canada and Iraq War resisters
Conscientious objector
Decimation (Roman army)
Defection
Draft evasion
Green Cadres
List of Iraq War resisters
Mutiny
No call, no show, in civilian employment
Nuremberg Principle IV
Resistance Inside the Army
Running the gauntlet
War resister
Notes:
References:
Works cited:
Further reading: David Cortright. Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005.
Charles Glass. Deserter: The Last Untold Story of the Second World War. Harperpress, 2013.
Maria Fritsche. "Proving One's Manliness: Masculine Self-perceptions of Austrian Deserters in the Second World War". Gender & History, 24/1 (2012), pp. 35–55.
Fred Halstead. GIs Speak Out Against the War: The Case of the Ft. Jackson 8. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970.
Kevin Linch. "Desertion from the British Army during the Napoleonic Wars". Journal of Social History, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Summer 2016), pp. 808–828.
Peter Rohrbacher. "Pater Wilhelm Schmidt im Schweizer Exil: Interaktionen mit Wehrmachtsdeserteuren und Nachrichtendiensten, 1943–1945". Paideuma: Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde, no. 62 (2016), pp. 203–221.
Jack Todd. Desertion: In the Time of Vietnam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2001.
Chris Lombardi. I Ain’t Marching Anymore: Dissenters, Deserters, and Objectors to America’s Wars. New York: The New Press, 2020.
External links:
Missing movement Archived 31 December 2015 at the Wayback Machine from About.com
Memorial to German World War II deserters in Ulm, Germany at the Sites of Memory webpage
Memorial to all deserters in Stuttgart, Germany at the Sites of Memory webpage
AWOL Information Archived 6 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deterrence theory | History: By November 1945 general Curtis LeMay, who led American air raids on Japan during World War II, was thinking about how the next war would be fought. He said in a speech that month to the Ohio Society of New York that since "No air attack, once it is launched, can be completely stopped", his country needed an air force that could immediately retaliate: "If we are prepared it may never come. It is not immediately conceivable that any nation will dare to attack us if we are prepared".
Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s. Historically, scholarship on deterrence has tended to focus on nuclear deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extension of deterrence scholarship to areas that are not specifically about nuclear weapons.
NATO was founded 1949 with a role including deterring aggression.
A distinction is sometimes made between nuclear deterrence and "conventional deterrence."
The two most prominent deterrent strategies are "denial" (denying the attacker the benefits of attack) and "punishment" (inflicting costs on the attacker).
Lesson of Munich, where appeasement failed, contributes to deterrence theory. In the words of scholars Frederik Logevall and Kenneth Osgood, "Munich and appeasement have become among the dirtiest words in American politics, synonymous with naivete and weakness, and signifying a craven willingness to barter away the nation's vital interests for empty promises." They claimed that the success of US foreign policy often depends upon a president withstanding "the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers.
Concept: The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of international security research for at least 2000 years.
The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats in limited force by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. In Arms and Influence (1966), Schelling offers a broader definition of deterrence, as he defines it as "to prevent from action by fear of consequences." Glenn Snyder also offers a broad definition of deterrence, as he argues that deterrence involves both the threat of sanction and the promise of reward.
A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.
As outlined by Huth, a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories: preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct deterrence) or preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur if there is a territorial dispute between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a great power becomes involved. The latter case has generated most interest in academic literature. Building on the two broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence) or as strategy to prevent a military conflict or short-term threat from arising (known as general deterrence).
A successful deterrence policy must be considered in military terms but also political terms: International relations, foreign policy and diplomacy. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and military co-operation into a crisis or militarized confrontation that threatens armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of wars, however, is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and the military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded.
Furthermore, as Jentleson et al. argue, two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important: a defending state strategy that balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility and minimizes international and domestic constraints and the extent of an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of noncompliance that it can impose on and the benefits of compliance it can offer to another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.
Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction. Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces. For example, the doctrine of massive retaliation threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.
A successful nuclear deterrent requires a country to preserve its ability to retaliate by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or ensuring a second-strike capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a nuclear triad, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States, Russia, the China and India. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have only sea-based and air-based nuclear weapons.
Proportionality: Jentleson et al. provides further detail in relation to those factors. Proportionality refers to the relationship between the defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the instruments available for use to pursue them. The more the defending state demands of another state, the higher that state's costs of compliance and the greater need for the defending state's strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. That is a challenge, as deterrence is by definition a strategy of limited means. George (1991) goes on to explain that deterrence sometimes goes beyond threats to the actual use of military force, but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of full-scale use to succeed.
The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to regime change, which has been seen in Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. There, defending states have sought to change the leadership of a state and to policy changes relating primarily to their nuclear weapons programs.
Reciprocity: Secondly, Jentleson et al. outlines that reciprocity involves an explicit understanding of linkage between the defending state's carrots and the attacking state's concessions. The balance lies in not offering too little, too late or for too much in return and not offering too much, too soon, or for too little return.
Coercive credibility: Finally, coercive credibility requires that in addition to calculations about costs and benefits of co-operation, the defending state convincingly conveys to the attacking state that failure to co-operate has consequences. Threats, uses of force, and other coercive instruments such as economic sanctions must be sufficiently credible to raise the attacking state's perceived costs of noncompliance. A defending state having a superior military capability or economic strength in itself is not enough to ensure credibility. Indeed, all three elements of a balanced deterrence strategy are more likely to be achieved if other major international actors like the UN or NATO are supportive, and opposition within the defending state's domestic politics is limited.
The other important considerations outlined by Jentleson et al. that must be taken into consideration is the domestic political and economic conditions in the attacking state affecting its vulnerability to deterrence policies and the attacking state's ability to compensate unfavourable power balances. The first factor is whether internal political support and regime security are better served by defiance, or there are domestic political gains to be made from improving relations with the defending state. The second factor is an economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose and the benefits that trade and other economic incentives may carry. That is partly a function of the strength and flexibility of the attacking state's domestic economy and its capacity to absorb or counter the costs being imposed. The third factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political figures within the attacking state. To the extent that such actors' interests are threatened with the defending state's demands, they act to prevent or block the defending state's demands.
Rational deterrence theory: One approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making (see game theory). Rational deterrence theory entails:
Rationality: actors are rational
Unitary actor assumption: actors are understood as unitary
Dyads: interactions tend to be between dyads (or triads) of states
Strategic interactions: actors consider the choices of other actors
Cost-benefit calculations: outcomes reflect actors' cost-benefit calculations
Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state. Huth outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict, and the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deterrence theory | Rational deterrence theory: One approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making (see game theory). Rational deterrence theory entails:
Rationality: actors are rational
Unitary actor assumption: actors are understood as unitary
Dyads: interactions tend to be between dyads (or triads) of states
Strategic interactions: actors consider the choices of other actors
Cost-benefit calculations: outcomes reflect actors' cost-benefit calculations
Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state. Huth outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict, and the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces. Huth goes on to explain the four key factors for consideration under rational deterrence theory: the military balance, signaling and bargaining power, reputations for resolve, interests at stake.
The American economist Thomas Schelling brought his background in game theory to the subject of studying international deterrence. Schelling's (1966) classic work on deterrence presents the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence. Schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory and is most successful when it is held in reserve.
In an article celebrating Schelling's Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics, Michael Kinsley, Washington Post op‑ed columnist and one of Schelling's former students, anecdotally summarizes Schelling's reorientation of game theory thus: "[Y]ou're standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You'll be released, and one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you persuade the other guy to give in, when the only method at your disposal—threatening to push him off the cliff—would doom you both? Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don't have to convince him that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that, you win."
Military balance: Deterrence is often directed against state leaders who have specific territorial goals that they seek to attain either by seizing disputed territory in a limited military attack or by occupying disputed territory after the decisive defeat of the adversary's armed forces. In either case, the strategic orientation of potential attacking states generally is for the short term and is driven by concerns about military cost and effectiveness. For successful deterrence, defending states need the military capacity to respond quickly and strongly to a range of contingencies. Deterrence often fails if either a defending state or an attacking state underestimates or overestimates the other's ability to undertake a particular course of action.
Signaling and bargaining power: The central problem for a state that seeks to communicate a credible deterrent threat by diplomatic or military actions is that all defending states have an incentive to act as if they are determined to resist an attack in the hope that the attacking state will back away from military conflict with a seemingly resolved adversary. If all defending states have such incentives, potential attacking states may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement of military forces as merely bluffs. In that regard, rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate the credibility of a defending state's resolve. Those are actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat. States that bluff are unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military action for fear of committing themselves to an armed conflict.
Reputations for resolve: There are three different arguments that have been developed in relation to the role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes. The first argument focuses on a defending state's past behavior in international disputes and crises, which creates strong beliefs in a potential attacking state about the defending state's expected behaviour in future conflicts. The credibilities of a defending state's policies are arguably linked over time, and reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on an attacking state's decision whether to challenge either general or immediate deterrence. The second approach argues that reputations have a limited impact on deterrence outcomes because the credibility of deterrence is heavily determined by the specific configuration of military capabilities, interests at stake, and political constraints faced by a defending state in a given situation of attempted deterrence. The argument of that school of thought is that potential attacking states are not likely to draw strong inferences about a defending states resolve from prior conflicts because potential attacking states do not believe that a defending state's past behaviour is a reliable predictor of future behavior. The third approach is a middle ground between the first two approaches and argues that potential attacking states are likely to draw reputational inferences about resolve from the past behaviour of defending states only under certain conditions. The insight is the expectation that decisionmakers use only certain types of information when drawing inferences about reputations, and an attacking state updates and revises its beliefs when a defending state's unanticipated behavior cannot be explained by case-specific variables.
An example shows that the problem extends to the perception of the third parties as well as main adversaries and underlies the way in which attempts at deterrence can fail and even backfire if the assumptions about the others' perceptions are incorrect.
Interests at stake: Although costly signaling and bargaining power are more well established arguments in rational deterrence theory, the interests of defending states are not as well known. Attacking states may look beyond the short-term bargaining tactics of a defending state and seek to determine what interests are at stake for the defending state that would justify the risks of a military conflict. The argument is that defending states that have greater interests at stake in a dispute are more resolved to use force and more willing to endure military losses to secure those interests. Even less well-established arguments are the specific interests that are more salient to state leaders such as military interests and economic interests.
Furthermore, Huth argues that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory agree that an unfavorable assessment of the domestic and international status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success of deterrence. In a rational choice approach, if the expected utility of not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position, deterrence failure is more likely since the alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive.
Tripwires: International relations scholars Dan Reiter and Paul Poast have argued that so-called "tripwires" do not deter aggression. Tripwires entail that small forces are deployed abroad with the assumption that an attack on them will trigger a greater deployment of forces. Dan Altman has argued that tripwires do work to deter aggression, citing the Western deployment of forces to Berlin in 1948–1949 to deter Soviet aggression as a successful example.
A 2022 study by Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg found that high-resolve, low-capability signals (such as tripwires) were not viewed as more reassuring to allies than low-resolve, high-capability alternatives (such as forces stationed offshore). Their study cast doubt on the reassuring value of tripwires.
Nuclear deterrence theory: In 1966, Schelling is prescriptive in outlining the impact of the development of nuclear weapons in the analysis of military power and deterrence. In his analysis, before the widespread use of assured second strike capability, or immediate reprisal, in the form of SSBN submarines, Schelling argues that nuclear weapons give nations the potential to destroy their enemies but also the rest of humanity without drawing immediate reprisal because of the lack of a conceivable defense system and the speed with which nuclear weapons can be deployed. A nation's credible threat of such severe damage empowers their deterrence policies and fuels political coercion and military deadlock, which can produce proxy warfare.
According to Kenneth Waltz, there are three requirements for successful nuclear deterrence:
Part of a state's nuclear arsenal must appear to be able to survive an attack by the adversary and be used for a retaliatory second strike
The state must not respond to false alarms of a strike by the adversary
The state must maintain command and control
The stability–instability paradox is a key concept in rational deterrence theory. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. This occurs because rational actors want to avoid nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts. For instance, during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged each other in warfare, but fought proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Angola, the Middle East, Nicaragua and Afghanistan and spent substantial amounts of money and manpower on gaining relative influence over the third world.
Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always ready but never used. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deterrence theory | It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. This occurs because rational actors want to avoid nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts. For instance, during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged each other in warfare, but fought proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Angola, the Middle East, Nicaragua and Afghanistan and spent substantial amounts of money and manpower on gaining relative influence over the third world.
Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always ready but never used.
Scholars have debated whether having a superior nuclear arsenal provides a deterrent against other nuclear-armed states with smaller arsenals. Matthew Kroenig has argued that states with nuclear superiority are more likely to win nuclear crises, whereas Todd Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann and David C. Logan have challenged this assertion. A 2023 study found that a state with nuclear weapons is less likely to be targeted by non-nuclear states, but that a state with nuclear weapons is not less likely to target other nuclear states in low-level conflict. A 2022 study by Kyungwon Suh suggests that nuclear superiority may not reduce the likelihood that nuclear opponents will initiate nuclear crises.
Proponents of nuclear deterrence theory argue that newly nuclear-armed states may pose a short- or medium-term risk, but that "nuclear learning" occurs over time as states learn to live with new nuclear-armed states. Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller have however argued that there is a weak theoretical and empirical basis for notions of "nuclear learning."
Stages of US policy of deterrence: The US policy of deterrence during the Cold War underwent significant variations.
Containment: The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by the containment of communism, an aggressive stance on behalf of the US especially on developing nations under its sphere of influence. The period was characterized by numerous proxy wars throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. One notable conflict was the Korean War. George F. Kennan, who is taken to be the founder of this policy in his Long Telegram, asserted that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic support, and that his ideas were misinterpreted as espoused by the general public.
Détente: With the US drawdown from Vietnam, the normalization of US relations with China, and the Sino-Soviet Split, the policy of containment was abandoned and a new policy of détente was established, with peaceful co-existence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all of those factors contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, which lasted from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence then characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and relations with Russia until the onset of the New Cold War in the early 2010s. Since then, relations have been less clear.
Reagan era: A third shift occurred with US President Ronald Reagan's arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify the policy by concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the post-1979 revolutionary government of Iran. Similar to the old policy of containment, the US funded several proxy wars, including support for Saddam Hussein of Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anticommunist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The funding of the Contras in Nicaragua led to the Iran-Contra Affair, while overt support led to a ruling from the International Court of Justice against the United States in Nicaragua v. United States.
The final expression of the full impact of deterrence during the cold war can be seen in the agreement between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. They "agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.".
While the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The US policy on deterrence after the Cold War was outlined in 1995 in the document called "Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence". It explains that while relations with Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of MAD, but the US policy of deterrence towards nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure by threats of immense retaliation (or even pre-emptive action) not to threaten the United States, its interests, or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining chemical or biological weapons. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs are caused partly by the continuation of the policy of deterrence.
Post-Cold War period: By the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, many western hawks expressed the view that deterrence worked in that war but only in one way – in favor of Russia. Former US security advisor, John Bolton, said: Deterrence is working in the Ukraine crisis, just not for the right side. The United States and its allies failed to deter Russia from invading. The purpose of deterrence strategy is to prevent the conflict entirely, and there Washington failed badly. On the other hand, Russian deterrence is enjoying spectacular success. Russia has convinced the West that even a whisper of NATO military action in Ukraine would bring disastrous consequences. Putin threatens, blusters, uses the word “nuclear,” and the West wilts.
When Elon Musk prevented Ukraine from carrying drone attacks on the Russian Black Sea fleet by denying to enable needed Starlink communications in Crimea, Anne Applebaum argued Musk had been deterred by Russia after the country's ambassador warned him an attack on Crimea would be met with a nuclear response. Later Ukrainian attacks on the same fleet using a different communications system also caused deterrence, this time to the Russian Navy.
Timo S. Koster who served at NATO as Director of Defence Policy & Capabilities similarly argued: A massacre is taking place in Europe and the strongest military alliance in the world is staying out of it. We are deterred and Russia is not. Philip Breedlove, a retired four-star U.S. Air Force general and a former SACEUR, said that Western fears about nuclear weapons and World War III have left it "fully deterred" and Putin "completely undeterred." The West have "ceded the initiative to the enemy." No attempt was made by NATO to deter Moscow with the threat of military force, wondered another expert. To the contrary, it was Russia’s deterrence that proved to be successful.
Cyber deterrence: Since the early 2000s, there has been an increased focus on cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence has two meanings:
The use of cyber actions to deter other states
The deterrence of an adversary's cyber operations
Scholars have debated how cyber capabilities alter traditional understandings of deterrence, given that it may be harder to attribute responsibility for cyber attacks, the barriers to entry may be lower, the risks and costs may be lower for actors who conduct cyber attacks, it may be harder to signal and interpret intentions, the advantage of offense over defense, and weak actors and non-state actors can develop considerable cyber capabilities. Scholars have also debated the feasibility of launching highly damaging cyber attacks and engaging in destructive cyber warfare, with most scholars expressing skepticism that cyber capabilities have enhanced the ability of states to launch highly destructive attacks. The most prominent cyber attack to date is the Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear program. By 2019, the only publicly acknowledged case of a cyber attack causing a power outage was the 2015 Ukraine power grid hack.
There are various ways to engage in cyber deterrence:
Denial: preventing adversaries from achieving military objectives by defending against them
Punishment: the imposition of costs on the adversary
Norms: the establishment and maintenance of norms that establish appropriate standards of behavior
Escalation: raising the probability that costs will be imposed on the adversary
Entanglement and interdependence: interdependence between actors can have a deterrent effect
There is a risk of unintended escalation in cyberspace due to difficulties in discerning the intent of attackers, and complexities in state-hacker relationships. According to political scientists Joseph Brown and Tanisha Fazal, states frequently neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations so that they can avoid the escalatory risks (that come with public credit) while also signaling that they have cyber capabilities and resolve (which can be achieved if intelligence agencies and governments believe they were responsible).
According to Lennart Maschmeyer, cyber weapons have limited coercive effectiveness due to a trilemma "whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deterrence theory | According to political scientists Joseph Brown and Tanisha Fazal, states frequently neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations so that they can avoid the escalatory risks (that come with public credit) while also signaling that they have cyber capabilities and resolve (which can be achieved if intelligence agencies and governments believe they were responsible).
According to Lennart Maschmeyer, cyber weapons have limited coercive effectiveness due to a trilemma "whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. These constraints pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables."
Intrawar deterrence: Intrawar deterrence is deterrence within a war context. It means that war has broken out but actors still seek to deter certain forms of behavior. In the words of Caitlin Talmadge, "intra-war deterrence failures... can be thought of as causing wars to get worse in some way." Examples of intrawar deterrence include deterring adversaries from resorting to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons attacks or attacking civilian populations indiscriminately. Broadly, it involves any prevention of escalation.
Criticism:
Deterrence failures: Deterrence theory has been criticized by numerous scholars for various reasons, the most basic being skepticism that decision makers are rational. A prominent strain of criticism argues that rational deterrence theory is contradicted by frequent deterrence failures, which may be attributed to misperceptions. Here it's argued that misestimations of perceived costs and benefits by analysts contribute to deterrence failures, as exemplified in case of Russian invasion of Ukraine. Frozen conflicts can be seen as rewarding aggression.
Misprediction of behavior: Scholars have also argued that leaders do not behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions of nuclear deterrence theory. Scholars have also argued that rational deterrence theory does not grapple sufficiently with emotions and psychological biases that make accidents, loss of self-control, and loss of control over others likely. Frank C. Zagare has argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for perfect deterrence, which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.
Suicide attacks: Advocates for nuclear disarmament, such as Global Zero, have criticized nuclear deterrence theory. Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz have all called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and created the Nuclear Security Project to advance that agenda. In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled Nuclear Tipping Point where proposed steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. Kissinger has argued, "The classical notion of deterrence was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesn't operate in any comparable way." Shultz said, "If you think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by definition not deterrable."
Stronger deterrent: Paul Nitze argued in 1994 that nuclear weapons were obsolete in the "new world disorder" after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and he advocated reliance on precision guided munitions to secure a permanent military advantage over future adversaries.
Minimum deterrence: As opposed to the extreme mutually assured destruction form of deterrence, the concept of minimum deterrence in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking is presently the most common form of deterrence practiced by nuclear weapon states, such as China, India, Pakistan, Britain, and France. Pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiations between the United States and Russia allows each state to make nuclear stockpile reductions without the state becoming vulnerable, but it has been noted that there comes a point that further reductions may be undesirable, once minimal deterrence is reached, as further reductions beyond that point increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to expand its nuclear arsenal secretly.
France has developed and maintained its own nuclear deterrent under the belief that the United States will refuse to risk its own cities by assisting Western Europe in a nuclear war.
Ethical objections: In the post cold war era, philosophical objections to the reliance upon deterrence theories in general have also been raised on purely ethical grounds. Scholars such as Robert L. Holmes have noted that the implementation of such theories is inconsistent with a fundamental deontological presumption which prohibits the killing of innocent life. Consequently, such theories are prima facie immoral in nature. In addition, he observes that deterrence theories serve to perpetuate a state of mutual assured destruction between nations over time. Holmes further argues that it is therefore both irrational and immoral to utilize a methodology for perpetuating international peace which relies exclusively upon the continuous development of new iterations of the very weapons which it is designed to prohibit.
See also:
Notes:
References:
Further reading: Schultz, George P. and Goodby, James E. The War that Must Never be Fought, Hoover Press, ISBN 978-0-8179-1845-3, 2015.
Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. Deterrence. New York: Polity Press.
Jervis, Robert, Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 270 pp.
Morgan, Patrick. 2003. Deterrence Now. Cambridge University Press.
T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, James J. Wirtz, Complex Deterrence: Strategy In the Global Age (University of Chicago Press, 2009) ISBN 978-0-226-65002-9.
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities". The American Political Science Review. Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep, 1990), pp. 731–746.
== External links == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Direct Attack Guided Rocket | Specifications: Diameter: 2.75 in (70 mm)
Length: 75 in (1.9 m)
Wingspan: 8.75 in (222 mm)
Weight: 35.0 lb (15.8 kg)
Guidance: Semi-active laser homing (SALH).
Range from Sea Level: Min: 1.5 km Max: 5 km
Range from 20,000 feet (6,100 m): 12 km.
Motor: Existing Hydra 70 motors.
Warhead: M151 warhead with M423 fuze
Program status: March 2005 – Program started.
February 2006 – 1st flight test.
October 2008 – 8th flight test and 1st ever 2.75" guided rocket live warhead flight test.
March 2009 – 1st platform flight test – AH-64D Apache attack helicopter.
July 2009 – 2nd platform flight test – AH-6 Little Bird: successfully hit the target in two separate trials.
March 2010 – 3rd platform test – Lockheed Martin's DAGR guided rocket fires successfully from Kiowa Warrior helicopter.
May 2012 – DAGR hits a truck target moving 25 mph (40 km/h) fired from an AH-64D Apache 3.5 km away.
September 2012 – DAGR successfully hits stationary targets while launched from ground-based mounts. Two missiles flew 3.5 kilometers and hit the target within one foot of the illuminated laser spot.
February 2013 – DAGR is launched from a Lockheed Martin JLTV. It locked onto the laser spot two seconds after launch, flew 5 km (3.1 mi) down range and impacted the target within 1 meter of the laser spot.
March 2014 – DAGR completed airworthiness tests from the AH-64D Apache, hitting all 16 targets within 1 meter of the laser spot from 1.5 to 5.1 km (0.93 to 3.17 mi). Over 40 DAGRs had been fired in total since the start of the program.
June 2014 – DAGR and Hellfire II are launched from Lockheed Martin's Long Range Surveillance and Attack Vehicle (LRSAV) turreted weapon system, which allows targeting and employment of missiles from ground platforms. The Hellfire and DAGR missiles hit targets at 6.4 km (4.0 mi) and 3.5 km (2.2 mi) respectively, with both demonstrating lock-on-before-launch and lock-on-after-launch capabilities, and one being designated by an AH-64D Apache helicopter.
Export: Following the Royal Jordanian Air Force's purchase of Boeing AH-6 helicopters, Lockheed offered to equip them with DAGRs.
See also: Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System
Low-Cost Guided Imaging Rocket
Barq
Guided Advanced Tactical Rocket - Laser
Roketsan Cirit
Ugroza
FZ275 LGR
References:
External links: Others & History |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Director (military) | Naval warships: For warships of the 20th century, the director is part of the fire control system; it passes information to the computer that calculates range and elevation for the guns. Typically, positions on the ship measured range and bearing of the target; these instantaneous measurements are used to calculate rate of change values, and the computer ("fire control table" in Royal Navy terms) then predicts the correct firing solution, taking into account other parameters, such as wind direction, air temperature, and ballistic factors for the guns. The British Royal Navy widely deployed the Pollen and Dreyer Fire Control Tables during the First World War, while in World War II a widely used computer in the US Navy was the electro-mechanical Mark I Fire Control Computer.
On ships the director control towers for the main battery are placed high on the superstructure, where they have the best view. Due to their large size and weight, in the World War II era the computers were located in plotting rooms deep in the ship, below the armored deck on armored ships.
Field artillery: Directors were introduced into field artillery in the early 20th century to orient the guns of an artillery battery in their zero line (or 'centre of arc'). Directors were an essential element in the introduction of indirect artillery fire. In US service these directors were called 'aiming circles'. Directors could also be used instead of theodolites for artillery survey over shorter distances. The first directors used an open sight rotating on an angular scale (e.g. degrees & minutes, grads or mils of one sort or another), but by World War I most directors were optical instruments. Introduction of digital artillery sights in the 1990s removed the need for directors.
Directors were mounted on a field tripod and oriented in relation to grid north of the map. If time was short this orientation usually used an integral compass, but was updated by calculation (azimuth by hour angle or azimuth by Polaris) or 'carried' by survey techniques from a survey control point. In the 1960s gyroscopic orientation was introduced.
Anti-aircraft: For anti-aircraft use, directors are usually used in conjunction with other fire control equipment, such as height finders or fire control radars. In some armies these 'directors' were called 'predictors'. The Mark 51 director was used by the US Navy for 40 mm guns and later for 3"/50 caliber guns. The Kerrison Predictor was also designed to be used with the Bofors 40 mm gun.
Example: The Bofors 40 mm gun (called a fire unit) used in its anti-aircraft role has the M5 director for its fire-control system. The director is operated by a member of the range section who reports to the chief of section, who in turn reports to the platoon commander. The range section's leader is also called a range setter; he guides the preparation of the director and generator for firing, verifies the orientation and synchronisation of the gun and the director, and supervises fire control using the M5 director (or by the carriage when the M7 Weissight is used). The range section that uses the M5 director consists of the range setter, elevation tracker, azimuth tracker, power plant operator and telephone operator.
The M5 director is used to determine or estimate the altitude or slant range of the aerial target. Two observers then track the aircraft through a pair of telescopes on opposite sides of the director. The trackers turn handwheels to keep the crosshairs of their respective telescope on the aircraft image. The rotation of the handwheels provides the director with data on the aircraft's change in elevation and change in azimuth in relation to the director. As the mechanisms inside the director respond to the rotation of the handwheels, a firing solution is mechanically calculated and continuously updated for as long as the target is tracked. Essentially, the director predicts future position based on the aircraft's present location and how it is moving.
After their introduction, directors soon incorporated correction factors that could compensate for ballistic conditions such as air density, wind velocity and wind direction. If the director was not located near the gun sections, a correction for parallax error could also be entered to produce even more accurate firing direction calculations.
Directors transmit three important calculated firing solutions to the anti-aircraft gun firing crew: the correct firing azimuth and quadrant elevation calculated to determine where exactly to aim the gun, and for guns that use ammunition with timed fuzes, the director also provides the flight time for the projectile so the fuze can be set to detonate close to the target.
Early anti-aircraft artillery batteries located the directors in the middle of the position, with the firing sections (guns) located at the corners of the position. Before the introduction of radars, searchlights were used in conjunction with directors to allow night target engagement.
U.S. Army anti-aircraft directors: T1 (wilson) director
T4 gun director used with 3-inch M1918 gun
T6 was built by Sperry Corporation in 1930 and standardized as the M2 director.
M3 was standardized from the T8 in 1934
M4 was standardized in 1939
M5 Gun Director Mechanical, a US-produced Kerrison Predictor, for use with 37mm Gun M1 and M1 40 MM
M5A1
M5A2
M7 gun director was standardized in 1941, and is similar to the M4 but added power control to the guns it is still described as a mechanical system. for use with 90 mm gun
M7A1B1
M7A1B2
T10 standardized as M9 Gun Director electrical for use with 90 mm gun produced by Bell Labs
M9B1
M10 gun director electrical for use with 120 mm M1 gun
Naval directors: Mark 1
MK 51 Fire Control System
Mark 56
Mark 57
Mark 58
Mark 59
Mark 92
Type 6 director (PRC)
Surviving examples: South African National Museum of Military History - Number 1 Mark II Predictor
Powerhouse Museum - Vickers No.1 anti-aircraft predictor, 1942
USS Texas, museum ship, Houston, Texas. Mark 51 anti-aircraft directors.
See also: Ship gun fire-control systems
Rangekeeper
Gun data computer
Fire-control system
Indirect fire
Hendrik Wade Bode, designer of US T10 director.
John Whitney (animator), Used M5 AA director for film animation.
Notes:
References: TM 9-2300 Standard Artillery and Fire Control Materiel dated 1944
Brooks, Brian L., Antiaircraft command: Preserving the history of U.S.Army antiaircraft artillery of World War II, Directors and height finders, [3]
Lone Sentry.com, German Antiaircraft Artillery, Military Intelligence Service, Special Series 10, Feb. 1943, U.S. War Department, 1943
Skylighters, A Beginner's Guide to the Skylighters, WW II Antiaircraft Artillery, Searchlights, and Radar, Skylighters.org Archived 2016-04-05 at the Wayback Machine January 10, 2004
Brown, Louis, A Radar History of World War II: Technical and Military Imperatives, CRC Press, 1999
Journal of the United States Artillery, v. 47, Artillery School (Fort Monroe, Va.), Coast Artillery Training Center (U.S.), 1917
Dow Boutwell, William, Brodinsky, Ben, Frederick, Pauline, Pratt Harris, Joseph, Nixon, Glenn, Robertson, Archibald Thomas, America Prepares for Tomorrow; the Story of Our Total Defense Effort, Harper and brothers, 1941
Evans, Nigel F., Laying and Orienting the Guns
Bennett, Stuart, A History of Control Engineering, 1930–1955, IET, 199
The Coast Artillery Journal, May/June 1935
Further reading: Mindell, David (December 1995). "Automation's Finest Hour: Bell Labs and Automatic Control in World War II" (PDF). IEEE Control Systems Magazine. 15 (6): 72–78 80. doi:10.1109/MCS.1995.476388. S2CID 10041704.
External links: Mark 51 Gun director
Director Firing Handbook index from HMS Dreadnought project
Gunnery Pocket book maritime.org
http://web.mit.edu/STS.035/www/PDFs/sperry.pdf
https://books.google.com/books?id=sExvSbe9MSsC&q=Between+Human+and+Machine
https://books.google.com/books?id=T-IDAAAAMBAJ&dq=m16+gun+data+computer&pg=PA801
Gun Fire Control System Mark 37 Operating Instructions at ibiblio.org
Director section of Mark 1 Mod 1 computer operations at NavSource.org |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disaster response | Definition: Disaster response refers to the actions taken directly before, during or in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The objective is to save lives, ensure health and safety and to meet the subsistence needs of the people affected.: 16
The Business Dictionary provide a more comprehensive definition for "disaster response"; Aggregate of decisions and measures to (1) contain or mitigate the effects of a disastrous event to prevent any further loss of life and/or property, (2) restore order in its immediate aftermath, and (3) re-establish normality through reconstruction and re-rehabilitation shortly thereafter. The first and immediate response is called emergency response.
The Johns Hopkins and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) state: "The word disaster implies a sudden overwhelming and unforeseen event. At the household level, a disaster could result in a major illness, death, a substantial economic or social misfortune. At the community level, it could be a flood, a fire, a collapse of buildings in an earthquake, the destruction of livelihoods, an epidemic or displacement through conflict. When occurring at district or provincial level, a large number of people can be affected."
A recent case study of a disaster response undertaken by the IFRC can be viewed here.
The level of disaster response depends on a number of factors and particular situation awareness. Studies undertaken by Son, Aziz and Peña-Mora (2007) shows that "initial work demand gradually spreads and increases based on a wide range of variables including scale of disaster, vulnerability of affected area which in turn is affected by population density, site-specific conditions (e.g. exposure to hazardous conditions) and effects of cascading disasters resulting from inter-dependence between elements of critical infrastructure".
In the British Government's Emergency Response and Recovery guidance, disaster response refers to decisions and actions taken in accordance with the strategic, tactical and operational objectives defined by emergency responders. At a high level these will be to protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of the emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality. Response encompasses the decisions and actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency. In many scenarios it is likely to be relatively short and to last for a matter of hours or days—rapid implementation of arrangements for collaboration, co-ordination and communication are, therefore, vital. Response encompasses the effort to deal not only with the direct effects of the emergency itself (e.g. fighting fires, rescuing individuals) but also the indirect effects (e.g. disruption, media interest).
Common objectives for responders are:
saving and protecting human life;
relieving suffering;
containing the emergency – limiting its escalation or spread and mitigating its impacts;
providing the public and businesses with warnings, advice and information;
protecting the health and safety of responding personnel;
safeguarding the environment;
as far as reasonably practicable, protecting property;
maintaining or restoring critical activities;
maintaining normal services at an appropriate level;
promoting and facilitating self-help in affected communities;
facilitating investigations and inquiries (e.g. by preserving the scene and effective records management);
facilitating the recovery of the community (including the humanitarian assistance, economic, infrastructure and environmental impacts);
evaluating the response and recovery effort; and
identifying and taking action to implement lessons identified.
Disaster response planning: The United States National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 Standard (NFPA, 2010) specify elements of an emergency response, as: defined responsibilities; specific actions to be taken (which must include protective actions for life safety); and communication directives. Within the standard, NFPA recognize that disasters and day-to-day emergencies are characteristically different. Nevertheless, the prescribed response elements are the same.
In support of the NFPA standard, Statoil's (2013) practical application of emergency response is across three distinct "lines" that incorporate NFPA's elements. Line 1 is responsible for the operational management of an incident; line 2, typically housed off-site, is responsible for tactical guidance and additional resource management. Finally, in the case of major incidents, line 3 provides strategic guidance, group resource management, and government and media relations.
While it is impossible to plan for every disaster, crisis or emergency, the Statoil investigation into the terrorist attacks on In Amenas place emphasis on the importance of having a disaster response. The report concludes that a disaster response framework may be utilized in an array of disaster situations, such as that at In Amenas.
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is action taken to "[reduce] existing disaster risk and [manage] residual risk." DRR plans aim to decrease the amount of disaster response necessary by planning ahead and making communities resilient to any potential hazardous events that might occur. A number of international frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction have been enacted to increase the implementation of global mitigation plans in the event of disasters.
Organizations:
United Nations: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies that require an international response. OCHA plays a key role in operational coordination in crisis situations. This includes assessing situations and needs; agreeing common priorities; developing common strategies to address issues such as negotiating access, mobilizing funding and other resources; clarifying consistent public messaging; and monitoring progress.
United Kingdom: The organisation in the United Kingdom for the provision of communications disaster response is RAYNET. The UK organisation for the provision of disaster response by off-road vehicles is 4x4 Response.
European Union: In addition to providing funding to humanitarian aid, the European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO) is in charge of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to coordinate the response to disasters in Europe and beyond and contributes to at least 75% of the transport and/or operational costs of deployments. Established in 2001, the Mechanism fosters cooperation among national civil protection authorities across Europe. Currently 34 countries are members of the Mechanism; all 27 EU Member States in addition to Iceland, Norway, Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Mechanism was set up to enable coordinated assistance from the participating states to victims of natural and man-made disasters in Europe and elsewhere.
Canada: In Canada, GlobalMedic was established in 1998 as a non-sectarian humanitarian-aid NGO to provide disaster relief services to large scale catastrophes around the world. Time magazine recognized the work of GlobalMedic in its 2010 Time 100 issue. It has a roster of over 1,000 volunteers from across Canada that includes professional rescuers, police officers, firefighters and paramedics who donate their time to respond to international disasters. Their personnel are divided into Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) that operate rescue units, Water Purification Units (WPUs) designed to provide safe drinking water; and Emergency Medical Units (EMUs) that use inflatable field hospitals to provide emergency medical treatment. Since 2004, GlobalMedic teams have deployed to over 60 humanitarian disasters around the world.
India: In India, the National Disaster Management Authority is responsible for planning for mitigating effects of natural disasters and anticipating and avoiding man-made disasters. It also coordinates the capacity-building and response of government agencies in the time of crises and emergencies. The National Disaster Response Force is an inter-government disaster response agency that specializes in search, rescue and rehabilitation.
United States of America: In the US, the Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinates federal operational and logistical disaster response capability needed to save and sustain lives, minimize suffering, and protect property in a timely and effective manner in communities that become overwhelmed by disasters. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention offer information for specific types of emergencies, such as disease outbreaks, natural disasters and severe weather, as well as chemical and radiation accidents. Also, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Program of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health develops resources to address responder safety and health during responder and recovery operations.
Among volunteers, the American Red Cross is chartered by Congress in 1900 to lead and coordinate non-profit efforts. They are supported by disaster relief organizations from many religious denominations and community service agencies. Licensed amateur radio operators support most volunteer organizations, and are often affiliated with the American Radio Relay League (ARRL).
Disaster response organizations: In addition to the response by the government, a great deal of assistance in the wake of any disaster comes from charities, disaster response and non-governmental organizations. The biggest international umbrella organizations are the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the International Council for Voluntary Agencies.
Humanitarian OSM Team works to update and provide map in areas struck by disaster.
Disaster response technologies:
Ad hoc infrastructure: A range of infrastructures could be restored ad hoc quickly after a disaster using technologies.
Communications: The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service supports federal, state, local and tribal government personnel, industry and non-governmental organizations during a crisis or emergency by providing emergency access and priority handling for local and long-distance calls over the public switched telephone network. There is a Nationwide Wireless Priority Service that allows a user to wait for cellular bandwidth to open.
Wireless mesh networks can be deployed rapidly to enable Internet connectivity, substitute failed mobile phone networks and emergency- and post-disaster communication – including for disaster response coordination and emergency calls. Mesh networks such as B.A.T.M.A.N. are often developed and deployed open-source by volunteer communities with little resources. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disaster response | The biggest international umbrella organizations are the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the International Council for Voluntary Agencies.
Humanitarian OSM Team works to update and provide map in areas struck by disaster.
Disaster response technologies:
Ad hoc infrastructure: A range of infrastructures could be restored ad hoc quickly after a disaster using technologies.
Communications: The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service supports federal, state, local and tribal government personnel, industry and non-governmental organizations during a crisis or emergency by providing emergency access and priority handling for local and long-distance calls over the public switched telephone network. There is a Nationwide Wireless Priority Service that allows a user to wait for cellular bandwidth to open.
Wireless mesh networks can be deployed rapidly to enable Internet connectivity, substitute failed mobile phone networks and emergency- and post-disaster communication – including for disaster response coordination and emergency calls. Mesh networks such as B.A.T.M.A.N. are often developed and deployed open-source by volunteer communities with little resources.
Electricity: Emergency power systems – such as mobile microgeneration units, mobile charging- and power supply-stations or specially designed or extended smart grids – could support important electrical systems on loss of normal power supply or restore power supply for small regions whose connections to the main power grid were cut off.
Transportation: The transportation infrastructure may have become unpassable due to a disaster, complicating logistics, evacuation and disaster response.
Technologies may allow for quick ad hoc sufficient restoration of the transportation network or substitutions of parts of it. Such include the rapid construction of stable bridges based on mobile lightweight and/or locally sourced materials or components, which militaries have been involved in.
Waste management: Disaster waste is often managed in an ad hoc manner. The waste generated by a disaster can overwhelm existing solid waste management facilities and affect other response activities. Depending on the type of disaster, its scope and recovery duration conventional waste may need to be managed in similar ways and both may be associated with the transportation network restoration.
Emergency accommodation: Emergency accommodation is sometimes considered to be an element of infrastructure. Temporary accommodation for people and animals after disasters is an issue. Sometimes existing private accommodation infrastructure and logistics are repurposed for the disaster response.
Water supply: Water supply, drainage and sewerage infrastructure, and the functioning of wastewater treatment plants may be disrupted by disasters.
Vaccination infrastructure: Long-term disaster response, as well as medical infrastructure local to disaster regions with increased health risk, may include vaccination infrastructure.
Response coordination websites: Volunteers, as well as other people involved in a disaster response such as locals and civil organizations like the Technische Hilfswerk, can be coordinated and coordinate with the help of websites and similar ICTs such as for preventing traffic jams, "disaster tourists" and other obstruction of the transportation network, for allocating different forms of help to locations in need, reporting missing persons and increasing efficiency. Such websites for specific individual affected regions have been set up after the 2021 European floods.
Emergency response systems: Smart Emergency Response System (SERS) prototype was built in the SmartAmerica Challenge 2013–2014, a United States government initiative. SERS has been created by a team of nine organizations led by MathWorks. The project was featured at the White House in June 2014 and described by Todd Park (U.S. Chief Technology Officer) as an exemplary achievement.
The SmartAmerica initiative challenges the participants to build cyber-physical systems as a glimpse of the future to save lives, create jobs, foster businesses, and improve the economy. SERS primarily saves lives. The system provides the survivors and the emergency personnel with information to locate and assist each other during a disaster. SERS allows to submit help requests to a MATLAB-based mission center connecting first responders, apps, search-and-rescue dogs, a 6-feet-tall humanoid, robots, drones, and autonomous aircraft and ground vehicles. The command and control center optimizes the available resources to serve every incoming requests and generates an action plan for the mission. The Wi-Fi network is created on the fly by the drones equipped with antennas. In addition, the autonomous rotorcrafts, planes, and ground vehicles are simulated with Simulink and visualized in a 3D environment (Google Earth) to unlock the ability to observe the operations on a mass scale.
The International Charter Space and Major Disasters provides for the charitable retasking of satellite assets, providing coverage from 15 space agencies, etc. which is wide albeit contingent. It focuses on the beginning of the disaster cycle, when timely data is of the essence.
Digital technologies are increasingly being used in humanitarian action, they have shown to improve the health and recovery of populations affected by both natural and man-made disasters. They are used in humanitarian response to facilitate and coordinate aid in various stages including preparedness, response, and recovery from emergencies. More specifically, mobile health (mHealth), which is defined as the use of communication devices such as mobile phones for the purpose of health services information. Nowadays, millions of people use mobile phones as a means of daily communication and data transference, out of which 64% live in developing countries. One of the most important characteristics of disasters are the harms caused to infrastructures, accessibility issues, and an exponential need of medical and emergency services. In such situations, the use of mobile phones for mHealth can be vital, especially when other communication infrastructures are hindered. In such conditions, the abundance of mobile technology in developing countries provide the opportunity to be harnessed for helping victims and vulnerable people.
Mobile health information technology platforms, in the acute phase of disaster response, create a common operational framework that improves disaster response by standardizing data acquisition, organizing information storage, and facilitating communication among medical staff. One of the challenges in disaster response is the need of pertinent, effective and continuous analysis of the situation and information in order to evaluate needs and resources. mHealth has been shown to provide effective disaster preparedness with real time collection of medical data as well as helping identify and create needs assessments during disasters. Using mobile technology in heath has set the stage for the dynamic organization of medical resources and promotion of patient care done through quick triage, patient tracking, and documentation storage and maintenance.
Managing an effective and influential response requires cooperation, which is also facilitated through mHealth. A retrospective study demonstrated that applying mHealth can lead to up to 15% decrease of unnecessary hospital transfers during disasters. In addition, they provide field hospital administrators with real-time census information essential for planning, resource allocation, inter-facility patient transfers, and inter-agency collaboration. mHealth technology systems can improve post-operative care and patient handoffs between volunteer providers. Data entry with mobile devices is now widely used to facilitate the registration of displaced individuals, to conduct surveys, identify those in need of assistance, and to capture data on issues such as food security, vaccination rates, and mortality.
Above all, mHealth can harness the power of information to improve patient outcomes. Efforts led by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Operational Medicine Institute during the Haiti earthquake resulted in the creation of a web-based mHealth system that created a patient log of 617 unique entries used by on-the-ground medical providers and field hospital administrators. This helped facilitate provider triage, improve provider handoffs, and track vulnerable populations such as unaccompanied minors, pregnant women, traumatic orthopedic injuries and specified infectious diseases. Also, during the Haiti earthquake, the International Red Crescent sent more than 45 million SMSs to Viole mobile phone users. This resulted in 95% of the receiver reporting they had gained useful information, and out of these 90% reported the SMS helped in their preparedness.
Problematic individual and collective responses: Previous experiences with false alarms cause some people to ignore legitimate danger signals, such as a fire alarm.
Amanda Ripley points out that (contrary to many portrayals in movies) among the general public in fires and large-scale disasters, there is a remarkable lack of panic and sometimes dangerous denial of, lack of reaction to, or rationalization of warning signs that should be obvious. She says that this is often attributed to local or national character, but appears to be universal, and is typically followed by consultations with nearby people when the signals finally get enough attention. Disaster survivors advocate training everyone to recognize warning signs and practice responding.
A study published in 2020 showed that social networks can function poorly as pathways for inconvenient truths that people would rather ignore and that the interplay between communication and action may depend on the structure of social networks. It also showed that communication networks suppress necessary "evacuations" in test-scenarios because of spontaneous and diffuse emergence of false reassurance when compared to groups of isolated individuals and that larger networks with a smaller proportion of informed subjects suffered more damage due to human-caused misinformation. Following disaster, collective processing of emotions leads to greater resilience and community engagement.
Impacts of disasters:
On men and women: In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, an affected population has a number of needs. In disaster response relief, many actors tend to focus on addressing the most immediate needs first. For example, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) emphasizes that:
response efforts will focus on the immediate provision of quality life-saving humanitarian supplies, including ready-to-eat rations and food baskets, basic relief items for the most vulnerable households, including light hygiene and dignity kits, and a series of initial – and largely mobile - emergency protection interventions. Delivery of basic services will be supported through the reinforcement of available service providers relating to sectors including health, WASH, shelter, protection and education in the areas hosting those newly displaced.
These priorities are more than just addressing basic needs, as they represent shared needs between men and women. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disaster response | Following disaster, collective processing of emotions leads to greater resilience and community engagement.
Impacts of disasters:
On men and women: In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, an affected population has a number of needs. In disaster response relief, many actors tend to focus on addressing the most immediate needs first. For example, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) emphasizes that:
response efforts will focus on the immediate provision of quality life-saving humanitarian supplies, including ready-to-eat rations and food baskets, basic relief items for the most vulnerable households, including light hygiene and dignity kits, and a series of initial – and largely mobile - emergency protection interventions. Delivery of basic services will be supported through the reinforcement of available service providers relating to sectors including health, WASH, shelter, protection and education in the areas hosting those newly displaced.
These priorities are more than just addressing basic needs, as they represent shared needs between men and women. Consequently, addressing these needs first, helps disaster relief responses to reach as many people as possible. While meeting these gender inclusive needs are critical, men and women also have different needs which must be addressed. Specifically, there are biological differences between men and women, which create different needs. For instance, the needs of women in a post-disaster context can include; having access to menstrual products, having access to a secure toilet (as going to a non secure toilet can leave women more vulnerable to the potential for rape or sexual assault) and having critical pre or post natal services, to name a few. These areas are also immediate needs that need to be addressed in post-disaster relief responses. Beyond women's immediate needs, women can face long-term income disparities as a result of disasters.
On women: Women's income is disproportionately impacted by disasters. A study undertaken by Le Masson et al. in 2016, found that following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, "the ratio of women's to men's earnings in New Orleans declined from 81.6% prior to the disaster to 61.8% in 2006". Underlying this disproportionate impact are gendered vulnerabilities. One notable gendered vulnerability is the double burden. The double burden is the combination of paid and unpaid work. One of the key forms of unpaid labor is care labor. Care labor (also referred to as social reproduction) encompasses, "tasks of providing for dependants, for children, the sick, the elderly and all the rest of us". This double burden exacerbates the unequal impact that disasters have on women. Lafrenière, Sweetman and Thylin emphasize that "women operate as unpaid carers keeping societies and economies functioning ... Poverty and crisis make this unpaid work even more critical for survival. This makes it imperative for humanitarian responders to understand the scope and extent of this unpaid care work and to work with women carers". Another critical underlying gendered vulnerability is unequal access to economic resources. Globally, "women have less access to livelihoods assets (such as financial accounts) and opportunities than men". In times of disaster, the lack of access to sufficient financial resources can "force [women] to turn to risky behaviour such as prostitution or transactional sex as a means of survival. Crises also tend to increase the burdens of care and household responsibilities for women, making their ability to economically support themselves and their dependents more difficult".
See also: Civil protection
Emergency management
Hurricane response
References:
Bibliography:
External links: Radio Society of Great Britain website (RSGB)
4x4 Response Network
Video on Smart Emergency Response System
CDC's Information on Specific Types of Emergencies
Emergency Preparedness and Response Resources by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disinformation | Etymology: The English word disinformation comes from the application of the Latin prefix dis- to information making the meaning "reversal or removal of information". The rarely used word had appeared with this usage in print at least as far back as 1887.
Some consider it a loan translation of the Russian дезинформация, transliterated as dezinformatsiya, apparently derived from the title of a KGB black propaganda department. Soviet planners in the 1950s defined disinformation as "dissemination (in
the press, on the radio, etc.) of false reports intended to mislead public opinion."
Disinformation first made an appearance in dictionaries in 1985, specifically, Webster's New College Dictionary and the American Heritage Dictionary. In 1986, the term disinformation was not defined in Webster's New World Thesaurus or New Encyclopædia Britannica. After the Soviet term became widely known in the 1980s, native speakers of English broadened the term as "any government communication (either overt or covert) containing intentionally false and misleading material, often combined selectively with true information, which seeks to mislead and manipulate either elites or a mass audience."
By 1990, use of the term disinformation had fully established itself in the English language within the lexicon of politics. By 2001, the term disinformation had come to be known as simply a more civil phrase for saying someone was lying. Stanley B. Cunningham wrote in his 2002 book The Idea of Propaganda that disinformation had become pervasively used as a synonym for propaganda.
Operationalization: The Shorenstein Center at Harvard University defines disinformation research as an academic field that studies “the spread and impacts of misinformation, disinformation, and media manipulation,” including “how it spreads through online and offline channels, and why people are susceptible to believing bad information, and successful strategies for mitigating its impact” According to a 2023 research article published in New Media & Society, disinformation circulates on social media through deception campaigns implemented in multiple ways including: astroturfing, conspiracy theories, clickbait, culture wars, echo chambers, hoaxes, fake news, propaganda, pseudoscience, and rumors.
In order to distinguish between similar terms, including misinformation and malinformation, scholars collectively agree on the definitions for each term as follows: (1) disinformation is the strategic dissemination of false information with the intention to cause public harm; (2) misinformation represents the unintentional spread of false information; and (3) malinformation is factual information disseminated with the intention to cause harm, these terms are abbreviated 'DMMI'.
In 2019, Camille François devised the "ABC" framework of understanding different modalities of online disinformation:
Manipulative Actors, who "engage knowingly and with clear intent in viral deception campaigns" that are "covert, designed to obfuscate the identity and intent of the actor orchestrating them." Examples include personas such as Guccifer 2.0, Internet trolls, state media, and military operatives.
Deceptive Behavior, which "encompasses the variety of techniques viral deception actors may use to enhance and exaggerate the reach, virality and impact of their campaigns." Examples include troll farms, Internet bots, astroturfing, and "paid engagement".
Harmful Content, which includes health misinformation, manipulated media such as deepfakes, online harassment, violent extremism, hate speech or terrorism.
In 2020, the Brookings Institution proposed amending this framework to include Distribution, defined by the "technical protocols that enable, constrain, and shape user behavior in a virtual space". Similarly, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace proposed adding Degree ("distribution of the content ... and the audiences it reaches") and Effect ("how much of a threat a given case poses").
Comparisons with propaganda: Whether and to what degree disinformation and propaganda overlap is subject to debate. Some (like U.S. Department of State) define propaganda as the use of non-rational arguments to either advance or undermine a political ideal, and use disinformation as an alternative name for undermining propaganda. While others consider them to be separate concepts altogether. One popular distinction holds that disinformation also describes politically motivated messaging designed explicitly to engender public cynicism, uncertainty, apathy, distrust, and paranoia, all of which disincentivize citizen engagement and mobilization for social or political change.
Practice: Disinformation is the label often given to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). Studies on disinformation are often concerned with the content of activity whereas the broader concept of FIMI is more concerned with the "behaviour of an actor" that is described through the military doctrine concept of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
Disinformation is primarily carried out by government intelligence agencies, but has also been used by non-governmental organizations and businesses. Front groups are a form of disinformation, as they mislead the public about their true objectives and who their controllers are. Most recently, disinformation has been deliberately spread through social media in the form of "fake news", disinformation masked as legitimate news articles and meant to mislead readers or viewers. Disinformation may include distribution of forged documents, manuscripts, and photographs, or spreading dangerous rumours and fabricated intelligence. Use of these tactics can lead to blowback, however, causing such unintended consequences such as defamation lawsuits or damage to the dis-informer's reputation.
Worldwide:
Soviet disinformation:
Russian disinformation:
Chinese disinformation:
American disinformation: The United States Intelligence Community appropriated use of the term disinformation in the 1950s from the Russian dezinformatsiya, and began to use similar strategies during the Cold War and in conflict with other nations. The New York Times reported in 2000 that during the CIA's effort to substitute Mohammed Reza Pahlavi for then-Prime Minister of Iran Mohammad Mossadegh, the CIA placed fictitious stories in the local newspaper. Reuters documented how, subsequent to the 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan during the Soviet–Afghan War, the CIA put false articles in newspapers of Islamic-majority countries, inaccurately stating that Soviet embassies had "invasion day celebrations". Reuters noted a former U.S. intelligence officer said they would attempt to gain the confidence of reporters and use them as secret agents, to affect a nation's politics by way of their local media.
In October 1986, the term gained increased currency in the U.S. when it was revealed that two months previously, the Reagan Administration had engaged in a disinformation campaign against then-leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi. White House representative Larry Speakes said reports of a planned attack on Libya as first broken by The Wall Street Journal on August 25, 1986, were "authoritative", and other newspapers including The Washington Post then wrote articles saying this was factual. U.S. State Department representative Bernard Kalb resigned from his position in protest over the disinformation campaign, and said: "Faith in the word of America is the pulse beat of our democracy."
The executive branch of the Reagan administration kept watch on disinformation campaigns through three yearly publications by the Department of State: Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns (1986); Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–87 (1987); and Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1987–88 (1989).
According to a report by Reuters, the United States ran a propaganda campaign to spread disinformation about the Sinovac Chinese COVID-19 vaccine, including using fake social media accounts to spread the disinformation that the Sinovac vaccine contained pork-derived ingredients and was therefore haram under Islamic law. Reuters said the ChinaAngVirus disinformation campaign was designed to "counter what it perceived as China’s growing influence in the Philippines" and was prompted by the "[fear] that China’s COVID diplomacy and propaganda could draw other Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia and Malaysia, closer to Beijing". The campaign was also described as "payback for Beijing's efforts to blame Washington for the pandemic". The campaign primarily targeted people in the Philippines and used a social media hashtag for "China is the virus" in Tagalog. The campaign ran from 2020 to mid-2021. The primary contractor for the U.S. military on the project was General Dynamics IT, which received $493 million for its role.
Response:
Responses from cultural leaders: Pope Francis condemned disinformation in a 2016 interview, after being made the subject of a fake news website during the 2016 U.S. election cycle which falsely claimed that he supported Donald Trump. He said the worst thing the news media could do was spread disinformation. He said the act was a sin, comparing those who spread disinformation to individuals who engage in coprophilia.
Ethics in warfare: In a contribution to the 2014 book Military Ethics and Emerging Technologies, writers David Danks and Joseph H. Danks discuss the ethical implications in using disinformation as a tactic during information warfare. They note there has been a significant degree of philosophical debate over the issue as related to the ethics of war and use of the technique. The writers describe a position whereby the use of disinformation is occasionally allowed, but not in all situations. Typically the ethical test to consider is whether the disinformation was performed out of a motivation of good faith and acceptable according to the rules of war. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disinformation | election cycle which falsely claimed that he supported Donald Trump. He said the worst thing the news media could do was spread disinformation. He said the act was a sin, comparing those who spread disinformation to individuals who engage in coprophilia.
Ethics in warfare: In a contribution to the 2014 book Military Ethics and Emerging Technologies, writers David Danks and Joseph H. Danks discuss the ethical implications in using disinformation as a tactic during information warfare. They note there has been a significant degree of philosophical debate over the issue as related to the ethics of war and use of the technique. The writers describe a position whereby the use of disinformation is occasionally allowed, but not in all situations. Typically the ethical test to consider is whether the disinformation was performed out of a motivation of good faith and acceptable according to the rules of war. By this test, the tactic during World War II of putting fake inflatable tanks in visible locations on the Pacific Islands in order to falsely present the impression that there were larger military forces present would be considered as ethically permissible. Conversely, disguising a munitions plant as a healthcare facility in order to avoid attack would be outside the bounds of acceptable use of disinformation during war.
Research: Research related to disinformation studies is increasing as an applied area of inquiry. The call to formally classify disinformation as a cybersecurity threat is made by advocates due to its increase in social networking sites. Researchers working for the University of Oxford found that over a three-year period the number of governments engaging in online disinformation rose from 28 in 2017, to 40 in 2018, and 70 in 2019. Despite the proliferation of social media websites, Facebook and Twitter showed the most activity in terms of active disinformation campaigns. Techniques reported on included the use of bots to amplify hate speech, the illegal harvesting of data, and paid trolls to harass and threaten journalists.
Whereas disinformation research focuses primarily on how actors orchestrate deceptions on social media, primarily via fake news, new research investigates how people take what started as deceptions and circulate them as their personal views. As a result, research shows that disinformation can be conceptualized as a program that encourages engagement in oppositional fantasies (i.e., culture wars), through which disinformation circulates as rhetorical ammunition for never-ending arguments. As disinformation entangles with culture wars, identity-driven controversies constitute a vehicle through which disinformation disseminates on social media. This means that disinformation thrives, not despite raucous grudges but because of them. The reason is that controversies provide fertile ground for never-ending debates that solidify points of view.
Scholars have pointed out that disinformation is not only a foreign threat as domestic purveyors of disinformation are also leveraging traditional media outlets such as newspapers, radio stations, and television news media to disseminate false information. Current research suggests right-wing online political activists in the United States may be more likely to use disinformation as a strategy and tactic. Governments have responded with a wide range of policies to address concerns about the potential threats that disinformation poses to democracy, however, there is little agreement in elite policy discourse or academic literature as to what it means for disinformation to threaten democracy, and how different policies might help to counter its negative implications.
Consequences of exposure to disinformation online: There is a broad consensus amongst scholars that there is a high degree of disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda online; however, it is unclear to what extent such disinformation has on political attitudes in the public and, therefore, political outcomes. This conventional wisdom has come mostly from investigative journalists, with a particular rise during the 2016 U.S. election: some of the earliest work came from Craig Silverman at Buzzfeed News. Cass Sunstein supported this in #Republic, arguing that the internet would become rife with echo chambers and informational cascades of misinformation leading to a highly polarized and ill-informed society.
Research after the 2016 election found: (1) for 14 percent of Americans social media was their "most important" source of election news; 2) known false news stories "favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times"; 3) the average American adult saw fake news stories, "with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them"; and 4) people are more likely to "believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks." Correspondingly, whilst there is wide agreement that the digital spread and uptake of disinformation during the 2016 election was massive and very likely facilitated by foreign agents, there is an ongoing debate on whether all this had any actual effect on the election. For example, a double blind randomized-control experiment by researchers from the London School of Economics (LSE), found that exposure to online fake news about either Trump or Clinton had no significant effect on intentions to vote for those candidates. Researchers who examined the influence of Russian disinformation on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential campaign found that exposure to disinformation was (1) concentrated among a tiny group of users, (2) primarily among Republicans, and (3) eclipsed by exposure to legitimate political news media and politicians. Finally, they find "no evidence of a meaningful relationship between exposure to the Russian foreign influence campaign and changes in attitudes, polarization, or voting behavior." As such, despite its mass dissemination during the 2016 Presidential Elections, online fake news or disinformation probably did not cost Hillary Clinton the votes needed to secure the presidency.
Research on this topic is continuing, and some evidence is less clear. For example, internet access and time spent on social media does not appear correlated with polarisation. Further, misinformation appears not to significantly change political knowledge of those exposed to it. There seems to be a higher level of diversity of news sources that users are exposed to on Facebook and Twitter than conventional wisdom would dictate, as well as a higher frequency of cross-spectrum discussion. Other evidence has found that disinformation campaigns rarely succeed in altering the foreign policies of the targeted states.
Research is also challenging because disinformation is meant to be difficult to detect and some social media companies have discouraged outside research efforts. For example, researchers found disinformation made "existing detection algorithms from traditional news media ineffective or not applicable...[because disinformation] is intentionally written to mislead readers...[and] users' social engagements with fake news produce data that is big, incomplete, unstructured, and noisy." Facebook, the largest social media company, has been criticized by analytical journalists and scholars for preventing outside research of disinformation.
Alternative perspectives and critiques: Researchers have criticized the framing of disinformation as being limited to technology platforms, removed from its wider political context and inaccurately implying that the media landscape was otherwise well-functioning. "The field possesses a simplistic understanding of the effects of media technologies; overemphasizes platforms and underemphasizes politics; focuses too much on the United States and Anglocentric analysis; has a shallow understanding of political culture and culture in general; lacks analysis of race, class, gender, and sexuality as well as status, inequality, social structure, and power; has a thin understanding of journalistic processes; and, has progressed more through the exigencies of grant funding than the development of theory and empirical findings."
Alternative perspectives have been proposed:
Moving beyond fact-checking and media literacy to study a pervasive phenomenon as something that involves more than news consumption.
Moving beyond technical solutions including AI-enhanced fact checking to understand the systemic basis of disinformation.
Develop a theory that goes beyond Americentrism to develop a global perspective, understand cultural imperialism and Third World dependency on Western news, and understand disinformation in the Global South.
Develop market-oriented disinformation research that examines the financial incentives and business models that nudge content creators and digital platforms to circulate disinformation online.
Include a multidisciplinary approach, involving history, political economy, ethnic studies, feminist studies, and science and technology studies.
Develop understandings of Gendered-based disinformation (GBD) defined as "the dissemination of false or misleading information attacking women (especially political leaders, journalists and public figures), basing the attack on their identity as women."
Strategies for spreading disinformation:
Disinformation attack: The research literature on how disinformation spreads is growing. Studies show that disinformation spread in social media can be classified into two broad stages: seeding and echoing. "Seeding," when malicious actors strategically insert deceptions, like fake news, into a social media ecosystem, and "echoing" is when the audience disseminates disinformation argumentatively as their own opinions often by incorporating disinformation into a confrontational fantasy. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disinformation | Develop market-oriented disinformation research that examines the financial incentives and business models that nudge content creators and digital platforms to circulate disinformation online.
Include a multidisciplinary approach, involving history, political economy, ethnic studies, feminist studies, and science and technology studies.
Develop understandings of Gendered-based disinformation (GBD) defined as "the dissemination of false or misleading information attacking women (especially political leaders, journalists and public figures), basing the attack on their identity as women."
Strategies for spreading disinformation:
Disinformation attack: The research literature on how disinformation spreads is growing. Studies show that disinformation spread in social media can be classified into two broad stages: seeding and echoing. "Seeding," when malicious actors strategically insert deceptions, like fake news, into a social media ecosystem, and "echoing" is when the audience disseminates disinformation argumentatively as their own opinions often by incorporating disinformation into a confrontational fantasy.
Internet manipulation: Studies show four main methods of seeding disinformation online:
Selective censorship
Manipulation of search rankings
Hacking and releasing
Directly Sharing Disinformation
See also:
Notes:
References:
Further reading: Bittman, Ladislav (1985), The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View, Pergamon-Brassey's, ISBN 978-0-08-031572-0
Boghardt, Thomas (26 January 2010), "Operation INFEKTION – Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign" (PDF), Studies in Intelligence, 53 (4), retrieved 9 December 2016
Golitsyn, Anatoliy (1984), New Lies for Old: The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation, Dodd, Mead & Company, ISBN 978-0-396-08194-4
O'Connor, Cailin, and James Owen Weatherall, "Why We Trust Lies: The most effective misinformation starts with seeds of truth", Scientific American, vol. 321, no. 3 (September 2019), pp. 54–61.
Ion Mihai Pacepa and Ronald J. Rychlak (2013), Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism, WND Books, ISBN 978-1-936488-60-5
Fletcher Schoen; Christopher J. Lamb (1 June 2012), "Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic. Communications: How One Interagency Group. Made a Major Difference" (PDF), Strategic Perspectives, 11, retrieved 9 December 2016
Shultz, Richard H.; Godson, Roy (1984), Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, Pergamon-Brassey's, ISBN 978-0080315737
Taylor, Adam (26 November 2016), "Before 'fake news,' there was Soviet 'disinformation'", The Washington Post, retrieved 3 December 2016
Legg, Heidi; Kerwin, Joe (1 November 2018), The Fight Against Disinformation in the U.S.: A Landscape Analysis, Harvard Kennedy School, Shorenstein Center, retrieved 10 August 2020
External links:
Disinformation Archived 25 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine – a learning resource from the British Library including an interactive movie and activities.
MediaWell – an initiative of the nonprofit Social Science Research Council seeking to track and curate disinformation, misinformation, and fake news research. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Divide and rule | Definition: The use of this technique is meant to empower the sovereign to control subjects, populations, or factions of different interests, who collectively might be able to oppose its rule. Niccolò Machiavelli identifies a similar application to military strategy, advising in Book VI of The Art of War (1521). a captain should endeavour with every act to divide the forces of the enemy. Machiavelli advises that this act should be achieved either by making him suspicious of his men in whom he trusted, or by giving him cause that he has to separate his forces, and, because of this, become weaker.
The maxim divide et impera has been attributed to Philip II of Macedon. It was utilised by the Roman ruler Julius Caesar and the French emperor Napoleon (together with the maxim divide ut regnes).
The strategy of division and rule has been attributed to sovereigns, ranging from Louis XI of France to the House of Habsburg. Edward Coke denounces it in Chapter I of the Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England, reporting that when it was demanded by the Lords and Commons what might be a principal motive for them to have good success in Parliament, it was answered: "Eritis insuperabiles, si fueritis inseparabiles. Explosum est illud diverbium: Divide, & impera, cum radix & vertex imperii in obedientium consensu rata sunt." ("You would be invincible if you were inseparable. This proverb, Divide and rule, has been rejected, since the root and the summit of authority are confirmed by the consent of the subjects.")
In a minor variation, Sir Francis Bacon wrote the phrase as separa et impera in a letter to James I of 15 February 1615. James Madison made this recommendation in a letter to Thomas Jefferson of 24 October 1787, which summarized the thesis of The Federalist#10:
Divide et impera is the third of three political maxims in Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace (1795), Appendix I, the others being Fac et excusa ("Act now, and make excuses later") and Si fecisti, nega ("If you commit a crime, deny it"): "Divide et impera, the reprobated axiom of tyranny, is under certain (some) qualifications, the only policy, by which a republic can be administered on just principles." Kant refers this tactic when describing the traits of a "political moralist."
Historical examples:
Asia: While the Mongols imported Central Asian Muslims to serve as administrators in China, the Mongols also sent Han Chinese and Khitans from China to serve as administrators over the Muslim population in Bukhara in Central Asia, using foreigners to curtail the power of the local peoples of both lands.
Some Indian historians, such as politician Shashi Tharoor, assert that the British Raj frequently used this tactic to consolidate their rule and prevent the emergence of the Indian independence movement, citing Lord Elphinstone who said that "Divide et impera was the old Roman maxim, and it should be ours." A Times Literary Supplement review by British historian Jon Wilson suggests that although this was broadly the case a more nuanced approach might be closer to the facts. On the other hand, Proponents of Hindutva, the ideology of the current and recent Indian governments over the years, stress strongly Hindu-Muslim conflict going back centuries before the arrival of the British.
The classic nationalist position was expressed by the Indian jurist and supporter of Indian reunification Markandey Katju, who wrote in the Pakistani paper The Nation in 2013:
Up to 1857, there were no communal problems in India; all communal riots and animosity began after 1857. No doubt even before 1857, there were differences between Hindus and Muslims, the Hindus going to temples and the Muslims going to mosques, but there was no animosity. In fact, the Hindus and Muslims used to help each other; Hindus used to participate in Eid celebrations, and Muslims in Holi and Diwali. The Muslim rulers like the Mughals, Nawab of Awadh and Murshidabad, Tipu Sultan, etc. were totally secular; they organised Ramlilas, participated in Holi, Diwali, etc. Ghalib's affectionate letters to his Hindu friends like Munshi Shiv Naraln Aram, Har Gopal Tofta, etc. attest to the affection between Hindus and Muslims at that time. In 1857, the ‘Great Mutiny’ broke out in which the Hindus and Muslims jointly fought against the British. This shocked the British government so much that after suppressing the Mutiny, they decided to start the policy of divide and rule (see online "History in the Service of Imperialism" by B.N. Pande). All communal riots began after 1857, artificially engineered by the British authorities. The British collector would secretly call the Hindu Pandit, pay him money, and tell him to speak against Muslims, and similarly he would secretly call the Maulvi, pay him money, and tell him to speak against Hindus. This communal poison was injected into our body politic year after year and decade after decade.
Historian John Keay takes a contrary position regarding British policy, writing:
Stock accusations of a wider Machiavellian intent to 'divide and rule' and to 'stir up Hindu-Muslim animosity' assume some premonition of a later partition. They make little sense in the contemporary context. 'Divide and rule' as a governing precept supposes the pre-existence of an integrated entity. In an India politically united only by British rule – and not yet even by the opposition which it generated – such a thing did not exist. Division was a fact of life. As Maulana Muhammad Ali would later put it, 'we divide and you rule'. Without recognising, exploring and accommodating such division, British dominion in India would have been impossible to establish, let alone sustain. Provoking sectarian conflict, on the other hand, was rarely in British interest.
General S.K. Sinha, former Vice-Chief of Army Staff, writes that contrary to what the notion of divide and rule would predict, the British Indian Army was effectively integrated:
The undivided army was a unique institution set up by the British in India... [A]ll combat units, except Gorkhas and Garhwalis, had a mixed combination of Muslims and non-Muslims. They fought wars together and lived as friendly comrades in peace, owing loyalty to their regiments. Political developments with the emergency of the Congress and the Muslim League did not affect them. The Indian Army was totally apolitical till June 3rd 1947... In fact, during the Partition holocaust and till that date, both Muslim and non-Muslim soldiers remained totally impartial in dealing with communal violence. After June 3, 1947 things started changing.
French Algeria:
Ottoman Empire: The Ottoman Empire often used a divide-and-rule strategy, pitting Armenians and Kurds against each other. This strategy no longer worked in the Republic of Turkey because the Armenians were eliminated in the Armenian genocide.
Europe: Herodotus, (Histories, 5.3) claimed that the Thracians would be the strongest nation in the world if they were united.
Athenian historian Thucydides in his book History of the Peloponnesian War claimed that Alcibiades recommended to Persian statesman Tissaphernes, to weaken both Athens and Sparta for his own Persian's benefit. Alcibiades, suggested to Tissaphernes that 'The cheapest plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a small share of the expense and without risk to himself.
Tacitus in Germania. chapter 33 writes "Long, I pray, may foreign nations persist in hating one another .... and fortune can bestow on us no better gift than discord among our foes."
The Romans invaded the Kingdom of Macedonia from the south and defeated King Perseus in the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC. Macedonia was then divided into four republics that were heavily restricted from relations with one another and other Hellenic states. A ruthless purge occurred, with allegedly anti-Roman citizens being denounced by their compatriots and forcibly deported in large numbers.
During the Gallic Wars, Caesar was able to use a divide and conquer strategy to easily defeat the Gauls, exploiting their fractious nature of their tribal society. Although the remaining Gauls were later united under Vercingetorix their resistance was not enough to stop the conquest.
In Revolutions of 1848, the governments which were being revolted against used this tactic to counter the rebels.
The Salami strategy of Hungarian Communist leader, Mátyás Rákosi.
The colonial authorities in British Cyprus often stirred up the Turkish minority in order to neutralize agitation from the Greek majority. This policy intentionally cultivated further animosity between the already divided Greek majority and the Turkish minority (which consists of 18% of the population) in the island that remains divided to this day after an invasion by Turkey to establish the state of North Cyprus (which is only diplomatically recognized by Turkey).
The partition of Ireland in 1921 has been claimed as an intentional implementation of this strategy by David Lloyd George, although the religious divisions in Ireland were notorious and of long standing. The Stanford historian Priya Satia claims that the partition of Ireland was in ways a patch-test for the partition of India in 1947. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Divide and rule | In Revolutions of 1848, the governments which were being revolted against used this tactic to counter the rebels.
The Salami strategy of Hungarian Communist leader, Mátyás Rákosi.
The colonial authorities in British Cyprus often stirred up the Turkish minority in order to neutralize agitation from the Greek majority. This policy intentionally cultivated further animosity between the already divided Greek majority and the Turkish minority (which consists of 18% of the population) in the island that remains divided to this day after an invasion by Turkey to establish the state of North Cyprus (which is only diplomatically recognized by Turkey).
The partition of Ireland in 1921 has been claimed as an intentional implementation of this strategy by David Lloyd George, although the religious divisions in Ireland were notorious and of long standing. The Stanford historian Priya Satia claims that the partition of Ireland was in ways a patch-test for the partition of India in 1947.
Colonialism: According to Richard Morrock, four tactics of divide and rule practiced by Western colonialists are:
The manufacture of differences within the targeted population;
The amplification of existing differences;
The use of these differences for the benefit of the colonial empire; and
The carry over of these differences into the post-colonial period.
Foreign policy: Divide and rule can be used by states to weaken enemy military alliances. This usually happens when propaganda or disinformation are disseminated within the enemy states in an attempt to raise doubts about the alliance. Once the alliance weakens or dissolves, a vacuum will allow the hostile state to achieve military dominance.
The divide and conquer strategy is similar to the notion of a Wedge strategy (diplomacy).
United States: Some analysts assert that the United States is practicing the strategy in the 21st-century Middle East through their supposed escalation of the Sunni–Shia conflict. British journalist Nafeez Ahmed cited a 2008 RAND Corporation study for the U.S Armed Forces which recommended "divide and rule" as a possible strategy against the Muslim world in "the Long War".
Israel: Professor Avner Cohen, a former Israeli religious affairs official, publicly acknowledged that Hamas was "Israel's creation." Similar statesments have been made by Yasser Arafat.
Assertions of Israeli support for Hamas date back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period marked by significant political upheaval in the Middle East. Former Israeli officials have openly acknowledged Israel's role in providing funding and assistance to Hamas as a means of undermining secular Palestinian factions such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, who served as the Israeli military governor in Gaza during the early 1980s, admitted to providing financial assistance to Muslim Brotherhood, the precursor of Hamas, on the instruction of the Israeli authorities. The aim of the support was to weaken leftist and secular Palestinian organizations.
Israel contributed to the construction of parts of Islamist politician Ahmed Yassin's network of mosques, clubs, and schools in Gaza, as well as the expansion of these institutions.
Shlomo Brom, retired general and former deputy to Israel's national security adviser, believes that an empowered Hamas helps Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu avoid negotiatings over a Palestinian state, suggesting that there is no viable partner for peace talks. Bezalel Smotrich, a far-right lawmaker and finance minister under Netanyahu Government, called the Palestinian Authority a "burden" and Hamas an "asset".
Russia: Contemporary Russian affairs have characteristics of a "divide and rule" strategy, too. Applied domestically to secure Vladimir Putin's power in Russia, it is used abroad in Russian disinformation campaigns to achieve "regime security, predominance in Russia’s near abroad, and world-power status for Russia".
Mexico:
Politics: In politics, the concept refers to a strategy that breaks up existing power structures, and especially prevents smaller power groups from linking up, causing rivalries and fomenting discord among the people to prevent a rebellion against the elites or the people implementing the strategy. The goal is either to pit the lower classes against themselves to prevent a revolution, or to provide a desired solution to the growing discord that strengthens the power of the elites.
The principle "divide et impera" is cited as a common in politics by Traiano Boccalini in La bilancia politica.
Economics: In economics, the concept is also mentioned as a strategy for market segmentation to get the most out of the players in a competitive market.
Psychopathy in the workplace: Clive R. Boddy found that "divide and conquer" was a common strategy by corporate psychopaths used as a smokescreen to help consolidate and advance their grip on power in the corporate hierarchy.
See also:
Ad hominem
Agent provocateur
Apartheid
Astroturfing
Black propaganda
Critical theory
Divide and conquer algorithm
False flag
Front organization
Cracking
Hate speech
Demographic engineering
Defeat in detail
Destabilisation
Identity politics
Overton window
Pork barrel
Promoting adversaries
Psychological warfare
Red herring
Right of conquest
Salami slicing tactics
Smear campaign
Smoke screen
Social exclusion
Social undermining
Strategy of tension
Triangulation (psychology)
Wedge issue
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfight | Etymology: The term dogfight has been used for centuries to describe a melee: a fierce, fast-paced battle at close quarters between two or more opponents. The term gained popularity during World War II, although its first use in reference to air combat can be traced to the latter years of World War I. One of the first written uses of the word in that sense was in an account of the death of Baron von Richthofen in The Graphic in May 1918: "The Baron joined the mêlée, which, scattering into groups, developed into what our men call a dog fight". On March 21, 1918, several British newspapers published an article by Frederic Cutlack in which the word was used in the modern sense: "A patrol of seven Australian machines on Saturday met about twenty of this [i.e., von Richthofen's] circus at 12,000 feet. Ten of the enemy dived to attack our men. A regular dogfight ensued for half a minute."
History:
Mexican Revolution: The first supposed instance of plane on plane combat and the first instance of one plane intercepting another during an aerial conflict apparently occurred during the Mexican Revolution on November 30, 1913, between two American mercenaries fighting for opposing sides, Dean Ivan Lamb and Phil Rader. The story comes from Lamb himself. According to his own statements in an interview two decades later, both men had orders to kill, but neither pilot wanted to harm the other, so they exchanged multiple volleys of pistol fire, intentionally missing before exhausting their supply of ammunition.
World War I: Dogfighting became widespread in World War I. Aircraft were initially used as mobile observation vehicles, and early pilots gave little thought to aerial combat. The new aeroplanes proved their worth by spotting the hidden German advance on Paris in the second month of the war.
Enemy pilots at first simply exchanged waves, or shook their fists at each other. Due to weight restrictions, only small weapons could be carried on board. Intrepid pilots decided to interfere with enemy reconnaissance by improvised means, including throwing bricks, grenades and sometimes rope, which they hoped would entangle the enemy plane's propeller. Pilots soon began firing hand-held guns at enemy planes, such as pistols and carbines. The first aerial dogfight of the war occurred during the Battle of Cer (August 15–24, 1914), when the Serbian aviator Miodrag Tomić encountered an Austro-Hungarian plane while performing a reconnaissance mission over Austro-Hungarian positions. The Austro-Hungarian pilot initially waved, and Tomić reciprocated. The Austro-Hungarian pilot then fired at Tomić with his revolver. Tomić managed to escape, and within several weeks, all Serbian and Austro-Hungarian planes were fitted with machine-guns. In August 1914, Staff-Captain Pyotr Nesterov, from Russia, became the first pilot to ram his plane into an enemy spotter aircraft. In October 1914, an airplane was shot down by a handgun from another plane for the first time over Reims, France. Once machine guns were mounted on the airplane, either on a flexible mounting or on the top wing of early biplanes, the era of air combat began.
The biggest problem was mounting a machine gun onto an aircraft so that it could be fired forward, through the propeller, and aimed by pointing the nose of the aircraft directly at the enemy. French aviator Roland Garros solved this problem by mounting steel deflector wedges on the propeller of a Morane Saulnier monoplane. He achieved three kills, but was forced down due to engine failure down behind enemy lines and captured before he could burn his plane to prevent it falling into enemy hands. The wreckage was brought to Anthony Fokker, a Dutch designer who built aircraft for the Germans. Fokker decided that the wedges were much too risky, and improved the design by connecting the trigger of an MG 08 Maxim machine gun to the timing of the engine. The invention of this synchronization gear in 1915 transformed air combat and gave the Germans an early air superiority with the Fokker E.I, the first synchronized, forward-firing fighter plane. On the evening of July 1, 1915, the very first aerial engagement by a fighter plane armed with a synchronized, forward-firing machine gun occurred just to the east of Luneville, France. The German Fokker E.I was flown by Lieutenant Kurt Wintgens, who shot down a French two-seat observation monoplane. Later that same month, on July 25, 1915, British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) Major Lanoe Hawker, flying a very early production Bristol Scout C., attacked three separate aircraft during a single sortie, shooting down two with a non-synchronizable Lewis gun which was mounted next to his cockpit at an outwards angle to avoid hitting the propeller. He forced the third one down, and was awarded the Victoria Cross.
Battles in the air increased as the technological advantage swung from the British to the Germans, then back again. The Feldflieger-Abteilung or "FFA", observation units of the German air service, consisted in 1914–15 of six two-seat observation aircraft each. Each unit was assigned to a particular German Army headquarters location, and had a single Fokker Eindecker aircraft assigned to each "FFA" unit for general defensive duties, so pilots such as Max Immelmann and Oswald Boelcke began as lone hunters with FFA units, shooting unarmed spotter planes and other enemy aircraft out of the sky. During the first part of the war, there was no tactical doctrine of air-to-air combat. Oswald Boelcke was the first to analyze the tactics of aerial warfare, resulting in a set of rules known as the Dicta Boelcke. Many of Boelcke's concepts from 1916 are still applied today, including the use of sun and altitude, surprise attack, and turning to meet a threat.
Brigadier General Hugh Trenchard ordered that all British reconnaissance aircraft be supported by at least three fighters, creating the first tactical formations in the air. The Germans responded by forming Jagdstaffel or Jastas, large squadrons of fighters solely dedicated to destroying enemy aircraft, under the supervision of Boelcke. Pilots who shot down five or more fighters became known as aces. One of the most famous dogfights, resulting in the death of Major Hawker, is described by the "Red Baron", Manfred von Richthofen:
I WAS extremely proud when, one fine day, I was informed that the airman whom I had brought down on the twenty- third of November, 1916, was the English [equivalent of] Immelmann....
First we circled twenty times to the left, and then thirty times to the right. Each tried to get behind and above the other. Soon I discovered that I was not meeting a beginner. He had not the slightest intention of breaking off the fight. He was traveling in a machine which turned beautifully. However, my own was better at rising than his, and I succeeded at last in getting above and beyond my English waltzing partner.
... The impertinent fellow was full of cheek and when we had got down to about 3,000 feet he merrily waved to me as if he would say, "Well, how do you do?"
The circles which we made around one another were so narrow that their diameter was probably no more than 250 or 300 feet. I had time to take a good look at my opponent....
When he had come down to about three hundred feet he tried to escape by flying in a zig-zag course during which, as is well known, it is difficult for an observer to shoot. That was my most favorable moment. I followed him at an altitude of from two hundred and fifty feet to one hundred and fifty feet, firing all the time. The Englishman could not help falling. But the jamming of my gun nearly robbed me of my success.
My opponent fell, shot through the head, one hundred and fifty feet behind our line.
Despite the Germans' early lead in combat tactics and their 'Dicta Boelcke', the Allies were quick to adapt and develop their own tactics. The Royal Flying Corps' Albert Ball was one of a band of pilots who liked to fly solo and he developed 'stalking' tactics for going after enemy two-seaters. He even used his Lewis gun in its top-wing adjustable Foster mounting to fire upwards into the underside of unsuspecting enemy aircraft. Other RFC pilots such as James McCudden and Mick Mannock emphasised mutual support and the advantages of attacking from height. Mannock expressed this in a list of aerial combat rules that were similar to Boelcke's.
During 1916, aerial reconnaissance patrols were usually unaccompanied as there had been few if any aerial disputes between the belligerents. However, just as the Sinai and Palestine Campaign ground war on the Gaza to Beersheba line came to resemble trench warfare on the western front, the air war over southern Palestine also came to resemble that being fought over France. After the Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917 and during the ensuing Stalemate in Southern Palestine, the concentration of Egyptian Expeditionary (EEF) and Ottoman Army forces holding established front lines grew, as associated supply dumps and lines of communications were developed. The need for information about these installations fuelled "intense rivalry in the air". |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfight | Other RFC pilots such as James McCudden and Mick Mannock emphasised mutual support and the advantages of attacking from height. Mannock expressed this in a list of aerial combat rules that were similar to Boelcke's.
During 1916, aerial reconnaissance patrols were usually unaccompanied as there had been few if any aerial disputes between the belligerents. However, just as the Sinai and Palestine Campaign ground war on the Gaza to Beersheba line came to resemble trench warfare on the western front, the air war over southern Palestine also came to resemble that being fought over France. After the Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917 and during the ensuing Stalemate in Southern Palestine, the concentration of Egyptian Expeditionary (EEF) and Ottoman Army forces holding established front lines grew, as associated supply dumps and lines of communications were developed. The need for information about these installations fuelled "intense rivalry in the air". Aerial reconnaissance patrols were regularly attacked, so all photography and artillery observation patrols had to be accompanied by armed escort aircraft. These special EEF patrols grew into squadrons, attacking hostile aircraft wherever they were found, either in the air or on the ground. However, the technically superior German aircraft shot down numbers of EEF aircraft during dog fights.
By the end of the war, the underpowered machines from just ten years prior had been transformed into fairly powerful, swift, and heavily armed fighter planes, and the basic tactics of dogfighting had been established.
Spanish Civil War: Airplane technology rapidly increased in sophistication after World War I. By 1936, dogfighting was thought to be a thing of the past, since aircraft were reaching top speeds of over 250 miles per hour (400 km/h). The experiences of the Spanish Civil War proved this theory was wrong.
At the beginning of the war, new tactics were developed, most notably in the Luftwaffe Condor Legion. Lieutenant Werner Mölders advised abandoning the standard "V" formation used in combat, and pairing fighters in twos, starting the practice of having a wingman at one's side. He advised that pairs of aircraft approaching a fight should increase the distance between them instead of holding tight formations, a precursor to the combat spread maneuver. He also started the practice of training pilots to fly at night, and with instruments only. Using the new tactics, and flying the newest Bf 109 fighters, the Germans shot down 22 Spanish Republican fighters within a five-day period, suffering no losses of their own.
World War II:
Strategies for fighter development: During the 1930s two different schools of thought about air-to-air combat began to emerge, resulting in two different trends of monoplane fighter development. In Japan and Italy especially, there continued to be a strong belief that lightly armed, highly maneuverable single seat fighters would still play a primary role in air-to-air combat. Aircraft such as the Nakajima Ki-27 and Nakajima Ki-43 and the Mitsubishi A6M Zero in Japan, and the Fiat G.50 and Macchi C.200 in Italy epitomised a generation of monoplanes designed to this concept.
The other stream of thought, which emerged primarily in Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States was the belief the high speeds of modern combat aircraft and the g-forces imposed by aerial combat meant that dogfighting in the classic WWI sense would be impossible. Fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109, the Supermarine Spitfire, the Yakovlev Yak-1, and the Curtiss P-40 were all designed for high speeds and a good rate of climb. Good maneuverability was not a primary objective.
Immediately following the Spanish Civil War came World War II, during which dogfighting was most prevalent. It was widely believed that strategic bombing alone was synonymous with air power; a fallacy that would not be fully understood until Vietnam. After the failings in Spain, a greater emphasis was placed on the accuracy of air-to-ground attacks. The need to stop bombers from reaching their targets, or to protect them on their missions, was the primary purpose for most dogfights of the era.
Dogfighting over Europe: Dogfighting was very prominent in the European theatre. While the French Air Force was a major force during World War I, it was inadequate and poorly organized, and quickly fell to the German onslaught. As the first battles between the Germans and the British began, the power of the German's anti-aircraft artillery became readily apparent, with 88 millimeter shells capable of firing 40,000 feet (12,000 m) in the air. General Wolfram von Richthofen noted that these guns were equally destructive when used for ground fire. Adolph Malan compiled a list of aerial combat rules that were widely taught to RAF pilots. The Bf 109 and the Spitfire were some of the most common fighters used in the European theater.
A typical dogfight is described by an unnamed pilot:
Pulling up into his blind spot I watched his plane grow larger and larger in my sight. But this German pilot was not content to fly straight and level. Before I could open fire his plane slewed to the right, and seeing me on his tail, he jerked back on the stick into the only defensive maneuver his plane could make. I banked my 47 over to the right and pulled back on the stick, striving to get him once more into my ring sight. The violent maneuver applied terrific G's to my body, and I started to black out as the blood rushed from my head. Fighting every second to overcome this blackness about me, I pulled back on the stick, further and further, so that the enemy would just show at the bottom of my ring sight to allow for the correct deflection.
We were both flying in a tight circle. Just a little more and I'll have him. Pressing the [trigger] I waited expectantly for the 109 to explode. I've hit his wing. A section two-feet long broke loose from the right wing as the machine gun cut like a machete through it. Too low, a little more rudder and the bullets will find his cockpit. I could see occasional strikes further up the wing, but it was too late. The 109, sensing that I was inside him on the turn, slunk into a nearby cloud. Straightening my plane, I climbed over the top of the bank, and poised on the other side, waiting for him to appear. But the 109 did not appear, and not wishing to tempt the gods of fate further, I pushed my stick forward, entered the protective cover of the clouds, and headed home.
Soviet fighters: During this time, three new Russian fighters, the LaGG-1, the Yak-1, and the MiG-3 were just coming off of the production line. The Soviet Air Defense Force had been fraught with problems since World War I. The German Barbarossa offensive on June 22, 1941, destroyed more than 2000 Soviet aircraft on the first day, and more than 5000 before October. With great desperation, the Soviets fought in dogfights over Leningrad, Moscow, and Ukraine for more than a year.
Fireteam, a triple of aircraft ("troika"), has been the main tactical unit used in battles since the beginning of World War II. The analysis and synthesis of fighting experience resulted in a conclusion that group tactics should have been rejected and replaced by action pairs. However, ramming an opponent was still a common practice among the pilots of the Soviet Union. Another successful maneuver was a "Sokolinnyi udar" (falcon punch) when a pilot obtained a speed advantage by swooping down on an opponent, characteristically from the direction of the sun in order to hide their fighter within the glare of the brilliant light before and during the attack. This maneuver and many other tactical principles were introduced by Alexander Pokryshkin, one of the greatest tacticians of the Soviet Air Force who showed his worth during World War II. His famous motto sounded as "Height, speed, maneuver, fire!". It became popular in the air armies and was adopted by pilots.
Struggling with morale problems, the Soviets slowly and methodically began to regain air supremacy after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943. This theater is notable for including the only female fighter aces in history, Yekaterina Budanova and Lydia Litvyak.
Second Sino-Japanese War: The Second Sino-Japanese War began on June 7, 1937, between China and Japan. The Japanese used the Mitsubishi A5M; the predecessor of the famous "Zero", which was a very lightweight and maneuverable fighter. The Chinese mainly used Russian biplanes similar to those from WWI, such as the Polikarpov I-15 and early monoplanes such as I-16. Despite being much lower in power and speed than the Japanese planes, the Chinese planes were much more maneuverable, and many dogfights ensued, resulting in high losses reported on both sides. Reports of dogfights that made it to the U.S. military provided valuable insight into the Japanese tactics and their plane's flight characteristics.
United States and Japan: After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States entered the war. The Japanese used, among other aircraft, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, an extremely lightweight fighter known for its exceptional range and maneuverability. The U.S. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfight | The Japanese used the Mitsubishi A5M; the predecessor of the famous "Zero", which was a very lightweight and maneuverable fighter. The Chinese mainly used Russian biplanes similar to those from WWI, such as the Polikarpov I-15 and early monoplanes such as I-16. Despite being much lower in power and speed than the Japanese planes, the Chinese planes were much more maneuverable, and many dogfights ensued, resulting in high losses reported on both sides. Reports of dogfights that made it to the U.S. military provided valuable insight into the Japanese tactics and their plane's flight characteristics.
United States and Japan: After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States entered the war. The Japanese used, among other aircraft, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, an extremely lightweight fighter known for its exceptional range and maneuverability. The U.S. military tested the Akutan Zero, a Mitsubishi A6M2 which was captured intact in 1942, advising – along the same lines that General Claire Chennault, commander of the Kunming-based Flying Tigers had already advised his pilots over a year before – "Never attempt to dogfight a Zero." Even though its engine was rather low in power, the Zero had very low wing loading characteristics, a small turn radius, a top speed over 330 mph (530 km/h), and could climb better than any fighter used by the U.S. at that time, although it was poorly armored compared to U.S. aircraft.
A pilot who realized that new tactics had to be devised was Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy" Thach, commander of Fighting Three in San Diego. He read the early reports coming out of China and wrestled with the problem of his F4F Wildcats being relatively slower and much less maneuverable than the Japanese planes. Using matchsticks on his kitchen table, he devised a defensive maneuver he called "beam defense position", but commonly called the "Thach Weave". Thach reasoned that, because the Zero had fabric wing-covers that tended to "balloon" at speeds above 295 mph, which made the plane very hard to turn, he could use high speed and a formation of four planes, consisting of two pairs of aircraft, flying line-abreast (side by side at the same altitude). Keeping the leader of each pair in close formation with their wingman, the pairs could fly about 200 feet (61 m) apart (the turn radius of the Wildcat) and adopt a weaving formation when either or both pairs fell under attack by Japanese fighters, allowing each pair to evade the attack while at the same time covering the other pair. Thach made a diagram of the idea and showed it to other pilots, but in trial-runs people like Butch O'Hare found it difficult to make the shot while, at the same time, evading the two friendly planes coming at him head on.
Thach later faced the A6M Zero during the Battle of Midway, in June 1942, for the test of his theory. Although outnumbered, he found that a Zero would lock onto the tail of one of the fighters. In response, the two planes would turn toward each other, with one plane's path crossing in front of the other. More importantly, the pursuer would have to follow that path to maintain pursuit, also crossing in front of the American plane's sights. Thus, when the Zero followed its original target through the turn it would come into a position to be fired on by the target's wingman, and the predator would become the prey. His tactic proved to be effective and was soon adopted by other squadrons. The Thach Weave helped make up for the inferiority of the US planes in maneuverability and numbers, until new aircraft could be brought into service. This tactic later morphed into the more fluid and versatile "loose-deuce maneuvering" that was to prove useful in the Vietnam war.
Another effective maneuver used by the U.S. pilots was a simple break, which consisted of turning sharply across an attacker's flight path, which worked well in part because the large nose of the Zero tended to obstruct the pilot's view. Still another good tactic was a high-side guns pass, which consisted of diving upon the Zero, shooting in one high-speed pass, and using the speed to climb back above the fight to dive again. By 1943 the U.S. began to produce planes that were better matched against the Japanese planes, such as the
Grumman F6F Hellcat, and the Vought F4U Corsair.
Technology: Technology advanced extremely fast during World War II in ways that would change dogfighting forever. Jet propulsion had been demonstrated long before the war, by German engineer Hans von Ohain in 1934, and by British engineer Frank Whittle in 1937. The Messerschmitt Me 262 was the first jet fighter to be used in battle, with a speed over 500 mph (800 km/h), and began taking a toll on Allied bombing missions in 1944. The British were testing a jet that same year, the Gloster Meteor, which would later see action in the Korean War. Although U.S. General Hap Arnold test flew the XP-59A in 1942, the plane was never used in combat. Other prime inventions of the era include radar and air-to-air missiles.
Propaganda: Enemy pilots were construed as weak and evil. For example, in World War II, describing the Soviet tactics, the Luftwaffe claimed that, "The characteristic feature of the average Soviet fighter pilot were a tendency toward caution and reluctance instead of toughness and stamina, brute strength instead of genuine combat efficiency, abysmal hatred instead of fairness and chivalry...."
Korean War: After World War II, the question began to rise about the future usefulness of fighter aircraft. This was especially true for the U.S., where the focus was placed on small, fast, long-range bombers capable of delivering atomic bombs. The Korean War began in June 1950, and the North Koreans were outmatched by the U.S. Air Force. The war was nearly over by October, with the occupation of North Korea when, on November 1, Chinese MiG-15s attacked. The Chinese began supplying North Korea with troops and provisions, and the war quickly resumed.
At 100 mph (160 km/h) faster, the MiG-15 was more than a match for the U.S. P-80 Shooting Star, using the same dive and shoot tactic that the Americans found so useful against Japan. The U.S. jets had inferior weaponry, and suffered from problems with production and parts. The U.S. resorted to using mainly the more maneuverable propeller driven fighters during the war, such as the P-51 Mustang which was carried over from World War II.
To combat the MiGs, the F-86 Sabre was put into production. The U.S. pilots had a number of major advantages over the Chinese, including the G-suit. Chinese fighters were often seen spinning off out of control during a hard turn because the pilot had lost consciousness. Other technological advantages included the radar-ranging gunsight and hydraulic controls. Colonel Harrison R. Thyng remarked:
Suddenly you go into a steep turn. Your mach drops off. The MiG turns with you, and you let him gradually creep up and outturn you. At the critical moment you reverse your turn. The hydraulic controls [of the F-86] work beautifully. The MiG cannot turn as readily as you and is slung out to the side. When you pop your speedbrakes, the MiG flashes by you. Quickly closing the brakes, you slide onto his tail and hammer him with your "50s".
The Chinese were very competent in a dogfight, and large swirling battles were fought in the skies over Korea. However, it was highly suspected by many U.S. pilots that some of the opponents they faced over Korea were in fact well-trained Soviet pilots, whom the Americans referred to as "hanchos", (a Japanese word, meaning "bosses"). Major Robinson Risner recalls,
Seeing one another about the same time, the MiG flight and my flight dropped [our extra fuel] tanks.. He was so low he was throwing up small rocks. I dropped down to get him, but to hit him I had to get down in his jet wash. He'd chop the throttle and throw out his speed brakes. I would coast up beside him, wingtip to wingtip. When it looked like I was going to overshoot him, I would roll over the top and come down on the other side of him. When I did, he'd go into a hard turn, pulling all the Gs he could. This guy was one fantastic pilot.
The war in the air, however, eventually came to a stalemate as fighting ceased between the two factions. Later after the fall of the Soviet Union, Soviet records showed that Russian pilots
were indeed in the air. Sometimes in the fury of combat they reverted to the Russian language over the radio.
Vietnam War: The Vietnam War "was the first 'modern' air war" in which air-to-air missiles were the primary weapons during aerial combat, and was the only confrontation between the latest aerial and ground defense technologies between the Soviet Union and the United States. If U.S. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfight | I would coast up beside him, wingtip to wingtip. When it looked like I was going to overshoot him, I would roll over the top and come down on the other side of him. When I did, he'd go into a hard turn, pulling all the Gs he could. This guy was one fantastic pilot.
The war in the air, however, eventually came to a stalemate as fighting ceased between the two factions. Later after the fall of the Soviet Union, Soviet records showed that Russian pilots
were indeed in the air. Sometimes in the fury of combat they reverted to the Russian language over the radio.
Vietnam War: The Vietnam War "was the first 'modern' air war" in which air-to-air missiles were the primary weapons during aerial combat, and was the only confrontation between the latest aerial and ground defense technologies between the Soviet Union and the United States. If U.S. air power could successfully conduct war against Soviet doctrine and equipment in the skies over North Vietnam, then it could expect to successfully operate against the Soviet Union during a massive war in Europe. Over the skies of North Vietnam, U.S. aircraft would be attacking the "most formidable and most heavily defended targets in the history of aerial warfare".
By this time, dogfighting techniques had fallen out of favor in U.S. training doctrines, as missiles were considered to be all that was necessary to shoot down the big bombers expected to be deployed by the Soviet Union. As a result, air combat methods known by fighter pilots since World War I became all but lost as veterans from WWII and Korea retired and didn't pass them on to succeeding generations. American fighter pilots would meet in the skies in secret to engage in mock combat to try to maintain some level of proficiency. It wasn't until TOPGUN was established for the Navy in 1969 and Red Flag was started for the Air Force in 1975 that pilots were formally trained in dogfighting again.
Both U.S. and Soviet-built jet "fighters" were primarily designed as interceptors: intercepting bomber groups, and then shooting them down with air-to-air missiles. Neither party had a separate designation for interceptor, though: just "F" for fighter; "A" for attack; and "B" for bomber (for the NATO aircraft). With possibly a few exceptions, such as the F-8 Crusader and the F-100 Super Sabre, which each mounted four 20 mm cannons, jets were not designed for dog fighting other jet aircraft. Soviet doctrine called for their interceptors to be strictly vectored towards their targets by Ground Control Intercept (GCI) operators. As a consequence, U.S. RF-101 Voodoo aircraft conducting reconnaissance missions, or F-102 Delta Daggers, F-104 Starfighters performing MiGCAP duties, and the strike aircraft themselves, such as F-105 Thunderchiefs, A-4 Skyhawks, A-6 Intruders, F-4 Phantoms and B-52's flying over North Vietnam were met by MiG-17s (or Chicom J-5s), MiG-19s (Chicom J-6s), and MiG-21s being vectored directly to them by GCI operators who worked in conjunction with surface-to-air missile (SAM) crews. U.S. aircraft which successfully made it through the NVAF MiGs were then confronted with the SAMs and AAA batteries.
This triad defense system of GCI-controlled MiGs, Missiles (SAMs), and AAA enabled the North Vietnamese MiGs to utilize their aircraft's design capabilities as their designers had intended, that of, in the vernacular of the time, making "one pass, and then hauling ass", which was, in practice, quickly firing at their targets and then speeding away. By 1967 the Soviets had supplied the NVAF with enough missile-firing MiG-21s to allow the North Vietnamese to routinely engage U.S. aircraft, and to rely less and less on their aged MiG-17s, although many North Vietnamese pilots still preferred the MiG-17s agility and easy maintenance. With the arrival of the additional MiG-21s, and by 1969 MiG-19s (J-6s) imported from China, engagements between U.S. and NVAF jets became generally divided into two arenas; MiG-21s engaged at higher altitudes, while MiG-17s and MiG-19s would try to give battle at lower altitudes where their cannons were more effective.
At the conclusion of the air war in 1973, U.S. airmen had downed 202 communist MiGs, including two downed by B-52 tail gunners from their quad .50 caliber machine guns; this at a cost of 90 U.S. aircraft to NVAF MiGs. The USAF claimed 137 MiGs while the USN/USMC brought down 65 in air-to-air combat. From these figures, the USAF had 40 gun kills, and the USN claimed eight cannon victories. This number approached parity with the NVAF MiG's 37 gun kill figures.
Approximately 612 radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow missiles were fired during the war, scoring 56 MiG kills, while 454 heat-seeking AIM-9 Sidewinders were launched achieving 81 aerial victories. During Operation Rolling Thunder 54 AIM-4 Falcon missiles were fired, obtaining five kills. By contrast, NVAF MiG-21s obtained 53 air-to-air kills with their AA-2 "Atoll" missiles, from an unknown number of launchings. At least three MiG-21s, and all of the MiG-17s and MiG-19s (J-6s) made the remaining 37 kills, from their 90 total, with their 23 mm, 30 mm and 37 mm cannons.
As part of the North Vietnamese triad system of defense, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) had become an ever-increasing threat. U.S Air Force Brigadier General Robin Olds describes a typical encounter with surface-to-air missiles, which during a period of time in Vietnam was referred to as either a "MiG day" or a "Sam day", this was a Sam day.
Here come the SAMs. The trick is seeing the launch. You can see the steam. It goes straight up, turns more level, then the booster drops off. If it maintains a relatively stable position, it's coming right for you and you're in trouble. You're eager to make a move but can't. If you dodge too fast it will turn and catch you; if you wait too late it will explode near enough to get you. What you do at the right moment is poke your nose down, go down as hard as you can, pull maybe three negative Gs at 550 knots and once it follows you down, you go up as hard as you can. It can't follow that and goes under.
This passage from a USAF booklet explained a MiG day:
If you know a MiG-21 is in your area or you lose sight of one and want to find it again: Roll out wings level for 15 seconds, then look in your 6 o'clock about 1.5 miles. It will be there. Probably you'll see Mach 2 Atoll (air-to-air missile) smoke trail first before you see the MiG. But remember that's where the MiG-21 is! Just ask one of the 20 aircrews shot down during Linebacker that never knew they were under attack.
Arab–Israeli Wars: Dogfighting occurred in every war between Israel and her Arab neighbors between 1948 and 1985, including the 1948 Palestine war, the Sinai War in 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the 1982 Lebanon War.
Initially both sides relied on propeller planes, such as Spitfires, Avia S-199s, and P-51s, then progressed to older jets like MiG-15s, Dassault Mysteres and Dassault Mirages. In the latter wars dogfighting ensued between modern aircraft, like F-15s and F-16s against MiG-21s and MiG-25s. Although often outnumbered, the IAF was dominant in every conflict and in 1967 defeated the combined air forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In dogfights the IAF often achieved kill ratios ranging from 10:1 to over 20:1, which is usually attributed to the far superior training of Israeli pilots and a technological advantage.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 saw the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces engaged in large-scale aerial combat against each other for the first time since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. The war took place during the course of September 1965 and saw both air forces conduct defensive and offensive operations over Indian and Pakistani airspace. The aerial war saw both sides conducting thousands of sorties in a single month. Both sides claimed victory in the air war; India claimed to have destroyed 73 enemy aircraft and lost 35 of its own while Pakistan claimed to have destroyed 104 aircraft against its own losses of 19. Despite the intense fighting, India was able to shoot down around 18 PAF jets while losing 14 jets. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfight | Indo-Pakistani War of 1965: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 saw the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces engaged in large-scale aerial combat against each other for the first time since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. The war took place during the course of September 1965 and saw both air forces conduct defensive and offensive operations over Indian and Pakistani airspace. The aerial war saw both sides conducting thousands of sorties in a single month. Both sides claimed victory in the air war; India claimed to have destroyed 73 enemy aircraft and lost 35 of its own while Pakistan claimed to have destroyed 104 aircraft against its own losses of 19. Despite the intense fighting, India was able to shoot down around 18 PAF jets while losing 14 jets. Neutral sources mention India losing 75 and Pakistan lost 20 jets. In the first stage of War, 4 Indian Vampire Fighters were shot down by PAF F-86s on 1 September, while from Indian side, Indian Sqn. Ldr. Trevor Keeler with his Gnat took the first hit on 3 September 1965 by downing a Pakistani F-86 which got crashed in an uncontrollable dive. IAF Flt. Lt.V S Pathania took the first kill by his Gnat on 4 September 1965 by downing the Pakistani F-86 of Flt. Lt Bhatt who escaped to safe territory by parachute. PAF Sqn. Ldr. Muhammad Mahmood Alam, became highest flying ace by 5 confirmed and 4 probable kills. PAF Sqn. Ldr. Sarfraz Rafiqui who shot down 3 and Flt. Lt. Yunus were shot down in Halwara, Indian air base by fresh pilots with IAF Hawker Hunter Mk. 56. One Indian Gnat landed in Pakistan airbase accidentally due low on fuel and disoriented, now exhibited as war trophy in Pakistan Air Force Museum. After the war, PAF's loss rate was 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 per cent.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971: By late 1971, the intensification of the independence movement in erstwhile East Pakistan led to the Bangladesh Liberation War between India and Pakistan. On November 22, 1971, 10 days before the start of a full-scale war, four PAF F-86 Sabre jets attacked Indian and Mukti Bahini positions at Garibpur, near the international border. Two of the four PAF Sabres were shot down and one damaged by the IAF's Folland Gnats. On December 3, India formally declared war against Pakistan following massive preemptive strikes by the PAF against Indian Air Force installations in Srinagar, Ambala, Sirsa, Halwara and Jodhpur. However, the IAF did not suffer significantly because the leadership had anticipated such a move and precautions were taken. The Indian Air Force was quick to respond to Pakistani air strikes, following which the PAF carried out mostly defensive sorties.
Within the first two weeks, the IAF had carried out almost 12,000 sorties over East Pakistan and also provided close air support to the advancing Indian Army. The IAF also assisted the Indian Navy in its operations against the Pakistani Navy in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. On the western front, the IAF destroyed more than 20 Pakistani tanks, four APCs and a supply train during the Battle of Longewala. The IAF undertook strategic bombing of West Pakistan by carrying out raids on oil installations in Karachi, the Mangla Dam and a gas plant in Sindh. A similar strategy was also deployed in East Pakistan, and, as the IAF achieved complete air superiority on the eastern front, the ordnance factories, runways, and other vital areas of East Pakistan were severely damaged. By the time the Pakistani forces surrendered, the IAF had destroyed 94 PAF aircraft. The IAF was able to conduct a wide range of missions – troop support; air combat; deep penetration strikes; para-dropping behind enemy lines; feints to draw enemy fighters away from the actual target; bombing; and reconnaissance. In contrast, the Pakistan Air Force, which was solely focused on air combat, was blown out of the subcontinent's skies within the first week of the war. Those PAF aircraft that survived took refuge at Iranian air bases or in concrete bunkers, refusing to offer a fight. Hostilities officially ended at 14:30 GMT on December 17, after the fall of Dacca on December 15. India claimed large gains of territory in West Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war), and the independence of Pakistan's East wing as Bangladesh was confirmed. The IAF had flown over 16,000 sorties on both East and West fronts; including sorties by transport aircraft and helicopters. while the PAF flew about 30 and 2,840. More than 80 percent of the IAF's sorties were close-support and interdiction, and according to neutral assessments about 45 IAF aircraft were lost while, Pakistan lost 75 aircraft. Not including any F-6s, Mirage IIIs, or the six Jordanian F-104s which failed to return to their donors. But the imbalance in air losses was explained by the IAF's considerably higher sortie rate, and its emphasis on ground-attack missions. On the ground Pakistan suffered most, with 9,000 killed and 25,000 wounded while India lost 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. The loss of armoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced. This represented a major defeat for Pakistan. Towards the end of the war, IAF's transport planes dropped leaflets over Dhaka urging the Pakistani forces to surrender, demoralising Pakistani troops in East Pakistan.
Gulf of Sidra Incidents: On August 19, 1981, two Grumman F-14 Tomcats of the V-84 Jolly Rogers engaged two Libyan Air Force Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter's over the Gulf of Sidra. One Su-22 opened fire on the F-14 but missed. The F-14s destroyed the Su-22 Fitters using AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles; both pilots of the destroyed Su-22 planes ejected.
Later, on January 4, 1989, a similar engagement occurred between two F-14s and MiG-23 Floggers.
Falklands War: The Falklands War began on April 2, 1982, when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, and then the island of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, which were small disputed dependencies. Because Britain had no military bases nearby and few aircraft carriers, the Argentinians did not expect a response from Britain. On April 5, the British sent carriers to the Falklands with Sea Harrier 'Jump-jets' on board. The Harrier was originally designed as a ground-attack plane, and was not equipped for dogfighting, so the aircraft had to undergo many modifications and the pilots given extra training.
The Argentinians had superior numbers, but their forces mainly consisted of older jets from the 1960s, such as Dassault Mirage IIIs and Israeli Daggers. The Argentinians were also handicapped by the long distance from mainland airfields and a lack of refueling tankers. Neither side was ready for war, but both prepared all through April as diplomacy failed. The fighting started on May 1, and was to become the largest naval and air conflict since World War II. By the end of the war, Argentina lost 20 fighters in dogfights, while Britain lost two Sea Harrier to ground fire. The Americans supplied late model Sidewinder missiles to the British; this and the analysis of French Mirage combat tactics made the difference. As of March 2019 David Morgan was the last British pilot to have fought a dogfight when he downed two Argentinian jets on June 8, 1982.
Iran–Iraq War and helicopter dogfight: In the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988, many dogfights occurred between the Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) and Iraqi Air Force. During the early years of the war, the IRIAF enjoyed air superiority (see for example Operation Sultan 10 and Operation Morvarid); however, by the end of the war and partly due to embargos, the Iranian Air Force had lost its superiority due to their increasingly outdated equipment and the lack of spare parts for their US-made aircraft. Iraq, meanwhile, continued to introduce new French and Soviet weapons into its air force.
The Iran–Iraq War also saw the worlds only confirmed helicopter dogfights, with Iranian Army Aviation's AH-1J Internationals (usually the TOW-capable ones) entering combat mostly against Iraqi Army Air Corps' Mil Mi-24 Hind gunships and HOT-armed Aérospatiale Gazelles. The Hinds proved faster and more robust, while the AH-1Js were more agile. The results of the skirmishes are disputed. There were also engagements between Iranian AH-1Js and Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft: using their 20 mm cannon, the AH-1Js scored three confirmed kills against MiG-21s, claimed an Su-20, and shared in the destruction of a MiG-23. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfight | Iraq, meanwhile, continued to introduce new French and Soviet weapons into its air force.
The Iran–Iraq War also saw the worlds only confirmed helicopter dogfights, with Iranian Army Aviation's AH-1J Internationals (usually the TOW-capable ones) entering combat mostly against Iraqi Army Air Corps' Mil Mi-24 Hind gunships and HOT-armed Aérospatiale Gazelles. The Hinds proved faster and more robust, while the AH-1Js were more agile. The results of the skirmishes are disputed. There were also engagements between Iranian AH-1Js and Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft: using their 20 mm cannon, the AH-1Js scored three confirmed kills against MiG-21s, claimed an Su-20, and shared in the destruction of a MiG-23.
Persian Gulf War: In the Gulf War of 1990–91, dogfighting once again proved its usefulness when the Coalition Air Force had to face off against the Iraqi Air Force, which at the time was the fifth largest in the world. By the second day of the war, the Coalition achieved air superiority. Many dogfights occurred during the short conflict, often involving many planes. By the end of January, 1991, the term "furball" became a popular word to describe the hectic situation of many dogfights, occurring at the same time within the same relatively small airspace. By the end of the war, the U.S. claimed 39 Iraqi aircraft in air-to-air victories to the loss of only one F/A-18. Of the 39 victories, 36 were taken by F-15 Eagles.
Balkans conflict: During the Balkans conflict, in 1999 (the Kosovo War), five MiG-29s of the Yugoslav Air Force were shot down in dogfights with NATO aircraft. The first was on March 24, by a Dutch F-16AM Falcon, and two were downed on the same night by U.S. F-15s. A day later, two more MiG-29s were shot down by an F-16 and F-15.
Eritrean–Ethiopian War (1998–2000): The war became the first to see 4th-generation jet fighters battle with each other. Most of the losses to Eritrean MiG-29s were caused by dogfights with Ethiopian Su-27s.
2019 Indo-Pakistan aerial skirmish: A dogfight between Indian and Pakistani jets took place on 27 February 2019, when Pakistani Dassault Mirage Vs, Dassault Mirage IIIs and JF-17 Thunders performed airstrikes near Indian military installations at Indian Administered Kashmir in retaliation to the Balakot Airstrike, which was carried out by the IAF on 26 February 2019.
In the ensuing dogfight, an Indian MiG-21 Bison and an Su-30MKI were shot down by Pakistani F-16s after they entered Pakistani airspace across the Line of Control. However, India later on reportedly flew the same Su-30MKI on its Air Force Day in October 2019.
See also: Aerobatic maneuver
Battle of Britain
John Boyd (military strategist)
Erich Hartmann
Ghost of Kyiv
Immelmann turn
J-CATCH
List of aircraft shootdowns
Lufbery circle
Post–World War II air-to-air combat losses
Split S
The Scissors
Whifferdill turn
Explanatory footnotes: ^ Su-37 Flanker Report from Farnborough '96
References:
General and cited references: F. M. Cutlack (1941). "The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War, 1914–1918". Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 (11th ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 2012-10-09.
Hobson, Chris. Vietnam Air Losses: United States Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia 1961–1973. 2001, Midland Publishing. ISBN 1-85780-1156.
McCarthy, Donald J. MiG Killers: A Chronology of U.S. Air Victories in Vietnam 1965–1973. 2009, Specialty Press. ISBN 978-1-58007-136-9.
Michel, Marshall L. III. Clashes: Aircombat Over North Vietnam 1965–1973. 1997, Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-519-6.
Shaw, Robert L. (1985). Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-059-9.
External links:
Media related to Aerial combat at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfighting | Etymology: The term dogfight has been used for centuries to describe a melee: a fierce, fast-paced battle at close quarters between two or more opponents. The term gained popularity during World War II, although its first use in reference to air combat can be traced to the latter years of World War I. One of the first written uses of the word in that sense was in an account of the death of Baron von Richthofen in The Graphic in May 1918: "The Baron joined the mêlée, which, scattering into groups, developed into what our men call a dog fight". On March 21, 1918, several British newspapers published an article by Frederic Cutlack in which the word was used in the modern sense: "A patrol of seven Australian machines on Saturday met about twenty of this [i.e., von Richthofen's] circus at 12,000 feet. Ten of the enemy dived to attack our men. A regular dogfight ensued for half a minute."
History:
Mexican Revolution: The first supposed instance of plane on plane combat and the first instance of one plane intercepting another during an aerial conflict apparently occurred during the Mexican Revolution on November 30, 1913, between two American mercenaries fighting for opposing sides, Dean Ivan Lamb and Phil Rader. The story comes from Lamb himself. According to his own statements in an interview two decades later, both men had orders to kill, but neither pilot wanted to harm the other, so they exchanged multiple volleys of pistol fire, intentionally missing before exhausting their supply of ammunition.
World War I: Dogfighting became widespread in World War I. Aircraft were initially used as mobile observation vehicles, and early pilots gave little thought to aerial combat. The new aeroplanes proved their worth by spotting the hidden German advance on Paris in the second month of the war.
Enemy pilots at first simply exchanged waves, or shook their fists at each other. Due to weight restrictions, only small weapons could be carried on board. Intrepid pilots decided to interfere with enemy reconnaissance by improvised means, including throwing bricks, grenades and sometimes rope, which they hoped would entangle the enemy plane's propeller. Pilots soon began firing hand-held guns at enemy planes, such as pistols and carbines. The first aerial dogfight of the war occurred during the Battle of Cer (August 15–24, 1914), when the Serbian aviator Miodrag Tomić encountered an Austro-Hungarian plane while performing a reconnaissance mission over Austro-Hungarian positions. The Austro-Hungarian pilot initially waved, and Tomić reciprocated. The Austro-Hungarian pilot then fired at Tomić with his revolver. Tomić managed to escape, and within several weeks, all Serbian and Austro-Hungarian planes were fitted with machine-guns. In August 1914, Staff-Captain Pyotr Nesterov, from Russia, became the first pilot to ram his plane into an enemy spotter aircraft. In October 1914, an airplane was shot down by a handgun from another plane for the first time over Reims, France. Once machine guns were mounted on the airplane, either on a flexible mounting or on the top wing of early biplanes, the era of air combat began.
The biggest problem was mounting a machine gun onto an aircraft so that it could be fired forward, through the propeller, and aimed by pointing the nose of the aircraft directly at the enemy. French aviator Roland Garros solved this problem by mounting steel deflector wedges on the propeller of a Morane Saulnier monoplane. He achieved three kills, but was forced down due to engine failure down behind enemy lines and captured before he could burn his plane to prevent it falling into enemy hands. The wreckage was brought to Anthony Fokker, a Dutch designer who built aircraft for the Germans. Fokker decided that the wedges were much too risky, and improved the design by connecting the trigger of an MG 08 Maxim machine gun to the timing of the engine. The invention of this synchronization gear in 1915 transformed air combat and gave the Germans an early air superiority with the Fokker E.I, the first synchronized, forward-firing fighter plane. On the evening of July 1, 1915, the very first aerial engagement by a fighter plane armed with a synchronized, forward-firing machine gun occurred just to the east of Luneville, France. The German Fokker E.I was flown by Lieutenant Kurt Wintgens, who shot down a French two-seat observation monoplane. Later that same month, on July 25, 1915, British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) Major Lanoe Hawker, flying a very early production Bristol Scout C., attacked three separate aircraft during a single sortie, shooting down two with a non-synchronizable Lewis gun which was mounted next to his cockpit at an outwards angle to avoid hitting the propeller. He forced the third one down, and was awarded the Victoria Cross.
Battles in the air increased as the technological advantage swung from the British to the Germans, then back again. The Feldflieger-Abteilung or "FFA", observation units of the German air service, consisted in 1914–15 of six two-seat observation aircraft each. Each unit was assigned to a particular German Army headquarters location, and had a single Fokker Eindecker aircraft assigned to each "FFA" unit for general defensive duties, so pilots such as Max Immelmann and Oswald Boelcke began as lone hunters with FFA units, shooting unarmed spotter planes and other enemy aircraft out of the sky. During the first part of the war, there was no tactical doctrine of air-to-air combat. Oswald Boelcke was the first to analyze the tactics of aerial warfare, resulting in a set of rules known as the Dicta Boelcke. Many of Boelcke's concepts from 1916 are still applied today, including the use of sun and altitude, surprise attack, and turning to meet a threat.
Brigadier General Hugh Trenchard ordered that all British reconnaissance aircraft be supported by at least three fighters, creating the first tactical formations in the air. The Germans responded by forming Jagdstaffel or Jastas, large squadrons of fighters solely dedicated to destroying enemy aircraft, under the supervision of Boelcke. Pilots who shot down five or more fighters became known as aces. One of the most famous dogfights, resulting in the death of Major Hawker, is described by the "Red Baron", Manfred von Richthofen:
I WAS extremely proud when, one fine day, I was informed that the airman whom I had brought down on the twenty- third of November, 1916, was the English [equivalent of] Immelmann....
First we circled twenty times to the left, and then thirty times to the right. Each tried to get behind and above the other. Soon I discovered that I was not meeting a beginner. He had not the slightest intention of breaking off the fight. He was traveling in a machine which turned beautifully. However, my own was better at rising than his, and I succeeded at last in getting above and beyond my English waltzing partner.
... The impertinent fellow was full of cheek and when we had got down to about 3,000 feet he merrily waved to me as if he would say, "Well, how do you do?"
The circles which we made around one another were so narrow that their diameter was probably no more than 250 or 300 feet. I had time to take a good look at my opponent....
When he had come down to about three hundred feet he tried to escape by flying in a zig-zag course during which, as is well known, it is difficult for an observer to shoot. That was my most favorable moment. I followed him at an altitude of from two hundred and fifty feet to one hundred and fifty feet, firing all the time. The Englishman could not help falling. But the jamming of my gun nearly robbed me of my success.
My opponent fell, shot through the head, one hundred and fifty feet behind our line.
Despite the Germans' early lead in combat tactics and their 'Dicta Boelcke', the Allies were quick to adapt and develop their own tactics. The Royal Flying Corps' Albert Ball was one of a band of pilots who liked to fly solo and he developed 'stalking' tactics for going after enemy two-seaters. He even used his Lewis gun in its top-wing adjustable Foster mounting to fire upwards into the underside of unsuspecting enemy aircraft. Other RFC pilots such as James McCudden and Mick Mannock emphasised mutual support and the advantages of attacking from height. Mannock expressed this in a list of aerial combat rules that were similar to Boelcke's.
During 1916, aerial reconnaissance patrols were usually unaccompanied as there had been few if any aerial disputes between the belligerents. However, just as the Sinai and Palestine Campaign ground war on the Gaza to Beersheba line came to resemble trench warfare on the western front, the air war over southern Palestine also came to resemble that being fought over France. After the Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917 and during the ensuing Stalemate in Southern Palestine, the concentration of Egyptian Expeditionary (EEF) and Ottoman Army forces holding established front lines grew, as associated supply dumps and lines of communications were developed. The need for information about these installations fuelled "intense rivalry in the air". |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfighting | Other RFC pilots such as James McCudden and Mick Mannock emphasised mutual support and the advantages of attacking from height. Mannock expressed this in a list of aerial combat rules that were similar to Boelcke's.
During 1916, aerial reconnaissance patrols were usually unaccompanied as there had been few if any aerial disputes between the belligerents. However, just as the Sinai and Palestine Campaign ground war on the Gaza to Beersheba line came to resemble trench warfare on the western front, the air war over southern Palestine also came to resemble that being fought over France. After the Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917 and during the ensuing Stalemate in Southern Palestine, the concentration of Egyptian Expeditionary (EEF) and Ottoman Army forces holding established front lines grew, as associated supply dumps and lines of communications were developed. The need for information about these installations fuelled "intense rivalry in the air". Aerial reconnaissance patrols were regularly attacked, so all photography and artillery observation patrols had to be accompanied by armed escort aircraft. These special EEF patrols grew into squadrons, attacking hostile aircraft wherever they were found, either in the air or on the ground. However, the technically superior German aircraft shot down numbers of EEF aircraft during dog fights.
By the end of the war, the underpowered machines from just ten years prior had been transformed into fairly powerful, swift, and heavily armed fighter planes, and the basic tactics of dogfighting had been established.
Spanish Civil War: Airplane technology rapidly increased in sophistication after World War I. By 1936, dogfighting was thought to be a thing of the past, since aircraft were reaching top speeds of over 250 miles per hour (400 km/h). The experiences of the Spanish Civil War proved this theory was wrong.
At the beginning of the war, new tactics were developed, most notably in the Luftwaffe Condor Legion. Lieutenant Werner Mölders advised abandoning the standard "V" formation used in combat, and pairing fighters in twos, starting the practice of having a wingman at one's side. He advised that pairs of aircraft approaching a fight should increase the distance between them instead of holding tight formations, a precursor to the combat spread maneuver. He also started the practice of training pilots to fly at night, and with instruments only. Using the new tactics, and flying the newest Bf 109 fighters, the Germans shot down 22 Spanish Republican fighters within a five-day period, suffering no losses of their own.
World War II:
Strategies for fighter development: During the 1930s two different schools of thought about air-to-air combat began to emerge, resulting in two different trends of monoplane fighter development. In Japan and Italy especially, there continued to be a strong belief that lightly armed, highly maneuverable single seat fighters would still play a primary role in air-to-air combat. Aircraft such as the Nakajima Ki-27 and Nakajima Ki-43 and the Mitsubishi A6M Zero in Japan, and the Fiat G.50 and Macchi C.200 in Italy epitomised a generation of monoplanes designed to this concept.
The other stream of thought, which emerged primarily in Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States was the belief the high speeds of modern combat aircraft and the g-forces imposed by aerial combat meant that dogfighting in the classic WWI sense would be impossible. Fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109, the Supermarine Spitfire, the Yakovlev Yak-1, and the Curtiss P-40 were all designed for high speeds and a good rate of climb. Good maneuverability was not a primary objective.
Immediately following the Spanish Civil War came World War II, during which dogfighting was most prevalent. It was widely believed that strategic bombing alone was synonymous with air power; a fallacy that would not be fully understood until Vietnam. After the failings in Spain, a greater emphasis was placed on the accuracy of air-to-ground attacks. The need to stop bombers from reaching their targets, or to protect them on their missions, was the primary purpose for most dogfights of the era.
Dogfighting over Europe: Dogfighting was very prominent in the European theatre. While the French Air Force was a major force during World War I, it was inadequate and poorly organized, and quickly fell to the German onslaught. As the first battles between the Germans and the British began, the power of the German's anti-aircraft artillery became readily apparent, with 88 millimeter shells capable of firing 40,000 feet (12,000 m) in the air. General Wolfram von Richthofen noted that these guns were equally destructive when used for ground fire. Adolph Malan compiled a list of aerial combat rules that were widely taught to RAF pilots. The Bf 109 and the Spitfire were some of the most common fighters used in the European theater.
A typical dogfight is described by an unnamed pilot:
Pulling up into his blind spot I watched his plane grow larger and larger in my sight. But this German pilot was not content to fly straight and level. Before I could open fire his plane slewed to the right, and seeing me on his tail, he jerked back on the stick into the only defensive maneuver his plane could make. I banked my 47 over to the right and pulled back on the stick, striving to get him once more into my ring sight. The violent maneuver applied terrific G's to my body, and I started to black out as the blood rushed from my head. Fighting every second to overcome this blackness about me, I pulled back on the stick, further and further, so that the enemy would just show at the bottom of my ring sight to allow for the correct deflection.
We were both flying in a tight circle. Just a little more and I'll have him. Pressing the [trigger] I waited expectantly for the 109 to explode. I've hit his wing. A section two-feet long broke loose from the right wing as the machine gun cut like a machete through it. Too low, a little more rudder and the bullets will find his cockpit. I could see occasional strikes further up the wing, but it was too late. The 109, sensing that I was inside him on the turn, slunk into a nearby cloud. Straightening my plane, I climbed over the top of the bank, and poised on the other side, waiting for him to appear. But the 109 did not appear, and not wishing to tempt the gods of fate further, I pushed my stick forward, entered the protective cover of the clouds, and headed home.
Soviet fighters: During this time, three new Russian fighters, the LaGG-1, the Yak-1, and the MiG-3 were just coming off of the production line. The Soviet Air Defense Force had been fraught with problems since World War I. The German Barbarossa offensive on June 22, 1941, destroyed more than 2000 Soviet aircraft on the first day, and more than 5000 before October. With great desperation, the Soviets fought in dogfights over Leningrad, Moscow, and Ukraine for more than a year.
Fireteam, a triple of aircraft ("troika"), has been the main tactical unit used in battles since the beginning of World War II. The analysis and synthesis of fighting experience resulted in a conclusion that group tactics should have been rejected and replaced by action pairs. However, ramming an opponent was still a common practice among the pilots of the Soviet Union. Another successful maneuver was a "Sokolinnyi udar" (falcon punch) when a pilot obtained a speed advantage by swooping down on an opponent, characteristically from the direction of the sun in order to hide their fighter within the glare of the brilliant light before and during the attack. This maneuver and many other tactical principles were introduced by Alexander Pokryshkin, one of the greatest tacticians of the Soviet Air Force who showed his worth during World War II. His famous motto sounded as "Height, speed, maneuver, fire!". It became popular in the air armies and was adopted by pilots.
Struggling with morale problems, the Soviets slowly and methodically began to regain air supremacy after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943. This theater is notable for including the only female fighter aces in history, Yekaterina Budanova and Lydia Litvyak.
Second Sino-Japanese War: The Second Sino-Japanese War began on June 7, 1937, between China and Japan. The Japanese used the Mitsubishi A5M; the predecessor of the famous "Zero", which was a very lightweight and maneuverable fighter. The Chinese mainly used Russian biplanes similar to those from WWI, such as the Polikarpov I-15 and early monoplanes such as I-16. Despite being much lower in power and speed than the Japanese planes, the Chinese planes were much more maneuverable, and many dogfights ensued, resulting in high losses reported on both sides. Reports of dogfights that made it to the U.S. military provided valuable insight into the Japanese tactics and their plane's flight characteristics.
United States and Japan: After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States entered the war. The Japanese used, among other aircraft, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, an extremely lightweight fighter known for its exceptional range and maneuverability. The U.S. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfighting | The Japanese used the Mitsubishi A5M; the predecessor of the famous "Zero", which was a very lightweight and maneuverable fighter. The Chinese mainly used Russian biplanes similar to those from WWI, such as the Polikarpov I-15 and early monoplanes such as I-16. Despite being much lower in power and speed than the Japanese planes, the Chinese planes were much more maneuverable, and many dogfights ensued, resulting in high losses reported on both sides. Reports of dogfights that made it to the U.S. military provided valuable insight into the Japanese tactics and their plane's flight characteristics.
United States and Japan: After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States entered the war. The Japanese used, among other aircraft, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, an extremely lightweight fighter known for its exceptional range and maneuverability. The U.S. military tested the Akutan Zero, a Mitsubishi A6M2 which was captured intact in 1942, advising – along the same lines that General Claire Chennault, commander of the Kunming-based Flying Tigers had already advised his pilots over a year before – "Never attempt to dogfight a Zero." Even though its engine was rather low in power, the Zero had very low wing loading characteristics, a small turn radius, a top speed over 330 mph (530 km/h), and could climb better than any fighter used by the U.S. at that time, although it was poorly armored compared to U.S. aircraft.
A pilot who realized that new tactics had to be devised was Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy" Thach, commander of Fighting Three in San Diego. He read the early reports coming out of China and wrestled with the problem of his F4F Wildcats being relatively slower and much less maneuverable than the Japanese planes. Using matchsticks on his kitchen table, he devised a defensive maneuver he called "beam defense position", but commonly called the "Thach Weave". Thach reasoned that, because the Zero had fabric wing-covers that tended to "balloon" at speeds above 295 mph, which made the plane very hard to turn, he could use high speed and a formation of four planes, consisting of two pairs of aircraft, flying line-abreast (side by side at the same altitude). Keeping the leader of each pair in close formation with their wingman, the pairs could fly about 200 feet (61 m) apart (the turn radius of the Wildcat) and adopt a weaving formation when either or both pairs fell under attack by Japanese fighters, allowing each pair to evade the attack while at the same time covering the other pair. Thach made a diagram of the idea and showed it to other pilots, but in trial-runs people like Butch O'Hare found it difficult to make the shot while, at the same time, evading the two friendly planes coming at him head on.
Thach later faced the A6M Zero during the Battle of Midway, in June 1942, for the test of his theory. Although outnumbered, he found that a Zero would lock onto the tail of one of the fighters. In response, the two planes would turn toward each other, with one plane's path crossing in front of the other. More importantly, the pursuer would have to follow that path to maintain pursuit, also crossing in front of the American plane's sights. Thus, when the Zero followed its original target through the turn it would come into a position to be fired on by the target's wingman, and the predator would become the prey. His tactic proved to be effective and was soon adopted by other squadrons. The Thach Weave helped make up for the inferiority of the US planes in maneuverability and numbers, until new aircraft could be brought into service. This tactic later morphed into the more fluid and versatile "loose-deuce maneuvering" that was to prove useful in the Vietnam war.
Another effective maneuver used by the U.S. pilots was a simple break, which consisted of turning sharply across an attacker's flight path, which worked well in part because the large nose of the Zero tended to obstruct the pilot's view. Still another good tactic was a high-side guns pass, which consisted of diving upon the Zero, shooting in one high-speed pass, and using the speed to climb back above the fight to dive again. By 1943 the U.S. began to produce planes that were better matched against the Japanese planes, such as the
Grumman F6F Hellcat, and the Vought F4U Corsair.
Technology: Technology advanced extremely fast during World War II in ways that would change dogfighting forever. Jet propulsion had been demonstrated long before the war, by German engineer Hans von Ohain in 1934, and by British engineer Frank Whittle in 1937. The Messerschmitt Me 262 was the first jet fighter to be used in battle, with a speed over 500 mph (800 km/h), and began taking a toll on Allied bombing missions in 1944. The British were testing a jet that same year, the Gloster Meteor, which would later see action in the Korean War. Although U.S. General Hap Arnold test flew the XP-59A in 1942, the plane was never used in combat. Other prime inventions of the era include radar and air-to-air missiles.
Propaganda: Enemy pilots were construed as weak and evil. For example, in World War II, describing the Soviet tactics, the Luftwaffe claimed that, "The characteristic feature of the average Soviet fighter pilot were a tendency toward caution and reluctance instead of toughness and stamina, brute strength instead of genuine combat efficiency, abysmal hatred instead of fairness and chivalry...."
Korean War: After World War II, the question began to rise about the future usefulness of fighter aircraft. This was especially true for the U.S., where the focus was placed on small, fast, long-range bombers capable of delivering atomic bombs. The Korean War began in June 1950, and the North Koreans were outmatched by the U.S. Air Force. The war was nearly over by October, with the occupation of North Korea when, on November 1, Chinese MiG-15s attacked. The Chinese began supplying North Korea with troops and provisions, and the war quickly resumed.
At 100 mph (160 km/h) faster, the MiG-15 was more than a match for the U.S. P-80 Shooting Star, using the same dive and shoot tactic that the Americans found so useful against Japan. The U.S. jets had inferior weaponry, and suffered from problems with production and parts. The U.S. resorted to using mainly the more maneuverable propeller driven fighters during the war, such as the P-51 Mustang which was carried over from World War II.
To combat the MiGs, the F-86 Sabre was put into production. The U.S. pilots had a number of major advantages over the Chinese, including the G-suit. Chinese fighters were often seen spinning off out of control during a hard turn because the pilot had lost consciousness. Other technological advantages included the radar-ranging gunsight and hydraulic controls. Colonel Harrison R. Thyng remarked:
Suddenly you go into a steep turn. Your mach drops off. The MiG turns with you, and you let him gradually creep up and outturn you. At the critical moment you reverse your turn. The hydraulic controls [of the F-86] work beautifully. The MiG cannot turn as readily as you and is slung out to the side. When you pop your speedbrakes, the MiG flashes by you. Quickly closing the brakes, you slide onto his tail and hammer him with your "50s".
The Chinese were very competent in a dogfight, and large swirling battles were fought in the skies over Korea. However, it was highly suspected by many U.S. pilots that some of the opponents they faced over Korea were in fact well-trained Soviet pilots, whom the Americans referred to as "hanchos", (a Japanese word, meaning "bosses"). Major Robinson Risner recalls,
Seeing one another about the same time, the MiG flight and my flight dropped [our extra fuel] tanks.. He was so low he was throwing up small rocks. I dropped down to get him, but to hit him I had to get down in his jet wash. He'd chop the throttle and throw out his speed brakes. I would coast up beside him, wingtip to wingtip. When it looked like I was going to overshoot him, I would roll over the top and come down on the other side of him. When I did, he'd go into a hard turn, pulling all the Gs he could. This guy was one fantastic pilot.
The war in the air, however, eventually came to a stalemate as fighting ceased between the two factions. Later after the fall of the Soviet Union, Soviet records showed that Russian pilots
were indeed in the air. Sometimes in the fury of combat they reverted to the Russian language over the radio.
Vietnam War: The Vietnam War "was the first 'modern' air war" in which air-to-air missiles were the primary weapons during aerial combat, and was the only confrontation between the latest aerial and ground defense technologies between the Soviet Union and the United States. If U.S. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfighting | I would coast up beside him, wingtip to wingtip. When it looked like I was going to overshoot him, I would roll over the top and come down on the other side of him. When I did, he'd go into a hard turn, pulling all the Gs he could. This guy was one fantastic pilot.
The war in the air, however, eventually came to a stalemate as fighting ceased between the two factions. Later after the fall of the Soviet Union, Soviet records showed that Russian pilots
were indeed in the air. Sometimes in the fury of combat they reverted to the Russian language over the radio.
Vietnam War: The Vietnam War "was the first 'modern' air war" in which air-to-air missiles were the primary weapons during aerial combat, and was the only confrontation between the latest aerial and ground defense technologies between the Soviet Union and the United States. If U.S. air power could successfully conduct war against Soviet doctrine and equipment in the skies over North Vietnam, then it could expect to successfully operate against the Soviet Union during a massive war in Europe. Over the skies of North Vietnam, U.S. aircraft would be attacking the "most formidable and most heavily defended targets in the history of aerial warfare".
By this time, dogfighting techniques had fallen out of favor in U.S. training doctrines, as missiles were considered to be all that was necessary to shoot down the big bombers expected to be deployed by the Soviet Union. As a result, air combat methods known by fighter pilots since World War I became all but lost as veterans from WWII and Korea retired and didn't pass them on to succeeding generations. American fighter pilots would meet in the skies in secret to engage in mock combat to try to maintain some level of proficiency. It wasn't until TOPGUN was established for the Navy in 1969 and Red Flag was started for the Air Force in 1975 that pilots were formally trained in dogfighting again.
Both U.S. and Soviet-built jet "fighters" were primarily designed as interceptors: intercepting bomber groups, and then shooting them down with air-to-air missiles. Neither party had a separate designation for interceptor, though: just "F" for fighter; "A" for attack; and "B" for bomber (for the NATO aircraft). With possibly a few exceptions, such as the F-8 Crusader and the F-100 Super Sabre, which each mounted four 20 mm cannons, jets were not designed for dog fighting other jet aircraft. Soviet doctrine called for their interceptors to be strictly vectored towards their targets by Ground Control Intercept (GCI) operators. As a consequence, U.S. RF-101 Voodoo aircraft conducting reconnaissance missions, or F-102 Delta Daggers, F-104 Starfighters performing MiGCAP duties, and the strike aircraft themselves, such as F-105 Thunderchiefs, A-4 Skyhawks, A-6 Intruders, F-4 Phantoms and B-52's flying over North Vietnam were met by MiG-17s (or Chicom J-5s), MiG-19s (Chicom J-6s), and MiG-21s being vectored directly to them by GCI operators who worked in conjunction with surface-to-air missile (SAM) crews. U.S. aircraft which successfully made it through the NVAF MiGs were then confronted with the SAMs and AAA batteries.
This triad defense system of GCI-controlled MiGs, Missiles (SAMs), and AAA enabled the North Vietnamese MiGs to utilize their aircraft's design capabilities as their designers had intended, that of, in the vernacular of the time, making "one pass, and then hauling ass", which was, in practice, quickly firing at their targets and then speeding away. By 1967 the Soviets had supplied the NVAF with enough missile-firing MiG-21s to allow the North Vietnamese to routinely engage U.S. aircraft, and to rely less and less on their aged MiG-17s, although many North Vietnamese pilots still preferred the MiG-17s agility and easy maintenance. With the arrival of the additional MiG-21s, and by 1969 MiG-19s (J-6s) imported from China, engagements between U.S. and NVAF jets became generally divided into two arenas; MiG-21s engaged at higher altitudes, while MiG-17s and MiG-19s would try to give battle at lower altitudes where their cannons were more effective.
At the conclusion of the air war in 1973, U.S. airmen had downed 202 communist MiGs, including two downed by B-52 tail gunners from their quad .50 caliber machine guns; this at a cost of 90 U.S. aircraft to NVAF MiGs. The USAF claimed 137 MiGs while the USN/USMC brought down 65 in air-to-air combat. From these figures, the USAF had 40 gun kills, and the USN claimed eight cannon victories. This number approached parity with the NVAF MiG's 37 gun kill figures.
Approximately 612 radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow missiles were fired during the war, scoring 56 MiG kills, while 454 heat-seeking AIM-9 Sidewinders were launched achieving 81 aerial victories. During Operation Rolling Thunder 54 AIM-4 Falcon missiles were fired, obtaining five kills. By contrast, NVAF MiG-21s obtained 53 air-to-air kills with their AA-2 "Atoll" missiles, from an unknown number of launchings. At least three MiG-21s, and all of the MiG-17s and MiG-19s (J-6s) made the remaining 37 kills, from their 90 total, with their 23 mm, 30 mm and 37 mm cannons.
As part of the North Vietnamese triad system of defense, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) had become an ever-increasing threat. U.S Air Force Brigadier General Robin Olds describes a typical encounter with surface-to-air missiles, which during a period of time in Vietnam was referred to as either a "MiG day" or a "Sam day", this was a Sam day.
Here come the SAMs. The trick is seeing the launch. You can see the steam. It goes straight up, turns more level, then the booster drops off. If it maintains a relatively stable position, it's coming right for you and you're in trouble. You're eager to make a move but can't. If you dodge too fast it will turn and catch you; if you wait too late it will explode near enough to get you. What you do at the right moment is poke your nose down, go down as hard as you can, pull maybe three negative Gs at 550 knots and once it follows you down, you go up as hard as you can. It can't follow that and goes under.
This passage from a USAF booklet explained a MiG day:
If you know a MiG-21 is in your area or you lose sight of one and want to find it again: Roll out wings level for 15 seconds, then look in your 6 o'clock about 1.5 miles. It will be there. Probably you'll see Mach 2 Atoll (air-to-air missile) smoke trail first before you see the MiG. But remember that's where the MiG-21 is! Just ask one of the 20 aircrews shot down during Linebacker that never knew they were under attack.
Arab–Israeli Wars: Dogfighting occurred in every war between Israel and her Arab neighbors between 1948 and 1985, including the 1948 Palestine war, the Sinai War in 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the 1982 Lebanon War.
Initially both sides relied on propeller planes, such as Spitfires, Avia S-199s, and P-51s, then progressed to older jets like MiG-15s, Dassault Mysteres and Dassault Mirages. In the latter wars dogfighting ensued between modern aircraft, like F-15s and F-16s against MiG-21s and MiG-25s. Although often outnumbered, the IAF was dominant in every conflict and in 1967 defeated the combined air forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In dogfights the IAF often achieved kill ratios ranging from 10:1 to over 20:1, which is usually attributed to the far superior training of Israeli pilots and a technological advantage.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 saw the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces engaged in large-scale aerial combat against each other for the first time since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. The war took place during the course of September 1965 and saw both air forces conduct defensive and offensive operations over Indian and Pakistani airspace. The aerial war saw both sides conducting thousands of sorties in a single month. Both sides claimed victory in the air war; India claimed to have destroyed 73 enemy aircraft and lost 35 of its own while Pakistan claimed to have destroyed 104 aircraft against its own losses of 19. Despite the intense fighting, India was able to shoot down around 18 PAF jets while losing 14 jets. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfighting | Indo-Pakistani War of 1965: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 saw the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces engaged in large-scale aerial combat against each other for the first time since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. The war took place during the course of September 1965 and saw both air forces conduct defensive and offensive operations over Indian and Pakistani airspace. The aerial war saw both sides conducting thousands of sorties in a single month. Both sides claimed victory in the air war; India claimed to have destroyed 73 enemy aircraft and lost 35 of its own while Pakistan claimed to have destroyed 104 aircraft against its own losses of 19. Despite the intense fighting, India was able to shoot down around 18 PAF jets while losing 14 jets. Neutral sources mention India losing 75 and Pakistan lost 20 jets. In the first stage of War, 4 Indian Vampire Fighters were shot down by PAF F-86s on 1 September, while from Indian side, Indian Sqn. Ldr. Trevor Keeler with his Gnat took the first hit on 3 September 1965 by downing a Pakistani F-86 which got crashed in an uncontrollable dive. IAF Flt. Lt.V S Pathania took the first kill by his Gnat on 4 September 1965 by downing the Pakistani F-86 of Flt. Lt Bhatt who escaped to safe territory by parachute. PAF Sqn. Ldr. Muhammad Mahmood Alam, became highest flying ace by 5 confirmed and 4 probable kills. PAF Sqn. Ldr. Sarfraz Rafiqui who shot down 3 and Flt. Lt. Yunus were shot down in Halwara, Indian air base by fresh pilots with IAF Hawker Hunter Mk. 56. One Indian Gnat landed in Pakistan airbase accidentally due low on fuel and disoriented, now exhibited as war trophy in Pakistan Air Force Museum. After the war, PAF's loss rate was 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 per cent.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971: By late 1971, the intensification of the independence movement in erstwhile East Pakistan led to the Bangladesh Liberation War between India and Pakistan. On November 22, 1971, 10 days before the start of a full-scale war, four PAF F-86 Sabre jets attacked Indian and Mukti Bahini positions at Garibpur, near the international border. Two of the four PAF Sabres were shot down and one damaged by the IAF's Folland Gnats. On December 3, India formally declared war against Pakistan following massive preemptive strikes by the PAF against Indian Air Force installations in Srinagar, Ambala, Sirsa, Halwara and Jodhpur. However, the IAF did not suffer significantly because the leadership had anticipated such a move and precautions were taken. The Indian Air Force was quick to respond to Pakistani air strikes, following which the PAF carried out mostly defensive sorties.
Within the first two weeks, the IAF had carried out almost 12,000 sorties over East Pakistan and also provided close air support to the advancing Indian Army. The IAF also assisted the Indian Navy in its operations against the Pakistani Navy in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. On the western front, the IAF destroyed more than 20 Pakistani tanks, four APCs and a supply train during the Battle of Longewala. The IAF undertook strategic bombing of West Pakistan by carrying out raids on oil installations in Karachi, the Mangla Dam and a gas plant in Sindh. A similar strategy was also deployed in East Pakistan, and, as the IAF achieved complete air superiority on the eastern front, the ordnance factories, runways, and other vital areas of East Pakistan were severely damaged. By the time the Pakistani forces surrendered, the IAF had destroyed 94 PAF aircraft. The IAF was able to conduct a wide range of missions – troop support; air combat; deep penetration strikes; para-dropping behind enemy lines; feints to draw enemy fighters away from the actual target; bombing; and reconnaissance. In contrast, the Pakistan Air Force, which was solely focused on air combat, was blown out of the subcontinent's skies within the first week of the war. Those PAF aircraft that survived took refuge at Iranian air bases or in concrete bunkers, refusing to offer a fight. Hostilities officially ended at 14:30 GMT on December 17, after the fall of Dacca on December 15. India claimed large gains of territory in West Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war), and the independence of Pakistan's East wing as Bangladesh was confirmed. The IAF had flown over 16,000 sorties on both East and West fronts; including sorties by transport aircraft and helicopters. while the PAF flew about 30 and 2,840. More than 80 percent of the IAF's sorties were close-support and interdiction, and according to neutral assessments about 45 IAF aircraft were lost while, Pakistan lost 75 aircraft. Not including any F-6s, Mirage IIIs, or the six Jordanian F-104s which failed to return to their donors. But the imbalance in air losses was explained by the IAF's considerably higher sortie rate, and its emphasis on ground-attack missions. On the ground Pakistan suffered most, with 9,000 killed and 25,000 wounded while India lost 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. The loss of armoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced. This represented a major defeat for Pakistan. Towards the end of the war, IAF's transport planes dropped leaflets over Dhaka urging the Pakistani forces to surrender, demoralising Pakistani troops in East Pakistan.
Gulf of Sidra Incidents: On August 19, 1981, two Grumman F-14 Tomcats of the V-84 Jolly Rogers engaged two Libyan Air Force Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter's over the Gulf of Sidra. One Su-22 opened fire on the F-14 but missed. The F-14s destroyed the Su-22 Fitters using AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles; both pilots of the destroyed Su-22 planes ejected.
Later, on January 4, 1989, a similar engagement occurred between two F-14s and MiG-23 Floggers.
Falklands War: The Falklands War began on April 2, 1982, when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, and then the island of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, which were small disputed dependencies. Because Britain had no military bases nearby and few aircraft carriers, the Argentinians did not expect a response from Britain. On April 5, the British sent carriers to the Falklands with Sea Harrier 'Jump-jets' on board. The Harrier was originally designed as a ground-attack plane, and was not equipped for dogfighting, so the aircraft had to undergo many modifications and the pilots given extra training.
The Argentinians had superior numbers, but their forces mainly consisted of older jets from the 1960s, such as Dassault Mirage IIIs and Israeli Daggers. The Argentinians were also handicapped by the long distance from mainland airfields and a lack of refueling tankers. Neither side was ready for war, but both prepared all through April as diplomacy failed. The fighting started on May 1, and was to become the largest naval and air conflict since World War II. By the end of the war, Argentina lost 20 fighters in dogfights, while Britain lost two Sea Harrier to ground fire. The Americans supplied late model Sidewinder missiles to the British; this and the analysis of French Mirage combat tactics made the difference. As of March 2019 David Morgan was the last British pilot to have fought a dogfight when he downed two Argentinian jets on June 8, 1982.
Iran–Iraq War and helicopter dogfight: In the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988, many dogfights occurred between the Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) and Iraqi Air Force. During the early years of the war, the IRIAF enjoyed air superiority (see for example Operation Sultan 10 and Operation Morvarid); however, by the end of the war and partly due to embargos, the Iranian Air Force had lost its superiority due to their increasingly outdated equipment and the lack of spare parts for their US-made aircraft. Iraq, meanwhile, continued to introduce new French and Soviet weapons into its air force.
The Iran–Iraq War also saw the worlds only confirmed helicopter dogfights, with Iranian Army Aviation's AH-1J Internationals (usually the TOW-capable ones) entering combat mostly against Iraqi Army Air Corps' Mil Mi-24 Hind gunships and HOT-armed Aérospatiale Gazelles. The Hinds proved faster and more robust, while the AH-1Js were more agile. The results of the skirmishes are disputed. There were also engagements between Iranian AH-1Js and Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft: using their 20 mm cannon, the AH-1Js scored three confirmed kills against MiG-21s, claimed an Su-20, and shared in the destruction of a MiG-23. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Dogfighting | Iraq, meanwhile, continued to introduce new French and Soviet weapons into its air force.
The Iran–Iraq War also saw the worlds only confirmed helicopter dogfights, with Iranian Army Aviation's AH-1J Internationals (usually the TOW-capable ones) entering combat mostly against Iraqi Army Air Corps' Mil Mi-24 Hind gunships and HOT-armed Aérospatiale Gazelles. The Hinds proved faster and more robust, while the AH-1Js were more agile. The results of the skirmishes are disputed. There were also engagements between Iranian AH-1Js and Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft: using their 20 mm cannon, the AH-1Js scored three confirmed kills against MiG-21s, claimed an Su-20, and shared in the destruction of a MiG-23.
Persian Gulf War: In the Gulf War of 1990–91, dogfighting once again proved its usefulness when the Coalition Air Force had to face off against the Iraqi Air Force, which at the time was the fifth largest in the world. By the second day of the war, the Coalition achieved air superiority. Many dogfights occurred during the short conflict, often involving many planes. By the end of January, 1991, the term "furball" became a popular word to describe the hectic situation of many dogfights, occurring at the same time within the same relatively small airspace. By the end of the war, the U.S. claimed 39 Iraqi aircraft in air-to-air victories to the loss of only one F/A-18. Of the 39 victories, 36 were taken by F-15 Eagles.
Balkans conflict: During the Balkans conflict, in 1999 (the Kosovo War), five MiG-29s of the Yugoslav Air Force were shot down in dogfights with NATO aircraft. The first was on March 24, by a Dutch F-16AM Falcon, and two were downed on the same night by U.S. F-15s. A day later, two more MiG-29s were shot down by an F-16 and F-15.
Eritrean–Ethiopian War (1998–2000): The war became the first to see 4th-generation jet fighters battle with each other. Most of the losses to Eritrean MiG-29s were caused by dogfights with Ethiopian Su-27s.
2019 Indo-Pakistan aerial skirmish: A dogfight between Indian and Pakistani jets took place on 27 February 2019, when Pakistani Dassault Mirage Vs, Dassault Mirage IIIs and JF-17 Thunders performed airstrikes near Indian military installations at Indian Administered Kashmir in retaliation to the Balakot Airstrike, which was carried out by the IAF on 26 February 2019.
In the ensuing dogfight, an Indian MiG-21 Bison and an Su-30MKI were shot down by Pakistani F-16s after they entered Pakistani airspace across the Line of Control. However, India later on reportedly flew the same Su-30MKI on its Air Force Day in October 2019.
See also: Aerobatic maneuver
Battle of Britain
John Boyd (military strategist)
Erich Hartmann
Ghost of Kyiv
Immelmann turn
J-CATCH
List of aircraft shootdowns
Lufbery circle
Post–World War II air-to-air combat losses
Split S
The Scissors
Whifferdill turn
Explanatory footnotes: ^ Su-37 Flanker Report from Farnborough '96
References:
General and cited references: F. M. Cutlack (1941). "The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War, 1914–1918". Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 (11th ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 2012-10-09.
Hobson, Chris. Vietnam Air Losses: United States Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia 1961–1973. 2001, Midland Publishing. ISBN 1-85780-1156.
McCarthy, Donald J. MiG Killers: A Chronology of U.S. Air Victories in Vietnam 1965–1973. 2009, Specialty Press. ISBN 978-1-58007-136-9.
Michel, Marshall L. III. Clashes: Aircombat Over North Vietnam 1965–1973. 1997, Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-519-6.
Shaw, Robert L. (1985). Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-059-9.
External links:
Media related to Aerial combat at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Drone warfare | United States: Estimates for the total people killed in U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, range from 2,000 to 3,500 militants killed and 158–965 civilians killed. 81 insurgent leaders in Pakistan have been killed. Drone strikes in Yemen are estimated to have killed 846–1,758 militants and 116–225 civilians. 57 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leaders are confirmed to have been killed.
In August 2018, Al Jazeera reported that a Saudi Arabian-led coalition combating Houthi rebels in Yemen had secured secret deals with al-Qaeda in Yemen and recruited hundreds of that group's fighters: "... Key figures in the deal-making said the United States was aware of the arrangements and held off on drone attacks against the armed group, which was created by Osama bin Laden in 1988."
After US president Donald Trump had increased drone strikes by over 400%,his successor Joe Biden reversed course. Under Biden, drone strikes reportedly decreased. A Biden administration drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan in August 2021 killed 10 civilians, including seven children. Later, a drone strike killed Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Effects: Scholarly opinions are mixed regarding the efficacy of drone strikes. Some studies support that decapitation strikes to kill a terrorist or insurgent group's leadership limit the capabilities of these groups in the future, while other studies refute this. Drone strikes are successful at suppressing militant behavior, though this response is in anticipation of a drone strike rather than as a result of one. Data from the US and Pakistan's joint counter-terrorism efforts show that militants cease communication and attack planning to avoid detection and targeting.
Proponents of drone strikes assert that drone strikes are largely effective in targeting specific combatants. Some scholars argue that drone strikes reduce the amount of civilian casualties and territorial damage when compared to other types of military force like large bombs. Military alternatives to drone strikes such as raids and interrogations can be extremely risky, time-consuming, and potentially ineffective. Relying on drone strikes does not come without risks as U.S. drone usage sets an international precedent on extraterritorial and extrajudicial killings.
Islamic State drone strikes: Small drones and quadcopters have been used for strikes by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. A group of twelve or more have been piloted by specially trained pilots to drop munitions onto enemy forces. They have been able to evade ground defense forces.
During the battle for Mosul, the Islamic State was able to kill or wound dozens of Iraqi soldiers by dropping light explosives or 40-millimeter grenades from numerous drones attacking at the same time. Drone strikes were also used to destroy military supplies. Drone footage released by the Islamic State showed bombs being dropped on an ammunitions facility located in Deir ez-Zor, Syria, an area of contested control between the Islamic State and the Syrian government at the time.
In 2017, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated at a Senate hearing that "We do know that terrorist organizations have an interest in using drones ... We have seen that overseas already with some frequency. I think that the expectation is that it is coming here, imminently."
Drone expert Brett Velicovich discussed the dangers of the Islamic State utilizing off the shelf drones to attack civilian targets, claiming in an interview with Fox News that it was only a matter of time before ISIS extremists use of drones to strike civilian targets would become more prevalent and sophisticated.
The overall success rate for drone strikes used by the Islamic State is unclear. The Islamic State may have used drones as a way to gather footage for propaganda purposes, rather than for their military value.
Proliferation in the 2020s: On 6 January 2018, Russian forces thwarted a drone (UAV) swarm attack on the Khmeimim Air Base, the first of this kind in the history of warfare.
In 2020, a Turkish-made UAV loaded with explosives detected and attacked Haftar's forces in Libya with artificial intelligence and without command, according to a report from the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts on Libya published in March 2021. It was considered the first attack carried out by an AI UAV.
The Economist has cited Azerbaijan's highly effective use of drones against Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and Turkey's use of drones in the Syrian Civil War as indicating the future of warfare. Noting that it had previously been assumed that drones would not play a major role in conflicts between nations due to their vulnerability to anti-aircraft fire, it suggested that while this might be true for major powers with air defences, it was less true for minor powers. It noted Azerbaijani tactics and Turkey's use of drones as indicating a "new, more affordable type of air power". It also noted that the ability of drones to record their kills enabled a highly effective Azerbaijani propaganda campaign.
On 13 October 2022, a Ukrainian MiG-29 became the first manned plane to go down to a drone during combat. The pilot is claimed to have destroyed a Shahed-136 drone with his cannon. The blast is believed to have brought the plane down and hospitalised the pilot.
Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, approximately 30 companies in Ukraine have emerged to mass-produce drones for the war effort. The Ukraine government Ministry of Digital Transformation initiated the "Army of Drones" project, and is attempting to purchase up to 200,000 drones in 2023, aiming to deploy relatively cheap drones against large advantages Russia has had in military equipment. In 2023, they have also sponsored several competitions where the "dozens of drone developers that have sprung up all over Ukraine" are invited to make simulated attacks on ground targets, or chase fixed-wing drones, or even participate in drone dogfight competitions. One new model that has been successful is the "Baba Yaga" hexacopter, which can carry "44 pounds of payload".
Commercial UCAVs: Commercial UCAVs may be equipped with such weapons as guided bombs, cluster bombs, incendiary devices, air-to-surface missiles, air-to-air missiles, anti-tank guided missiles or other types of precision-guided munitions, autocannons and machine guns. Drone attacks can be conducted by commercial UCAVs dropping bombs, firing a missile, or crashing into a target. Commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be weaponized by being loaded with dangerous explosives and then crashed into vulnerable targets or detonated above them. They can conduct aerial bombing by dropping hand grenades, mortar shell or other improvised explosive munitions directly above targets. Payloads could include explosives, shrapnel, chemical, radiological or biological hazards. Multiple drones may attack simultaneously in a drone swarm. Drones have been used extensively by both sides for recon and artillery spotting in the Russo-Ukraine War.
Anti-UAV systems are being developed by states to counter the threat of drone strikes. This is, however, proving difficult. According to James Rogers, an academic who studies drone warfare, "There is a big debate out there at the moment about what the best way is to counter these small UAVs, whether they are used by hobbyists causing a bit of a nuisance or in a more sinister manner by a terrorist actor."
Azerbaijan drone warfare: UCAVs were used extensively by the Azerbaijani Army against the Armenian Army during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These UCAVs included Israeli IAI Harops and Turkish Bayraktar TB2s. As the Bayraktar TB2 utilizes Canadian optics and laser targeting systems, Canada suspended export of its military drone technology to Turkey in October 2020 after allegations that the technology had been used to collect intelligence and direct artillery and missile fire at military positions. After the incident, Aselsan stated that it would begin the serial production and integration of the CATS system to replace the Canadian MX15B.
Russian invasion of Ukraine: During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, both sides have utilised drones in combat and for reconnaissance, and drones have played an important role in offensives. Ukrainian forces have made extensive use of the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone throughout the conflict in strikes against Russian forces. Russian forces meanwhile launched waves of Iranian HESA Shahed 136 drones during the October 2022 missile strikes on Ukraine. The main roles of drones in the war, however, are in reconnaissance and artillery spotting. Russian sources claimed to have used a "Stupor anti-drone rifle" to jam the radio controls of Ukrainian drones.
On October 13, 2022, the first recorded instance of an unarmed drone-on-drone combat encounter occurred above the Donetsk region of Ukraine. A Ukrainian DJI Mavic quadcopter was recorded ramming a Russian drone of the same model, resulting in the latter crashing towards the surface below. Another instance of this aerial ramming tactic occurred on November 24, 2022, this time with the Russian DJI Mavic being recorded plummeting towards the ground after a collision with a Ukrainian drone.
On May 9, 2023, a Russian conscript surrendered to (or rather via) a Ukrainian drone.
The average HESA Shahed 136 drone is worth about $20,000. An IRIS-T missile is worth about $430,000 each in comparison. From 13 September until 17 October, open source information suggests that Ukraine has had to spend $28.14 million on defending against these drones. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Drone warfare | On October 13, 2022, the first recorded instance of an unarmed drone-on-drone combat encounter occurred above the Donetsk region of Ukraine. A Ukrainian DJI Mavic quadcopter was recorded ramming a Russian drone of the same model, resulting in the latter crashing towards the surface below. Another instance of this aerial ramming tactic occurred on November 24, 2022, this time with the Russian DJI Mavic being recorded plummeting towards the ground after a collision with a Ukrainian drone.
On May 9, 2023, a Russian conscript surrendered to (or rather via) a Ukrainian drone.
The average HESA Shahed 136 drone is worth about $20,000. An IRIS-T missile is worth about $430,000 each in comparison. From 13 September until 17 October, open source information suggests that Ukraine has had to spend $28.14 million on defending against these drones.
Since at least September 2022, Ukraine has used black naval drones, equipped with the Starlink satellite internet system, to carry attacks on the Russian Black Sea fleet at the Sevastopol Naval base. The naval drones were at first assumed to be for reconnaissance, but appear to carry munitions and act as a bomb. With experts noting that the sensors on the front of the naval drone could be used as a laser range finder to help in targeting. In late October 2022, seven of these drones were used to mount a successful drone attack on the Sevastopol Naval base.
In September 2023, Ukrainian troops were reported as using cardboard drones with GoPro cameras for aerial reconnaissance.
As of April 2024, Ukraine has started deploying manned aircraft, such as the Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat and Yakovlev Yak-52, which uses snipers or machine guns to shot down Russian drones. Ukrainian drones have also been given a variety of improvised modifications for the express purpose of attacking and countering Russian drones; these include an instance in July 2024 where an FPV drone with a stick mounted to it was used to attack and eventually destroy a ZALA 421-16E reconnaissance drone through repeated aerial ramming.
On 31 July 2024, a Russian Mi-8 helicopter was shot down by over occupied Donetsk, by a Ukrainian FPV drones. The first time a helicopter in combat was destroyed by a drone. The Mi-8 was believed to have been attacked on the ground either during landing or take off.
2023 Gaza War: On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an invasion of southern Israel, using commercial drones to bomb Israeli guard towers before breaching the border wall. Videos of Israeli troops and a Merkava IV tank being taken out by drones surfaced on the internet.
The largest drone attack in history: As of April 14, 2024, the world's largest drone attack in history took place in the middle of the conflict caused by the developments of the Israeli war on Gaza, with a mass and simultaneous attack of more than 185 Iranian drones in less than a few hours against targets across Israel. This Iranian attack on Israel was carried out in response to the bombing of the Iranian consular building in Damascus (which happened a few days before by the Israeli side).
See also: Anti-drone systems using: electronic jamming and hi-jacking systems, directed-energy weapons (mainly laser), kinetic projectiles, netting, trained eagles etc.
Counter unmanned air system (C-UAS)
Anti-aircraft warfare § AUDS
Electronic beam
Directed-energy weapon, planned to also be used against drones
Laser weapon: Anti-drone systems
Silent Hunter (laser weapon), Chinese anti-drone laser weapon
Electronic warfare (EW) - jamming & hi-jacking
Bukovel (counter unmanned aircraft system), Ukrainian anti-drone electronic warfare system
EDM4S (Electronic Drone Mitigation 4 - System), Lithuanian portable EW anti-drone device
Malyuk assault rifle, Riff model: Ukrainian man-portable battery-powered anti-drone weapon
R-330Zh Zhitel, Russian truck-mounted EW jamming communication station
Kinetic systems
Slinger (weapon system), Australian anti-drone system using an auto-cannon
Large systems & manufacturers
Drone Dome, Israeli anti-aircraft including anti-drone system developed by Rafael ADS
DronesVision, Taiwanese arms manufacturer, specialising in UAV and anti-UAV technologies
Indrajaal Autonomous Drone Defence Dome, Indian AI anti-drone system
ZALA Aero Group, Russian arms manufacturer, specialising in UAV and anti-UAV EW systems
Other related topics
Non-combatant Casualty Value
PlayStation mentality
Public opinion about US drone attacks
Military robot
Unmanned surface vehicle
Zanana
Civilian casualties from U.S. drone strikes
References:
External links: Media related to Drone strikes at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | Europe: In Europe, Medieval castles were replaced by the "Italian style" fortresses, known for low, thick, sloping walls and star-shaped designs with bastions. However, by the mid-18th century, polygonal forts emerged to counter the power of explosive shells.
Fortifications: The period from 1501 to 1800 saw a rapid advance in techniques of fortification in Europe. Whereas medieval castles had relied on high walls to keep out attackers, early modern fortifications had to withstand artillery bombardments. To do this, engineers developed a style of fortress known as the "Italian style" or trace Italienne. These had low, thick, sloping walls, that would either absorb or deflect cannon fire.
In addition, they were shaped like stars, with bastions protruding at sharp angles. This was to ensure that every bastion could be supported with fire from an adjacent bastion, leaving no dead ground for an attacker to take cover in. These new fortifications quickly negated the advantages cannon had offered to besiegers.
In response to the vulnerabilities of star forts, military engineers evolved a much simpler but more robust style of fortification. A polygonal fort is a fortification in the style that evolved around the middle of the 18th century, in response to the development of explosive shells. The complex and sophisticated designs of star forts that preceded them were highly effective against cannon assault, but proved much less effective against the more accurate fire of rifled guns and the destructive power of explosive shells. The polygonal style of fortification is also described as a "flankless fort". Many such forts were built in the United Kingdom and British Empire during the government of Lord Palmerston, and so they are also often referred to as Palmerston forts. Fort Tas-Silġ is an example of a British polygonal fort.
Firearms: The power of aristocracies vis à vis states diminished throughout Western Europe during this period. Aristocrats' 200- to 400-year-old ancestral castles no longer provided useful defences against artillery. The nobility's importance in warfare also eroded as medieval heavy cavalry lost its central role in battle. The heavy cavalry - made up of armoured knights - had begun to fade in importance in the Late Middle Ages. The English longbow and the Swiss pike had both proven their ability to devastate larger armed forces of mounted knights. However, the proper use of the longbow required the user to be extremely strong, making it impossible to amass very large forces of archers.
The proper use of the pike required complex operations in formation and a great deal of fortitude and cohesion by the pikemen, again making amassing large forces difficult. Starting in the early 14th century, armourers added plate-armour pieces to the traditional protective linked mail armour of knights and men-at-arms to guard against the arrows of the longbow and crossbow. By 1415, some infantrymen began deploying the first "hand cannons", and the earliest small-bore arquebuses, with burning "match locks", appeared on the battlefield in the later 15th century.
Decline of plate armour: In virtually all major European battles during a period of 250 years (1400 to 1650), many soldiers wore extensive plate armour; this includes infantrymen (usually pikemen) and almost all mounted troops. Plate armour was expected to deflect edged weapons and to stop an arquebus or pistol ball fired from a distance, and it usually did. The use of plate armour as a remedy to firearms tended to work as long as the velocity and weight of the ball remained quite low, but over time the increasing power and effectiveness of firearms overtook the development of defenses to counteract them, such that flintlock muskets (entering use after 1650) could kill an armoured man at a distance of even 100 yards (though with limited accuracy), and the armour necessary to protect against this threat would have been too heavy and unwieldy to be practical.
The flintlock musket, carried by most infantrymen other than pikemen after 1650, fired a heavier charge and ball than the matchlock arquebus. A recruit could be trained to use a musket in a matter of weeks. Operating a musket did not require the great physical strength of a pikeman or a longbowman or the fairly rare skills of a horseman. Unlike their arquebus predecessors, flintlock muskets could neutralize even the most heavily armoured cavalry forces.
Since a firearm requires little training to operate, a peasant with a gun could now undermine the order and respect maintained by mounted cavalry in Europe and their Eastern equivalents. Although well-smithed plate-armour could still prevent the penetration of gunpowder-weapons, by 1690 it had become no match for massed firearms in a frontal attack and its use ended, even among the cavalry. By the end of the 17th century, soldiers in the infantry and most cavalry units alike preferred the higher mobility of being completely unarmoured to the slight protection, but greatly lessened mobility, offered by donning the heavy plate armour of the period.
Transition to flintlock muskets: The arquebus, in use from 1410, was one of the first handheld firearms that were relatively light (it still required a stand to balance on) and a single person could operate one. One of these weapons was first recorded as being used in the Battle of Agincourt in 1415, although this was still very much a medieval battle. The term musket originally applied to a heavier form of the arquebus, which fired a shot that could pierce plate armour, though only at close range. In the 16th century it still had to be mounted on a support stick to keep it steady. The caliver was the lighter form of the arquebus. By 1600, armies phased out these firearms in favour of a new lighter matchlock musket. Throughout the 16th century and up until 1690, muskets used the matchlock design.
However, the matchlock design was superseded in the 1690s by the flintlock musket, which was less prone to misfires and had a faster reloading rate. By this time, only light-cavalry scouting units, "the eyes of the army", continued to wear front and back armour plates to protect themselves from distant or undisciplined musket-equipped troops.
While soldiers armed with firearms could inflict great damage on cavalry at a moderate distance, at close quarters the cavalry could slaughter the musket-armed infantry if they could break their formation and close to engage in melee combat. For many years infantry formations included a mix of troops armed with both firearms to provide striking power and pikes to allow for the defence of the arquebusiers or musketeers from a cavalry charge. The invention of the bayonet allowed the combining of these two weapons into one in the 1690s, which transformed the infantry into the most important branch of the early modern military—one that uniformly used flintlock muskets tipped with bayonets.
Nature of war: This period saw the size and scale of warfare greatly increase. The number of combatants involved escalated steadily from the mid 16th century and dramatically expanded after the 1660s. For example, Henry II of France, even in the dawn of religious unrest and inevitable violence, could amass an impressive 20,000 men in total for his 1550 decade of war against Habsburg Spain, but Louis XIV, Sun King with the highest population in the Kingdom of France and by extension Western Europe could deploy up to 500,000 men into the field by 1700 in the War of the Spanish Succession with more at stake. Moreover, wars and subsequent battles became increasingly deadly and pyrrhic in this period. The Battle of Fontenoy with advanced presence of Louis XV saw over 100,000 men deployed on both sides ending 20,000 lives, almost half of which were French, and despite a French victory, France herself did not keep Dutch territory gained as peace was desired for the bankrupt kingdom, a layman translation meaning almost 10,000 deaths were rendered obsolete by said king who witnessed the horrors from afar just 3 years later with very few battles left in the Austrian conflict. Cities that took months to siege could fall in mere days. European monarchs with bitter rivalries would invest many resources into intense warfare which often resulted in mass death and destruction of innocent populations, such as the Sack of Rome where the Supreme Pontiff's life was endangered, a symbolic attack against God and Christendom. The Italian Wars alone would threaten Europe's very existence. This may in part be attributed to improvements in weapons technology and in the techniques of using it (for example infantry volley fire).
However, the main reason was that armies were now much bigger, but logistical support for them was inadequate. This meant that armies tended to devastate civilian areas in an effort to feed themselves, causing famines and population displacement. This was exacerbated by the increasing length of conflicts, such as the Thirty Years' War and Eighty Years' War, when this period saw the size and scale of warfare greatly increase. The number of combatants involved escalated steadily from the mid 16th century and they fought over areas subjected to repeated devastation. For this reason, the wars of this era were among the most lethal before the modern period. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | The Italian Wars alone would threaten Europe's very existence. This may in part be attributed to improvements in weapons technology and in the techniques of using it (for example infantry volley fire).
However, the main reason was that armies were now much bigger, but logistical support for them was inadequate. This meant that armies tended to devastate civilian areas in an effort to feed themselves, causing famines and population displacement. This was exacerbated by the increasing length of conflicts, such as the Thirty Years' War and Eighty Years' War, when this period saw the size and scale of warfare greatly increase. The number of combatants involved escalated steadily from the mid 16th century and they fought over areas subjected to repeated devastation. For this reason, the wars of this era were among the most lethal before the modern period.
For example, the Thirty Years' War and the contemporary Wars of the Three Kingdoms, were the bloodiest conflicts in the history of Germany and Britain respectively before World War I. Another factor adding to bloodshed in war was the lack of a clear set of rules concerning the treatment of prisoners and non-combatants. While prisoners were usually ransomed for money or other prisoners, they were sometimes slaughtered out of hand - as at the Battle of Dungans Hill in 1647.
One of the reasons for warfare's increased impact was its indecisiveness. Armies were slow moving in an era before good roads and canals. Battles were relatively rare as armies could manoeuvre for months, with no direct conflict. In addition, battles were often made irrelevant by the proliferation of advanced, bastioned fortifications. To control an area, armies had to take fortified towns, regardless of whether they defeated their enemies' field armies. As a result, by far the most common battles of the era were sieges, hugely time-consuming and expensive affairs. Storming a fortified city could result in massive casualties and cities which did not surrender before an assault were usually brutally sacked -for example Magdeburg in 1631 or Drogheda in 1649. In addition, both garrisons and besiegers often suffered heavily from disease.
The indecisive nature of conflict meant wars were long and endemic. Conflicts stretched on for decades and many states spent more years at war than they did at peace. The Spanish attempt to reconquer the Netherlands after the Dutch Revolt became bogged down in endless siege warfare. The expense caused the Spanish monarchy to declare bankruptcy several times, beginning in 1577.
The changes in warfare eventually made the mercenary forces of the Renaissance and Middle Ages obsolete. However this was a gradual change. As late as the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), most troops were mercenaries. However, after this conflict, most states invested in better disciplined and more ideologically inspired troops. For a time mercenaries became important as trainers and administrators, but soon these tasks were also taken by the state. The massive size of these armies required a large supporting force of administrators. The newly centralized states were forced to set up vast organized bureaucracies to manage these armies, which some historians argue is the basis of the modern bureaucratic state.
The combination of increased taxes and increased centralisation of government functions caused a series of revolts across Europe such as the English Civil War and the Fronde in France. In many countries, the resolution of this conflict was the rise of monarchical absolutism. Only in England and the Netherlands did representative government evolve as an alternative. From the late 17th century, states started financing wars through long term low interest loans from national banking institutions like the Bank of England. The first state to take full advantage of this process was the Dutch Republic.
This transformation in the armies of Europe had great social impact. J. F. C. Fuller famously stated that "the musket made the infantryman and the infantryman made the democrat". This argument states that the defence of the state now rested on the common man, not on the aristocrats. Revolts by the underclass, that had routinely been defeated in the Middle Ages, could now conceivably threaten the power of the state. However, aristocrats continued to monopolise the officer corps of almost all early modern armies, including their high command.
Moreover, popular revolts almost always failed unless they had the support and patronage of the noble or gentry classes. The new armies, because of their vast expense, were also dependent on taxation and the commercial classes who also began to demand a greater role in society. The great commercial powers of the Dutch and English matched much larger states in military might.
As any man could be quickly trained in the use of a musket, it became far easier to form massive armies. The inaccuracy of the weapons necessitated large groups of massed soldiers. This led to a rapid swelling of the size of armies.
For the first time huge masses of the population could enter combat, rather than just the highly skilled professionals. It has been argued that the drawing of men from across the nation into an organized corps helped breed national unity and patriotism, and during this period the modern notion of the nation state was born. However, this would only become apparent after the French Revolutionary Wars. At this time, the levée en masse and conscription would become the defining paradigm of modern warfare.
Before then, however, most national armies were in fact composed of many nationalities. For example, although the Swedish Army under Gustavus Adolphus was originally recruited by a kind of national conscription, the losses of the Thirty Years' War meant that by 1648 over 80% of its troops were foreign mercenaries. In Spain, armies were recruited from all the Spanish European territories including Spain, Italy, Wallonia and Germany. The French recruited soldiers from Germany, Switzerland and elsewhere as well as from France. Britain recruited Hessian troops until the late 18th century. Irish Catholics made careers for themselves in the armies of many European states (See the Flight of the Wild Geese).
Infantry: Column - This formation was typically used while marching, although with sufficient will and mass it was effective at breaking through line formations, albeit with heavy casualties.
Line - A simple two- or three-rank deep line formation allowed most muskets to be brought to bear and was the most commonly used battle formation. Often the first rank would kneel after firing to allow the second rank to fire.
Skirmishers - Skirmishers were not a common infantry unit until late in the 18th century. Light infantry would advance and be the first to fire to draw the enemy to attack, while also probing the flanks. In later eras, sharpshooters would not only target common soldiers, but also officers so that the men were without leadership.
Square - This formation was used against cavalry. Bayonets would be fixed, the first line would kneel with their muskets angled upward (much like a pike.) The second and third lines would fire at the cavalry when it came close. This formation was very ineffective when faced with combined cavalry and infantry, or artillery fire in the case of plain squares.
Cavalry: The rise of gunpowder reduced the importance of the once dominant heavy cavalry, but it remained effective in a new role into the 19th century. The cavalry, along with the infantry, became more professional in this period but it retained its greater social and military prestige than the infantry. Light cavalry was introduced for skirmishing and scouting because of its advantage in speed and mobility. The new types of cavalry units introduced in this period were the dragoons or mounted infantry.
Dragoons were intended to travel on horseback but fight on foot and were armed with carbines and pistols. Even orthodox cavalry carried firearms, especially the pistol, which they used in a tactic known as the caracole. Cavalry charges using swords on undisciplined infantry could still be quite decisive, but a frontal charge against well-ordered musketeers and pikemen was all but futile. Cavalry units, from the 16th century on, were more likely to charge other cavalry on the flanks of an infantry formation and try to work their way behind the enemy infantry. When they achieved this and pursued a fleeing enemy, heavy cavalry could still destroy an enemy army. Only specialised cavalry units like winged hussars armed with long lances could break pikemen lines, but this was rather an exception. After wars with Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, when he fought often against superior mounted troops, King Gustavus II Adolphus started using successfully cavalry melee charge more often instead of caracole like during Battle of Breitenfeld. The cavalry charge remained an important part of battle tactics for the rest of 17th century and until the modern area, and its shock value could be decisive when implemented properly like during Battle of Vienna (1683).
However, the power formerly wielded by a heavy cavalry-focused army was at an end. For the first time in millennia, the settled people of the agricultural regions could defeat the horse peoples of the steppe in open combat. The power of the Mongols was broken in Russia and, no longer threatened from the east, Russia began to assert itself as a major force in European affairs. Never again would nomads from the east threaten to overrun Europe or the Middle East. In the Siege of Kazan (1552), Russia had employed artillery, sappers, cavalry and infantry armed with arquebus (Streltsy), while the Khanate of Kazan had only employed cavalry. The use of sappers proved decisive. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | The cavalry charge remained an important part of battle tactics for the rest of 17th century and until the modern area, and its shock value could be decisive when implemented properly like during Battle of Vienna (1683).
However, the power formerly wielded by a heavy cavalry-focused army was at an end. For the first time in millennia, the settled people of the agricultural regions could defeat the horse peoples of the steppe in open combat. The power of the Mongols was broken in Russia and, no longer threatened from the east, Russia began to assert itself as a major force in European affairs. Never again would nomads from the east threaten to overrun Europe or the Middle East. In the Siege of Kazan (1552), Russia had employed artillery, sappers, cavalry and infantry armed with arquebus (Streltsy), while the Khanate of Kazan had only employed cavalry. The use of sappers proved decisive.
The one exception to this was the Ottoman Empire, which had been founded by Turkish horsemen. The Ottomans were some of the first to embrace gunpowder artillery and firearms and integrated them into their already formidable fighting abilities. As European infantry became better armed and disciplined, by about 1700, the Ottoman forces began to be regularly defeated by the troops of the Austria and Russia.
Naval warfare: The Age of Sail (usually dated as 1571–1862) was a period roughly corresponding to the early modern period in which international trade and naval warfare were dominated by sailing ships and gunpowder warfare, lasting from the mid-16th to the mid-19th centuries. The spread of European power around the world was closely tied to naval developments in this period. The caravel for the first time made unruly seas like the Atlantic Ocean open to exploration, trade, and military conquest. While in all previous eras, European navies had been largely confined to operations in coastal waters, and were generally used only in a support role for land-based forces, this changed with the introduction of the new vessels like the caravel, carrack, and galleon, and the increasing importance of international waterborne trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The new caravels were large enough and powerful enough to be armed with cannons with which they could bombard both shoreline defenses and other vessels.
Africa:
Somalia: The Ethiopian–Adal War was a military conflict between the Ethiopian Empire and the Adal Sultanate from 1529 until 1543. The Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi (nicknamed Gurey in Somali and Gragn in Amharic (ግራኝ Graññ), both meaning "the left-handed") came close to extinguishing the ancient realm of Ethiopia, and converting all of its subjects to Islam; the intervention of the European Cristóvão da Gama, son of the famous navigator Vasco da Gama, helped to prevent this outcome. Many historians trace the origins of hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia to this war. Some historians also argue that this conflict proved, through their use on both sides, the value of firearms such as the matchlock musket, cannons, and the arquebus over traditional weapons. Imam Ahmed was the first African commander to use cannon warfare on the continent during the Adal's conquest of the Ethiopian Empire under Dawit II.
Asia:
China: Gunpowder was invented in China in the Tang dynasty. It started being broadly used in warfare in the Song dynasty. From the 7th through 10th century, there were widespread advances in gunpowder technology. While the Europeans were pressed on technological advancements and military developments with gunpowder, the Chinese fell back in regards to further developing military technology. This was due to the fact that the Chinese were not as heavily engaged in wars or conquests as the Europeans. Notably, when the Chinese were at war with the Portuguese, for example, they swiftly adapted to military technology, and adopted Western style guns.
The Chinese pioneered the use of gunpowder weapons, crossbows, advanced forms of arms and armor, naval and nomadic cavalry. Thus, the Chinese even adopted Western military technology. Interestingly, the Chinese had many descriptions of how they utilized their technology. For Ming China, they had experiences on the battlefield: against Chinese rebels, Shan elephants, and Mongol horsemen. Nonetheless, under the Ming dynasty, intensively practiced tactical strategies based on their firearm use. Qi Jiguang and his troops used innovative battle techniques such as counter marching, dividing the troops, as a flexible way of adapting to the battlefield. These tactics were proved effective during the Sino-Dutch War beginning in 1661. While the Chinese were undermined as the inferior empire due to lack of weaponry, their strict adherence discipline and tactical strategy led to them defeating the Dutch. This draws a parallel to the Sino-Portuguese conflict. During the first war, in 1521, the Portuguese firepower was far more effective than the Chinese. As they witnessed the power of Portuguese artillery, the Chinese better prepared for the war in 1522. They modified, adapted, innovated and improved. The Chinese were a display of rapid militarization, as they instilled Western style learnings to their knowledge of artillery and war tactical strategy.
The fire arrows (rocket arrows) were first reported to have been used by the Southern Wu in 904 during the siege of Yuzhang.
Safavid Empire: Soon after the Ottoman Empire, two other Muslim gunpowder empires appeared: the Safavid Empire in Iran and the Mughal Empire in India. They both began in the early 16th century but later collapsed in the 18th century.
The refusal of their Qizilbash forces to use firearms contributed to the Safavid rout at Chaldiran in 1514.
After this, the Persians actively sought to acquire the skills to make and use firearms. In a report given to the Council of Ten on 24 September 1572, the Venetian envoy Vincenzo di Alessandri noted how firearms had become integrated into the Persian army:
They used for arms, swords, lances, arquebuses, which all the soldiers carry and use; their arms are also superior and better tempered than those of any other nation. The barrels of the arquebuses are generally six spans long, and carry a ball little less than three ounces in weight. They use them with such facility that it does not hinder them drawing their bows nor handling their swords, keeping the latter hung at their saddle bows till occasion requires them. The arquebus is then put away behind the back so that one weapon does not impede the use of the other.
Japan: The Japanese were introduced to early firearms by Portuguese traders arriving with European style arquebuses onto the island of Tanegashima, near the island of Kyushu in September 1543. The impact of this event would revolutionize Japanese strategy throughout the Sengoku-jidai, revolving around tactics that centered on usage of firearms.
While memoirs by Fernão Mendes Pinto attribute himself and Diogo Zeimoto as the traders to initially introduce firearms to Japan, studies of said memoirs call this claim highly embellished, and therefore the validity of this claim falls into question. Daimyō of the period, searching for any sort of new tactical edge over their regional rivals, were quick to acquire and have blacksmiths under their retinue, reverse-engineer and reproduce the early European firearms. Portuguese traders visiting Japan several years later found that the Japanese had successfully reproduced hundreds of arquebuses, and by 1546, a rough estimate of over 300,000 of the early firearms were in circulation throughout Japan. Early production of said firearms were limited to the general region of Kyushu, though gunsmiths would eventually migrate throughout Japan. Different schools started to emerge from this migration. with notable examples from Sakai, Yokkaichi, and Kunitomo being the most prevalent. Moreover, production of small arms ranged from the early Tanegashima arquebus, to later production teppo, which also subdivided into arquebuses of varying caliber and length, to "hand cannons" favored by those of the Shimazu clan.
Japanese military strategy upon receiving the new weapon, began to gradually shift towards infantry based tactics, rather than those that favored horseback cavalry. This is most famously portrayed at the Battle of Nagashino in 1575, where Oda Nobunaga's 3,000 riflemen had handily dispatched the much larger Takeda clan cavalry force using the first recorded utilization of volley fire. However, certain studies have disputed the claim that Nobunaga was the first to utilize this tactic, though Japanese forces were utilizing it far earlier than other world contemporaries. Japanese battle planning soon centered around manipulating one's enemies into allied fortified positions to rapidly dispatch enemy manpower, only engaging in hand-to-hand combat when necessary.
Similarly, Japanese daimyō were introduced to artillery in 1551, when a trader claiming to be the king of Rome presented elements of the Ōtomo clan with two examples of field artillery. As with their small arms counterparts, many warlords wished to quickly adopt the weapon in order to gain an advantage over their contemporaries, but difficulties in producing suitable reproductions led to limited early usage in comparison. As with personal firearms, Oda Nobunaga was early to adopt the new weapon, and later, after his death, one of his retainers Toyotomi Hideyoshi would use cannons to destructive effect to lay siege to Kanki Castle in 1582. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | Japanese battle planning soon centered around manipulating one's enemies into allied fortified positions to rapidly dispatch enemy manpower, only engaging in hand-to-hand combat when necessary.
Similarly, Japanese daimyō were introduced to artillery in 1551, when a trader claiming to be the king of Rome presented elements of the Ōtomo clan with two examples of field artillery. As with their small arms counterparts, many warlords wished to quickly adopt the weapon in order to gain an advantage over their contemporaries, but difficulties in producing suitable reproductions led to limited early usage in comparison. As with personal firearms, Oda Nobunaga was early to adopt the new weapon, and later, after his death, one of his retainers Toyotomi Hideyoshi would use cannons to destructive effect to lay siege to Kanki Castle in 1582. Moreover, Nobunaga had attempted to incorporate cannons onto warships in 1578, but their inefficacy against rival naval daimyō forces under the Mori had led to the discontinuation of any further implementations to other naval forces.
These changes and adoptions into Sengoku era Japanese warfare made themselves present during the Japanese invasions of Korea of 1592–1598 after Toyotomi Hideyoshi had unified Japan. Early success in the first incursion during May 1592 into Korea was attributed to the varied small arms and tactics of the Japanese forces, allowing them to make and defend early footholds into the Korean peninsula. However, after the Koreans had allied themselves with Ming China, they gained access to better artillery with greater range and destructive power than their Japanese equivalents. Finally, the Korean navy under the command of Yi Sun-sin had utilized the superior, cannon-armed navy of the Korean-Ming alliance against the Japanese maritime supply lines, eventually leading to a shortage of supplies and Japanese losses on the mainland. Japan was driven off their last stronghold in Seoul in May 1594, and subsequent ventures 1597 would not come close to the success of the first, as the Korean-Ming alliance had developed countermeasures and equivalent small arms to Japanese equivalents.
The Japanese version of the fire arrow (rocket arrow) was known as the bo hiya. The Japanese pirates (wokou, also known as wako or kaizoku) in the 16th century were reported to have used the bo hiya which had the appearance of a large arrow. A burning element made from incendiary waterproof rope was wrapped around the shaft and when lit the bo hiya was launched from a mortar like weapon hiya taihou or a wide bore Tanegashima matchlock arquebus. During one sea battle it was said the bo hiya were "falling like rain".
Kingdom of Mysore: The first iron rockets were developed by Tipu Sultan, a Muslim ruler of the South Indian Kingdom of Mysore. He successfully used these iron rockets against the larger forces of the British East India Company during the Anglo-Mysore Wars. The Mysore rockets of this period were much more advanced than what the British had seen, chiefly because of the use of iron tubes for holding the propellant; this enabled higher thrust and longer range for the missile (up to 2 km range). After Tipu's eventual defeat in the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War and the capture of the Mysore iron rockets, they were influential in British rocket development and were soon put into use in the Napoleonic Wars.
Mughal Empire: Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire on the Indian subcontinent, employed firearms, gun carts and movable artillery in battle. In particular, he used them at the first Battle of Panipat (1526) to defeat the much larger forces of Ibrahim Lodhi, the last ruler of the Delhi Sultanate. Other battles he fought using gunpowder weapons include the Battle of Khanwa in 1527 against Rana Sanga, and the Battle of Ghaghra in 1529.
His descendants also employed gunpowder weapons in their expansion of the Mughal Empire, such as Akbar the Great at the second Battle of Panipat (1556) against Adil Shah Suri and Hemu of the Sur dynasty. In 1582, Fathullah Shirazi, a Persian-Indian developed a seventeen-barrelled cannon, fired with a matchlock.
Ottoman Empire: The Ottoman Empire had been one of the first Middle Eastern states to effectively use gunpowder weapons and used them to great effect conquering much of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans. In the 17th century the state began to stagnate as more modern technologies and strategies were not adopted. Specifically, the Ottoman Empire was slow to adopt innovations like boring cannon (rather than casting them in a mold), making the conversion from matchlock firearms to flintlocks, and the lightening of field guns and carriages.
In part this was because the military elite had become a powerful force in the empire and change threatened their positions. David Nicolle theorizes that one contributing factor to the Ottoman reluctance to adopt the flintlock musket, despite its superiority over the matchlock ignition system, was the dusty climate of much of the Middle East which could cause problems with reliability.
Overall, the Ottoman Empire between the 15th and 18th centuries has been assessed as a military producer which copies existing technologies, but does not capture the underlying process of innovation or adaption. Other research, though, complicates that view. A Chinese military manual published in 1644 compared Ottoman and European firearms in the following manner:
Firearms have been in use since the beginning of the dynasty, and field armies in battle formation have found them convenient and useful to carry along... Since muskets have been transmitted to China, these weapons have lost their effectiveness... In battle formation, aside from various cannon such as the "three generals", the breech-loading swivel gun, and the "hundred-league thunder", nothing has more range or power than the Turkish musket. The next best is the European one.
The fact that Ottoman firearms were considered by 17th century Chinese writers to be superior to European firearms demonstrates that the Ottoman Empire was at least a second tier producer of muskets during this period. However, some claim that the 'European' firearms the Chinese researcher tested were actually Japanese arquebuses based on fifty-year-old Portuguese models. The design of the Ottoman matchlock is substantially different from that of the European variety and it in turn influenced the matchlocks produced in both Safavid Persia and Mughal India.
15th century: The Ottoman Empire by the middle of the fifteenth century had developed strategic infantry groups along with the ascension of weaponry. Early modern warfare has many important factors alongside weapons and artillery, and strategy is one of them. Developing a strong core for the sultan was key to understanding the way the Ottoman Empire could expand and take over vast territories to maintain them under their rule. One of the most important creations for their early modern warfare was a group called the Janissaries. They were considered to be an elite group of infantryman that were highly skilled and sociable. With their placement in use for the sultan, they were an unmatched military power that no European power could compete with during the fifteenth century.
The Ottoman Empire was brought up in a different way from most militaristic powers, and that was from the bottom up. They were developed in peaceful upbringings. When they conquered Constantinople in 1453, they had created a transcontinental government that would see them to continue to expand militarily and politically. They used the Janissary units to advance their stronghold on the will of the people they conquered. One of their techniques was to capture boys from the territories they had defeated and forced them to become Muslim in order to control their easily molded minds. It was a similar tactic to many growing empires, because it is understood that children are easily manipulated, and in order to maintain new territories guarded by the Janissary, they needed to have an easier population to mold. The Janissaries also had other roles outside of military conflict. They were one of the main protectors of the sultan in order to prevent coups from happening, or paramilitary units from gaining control of the empire. The problem with this is that the Ottoman Empire made the Janissaries too powerful and because of their socialization, career advancement options, and recruitment procedures, the men in the units were very cohesive and respected each other more than the sultan. This would prove to be an issue later on, but during the fifteenth century it was not an issue yet because their numbers were still growing and would continue to grow in order to boost their elite power.
A man by the name of Konstantin Mihailović was captured by the Turks in 1455 and would eventually write a memoir about his time with the Ottoman Empire's Janissary units. His account would be considered flawed because of the translations from Serbian to Czech and Polish. There is no original text from his memoir and only translations are left to work from, and those have far fetched ideas of what the Janissaries were doing during the time. He was recaptured in 1463 by Hungarian troops and eventually wrote the memoir after he became a Christian again. His memoir is an important piece of history, but scholars and historians have widely debated the authentic nature of his stories and doubt the consistency of his tales.
The Ottoman Empire was one of the first states to put gunpowder weapons into widespread use. The famous Janissary corps of the Ottoman army began using matchlock muskets as early as the 1440s. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | A man by the name of Konstantin Mihailović was captured by the Turks in 1455 and would eventually write a memoir about his time with the Ottoman Empire's Janissary units. His account would be considered flawed because of the translations from Serbian to Czech and Polish. There is no original text from his memoir and only translations are left to work from, and those have far fetched ideas of what the Janissaries were doing during the time. He was recaptured in 1463 by Hungarian troops and eventually wrote the memoir after he became a Christian again. His memoir is an important piece of history, but scholars and historians have widely debated the authentic nature of his stories and doubt the consistency of his tales.
The Ottoman Empire was one of the first states to put gunpowder weapons into widespread use. The famous Janissary corps of the Ottoman army began using matchlock muskets as early as the 1440s. The army of Mehmed the Conqueror, which conquered Constantinople in 1453, included both artillery and foot soldiers armed with gunpowder weapons. The Ottomans brought to the siege sixty-nine guns in fifteen separate batteries and trained them at the walls of the city. The barrage of Ottoman cannon fire lasted forty days, and they are estimated to have fired 19,320 times.
16th century: The 16th century saw the first widespread use of the matchlock musket as a decisive weapon on the battlefield with the Turks becoming leaders in this regard. The first of these campaigns was the campaign against the Persians in 1514 under Yavuz Sultan Selim, or Selim the Grim. Armed with gunpowder weapons, his army defeated the Persians at the Battle of Chaldiran. After his victory over the Safavids, Selim turned his attention towards the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt. The decisive battle of his campaign against the Mamluks, and the battle which highlighted the importance of the musket in the Ottoman military, was the Battle of Raydaniyah, fought in 1517. There, Selim outflanked the entrenched Mamluk artillery, and attacked the Mamluk forces with his Janissaries. The Janissaries, armed with firearms, destroyed the Mamluk army, armed mostly with traditional swords and javelins.
Reference was made by João de Barros to a sea battle outside Jiddah, in 1517, between Portuguese and Ottoman vessels. The Muslim force under Salman Reis had "three or four basilisks firing balls of thirty palms in circumference". This was estimated to be a cannon of about 90 inch bore "firing cut stone balls of approximately 1,000 pounds (453 kg)".
After the death of Selim, he was succeeded by his son Suleiman the Magnificent. During his reign, gunpowder weapons continued to be used effectively. One important example is the Battle of Mohács in 1526. During this battle, Ottoman artillery, and Janissaries armed with muskets, were able to cut down charging Hungarian cavalry.
17th century: Although the cannon and musket were employed by the Ottomans long beforehand, by the 17th century they witnessed how ineffective the traditional cavalry charges were in the face of concentrated musket-fire volleys. In a report given by an Ottoman general in 1602, he confessed that the army was in a distressed position due to the emphasis in European forces for musket-wielding infantry, while the Ottomans relied heavily on cavalry. Thereafter it was suggested that the Janissaries, who were already trained and equipped with muskets, become more heavily involved in the imperial army while led by their agha.
By the middle of the 17th century, the continued reliance of the Ottomans on over-heavy ordnance had been made out by European officers as a liability. Raimondo Montecuccoli, the Habsburg commander who defeated the Ottomans at Battle of Saint Gotthard commented on Ottoman cannon:
This enormous artillery produces great damage when it hits, but it is awkward to move and it requires too much time to reload and site. Furthermore, it consumes a great amount of powder, besides cracking and breaking the wheels and the carriages and even the ramparts on which it is placed ... our artillery is more handy and more efficient and here resides our advantage over the cannon of the Turks.
Vietnam: Western matchlock arquebuses were imported into Vietnam during the early 16th century. The raging and lengthy wars between Le and Mac dynasties, and later Trinh and Nguyen clans invoked an arm race between the opposing factions. Gunnery and marksmanship rapidly spread across the country and soon Vietnamese musketeers became famous within Asia as masters of firearms.
See also: Gunpowder magazine
Kabinettskriege
Battle of Caishi
Battle of Tangdao
Technology of the Song dynasty
Early modern period
References:
Bibliography:
External links: Military Science in Western Europe in the 16th Century. Prologue: The Nature of Armies in the 16th Century (PDF).
From Gunpowder to World Domination |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Economic warfare | History:
Crusades: In his Book on the Recovery of the Holy Land, Fidentius of Padua provides prescriptions for economic warfare to be waged against the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt in furtherance of the Crusades. He envisions a fleet of 40–50 galleys to enforce a blockade on trade between Europe and Egypt. He sees this trade as helping Egypt in two ways: from Europe it obtains war materiel (iron, tin, timber, oil) and from Asia dues on goods brought in via the Red Sea for trade to Europe. If this spice trade were deflected from the Red Sea to Mongol Persia, Egypt would be deprived of customs duties and would also lose export markets because of the reduction in shipping. This may also make it unable to afford more slave soldiers imported from the Black Sea.
American Civil War: Union forces in the American Civil War had the challenge of occupying and controlling the 11 states of the Confederacy, a vast area larger than Western Europe. The Confederate economy proved surprisingly vulnerable.
Guerrilla warfare in the American Civil War was supported by a large fraction of the Confederate population that provided food, horses, and hiding places for official and unofficial Confederate units. The Union response was to ravage the local economy, as in the Burning Raid of 1864. Before the war, most passenger and freight traffic moved by water through the river system or coastal ports. Confederate railroads were already inadequate and suffered much damage. Travel became far more difficult. The Union Navy took control of much of the seacoast and the main rivers such as the Mississippi River and the Tennessee River, using the Mississippi River Squadron of powerful small gunboats. Land transportation was contested, as Confederate supporters tried to block shipments of munitions, reinforcements and supplies through West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee to Union forces to the south. Bridges were burned, railroad tracks torn up, and telegraph lines were cut. Both sides did the same and effectively ruined the infrastructure of the Confederacy.
The Confederacy in 1861 had 297 towns and cities with a total population of 835,000 people, 162 of which were at one point occupied by Union forces with a total population of 681,000 people. In practically every case, infrastructure was damaged, and trade and economic activity was disrupted for a while. Eleven cities were severely damaged by war action, including Atlanta, Charleston, Columbia, and Richmond. The rate of damage in smaller towns was much lower, with severe damage to 45 out of a total of 830.
Farms were in disrepair, and the prewar stock of horses, mules, and cattle was much depleted; 40% of the South's livestock had been killed. The South's farms were not highly mechanized, but the value of farm implements and machinery in the 1860 census was $81 million and had been reduced by 40% by 1870. The transportation infrastructure lay in ruins, with little railroad or riverboat service available to move crops and animals to market. Railroad mileage was located mostly in rural areas and over two thirds of the South's rails, bridges, rail yards, repair shops, and rolling stock were in areas reached by Union armies, which systematically destroyed what they could. Even in untouched areas, the lack of maintenance and repair, the absence of new equipment, the heavy overuse, and the relocation of equipment by the Confederacy from remote areas to the war zone ensured the system would be ruined at war's end.
The enormous cost of the Confederate war effort took a high toll on the South's economic infrastructure. The direct costs to the Confederacy in human capital, government expenditures, and physical destruction totaled perhaps $3.3 billion. By 1865, the Confederate dollar was worthless because of high inflation, and people in the South had to resort to bartering for goods or services to use scarce Union dollars. With the emancipation of the slaves, the entire economy of the South had to be rebuilt. Having lost their enormous investment in slaves, white planters had minimal capital to pay freedmen workers to bring in crops. As a result, a system of sharecropping was developed in which landowners broke up large plantations and rented small lots to the freedmen and their families. The main feature of the Southern economy changed from an elite minority of landed gentry slaveholders to a tenant farming agriculture system. The disruption of finance, trade, services, and transportation nodes severely disrupted the prewar agricultural system and forced Southerners to turn to barter. The entire region was impoverished for generations.
World War I: The British used their greatly-superior Royal Navy to cause a tight blockade of Germany and a close monitoring of shipments to neutral countries to prevent them from being transshipped to there. Germany could not find enough food since its younger farmers were all in the army, and the desperate Germans were eating turnips by the winter of 1916–17. US shipping was sometimes seized, and Washington protested. The British paid monetary compensation so that the American protests would not escalate into serious trouble.
World War II: Clear examples of economic warfare occurred during World War II when the Allied powers followed such policies to deprive the Axis economies of critical resources. The British Royal Navy again blockaded Germany although with much more difficulty than in 1914. The US Navy, especially its submarines, cut off shipments of oil and food to Japan.
In turn, Germany attempted to damage the Allied war effort via submarine warfare: the sinking of transport ships carrying supplies, raw materials, and essential war-related items such as food and oil. As the Allied air forces grew, they mounted an Oil campaign of World War II to deprive Germany of fuel.
Neutral countries continue to trade with both sides. The Royal Navy could not stop land trade, so the allies made other effort to cut off sales to Germany of critical minerals such as tungsten, chromium, mercury and iron ore from Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden and elsewhere. Germany wanted Spain to enter the war but they could not agree to terms. To keep Germany and Spain apart, Britain used a carrot-and-stick approach. Britain provided oil and closely monitored Spain's export trade. It outbid Germany for the wolfram, whose price soared, and by 1943, wolfram was Spain's biggest export-earner. Britain's cautious treatment of Spain brought conflict with the more aggressive American policy. In the Wolfram Crisis of 1944 Washington cut off oil supplies but then agreed with London's requests to resume oil shipments. Portugal feared a German-Spanish invasion, but when that became unlikely in 1944, it virtually joined the Allies.
Cold War: During the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), the British military deployed herbicides and defoliants in the Malaysian countryside (including crop fields) in order to deprive Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) insurgents of cover, potential sources of food and to flush them out of the jungle. The herbicides and defoliants deployed by the British contained Trioxone, an ingredient which was also formed part of the chemical composition of the Agent Orange herbicide used by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War. Deployment of herbicides and defoliants served the dual purpose of thinning jungle trails to prevent ambushes and destroying crop fields in regions where the MNLA was active to deprive them of potential sources of food. Herbicides and defoliants were also sprayed from Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft.
On 17 November 1953, the Greek National Intelligence Service (KYP) proposed conducting tax audits on suspected communist book publishers and cinema owners, censoring Soviet movies and promoting Soviet films of particularly low quality. In 1959, KYP launched exhibitions of Soviet products in Volos, Thessaloniki and Piraeus. The bulk of the products were cheap and defective, purposefully selected to tarnish the Soviet Union's image.
During the Vietnam War, between 1962 and 1971, the United States military sprayed nearly 20,000,000 U.S. gallons (76,000 m3) of various chemicals – the "rainbow herbicides" and defoliants – in Vietnam, eastern Laos, and parts of Cambodia as part of Operation Ranch Hand, reaching its peak from 1967 to 1969. For comparison purposes, an olympic size pool holds approximately 660,000 U.S. gal (2,500 m3). As the British did in Malaya, the goal of the U.S. was to defoliate rural/forested land, depriving guerrillas of food and concealment and clearing sensitive areas such as around base perimeters. Samuel P. Huntington argued that the program was also a part of a general policy of forced draft urbanization, which aimed to destroy the ability of peasants to support themselves in the countryside, forcing them to flee to the U.S.-dominated cities, depriving the guerrillas of their rural support base.
French Economic Warfare School: Christian Harbulot, the director of the Economic Warfare School in Paris, provides an historical reconstruction of the economic balance of power between states. In his study, he demonstrates that the strategies that states put in place to increase their economic power and their impact on the international balance of power can be interpreted only by the concept of economic warfare.
Economic sanctions: The Covenant of the League of Nations provided for military and economic sanctions against aggressor states, and the idea of economic sanctions was regarded as a great innovation. However, economic sanctions without military ones failed to dissuade Italy from conquering Abbysinia. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Economic warfare | Samuel P. Huntington argued that the program was also a part of a general policy of forced draft urbanization, which aimed to destroy the ability of peasants to support themselves in the countryside, forcing them to flee to the U.S.-dominated cities, depriving the guerrillas of their rural support base.
French Economic Warfare School: Christian Harbulot, the director of the Economic Warfare School in Paris, provides an historical reconstruction of the economic balance of power between states. In his study, he demonstrates that the strategies that states put in place to increase their economic power and their impact on the international balance of power can be interpreted only by the concept of economic warfare.
Economic sanctions: The Covenant of the League of Nations provided for military and economic sanctions against aggressor states, and the idea of economic sanctions was regarded as a great innovation. However, economic sanctions without military ones failed to dissuade Italy from conquering Abbysinia.
In 1973–1974, the oil-producing Arab states imposed an oil embargo against the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, South Africa, Japan, and other industrialized countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. Results included the 1973 oil crisis and a sharp rise in prices but not an end to support for Israel.
Many United States sanctions have been imposed since the middle 20th century.
United States embargo against Cuba
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
Sanctions against North Korea
Fortress economics or a fortress economy is a phrase used in relation to the defense and sustenance of a countries' economy amidst international sanctions. (The term has been used in reference to Russia in 2022, Taiwan with relation to China-US relations, and Europe.)
See also:
References:
Further reading: Baldwin, David A. Economic Statecraft (Princeton UP, 1985).
Clark, J. Maurice et al. Readings in the Economics Of War (1918) 703pp; short excerpts from primary sources on a very wide range of economic warfare topics online free
Dobson, Alan P. U.S. Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933–1991 (2003). excerpt
Duffett, Rachel, and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, eds. Food and War in Twentieth Century Europe (2016)
Einzig, Paul. Economic Warfare 1939-1940 (1942) online free
Esno, Tyler. "Reagan's Economic War on the Soviet Union," Diplomatic History (2018) 42#2 pp 281–304.
Christian Harbulot,La machine de guerre économique, Economica,Paris, 1992.
Christian Harbulot,La guerre économique, PUF,Paris, 2011
Christian Harbulot,Le manuel de l'intelligence économique, PUF,Paris, 2012
Christian Harbulo,Techniques offensives et guerre économique, éditions La Bourdonnaye,Paris, 2014.
Christian Harbulot,Le manuel de l'intelligence économique, comprendre la guerre économique, PUF,Paris, 2015
Christian Harbulot,L'art de la guerre economique,Editions Va Press,Versailles,2018
Jack, D. T. Studies in economic warfare (1940), covers Napoleonic wars, laws, WWI and 1939-40 online free
Jackson, Ian. The Economic Cold War: America, Britain and East-West Trade, 1948–63 (2001)
Joes, Anthony James. America and guerrilla warfare (2015); Covers nine major wars from the 1770s to the 21st century.
McDermott, John. "Total War and the Merchant State: Aspects of British Economic Warfare against Germany, 1914-16." Canadian Journal of History 21.1 (1986): 61–76.
Siney, Marion C. The Allied blockade of Germany, 1914-1916 (1957) online free
External links: Media related to Economic warfare at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Economy of force | Notes:
See also: Carl Von Clausewitz's Vom Krieg (On War)
J.F.C. Fuller's The Nine Principles of War.
Col. John Boyd's OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) theory.
Further reading: Handel, Michael I. (2001). Robert Cowley, Geoffrey Parker (ed.). The Reader's Companion to Military History. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. pp. 147–. ISBN 978-0-618-12742-9. Retrieved 6 September 2011. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Electromagnetic warfare | The electromagnetic environment: Military operations are executed in an information environment increasingly complicated by the electromagnetic spectrum. The electromagnetic spectrum portion of the information environment is referred to as the electromagnetic environment (EME). The recognized need for military forces to have unimpeded access to and use of the electromagnetic environment creates vulnerabilities and opportunities for electronic warfare in support of military operations.
Within the information operations construct, EW is an element of information warfare; more specifically, it is an element of offensive and defensive counterinformation.
NATO has a different and arguably more encompassing and comprehensive approach to EW. A military committee conceptual document from 2007, MCM_0142 Nov 2007 Military Committee Transformation Concept for Future NATO Electronic Warfare, recognised the EME as an operational maneuver space and warfighting environment/domain. In NATO, EW is considered to be warfare in the EME. NATO has adopted simplified language which parallels those used in other warfighting environments like maritime, land, and air/space. For example, an electronic attack (EA) is offensive use of EM energy, electronic defense (ED), and electronic surveillance (ES). The use of the traditional NATO EW terms, electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic protective measures (EPM), and electronic support measures (ESM) has been retained as they contribute to and support electronic attack (EA), electronic defense (ED) and electronic surveillance (ES). Besides EW, other EM operations include intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Subsequently, NATO has issued EW policy and doctrine and is addressing the other NATO defense lines of development.
Primary EW activities have been developed over time to exploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities that are inherent in the physics of EM energy. Activities used in EW include electro-optical, infrared and radio frequency countermeasures; EM compatibility and deception; radio jamming, radar jamming and deception and electronic counter-countermeasures (or anti-jamming); electronic masking, probing, reconnaissance, and intelligence; electronic security; EW reprogramming; emission control; spectrum management; and wartime reserve modes.
Subdivisions: Electronic warfare consists of three major subdivisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES).
Electronic attack: Electronic attack (EA), also known as electronic countermeasures (ECM), involves the offensive use of electromagnetic energy weapons, directed energy weapons, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability including human life. In the case of electromagnetic energy, this action is most commonly referred to as "jamming" and can be performed on communications systems or radar systems. In the case of anti-radiation weapons, this often includes missiles or bombs that can home in on a specific signal (radio or radar) and follow that path directly to impact, thus destroying the system broadcasting.
In November 2021, Israel Aerospace Industries announced a new electronic warfare system named Scorpius that can disrupt radar and communications from ships, UAVs, and missiles simultaneously and at varying distances.
On 8 September 2024, Russian drones entered both Romanian and Latvian airspace. Romanian scrambled two F-16s to monitor the drone's progress, it landed "in an uninhabited area" near Periprava, according to the Romanian Ministry of Defence. The drone that entered Latvian airspace from Belarus crashed near Rezekne. This comes as the ISW noted increased success in Ukrainian Electronic Warfare against Russian drones that resulted in "several Russian Shahed drones (that) recently failed to reach their intended targets for unknown reasons." Two Kh-58s also reportedly failed to reach their targets.
Electronic protection: Electronic protection (EP), also known as an electronic protective measure (EPM) or electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) are a measure used to protect against an electronic enemy attack (EA) or to protect against friendly forces who unintentionally deploy the equivalent of an electronic attack on friendly forces. (sometimes called EW fratricide). The effectiveness of electronic protection (EP) level is the ability to counter an electronic attack (EA).
Flares are often used to distract infrared homing missiles into missing their target. The use of flare rejection logic in the guidance (seeker head) of an infrared homing missile to counter an adversary's use of flares is an example of EP. While defensive EA actions (jamming) and EP (defeating jamming) both protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment, EP protects from the effects of EA (friendly and/or adversary). Other examples of EP include spread spectrum technologies, the use of restricted frequency lists, emissions control (EMCON), and low observability (stealth) technology.
Electronic warfare self-protection (EWSP) is a suite of countermeasure systems fitted primarily to aircraft for the purpose of protecting the host from weapons fire and can include, among others: directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM, flare systems and other forms of infrared countermeasures for protection against infrared missiles; chaff (protection against radar-guided missiles); and DRFM decoy systems (protection against radar-targeted anti-aircraft weapons).
An electronic warfare tactics range (EWTR) is a practice range that provides training for personnel operating in electronic warfare. There are two examples of such ranges in Europe: one at RAF Spadeadam in the northwest county of Cumbria, England, and the Multinational Aircrew Electronic Warfare Tactics Facility Polygone range on the border between Germany and France. EWTRs are equipped with ground-based equipment to simulate electronic warfare threats that aircrew might encounter on missions. Other EW training and tactics ranges are available for ground and naval forces as well.
Antifragile EW is a step beyond standard EP, occurring when a communications link being jammed actually increases in capability as a result of a jamming attack, although this is only possible under certain circumstances such as reactive forms of jamming.
Electronic warfare support: Electronic warfare support (ES) is a subdivision of EW involving actions taken by an operational commander or operator to detect, intercept, identify, locate, and/or localize sources of intended and unintended radiated electromagnetic (EM) energy. These Electronic Support Measures (ESM) aim to enable immediate threat recognition focuses on serving military service needs even in the most tactical, rugged, and extreme environments. This is often referred to as simply reconnaissance, although today, more common terms are intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) or intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR). The purpose is to provide immediate recognition, prioritization, and targeting of threats to battlefield commanders.
Signals intelligence (SIGINT), a discipline overlapping with ES, is the related process of analyzing and identifying intercepted transmissions from sources such as radio communication, mobile phones, radar, or microwave communication. SIGINT is broken into two categories: electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT). Analysis parameters measured in signals of these categories can include frequency, bandwidth, modulation, and polarization.
The distinction between SIGINT and ES is determined by the controller of the collection assets, the information provided, and the intended purpose of the information. Electronic warfare support is conducted by assets under the operational control of a commander to provide tactical information, specifically threat prioritization, recognition, location, targeting, and avoidance. However, the same assets and resources that are tasked with ES can simultaneously collect information that meets the collection requirements for more strategic intelligence.
History: The earliest documented use of EW was during the Second Boer War of 1899–1902. The British Army, when trying to relieve Ladysmith, under siege by the Boers, used a searchlight to "bounce" Morse code signals off the clouds. The Boers immediately spotted this and used one of their own searchlights in an attempt to jam the British signals. This was graphically described by Winston Churchill in his book London to Ladysmith via Pretoria.
During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru had located the Russian Baltic Fleet in Tsushima Strait, and was communicating the fleet's location by radio signals to the Imperial Japanese Fleet HQ. The captain of the Russian warship Ural requested permission to disrupt the Japanese communications link by attempting to transmit a stronger radio signal over the Shinano Maru's signal, hoping to distort the Japanese signal at the receiving end. Russian Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky refused the advice and denied the Ural permission to electronically jam the enemy, which in those circumstances might have proved invaluable. The intelligence the Japanese gained ultimately led to the decisive Battle of Tsushima, where the Russian Navy lost all its battleships and most of its cruisers and destroyers. These losses effectively ended the Russo-Japanese War in Japan's favor.
During World War II, the Allies and Axis Powers both extensively used EW, or what Winston Churchill referred to as the "Battle of the Beams": as navigational radars were used to guide bombers to their targets and back to their base, the first application of EW in WWII was to interfere with the navigational radars. Chaff was also introduced during WWII to confuse and defeat tracking radar systems.
As battlefield communication and radar technology improved, so did electronic warfare, which played a major role in several military operations during the Vietnam War. Aircraft on bombing runs and air-to-air missions often relied on EW to survive the battle, although many were defeated by Vietnamese ECCM. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Electromagnetic warfare | The intelligence the Japanese gained ultimately led to the decisive Battle of Tsushima, where the Russian Navy lost all its battleships and most of its cruisers and destroyers. These losses effectively ended the Russo-Japanese War in Japan's favor.
During World War II, the Allies and Axis Powers both extensively used EW, or what Winston Churchill referred to as the "Battle of the Beams": as navigational radars were used to guide bombers to their targets and back to their base, the first application of EW in WWII was to interfere with the navigational radars. Chaff was also introduced during WWII to confuse and defeat tracking radar systems.
As battlefield communication and radar technology improved, so did electronic warfare, which played a major role in several military operations during the Vietnam War. Aircraft on bombing runs and air-to-air missions often relied on EW to survive the battle, although many were defeated by Vietnamese ECCM.
In 2007, an Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear site during Operation Outside the Box (or Operation Orchard) used electronic warfare systems to disrupt Syrian air defenses while Israeli jets crossed much of Syria, bombed their targets, and returned to Israel undeterred. The target was a suspected nuclear reactor under construction near the Euphrates River, modeled after a North Korean reactor and supposedly financed with Iranian assistance. Some reports say Israeli EW systems deactivated all of Syria's air defense systems for the entire period of the raid.
In December 2010, the Russian Army deployed their first land-based multifunctional electronic warfare system known as Borisoglebsk 2, developed by Sozvezdie. Development of the system started in 2004 and evaluation testing successfully completed in December 2010. The Borisoglebsk-2 uses four different types of jamming stations on a single system. The Borisoglebsk-2 system is mounted on nine MT-LB armored vehicles and is intended to suppress mobile satellite communications and satellite-based navigation signals. This EW system is developed to conduct electronic reconnaissance and suppression of radio-frequency sources. In August 2015, the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet said its initial usage caused concern within NATO. A Russian blog described Borisoglebsk-2 thus:
The 'Borisoglebsk-2', when compared to its predecessors, has better technical characteristics: wider frequency bandwidth for conducting radar collection and jamming, faster scanning times of the frequency spectrum, and higher precision when identifying the location and source of radar emissions, and increased capacity for suppression.
During the first two days of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian EW disrupted Ukraine's air defense radars and communications, severely disrupting Ukrainian ground-based air defense systems. Russian jamming was so effective it interfered with their own communications, so efforts were scaled back. This led to Ukrainian SAMs regaining much of their effectiveness, which began inflicting significant losses on Russian aircraft by the start of March 2022. Rapid Russian advances at the start of the war prevented EW troops from properly supporting the advancing troops, but by late March and April 2022, extensive jamming infrastructure had been deployed. EW complexes were set up in Donbas in concentrations of up to 10 complexes per 13 mi (21 km) of frontage. Electronic suppression of GPS and radio signals caused heavy losses of Ukrainian UAVs, depriving them of intelligence and precise artillery fire spotting. Small quadcopters had an average life expectancy of around three flights, and larger fixed-wing UAVs like the Bayraktar TB2 had a life expectancy of about six flights. By summer 2022, only some one-third of Ukrainian UAV missions could be said to have been successful, as EW had contributed to Ukraine losing 90% of the thousands of drones it had at the beginning of the invasion.
Russian EW capacity to disrupt GPS signals is credited with the reduction in the success of Ukrainian usage of HIMARS and JDAM bombs. The failure of GPS guidance forces these weapons, in particular JDAMS, to use inertial navigation system which reduces accuracy from around 5 metres (15 ft) down to around 27 metres (90 ft).
Ukraine was losing some 10,000 drones a month due to Russian electronic warfare, according to a 19 May 2023 report by the Royal United Services Institute. This was an average of 300 drones a day. Russia has established EW posts about every 10 kilometres (6 mi) of the front, being some 6 kilometres (4 mi) back from the front line. In October 2023, The Economist reported that electronic warfare was in widespread use on front lines to impair small battlefield UAV activity, with Russia installing video feedback and control jammers on high-value equipment like tanks and artillery. By 11 March 2024, Ukraine reported it had destroyed a Russian Palantin EW system in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, which "suppress satellite radio navigation along the entire line of contact and in most parts of Ukraine, replacing the satellite radio navigation field (spoofing)". An estimated three Palantin systems have been hit (June 2022, February 2023, and March 2024). In addition to the Palantin, in Zaporizhzhia a Layer EW system was destroyed.
In popular culture: In the movie Spaceballs, an electronic attack "jams" a weapons system with a literal jar of jam. In both Top Gun: Maverick and Behind Enemy Lines, characters utilize chaff and flares from their F/A-18s to confuse/deflect guided missiles.
See also: Cyberwarfare
Electromagnetic pulse
Electromagnetic interference
Electronic harassment
L3Harris Technologies
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)
Other electronic warfare systems:
ADM-160 MALD
Krasukha (electronic warfare system)
Radar warning receiver (RWR)
Samyukta electronic warfare system
Sky Shadow (radar)
Historic:
36th Electronic Warfare Squadron
55th Wing
Battle of Latakia: the first recorded use of deception EW in a naval battle
No. 100 Group RAF
U.S. specific:
Association of Old Crows
DARPA
Electronic warfare officer
Fleet Electronic Warfare Center
Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare
National Electronics Museum
U.S. Marine Corps Radio Reconnaissance Platoon
USACEWP (United States Army Computer Network Operations-Electronic Warfare Proponents )
References:
Citations:
Sources:
Further reading: EW 101: A First Course in Electronic Warfare; David Adamy; 2001; ISBN 978-1580531696.
EW 102: A Second Course in Electronic Warfare; David Adamy; 2004; ISBN 978-1580536868.
Deception in War; Jon Latimer; 2001; ISBN 978-0719556050.
FM 3-36: Electronic Warfare In Operations. Safeguarding Soldiers Through Technology. Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Archived 2011-09-28 at the Wayback Machine (CAC), 26 February 2009 – PDF, 114 p., 4,5 MB. See also: John Milburn: Army manual raises emphasis on electronic warfare. The Washington Post, 26 February 2009.
Jogiaas, Aadu. "Disturbing soviet transmissions in August 1991". Archived from the original on 14 November 2011.
Bolton, Matt; Munro, Matt (2011). "The Tallinn Cables" (PDF). Lonely Planet Magazine (December): 48–55. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-11-13.
Winkler, Jonathan Reed (2017). "The Forgotten Menace of Electro-Magnetic Warfare in the Early Cold War". Diplomatic History. 42 (2): 254–280. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Electronic-warfare aircraft | List of electronic-warfare aircraft: Examples of modern aircraft designed or modified for EW include:
Antonov An-12BK-PPS (Soviet Union)
Antonov An-26REP (Soviet Union)
Boeing EA-18G Growler (United States)
Denel TP1 Oryx EW (South Africa)
Chengdu J-10D (China)
Douglas C-47TP EW (South Africa)
Douglas EA-3 Skywarrior (United States)
Douglas EB-66 Destroyer (United States)
Douglas EF-10B Skyknight (United States)
Embraer R-99 (Brazil)
General Dynamics/Grumman EF-111A Raven (United States)
IAI 202B Arava (Israel)
Ilyushin Il-22PP (Soviet Union) / (Russia)
Kawasaki EC-1 (Japan)
Kawasaki RC-2 (Japan)
Lockheed EC-130H Compass Call (United States)
Mil Mi-8PP (Soviet Union)
Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler (United States)
Tornado ECR (Germany / Italy)
Shaanxi Y-8EW (China)
Shaanxi Y-8-GX1 (China)
Shaanxi Y-9-GX11 (China)
Shaanxi Y-9DZ (China)
Shenyang J-15D (China)
Shenyang J-16D (China)
Sukhoi Su-24MP (Soviet Union)
Tupolev Tu-16RM-2 (Soviet Union)
Yakovlev Yak-28PP (Soviet Union)
Dassault Falcon 20 (Pakistan)
Saab Globaleye (Sweden)
Hava Soj (Turkiye)
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Empty Fort Strategy | Cao Cao: According to the Sanguozhi, in 195, the Empty Fort Strategy was used by the warlord Cao Cao against his rival Lü Bu in one incident at Chengshi County (乘氏縣; southwest of present-day Juye County, Shandong). In the summer of that year, Lü Bu went to Dongmin County (東緡縣; northeast of present-day Jinxiang County, Shandong) and gathered about 10,000 troops to attack Cao Cao. At the time, Cao Cao had very few soldiers with him, but he set up an ambush and managed to defeat Lü Bu.
The Wei Shu (魏書) gave a more detailed account of the ambush. Cao Cao had sent most of his troops out to collect grain so he had less than 1,000 men available in his base, which could not be well defended with so few men. When Lü Bu showed up, Cao Cao ordered all his available soldiers to defend the base and even ordered women to stand guard on the walls. To the west of Cao Cao's base was a dyke, and to its south was a deep forest. Lü Bu suspected that there was an ambush, so he told his men, "Cao Cao is very cunning. We must not fall into his ambush." He then led his troops to 10 li (Chinese miles) south of Cao Cao's base and set up his camp there. The next day, Lü Bu came to attack Cao Cao, and by then, Cao Cao had really set up an ambush near the dyke with the soldiers that had returned from gathering the grain. Lü Bu's forces fell into the ambush and were defeated.
The "ambush" mentioned in the Sanguozhi refers to the ambush that Lü Bu's forces fell into a trap on the second day, as described in the Wei Shu. The incident is also mentioned in Sima Guang's Zizhi Tongjian. However, the Zizhi Tongjian account, which combined the Sanguozhi and Wei Shu accounts, did not mention the events on the first day – which were about Cao Cao sending all his available soldiers to defend the base and ordering women to stand guard on the walls.
Debate: Yi Zhongtian, a history professor from Xiamen University, commented on this incident in his book Pin San Guo (品三国) in response to criticism from Fudan University historian Zhou Zhenhe and an online commentator known as "Hongchayangweili" (红茶杨威利). Earlier on, Yi referred to this incident when he said in a lecture on the television programme Lecture Room that "Cao Cao's rights to the invention of the Empty Fort Strategy had been stolen from him". Zhou claimed that the Empty Fort Strategy had never been used in history before so there were no "rights" to its invention; the online commentator argued that the incident does not count as a use of the Empty Fort Strategy.
Yi defended his claim and said that the incident in 195 is valid because of the circumstances under which it was used, which were very similar to the incidents involving Zhao Yun and Wen Ping (see the sections below). Cao Cao was trying to confuse Lü Bu by making use of the geographical features (the "deep forest") and by ordering women to stand guard on the walls, so as to make Lü Bu suspect that he had set up an ambush in the "deep forest" and lure Lü Bu to attack his "weakly defended" base by deploying women as soldiers to show how "desperate" he was to set up a defence. The ploy worked because it made Lü Bu hesitate when he wanted to attack. Cao Cao had bought sufficient time to set up a real ambush, and he defeated Lü Bu when he came to attack again on the following day.
Zhao Yun: The Zhao Yun Biezhuan (趙雲別傳; Unofficial Biography of Zhao Yun) mentioned an incident about Zhao Yun, a general under the warlord Liu Bei, using the Empty Fort Strategy during the Battle of Han River in 219, fought between Liu Bei and his rival Cao Cao as part of the Hanzhong Campaign.
This incident took place after Cao Cao's general Xiahou Yuan was defeated and killed in action at the earlier Battle of Mount Dingjun. Cao Cao's forces were transporting food supplies to the north hill when Liu Bei's general Huang Zhong, heard about it and led a group of soldiers, including some of Zhao Yun's men, to seize the supplies. When Huang Zhong did not return after a long time, Zhao Yun led tens of horsemen in search of Huang. Zhao Yun's search party encountered Cao Cao's forces and engaged them in battle but were outnumbered and was forced to retreat back to camp with Cao Cao's men in pursuit. Zhao Yun's subordinate Zhang Yi wanted to close the gates of the camp to prevent the enemy from entering. However, Zhao Yun gave orders for the gates to be opened, all flags and banners to be hidden, and the war drums silenced. Cao Cao's forces thought that there was an ambush inside Zhao Yun's camp so they withdrew. Just then, Zhao Yun launched a counterattack and his men beat the war drums loudly and fired arrows at the enemy. Cao Cao's soldiers were shocked and thrown into disarray. Some of them trampled on each other while fleeing in panic, and many of them fell into the Han River in their haste to get away and drowned. When Liu Bei came to inspect the camp later, he praised Zhao Yun and held a banquet to celebrate his victory.
Wen Ping: The Weilüe mentioned an incident about the Empty Fort Strategy being used by a general Wen Ping during a battle between the forces of the states of Cao Wei and Eastern Wu in the Three Kingdoms period. It is not clear which battle this was, but it could have been the Battle of Jiangling of 223.
The Wu leader Sun Quan led thousands of troops to attack a fortress defended by the Wei general Wen Ping. At the time, there were heavy rains and many fortifications were damaged. The civilians in the fortress had retreated to the fields further back so they could not help with repairs to the fortifications, and some repairs were still uncompleted when Sun Quan arrived with his men. When Wen Ping heard that Sun Quan had arrived, he was unsure of what to do, but eventually formulated a plan to deceive him. He ordered everyone in the fortress to stay under cover while he hid behind the walls, creating an illusion of an empty fortress. As Wen Ping expected, Sun Quan became suspicious and he said to his subordinates, "The northerners regard this man (Wen Ping) as a loyal subject, which is why they entrusted him with defending this commandery. Now, as I approach, he does not make any move. It must be either that he has something up his sleeve or that his reinforcements have arrived." Sun Quan then withdrew his forces.
The historian Pei Songzhi commented that the Weilüe account did not match the original account in the Sanguozhi. The Sanguozhi mentioned: "Sun Quan led 50,000 troops to besiege Wen Ping at Shiyang (石陽). The situation was very critical but Wen Ping put up a firm defence. Sun Quan withdrew his forces after more than 20 days, and Wen Ping led his men to attack them as they were retreating and defeated them."
Zhuge Liang: One of the best known examples of the use of the Empty Fort Strategy is a fictional incident in the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, which romanticises historical events in the late Han dynasty and the Three Kingdoms period. This event took place during the first of a series of campaigns – known as Zhuge Liang's Northern Expeditions – led by Shu Han's chancellor Zhuge Liang to attack Shu's rival state, Cao Wei.
In the first Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang's efforts to conquer the Wei city Chang'an were undermined by the Shu defeat at the Battle of Jieting. With the loss of Jieting (present-day Qin'an County, Gansu), Zhuge Liang's current location, Xicheng (西城; believed to be located 120 li southwest of present-day Tianshui, Gansu), became exposed and was in danger of being attacked by the Wei army. In the face of imminent danger, with the main Shu army deployed elsewhere and only a small group of soldiers in Xicheng with him, Zhuge Liang came up with a ploy to hold off the approaching enemy.
Zhuge Liang ordered all the gates to be opened and instructed soldiers disguised as civilians to sweep the roads while he sat on the viewing platform above the gates with two page boys by his side. He put on a calm and composed image by playing his guqin. When the Wei army led by Sima Yi arrived, Sima was surprised by the sight before him and he ordered a retreat after suspecting that there was an ambush inside the city. Zhuge Liang later explained that his strategy was a risky one. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Empty Fort Strategy | In the face of imminent danger, with the main Shu army deployed elsewhere and only a small group of soldiers in Xicheng with him, Zhuge Liang came up with a ploy to hold off the approaching enemy.
Zhuge Liang ordered all the gates to be opened and instructed soldiers disguised as civilians to sweep the roads while he sat on the viewing platform above the gates with two page boys by his side. He put on a calm and composed image by playing his guqin. When the Wei army led by Sima Yi arrived, Sima was surprised by the sight before him and he ordered a retreat after suspecting that there was an ambush inside the city. Zhuge Liang later explained that his strategy was a risky one. It worked because Zhuge Liang had a reputation for being a careful military tactician who hardly took risks, so Sima Yi came to the conclusion that there was certainly an ambush upon seeing Zhuge's relaxed composure.
As a topic of academic study: Christopher Cotton, an economist from the Queen's University, and Chang Liu, a graduate student, used game theory to model the bluffing strategies used in the Chinese military legends of Li Guang and his 100 horsemen (144 BC), and Zhuge Liang and the Empty City (228 AD). In the case of these military legends, the researchers found that bluffing arose naturally as the optimal strategy in each situation. The findings were published under the title 100 Horsemen and the empty city: A game theoretic examination of deception in Chinese military legend in the Journal of Peace Research in 2011.
Historicity: The basis for this story in Romance of the Three Kingdoms is an anecdote shared by one Guo Chong (郭沖) in the early Jin dynasty (266–420). In the fifth century, Pei Songzhi added the anecdote as an annotation to Zhuge Liang's biography in the third-century historical text Sanguozhi. The anecdote is as follows: Zhuge Liang garrisoned at Yangping (陽平; around present-day Hanzhong, Shaanxi) and ordered Wei Yan to lead the troops east. He left behind only 10,000 men to defend Yangping. Sima Yi led 200,000 troops to attack Zhuge Liang and he took a shortcut, bypassing Wei Yan's army and arriving at a place 60 li away from Zhuge Liang's location. Upon inspection, Sima Yi realised that Zhuge Liang's city was weakly defended. Zhuge Liang knew that Sima Yi was near, so he thought of recalling Wei Yan's army back to counter Sima Yi, but it was too late already and his men were worried and terrified. Zhuge Liang remained calm and instructed his men to hide all flags and banners and silence the war drums. He then ordered all the gates to be opened and told his men to sweep and dust the ground. Sima Yi knew that impression that Zhuge Liang was a cautious and prudent man, and he was baffled by the sight before him and suspected that there was an ambush. He then withdrew his troops. The following day, Zhuge Liang clapped his hands, laughed, and told an aide that Sima Yi thought that there was an ambush and had withdrawn. Later, his scouts returned and reported that Sima Yi had indeed retreated. Sima Yi was very upset when he later found out about the ruse.
After adding the anecdote to Zhuge Liang's biography, Pei Songzhi wrote a short commentary as follows: When Zhuge Liang garrisoned at Yangping, Sima Yi was serving as the Area Commander of Jing Province and he was stationed at Wancheng (宛城; present-day Wancheng District, Nanyang, Henan). He only came into confrontation with Zhuge Liang in Guanzhong after Cao Zhen's death (in 231). It was unlikely that the Wei government ordered Sima Yi to lead an army from Wancheng to attack Shu via Xicheng (西城; present-day Ankang, Shaanxi) because there were heavy rains at the time (which obstructed passage). There were no battles fought at Yangping before and after that period of time. Going by Guo Chong's anecdote, if Sima Yi did lead 200,000 troops to attack Zhuge Liang, knew that Zhuge Liang's position was weakly defended, and suspected that there was an ambush, he could have ordered his troops to surround Zhuge Liang's position instead of retreating. Wei Yan's biography mentioned: "Each time Wei Yan followed Zhuge Liang to battle, he would request to command a separate detachment of about 10,000 men and take a different route and rendezvous with Zhuge Liang's main force at Tong Pass. Zhuge Liang rejected the plan, and Wei Yan felt that Zhuge Liang was a coward and complained that his talent was not put to good use." As mentioned in Wei Yan's biography, Zhuge Liang never agreed to allow Wei Yan to command a separate detachment of thousands of troops. If Guo Chong's anecdote was true, how was it possible that Zhuge Liang would allow Wei Yan to lead a larger army ahead while he followed behind with a smaller army? Guo Chong's anecdote was endorsed by the Prince of Fufeng (Sima Jun, a son of Sima Yi). However, the story puts Sima Yi in a negative light, and it does not make sense for a son to approve a story which demeans his father. We can tell that this anecdote is fake after reading the sentence "the Prince of Fufeng endorsed Guo Chong's anecdote".
Evidence from historical sources indicate that Sima Yi was indeed not in Jieting at the time. The Battle of Jieting took place in 228 but Sima Yi's biography in the Book of Jin claimed that in 227, Sima Yi was stationed at Wancheng in the north of Jing Province. He led an army to suppress a rebellion by Meng Da at Xincheng (新城; in present-day northwestern Hubei), and returned to Wancheng after his victory. Later, he went to the imperial capital Luoyang to meet the Wei emperor Cao Rui, who consulted him on some affairs before ordering him to return to Wancheng. Sima Yi only engaged Zhuge Liang in battle after 230.
Yi Zhongtian, a professor from Xiamen University, commented on this incident in his book Pin San Guo (品三国). He pointed out three problems in the story:
Sima Yi did not dare to attack because he feared that there was an ambush inside the fortress. If so, he could have sent recces to scout ahead and check if there was really an ambush.
Romance of the Three Kingdoms provided this description: "(Sima Yi) saw Zhuge Liang sitting at the top of the gates, smiling and playing his guqin and being oblivious to his surroundings." Based on this description, the distance between Sima Yi and Zhuge Liang must have been very short, or else Sima would not have been able to observe Zhuge's actions so clearly. If so, Sima Yi could have ordered an archer to kill Zhuge Liang.
Both Guo Chong's anecdote and Romance of the Three Kingdoms said that Sima Yi's army was superior to Zhuge Liang's in terms of size: Guo Chong's anecdote stated that Sima Yi had 200,000 men while Zhuge Liang had 10,000 men; Romance of the Three Kingdoms mentioned that Sima Yi had 150,000 men while Zhuge Liang had only 2,500 men. If so, Sima Yi could have ordered his troops to surround Zhuge Liang's fortress first, and then wait for an opportunity to attack.
Li Yuan: According to historical sources such as the Old Book of Tang, New Book of Tang and Zizhi Tongjian, Li Yuan, the founding emperor of the Tang dynasty, used a similar strategy in 618 CE in a battle against the Göktürks before he started his rebellion against the Sui dynasty. In early 618, Li Yuan was still a general in the Sui army and was based in Jinyang (晉陽; present-day Taiyuan, Shanxi). When he heard rumours that Emperor Yang of Sui wanted to execute him, he started making preparations for a rebellion against the Sui dynasty to save himself. In May 618, the Göktürks allied with the warlord Liu Wuzhuo to attack the Sui dynasty in order to gain territory. Jinyang became one of their targets.
Around the time, Li Yuan had just arrested Wang Wei (王威) and Gao Junya (高君雅), two officials sent by Emperor Yang to spy on him. He was also still busy plotting his rebellion. Moreover, he was also not prepared for a battle against the Göktürks because of two reasons. Firstly, Göktürk cavalrymen were so powerful that Li Yuan was not confident that his troops could defeat them. Secondly, even if Li Yuan defeated them in battle, he would nonetheless suffer significant losses that would undermine his rebellion against the Sui dynasty.
Li Yuan thus ordered his soldiers to hide in Jinyang and leave the city gates wide open. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Empty Fort Strategy | In May 618, the Göktürks allied with the warlord Liu Wuzhuo to attack the Sui dynasty in order to gain territory. Jinyang became one of their targets.
Around the time, Li Yuan had just arrested Wang Wei (王威) and Gao Junya (高君雅), two officials sent by Emperor Yang to spy on him. He was also still busy plotting his rebellion. Moreover, he was also not prepared for a battle against the Göktürks because of two reasons. Firstly, Göktürk cavalrymen were so powerful that Li Yuan was not confident that his troops could defeat them. Secondly, even if Li Yuan defeated them in battle, he would nonetheless suffer significant losses that would undermine his rebellion against the Sui dynasty.
Li Yuan thus ordered his soldiers to hide in Jinyang and leave the city gates wide open. Shibi Khan, leading a force of Göktürk cavalrymen, saw that the city appeared to be deserted and feared that there might be an ambush, so he did not enter. Li Yuan then ordered his son Li Shimin and subordinate Pei Ji to make their troops beat war drums loudly in the empty camps they had set up earlier, so as to create an illusion that reinforcements had arrived in Jinyang. Shibi Khan was so frightened that he retreated after two days.
Battle of Mikatagahara: Many traditions say that in 1572, during the Sengoku Period in Japan, Tokugawa Ieyasu used the tactic during his retreat in the Battle of Mikatagahara. He commanded that the fortress gates remain open, and that braziers be lit to guide his retreating army back to safety. One officer beat a large war drum, seeking to add encouragement to the returning men of a noble, courageous retreat. When Takeda forces led by Baba Nobuharu and Yamagata Masakage heard the drums, and saw the braziers and open gates, they assumed that Tokugawa was planning a trap, and so they stopped and made camp for the night. The authenticity of this story has been disputed by some, however, as it appears to be copied straight from Zhuge Liang's story, perhaps in an attempt to embellish Tokugawa's career.
References:
Chen, Shou. Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi).
Fang, Xuanling. Book of Jin (Jin Shu).
Liu, Xu. Old Book of Tang (Jiu Tang Shu).
Luo, Guanzhong. Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo Yanyi).
Ouyang, Xiu and Song Qi. New Book of Tang (Xin Tang Shu).
Pei, Songzhi. Annotations to Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi zhu).
Sima, Guang. Zizhi Tongjian. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Encirclement | History: Encirclement has been used throughout the centuries by military leaders, including generals such as Spartacus, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, Khalid bin Waleed, Hannibal, Sun Tzu, Yi Sun Shin, Shaka Zulu, von Wallenstein, Nader Shah, Napoleon, von Moltke, Heinz Guderian, von Rundstedt, von Manstein, Zhukov, Patton and Soleimani.
Sun Tzu and other military thinkers suggest that an army should be not completely encircled but instead given some room for escape. Otherwise, the "encircled" army's men will lift their morale and fight to the death. It is better to have them consider the possibility of a retreat. Once the enemy retreats, it can be pursued and captured or destroyed with far less risk to the pursuing forces than a fight to the death.
Types of encirclement: The main form of encircling, the "double pincer", is executed by attacks on the flanks of a battle whose mobile forces of the era, such as light infantry, cavalry, tanks, or armoured personnel carriers attempt to force a breakthrough to utilize their speed to join behind the back of the enemy force and complete the "ring" while the main enemy force is stalled by probing attacks. The encirclement of the German Sixth Army in the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942 is a typical example. During the Winter War, Finland used "pocket tactics" against the Soviet Union, called motti; in the context of war, motti describes a tactic that the Finns used to immobilise, segment, surround and destroy the Soviet troops that were many times as large as them.
If there is a natural obstacle, such as ocean or mountains on one side of the battlefield, only one pincer is needed ("single pincer"), because the function of the second arm is taken over by the natural obstacle. The German attack into the lowlands of France in 1940 is a typical example of this.
A third and rare type of encirclement can ensue from a breakthrough in an area of the enemy front, and exploiting that with mobile forces, diverging in two or more directions behind the enemy line. Full encirclement rarely follows, but the threat of it severely hampers the defender's options. This type of attack pattern is centerpiece to blitzkrieg operations. Because of the extreme difficulty of this operation, it cannot be executed unless the offensive force has a vast superiority, either in technology, organization, or sheer numbers. The Barbarossa campaign of 1941 saw some examples.
The danger to the encircling force is that it is, itself, cut off from its logistical base; if the encircled force is able to stand firm, or maintain a supply route, the encircling force can be thrown into confusion (for example, Rommel's "Dash to the Wire" in 1941 and the Demyansk Pocket in 1942) or be comprehensively destroyed (as during the Burma campaign, in 1944).
Notable encirclement battles: Some examples of battles of encirclement are listed below.
Battle of Thermopylae (480 BC)
Battle of Cannae (216 BC)
Battle of the Abas (65 BC)
Battle of Walaja (633 AD)
Battle of Mohi (1241)
Battle of Ekeren (1703)
Battle of Fraustadt (1706)
Battle of Kirkuk (1733)
Battle of Kars (1745)
Battle of Maymyo (1768)
Ulm Campaign (1805)
Battle of Ocaña (1809)
Battle of Isandlwana (1879)
Battle of Tannenberg (1914)
Battle of Magdhaba (1916)
Battle of Rafa (1916)
First Battle of Gaza (1917)
Battle of Beersheba (1917)
Battle of Megiddo (1918)
Battle of Suomussalmi (1939-1940)
Battle of Kiev (1941)
Battle of Smolensk (1941)
Battle of Białystok–Minsk (1941)
Battle for Velikiye Luki (1942)
Battle of Hong Kong (1941)
Battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943)
Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket (1944)
Kamenets-Podolsky pocket (1944)
Operation Bagration (1944)
Battle of the Mons Pocket (1944)
Siege of Bastogne, Belgium (1944)
Battle of the Ruhr Pocket (1945)
Battle of Berlin (1945)
Six-Day War (1967)
Battle of Khorramshahr (1980)
Battle of Mogadishu (1993)
Battle of Misrata (2011)
Battle of Aleppo (2012–2016)
Battle of Ilovaisk (2014)
Second Battle of Tikrit (2015)
Battle of Afrin (2018)
Battle of the Jabara Valley (2019)
Siege of Mariupol (2022)
See also: Blockade
Encirclement Campaigns
Maneuver warfare
References:
External links:
The Great Kitilä Motti (Winter War history from a documentary film's website showing multiple encirlements.) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Endemic warfare | Description: Ritual fighting (or ritual battle or ritual warfare) permits the display of courage, masculinity, and the expression of emotion while resulting in relatively few wounds and even fewer deaths. Thus such a practice can be viewed as a form of conflict-resolution and/or as a psycho-social exercise. Native Americans often engaged in this activity, but the frequency of warfare in most hunter-gatherer cultures is a matter of dispute.
Examples: Warfare is known to every tribal society, but some societies develop a particular emphasis of warrior culture. Examples includes the Nuer of South Sudan, the Māori of New Zealand, the Dugum Dani of Papua, the Yanomami (dubbed "the Fierce People") of the Amazon. The culture of inter-tribal warfare has long been present in New Guinea.
Communal societies are well capable of escalation to all-out wars of annihilation between tribes. Thus, in Amazonas, there was perpetual animosity between the neighboring tribes of the Jívaro. A fundamental difference between wars enacted within the same tribe and against neighboring tribes is such that "wars between different tribes are in principle wars of extermination".
The Yanomami of Amazonas traditionally practiced a system of escalation of violence in several discrete stages.
The chest-pounding duel, the side-slapping duel, the club fight, and the spear-throwing fight. Further escalation results in raiding parties with the purpose of killing at least one member of the hostile faction. Finally, the highest stage of escalation is Nomohoni or all-out massacres brought about by treachery.
Similar customs were known to the Dugum Dani and the Chimbu of New Guinea, the Nuer of Sudan and the North American Plains Indians. Among the Chimbu and the Dugum Dani, pig theft was the most common cause of conflict, even more frequent than abduction of women, while among the Yanomamö, the most frequent initial cause of warfare was accusations of sorcery. Warfare serves the function of easing intra-group tensions and has aspects of a game, or "overenthusiastic football". Especially Dugum Dani "battles" have a conspicuous element of play, with one documented instance of a battle interrupted when both sides were distracted by throwing stones at a passing cuckoo dove.
See also: Captives in American Indian Wars
Communal violence
Flower war
Irregular warfare
Mock combat
Napoleon Chagnon
Prehistoric warfare
Religion and violence
Sudanese nomadic conflicts
Ethnic violence in South Sudan
Oromo–Somali clashes
Tinku
War dance
References:
Further reading: Zimmerman, L. The Crow Creek Site Massacre: A Preliminary Report, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, 1981.
Chagnon, N. The Yanomamo, Holt, Rinehart & Winston,1983.
Keeley, Lawrence. War Before Civilization, Oxford University Press, 1996.
Pauketat, Timothy R. North American Archaeology 2005. Blackwell Publishing.
Wade, Nicholas. Before the Dawn, Penguin: New York 2006.
S. A. LeBlanc, Prehistoric Warfare in the American Southwest, University of Utah Press (1999).
Guy Halsall, 'Anthropology and the Study of Pre-Conquest Warfare and Society: The Ritual War in Anglo-Saxon England' in *Hawkes (ed.), Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England (1989), 155–177.
Diamond, Jared. The World Until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies?, Viking. New York, 2012. pp. 79–129
External links: Haida Warfare
Tribal Warfare and Blood Revenge
The Crow Creek Massacre
Tribal warfare kills nine in Indonesia's Papua |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Envelopment | See also: Platform envelopment
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Expeditionary warfare | In the ancient world: The earliest examples of expeditionary warfare come from the Sea Peoples, a term used for a confederation of seafaring raiders of the second millennium BC who sailed into the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, caused political unrest, and attempted to enter or control Egyptian territory during the late 19th dynasty, and especially during Year 8 of Ramesses III of the 20th dynasty.
The raiding tactics were expanded into the more complex expeditionary warfare operations by Alexander the Great who used naval vessels for both troop transporting and logistics in his campaigns against the Persian Empire.
The next exponents of expeditionary warfare in the ancient world of the Mediterranean Basin were the Carthaginians who introduced two entirely new dimensions to the use of naval forces by staging not only operations that combined naval and land troops, but also eventuated in combining strategic multi-national forces during the land phase of the operation when Hannibal in his most famous achievement at the outbreak of the Second Punic War marched an army, which included war elephants, from Iberia over the Pyrenees and the Alps into Northern Italy.
Following on the example of Carthage, the Romans used expeditionary operations extensively to expand their Empire and influence in the Mediterranean and beyond, including the Roman conquest of Britain which was not only a limited expeditionary operation, but one conceived to include long-term occupation and Roman settlement of the territories.
The Han dynasty of ancient China also famously used expeditionary warfare to deal with the nomadic Xiongnu people during the Han–Xiongnu War. Under the orders of Emperor Wu of Han, the Han launched numerous long-distance raids deep into Xiongnu territory. The exploits of famed Han generals Wei Qing and Huo Qubing were of particular note, with both recording multiple successful expeditions between the years 127 and 119 BC, eventually annexing the Hexi Corridor and expelling the Xiongnu from the Qilian Mountains. The expeditionary Han forces were primarily made up of cavalry and were typically arrayed in columns. They also frequently crossed vast distances–Huo Qubing is said to have travelled 2,000 li, roughly 620 miles, during one of his raids.
In the Middle Ages: Shortly after the collapse of the Roman empire in Italy, the European Middle Ages began with an expedition of imperial Byzantine general Belisarius against the Vandals. But as that empire dwindled, its warfare became more defensive.
The most prominent development of expeditionary warfare during the Middle Ages came from the environmental pressures in the Scandinavian region during the Middle Ages, and the emergence of the Viking migrations that combined raiding, longer term inland operations, occupation and settlement. These operations were conducted as sea, coastal and riverine operations, and sometimes were strategic in nature, reaching as far as Constantinople.
Expeditionary warfare in East Asia began very much in the same way it had in the Mediterranean with short-term raids by Japanese pirates. Because the wokou were weakly resisted by the Ming dynasty, the raiding eventually developed into fully-fledged expeditionary warfare with the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598).
During the Crusades: The development in expeditionary operations reached a new level when during the Crusades the element of political alliance as an influence on the military strategy was introduced, for example in the Sixth Crusade (AD 1228.)
The rise of European colonial empires: Although all expeditionary warfare until the invention of the combustion engine was largely dependent on sailing vessels, it was with the creation of sophisticated rigging systems of the European Renaissance that the Age of Sail allowed a significant expansion in expeditionary warfare, notably by the European colonial empires. Some have argued that this was the first revolution in military affairs that changed national strategies, operational methods, and tactics both at sea and on the land. One notable example of this evolution was the French invasion of Egypt (1798).
Though a significantly expanded expeditionary operation, the Crimean War was the first example of a planned expeditionary campaign that was directed as part of a multinational coalition strategy. It was also the first modern expeditionary operation that used steam-powered warships and telegraph communications.
The next development in the evolution of the expeditionary warfare was made during the expansion of the western European empires and the era of colonialism that also led to the inclusion of the expeditionary methods into the direct expression of national strategies to avoid full-scale conflicts in the shape of the gunboat diplomacy approach. It was at this time that naval troops previously used almost exclusively for defence of vessels or minor beach operations were expanded to enable extended littoral operations. The colonial experience, though largely confined to the period before the First World War, persisted well into the 20th century.
The World Wars:
First World War: The period of the First World War and its aftermath in the 1920s saw expeditionary warfare established as a systematic and planned type of operations with larger scope than simple transportations of troops to the theatre, such as the British Expeditionary Force in 1914, Russian Expeditionary Force in 1916, and the American Expeditionary Forces in 1917, and the beginnings of development in true combined operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels with the unsuccessful amphibious landing at Gallipoli. Not only did this operation combine the elements of overall war planning context, multinational deployment of forces as part of the same operation, and use of troops prepared for the landings (as opposed to disembarkation), as well as naval gunfire support that was limited during the era of sailing ships, but also included extensive use of combat engineering in support of the infantry. One of the most extensive and complex of expeditionary operations that followed the war was the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War that saw forces deployed in the Baltic region, the Arctic region, along the Black Sea coast, and in the Russian Far East.
Other expeditionary forces during WWI included:
Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914–1920
First Australian Imperial Force (Europe)
Indian Expeditionary Force 1914–1918
Hejaz Expeditionary Force (Ottoman Empire) 1916-1919
South African Overseas Expeditionary Force 1915–1919
New Zealand Expeditionary Force 1914–1918
Portuguese Expeditionary Corps 1917–1918
Second World War: Afrika Korps (Nazi Germany)
Corpo Aereo Italiano (Fascist Italy)
Corpo Truppe Volontarie
Brazilian Expeditionary Force
British Expeditionary Force
Canadian Corps
China Expeditionary Army (Imperial Japan)
Chinese Expeditionary Force (Chinese Army)
Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia
Second Australian Imperial Force
Contemporary:
European Union: EU Battlegroup
European Maritime Force
NATO: NATO Response Force
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
United Kingdom: 3rd Division (United Kingdom)
16 Air Assault Brigade
3 Commando Brigade
Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)
Joint Expeditionary Force
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force
Joint Rapid Reaction Force
No. 83 Expeditionary Air Group
No. 901 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 902 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 903 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 904 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 906 Expeditionary Air Wing
Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 34 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 38 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 121 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 135 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 138 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 140 Expeditionary Air Wing
United States: Carrier Strike Group
Carrier Strike Group 1
Carrier Strike Group 2
Carrier Strike Group 3
Carrier Strike Group 5
Carrier Strike Group 8
Carrier Strike Group 9
Carrier Strike Group 10
Carrier Strike Group 11
Carrier Strike Group 12
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
Expeditionary Strike Group
Marine Expeditionary Force
I Marine Expeditionary Force
II Marine Expeditionary Force
III Marine Expeditionary Force
Marine Expeditionary Brigade
1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade
2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade
3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Marine Expeditionary Unit
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit
List of Air Expeditionary units of the United States Air Force (43 of them)
See also: Blue-water navy
Expeditionary energy economics
Expeditionary maneuver warfare
Loss of Strength Gradient
Military deployment
Military logistics
Over-the-beach capability
Power projection
Seabasing
Unsinkable aircraft carrier
References:
External links: Response Force Task Group (RFTG) (Royal Navy PDF) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Explosive device | null |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | F-4 Phantom II | Development:
Origins: In 1952, McDonnell's Chief of Aerodynamics, Dave Lewis, was appointed by CEO Jim McDonnell to be the company's preliminary design manager. With no new aircraft competitions on the horizon, internal studies concluded the Navy had the greatest need for a new and different aircraft type: an attack fighter.
In 1953, McDonnell Aircraft began work on revising its F3H Demon naval fighter, seeking expanded capabilities and better performance. The company developed several projects, including a variant powered by a Wright J67 engine, and variants powered by two Wright J65 engines, or two General Electric J79 engines. The J79-powered version promised a top speed of Mach 1.97. On 19 September 1953, McDonnell approached the United States Navy with a proposal for the "Super Demon". Uniquely, the aircraft was to be modular, as it could be fitted with one- or two-seat noses for different missions, with different nose cones to accommodate radar, photo cameras, four 20 mm (.79 in) cannon, or 56 FFAR unguided rockets in addition to the nine hardpoints under the wings and the fuselage. The Navy was sufficiently interested to order a full-scale mock-up of the F3H-G/H, but felt that the upcoming Grumman XF9F-9 and Vought XF8U-1 already satisfied the need for a supersonic fighter.
The McDonnell design was therefore reworked into an all-weather fighter-bomber with 11 external hardpoints for weapons and on 18 October 1954, the company received a letter of intent for two YAH-1 prototypes. Then on 26 May 1955, four Navy officers arrived at the McDonnell offices and, within an hour, presented the company with an entirely new set of requirements. Because the Navy already had the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk for ground attack and F-8 Crusader for dogfighting, the project now had to fulfill the need for an all-weather fleet defense interceptor. A second crewman was added to operate the powerful radar; designers believed that air combat in the next war would overload solo pilots with information.
XF4H-1 prototype: The XF4H-1 was designed to carry four semi-recessed AAM-N-6 Sparrow III radar-guided missiles, and to be powered by two J79-GE-8 engines. As in the McDonnell F-101 Voodoo, the engines sat low in the fuselage to maximize internal fuel capacity and ingested air through fixed geometry intakes. The thin-section wing had a leading edge sweep of 45° and was equipped with blown flaps for better low-speed handling.
Wind tunnel testing had revealed lateral instability, requiring the addition of 5° dihedral to the wings. To avoid redesigning the titanium central section of the aircraft, McDonnell engineers angled up only the outer portions of the wings by 12°, which averaged to the required 5° over the entire wingspan. The wings also received the distinctive "dogtooth" for improved control at high angles of attack. The all-moving tailplane was given 23° of anhedral to improve control at high angles of attack, while still keeping the tailplane clear of the engine exhaust. In addition, air intakes were equipped with one fixed ramp and one variable geometry ramp with angle scheduled to give maximum pressure recovery between Mach 1.4 and Mach 2.2. Airflow matching between the inlet and engine was achieved by bypassing the engine as secondary air into the exhaust nozzle. All-weather intercept capability was achieved with the AN/APQ-50 radar. To meet requirements for carrier operations, the landing gear was designed to withstand landings with a maximum sink rate of 23 ft/s (7 m/s), while the nose strut could extend by 20 in (51 cm) to increase angle of attack on the catapult portion of a takeoff.
On 25 July 1955, the Navy ordered two XF4H-1 test aircraft and five YF4H-1 pre-production examples. The Phantom made its maiden flight on 27 May 1958 with Robert C. Little at the controls. A hydraulic problem precluded the retraction of the landing gear, but subsequent flights went more smoothly. Early testing resulted in redesign of the air intakes, including the distinctive addition of 12,500 holes to "bleed off" the slow-moving boundary layer air from the surface of each intake ramp. Series production aircraft also featured splitter plates to divert the boundary layer away from the engine intakes. The aircraft was soon in competition with the XF8U-3 Crusader III. Due to cockpit workload, the Navy wanted a two-seat aircraft and on 17 December 1958 the F4H was declared the winner. Delays with the J79-GE-8 engines meant that the first production aircraft were fitted with J79-GE-2 and −2A engines, each having 16,100 lbf (71.8 kN) of afterburning thrust. In 1959, the Phantom began carrier suitability trials with the first complete launch-recovery cycle performed on 15 February 1960 from Independence.
There were proposals to name the F4H "Satan" and "Mithras". In the end, the aircraft was given the less controversial name "Phantom II", the first "Phantom" being another McDonnell jet fighter, the FH-1 Phantom. The Phantom II was briefly given the designation F-110A and named "Spectre" by the USAF and the Tri-Service aircraft designation system, F-4, was adopted in September 1962.
Production: Early in production, the radar was upgraded to the Westinghouse AN/APQ-72, an AN/APQ-50 with a larger radar antenna, necessitating the bulbous nose, and the canopy was reworked to improve visibility and make the rear cockpit less claustrophobic. During its career the Phantom underwent many changes in the form of numerous variants developed.
The USN operated the F4H-1 (re-designated F-4A in 1962) with J79-GE-2 and -2A engines of 16,100 lbf (71.62 kN) thrust and later builds receiving -8 engines. A total of 45 F-4As were built; none saw combat, and most ended up as test or training aircraft. The USN and USMC received the first definitive Phantom, the F-4B which was equipped with the Westinghouse APQ-72 radar (pulse only), a Texas Instruments AAA-4 Infrared search and track pod under the nose, an AN/AJB-3 bombing system and powered by J79-GE-8,-8A and -8B engines of 10,900 lbf (48.5 kN) dry and 16,950 lbf (75.4 kN) afterburner (reheat) with the first flight on 25 March 1961. 649 F-4Bs were built with deliveries beginning in 1961 and VF-121 Pacemakers receiving the first examples at NAS Miramar.
The USAF received Phantoms as the result of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's push to create a unified fighter for all branches of the US military. After an F-4B won the "Operation Highspeed" fly-off against the Convair F-106 Delta Dart, the USAF borrowed two Naval F-4Bs, temporarily designating them F-110A in January 1962, and developed requirements for their own version. Unlike the US Navy's focus on air-to-air interception in the Fleet Air Defense (FAD) mission, the USAF emphasized both an air-to-air and an air-to-ground fighter-bomber role. With McNamara's unification of designations on 18 September 1962, the Phantom became the F-4 with the naval version designated F-4B and USAF F-4C. The first Air Force Phantom flew on 27 May 1963, exceeding Mach 2 on its maiden flight.
The F-4J improved both air-to-air and ground-attack capability; deliveries begun in 1966 and ended in 1972 with 522 built. It was equipped with J79-GE-10 engines with 17,844 lbf (79.374 kN) thrust, the Westinghouse AN/AWG-10 Fire Control System (making the F-4J the first fighter in the world with operational look-down/shoot-down capability), a new integrated missile control system and the AN/AJB-7 bombing system for expanded ground attack capability.
The F-4N (updated F-4Bs) with smokeless engines and F-4J aerodynamic improvements started in 1972 under a U.S. Navy-initiated refurbishment program called "Project Bee Line" with 228 converted by 1978. The F-4S model resulted from the refurbishment of 265 F-4Js with J79-GE-17 smokeless engines of 17,900 lbf (79.379 kN), AWG-10B radar with digitized circuitry for improved performance and reliability, Honeywell AN/AVG-8 Visual Target Acquisition Set or VTAS (world's first operational Helmet Sighting System), classified avionics improvements, airframe reinforcement and leading edge slats for enhanced maneuvering. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | F-4 Phantom II | The F-4N (updated F-4Bs) with smokeless engines and F-4J aerodynamic improvements started in 1972 under a U.S. Navy-initiated refurbishment program called "Project Bee Line" with 228 converted by 1978. The F-4S model resulted from the refurbishment of 265 F-4Js with J79-GE-17 smokeless engines of 17,900 lbf (79.379 kN), AWG-10B radar with digitized circuitry for improved performance and reliability, Honeywell AN/AVG-8 Visual Target Acquisition Set or VTAS (world's first operational Helmet Sighting System), classified avionics improvements, airframe reinforcement and leading edge slats for enhanced maneuvering. The USMC also operated the RF-4B with reconnaissance cameras with 46 built; the RF-4B flew alone and unarmed, with a requirement to fly straight and level at 5,000 feet while taking photographs. They relied on the shortcomings of the anti-aircraft defenses to survive as they were unable to make evasive maneuvers.
Phantom II production ended in the United States in 1979 after 5,195 had been built (5,057 by McDonnell Douglas and 138 in Japan by Mitsubishi). Of these, 2,874 went to the USAF, 1,264 to the Navy and Marine Corps, and the rest to foreign customers. The last U.S.-built F-4 went to South Korea, while the last F-4 built was an F-4EJ built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan and delivered on 20 May 1981. As of 2008, 631 Phantoms were in service worldwide, while the Phantoms were in use as a target drone (specifically QF-4Cs) operated by the U.S. military until 21 December 2016, when the Air Force officially ended use of the type.
World records: To show off their new fighter, the Navy led a series of record-breaking flights early in Phantom development: All in all, the Phantom set 16 world records. Five of the speed records remained unbeaten until the F-15 Eagle appeared in 1975.
Operation Top Flight: On 6 December 1959, the second XF4H-1 performed a zoom climb to a world record 98,557 ft (30,040 m). Commander Lawrence E. Flint Jr., USN accelerated his aircraft to Mach 2.5 (2,660 km/h; 1,650 mph) at 47,000 ft (14,330 m) and climbed to 90,000 ft (27,430 m) at a 45° angle. He then shut down the engines and glided to the peak altitude. As the aircraft fell through 70,000 ft (21,300 m), Flint restarted the engines and resumed normal flight.
On 5 September 1960, an F4H-1 averaged 1,216.78 mph (1,958.16 km/h) over a 500 km (311 mi) closed-circuit course.
On 25 September 1960, an F4H-1F averaged 1,390.24 mph (2,237.37 km/h) over a 100 km (62.1 mi) closed-circuit course. FAIRecord File Number 8898.
Operation LANA: To celebrate the 50th anniversary of Naval aviation (L is the Roman numeral for 50 and ANA stood for Anniversary of Naval Aviation) on 24 May 1961, Phantoms flew across the continental United States in under three hours and included several tanker refuelings. The fastest of the aircraft averaged 869.74 mph (1,400.28 km/h) and completed the trip in 2 hours 47 minutes, earning the pilot (and future NASA Astronaut), Lieutenant Richard Gordon, USN and RIO, Lieutenant Bobbie Young, USN, the 1961 Bendix trophy.
Operation Sageburner: On 28 August 1961, a F4H-1F Phantom II averaged 1,452.777 kilometers per hour (902.714 miles per hour) over a 3 mi (4.82 km) course flying below 125 feet (38.1 m) at all times. Commander J.L. Felsman, USN was killed during the first attempt at this record on 18 May 1961 when his aircraft disintegrated in the air after pitch damper failure.
Operation Skyburner: On 22 November 1961, a modified Phantom with water injection, piloted by Lt. Col. Robert B. Robinson, set an absolute world record average speed over a 20-mile (32.2 km) long 2-way straight course of 1,606.342 mph (2,585.086 km/h).
On 5 December 1961, another Phantom set a sustained altitude record of 66,443.8 feet (20,252 m).
Project High Jump: A series of time-to-altitude records was set in early 1962: 34.523 seconds to 3,000 m (9,840 ft), 48.787 seconds to 6,000 m (19,700 ft), 61.629 seconds to 9,000 m (29,500 ft), 77.156 seconds to 12,000 m (39,400 ft), 114.548 seconds to 15,000 m (49,200 ft), 178.5 s to 20,000 m (65,600 ft), 230.44 s to 25,000 m (82,000 ft), and 371.43 s to 30,000 m (98,400 ft). All High Jump records were set by F4H-1 production number 108 (Bureau Number 148423). Two of the records were set by future distinguished NASA astronaut LCdr John Young.
Design:
Overview: The F-4 Phantom is a tandem-seat fighter-bomber designed as a carrier-based interceptor to fill the U.S. Navy's fleet defense fighter role. Innovations in the F-4 included an advanced pulse-Doppler radar and extensive use of titanium in its airframe.
Despite imposing dimensions and a maximum takeoff weight of over 60,000 lb (27,000 kg), the F-4 has a top speed Mach 2.23 and an initial climb rate of over 41,000 ft/min (210 m/s). The F-4's nine external hardpoints have a capability of up to 18,650 pounds (8,480 kg) of weapons, including air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, and unguided, guided, and thermonuclear weapons. Like other interceptors of its day, the F-4 was designed without an internal cannon.
The baseline performance of a Mach 2-class fighter with long-range and a bomber-sized payload would be the template for the next generation of large and light/middle-weight fighters optimized for daylight air combat.
Flight characteristics: "Speed is life" was F-4 pilots' slogan, as the Phantom's greatest advantage in air combat was acceleration and thrust, which permitted a skilled pilot to engage and disengage from the fight at will. MiGs usually could outturn the F-4 because of the high drag on the Phantom's airframe; as a massive fighter aircraft designed to fire radar-guided missiles from beyond visual range, the F-4 lacked the agility of its Soviet opponents and was subject to adverse yaw during hard maneuvering. Although the F-4 was subject to irrecoverable spins during aileron rolls, pilots reported the aircraft to be very responsive and easy to fly on the edge of its performance envelope. In 1972, the F-4E model was upgraded with leading edge slats on the wing, greatly improving high angle of attack maneuverability at the expense of top speed.
The J79 had a reduced time lag between the pilot advancing the throttle, from idle to maximum thrust, and the engine producing maximum thrust compared to earlier engines. While landing on USS Midway (CV-41) John Chesire's tailhook missed the arresting gear as he (mistakenly) reduced thrust to idle. He then slammed the throttle to full afterburner, the engine's response time being enough to return to full thrust quickly, and he was able get the Phantom airborne again successfully (bolter). The J79 produced noticeable amounts of black smoke (at mid-throttle/cruise settings), a severe disadvantage in that it made it easier for the enemy to spot the aircraft. Two decades after the aircraft entered service this was solved on the F-4S, which was fitted with the −10A engine variant with a smokeless combustor.
The lack of an internal gun "was the biggest mistake on the F-4", Chesire said; "Bullets are cheap and tend to go where you aim them. I needed a gun, and I really wished I had one." Marine Corps General John R. Dailey recalled that "everyone in RF-4s wished they had a gun on the aircraft." For a brief period, doctrine held that turning combat would be impossible at supersonic speeds and little effort was made to teach pilots air combat maneuvering. In reality, engagements quickly became subsonic, as pilots would slow down in an effort to get behind their adversaries. Furthermore, the relatively new heat-seeking and radar-guided missiles at the time were frequently reported as unreliable and pilots had to fire multiple missiles just to hit one enemy fighter. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | F-4 Phantom II | The lack of an internal gun "was the biggest mistake on the F-4", Chesire said; "Bullets are cheap and tend to go where you aim them. I needed a gun, and I really wished I had one." Marine Corps General John R. Dailey recalled that "everyone in RF-4s wished they had a gun on the aircraft." For a brief period, doctrine held that turning combat would be impossible at supersonic speeds and little effort was made to teach pilots air combat maneuvering. In reality, engagements quickly became subsonic, as pilots would slow down in an effort to get behind their adversaries. Furthermore, the relatively new heat-seeking and radar-guided missiles at the time were frequently reported as unreliable and pilots had to fire multiple missiles just to hit one enemy fighter. To compound the problem, rules of engagement in Vietnam precluded long-range missile attacks in most instances, as visual identification was normally required. Many pilots found themselves on the tail of an enemy aircraft, but too close to fire short-range Falcons or Sidewinders. Although by 1965 USAF F-4Cs began carrying SUU-16 external gunpods containing a 20 mm (.79 in) M61A1 Vulcan Gatling cannon, USAF cockpits were not equipped with lead-computing gunsights until the introduction of the SUU-23, virtually assuring a miss in a maneuvering fight. Some Marine Corps aircraft carried two pods for strafing. In addition to the loss of performance due to drag, combat showed the externally mounted cannon to be inaccurate unless frequently boresighted, yet far more cost-effective than missiles. The lack of a cannon was finally addressed by adding an internally mounted 20 mm (.79 in) M61A1 Vulcan on the F-4E.
Costs: Note: Original amounts were in 1965 U.S. dollars. The figures in these tables have been adjusted for inflation to the current year.
Operational history:
United States Air Force: In USAF service, the F-4 was initially designated the F-110A prior to the introduction of the 1962 United States Tri-Service aircraft designation system. The USAF quickly embraced the design and became the largest Phantom user. The first USAF Phantoms in Vietnam were F-4Cs from the 43rd Tactical Fighter Squadron arrived in December 1964.
Unlike the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps, which flew the Phantom with a Naval Aviator (pilot) in the front seat and a naval flight officer as a radar intercept officer (RIO) in the back seat, the USAF initially flew its Phantoms with a rated Air Force Pilot in front and back seats. Pilots usually did not like flying in the back seat; while the GIB, or "guy in back", could fly and ostensibly land the aircraft, he had fewer flight instruments and a very restricted forward view. The Air Force later assigned a rated Air Force Navigator qualified as a weapon/targeting systems officer (later designated as weapon systems officer or WSO) in the rear seat instead of another pilot.
On 10 July 1965, F-4Cs of the 45th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 15th TFW, on temporary assignment in Ubon, Thailand, scored the USAF's first victories against North Vietnamese MiG-17s using AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. On 26 April 1966, an F-4C from the 480th Tactical Fighter Squadron scored the first aerial victory by a U.S. aircrew over a North Vietnamese MiG-21 "Fishbed". On 24 July 1965, another Phantom from the 45th Tactical Fighter Squadron became the first American aircraft to be downed by an enemy SAM, and on 5 October 1966 an 8th Tactical Fighter Wing F-4C became the first U.S. jet lost to an air-to-air missile, fired by a MiG-21.
Early aircraft suffered from leaks in wing fuel tanks that required re-sealing after each flight and 85 aircraft were found to have cracks in outer wing ribs and stringers. There were also problems with aileron control cylinders, electrical connectors, and engine compartment fires. Reconnaissance RF-4Cs made their debut in Vietnam on 30 October 1965, flying the hazardous post-strike reconnaissance missions. The USAF Thunderbirds used the F-4E from the 1969 season until 1974.
Although the F-4C was essentially identical to the Navy/Marine Corps F-4B in-flight performance and carried the AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, USAF-tailored F-4Ds initially arrived in June 1967 equipped with AIM-4 Falcons. However, the Falcon, like its predecessors, was designed to shoot down heavy bombers flying straight and level. Its reliability proved no better than others and its complex firing sequence and limited seeker-head cooling time made it virtually useless in combat against agile fighters. The F-4Ds reverted to using Sidewinders under the "Rivet Haste" program in early 1968, and by 1972 the AIM-7E-2 "Dogfight Sparrow" had become the preferred missile for USAF pilots. Like other Vietnam War Phantoms, the F-4Ds were urgently fitted with radar warning receivers to detect the Soviet-built S-75 Dvina SAMs.
From the initial deployment of the F-4C to Southeast Asia, USAF Phantoms performed both air superiority and ground attack roles, supporting not only ground troops in South Vietnam, but also conducting bombing sorties in Laos and North Vietnam. As the F-105 force underwent severe attrition between 1965 and 1968, the bombing role of the F-4 proportionately increased until after November 1970 (when the last F-105D was withdrawn from combat) it became the primary USAF tactical ordnance delivery system. In October 1972 the first squadron of EF-4C Wild Weasel aircraft deployed to Thailand on temporary duty. The "E" prefix was later dropped and the aircraft was simply known as the F-4C Wild Weasel.
Sixteen squadrons of Phantoms were permanently deployed to Indochina between 1965 and 1973, and 17 others deployed on temporary combat assignments. Peak numbers of combat F-4s occurred in 1972, when 353 were based in Thailand. A total of 445 Air Force Phantom fighter-bombers were lost, 370 in combat and 193 of those over North Vietnam (33 to MiGs, 30 to SAMs and 307 to AAA).
The RF-4C was operated by four squadrons, and of the 83 losses, 72 were in combat including 38 over North Vietnam (seven to SAMs and 65 to AAA). By war's end, the U.S. Air Force had lost a total of 528 F-4 and RF-4C Phantoms. When combined with U.S. Navy and Marine Corps losses of 233 Phantoms, 761 F-4/RF-4 Phantoms were lost in the Vietnam War.
On 28 August 1972, Captain Steve Ritchie became the first USAF ace of the war. On 9 September 1972, WSO Capt Charles B. DeBellevue became the highest-scoring American ace of the war with six victories. and WSO Capt Jeffrey Feinstein became the last USAF ace of the war on 13 October 1972. Upon return to the United States, DeBellevue and Feinstein were assigned to undergraduate pilot training (Feinstein was given a vision waiver) and requalified as USAF pilots in the F-4. USAF F-4C/D/E crews claimed 107.5 MiG kills in Southeast Asia (50 by Sparrow, 31 by Sidewinder, five by Falcon, 15.5 by gun, and six by other means).
On 31 January 1972, the 170th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 183d Tactical Fighter Group of the Illinois Air National Guard became the first Air National Guard (ANG) unit to transition to Phantoms from Republic F-84F Thunderstreaks. Phantoms would eventually equip numerous tactical fighter and tactical reconnaissance units in the USAF active, National Guard, and reserve.
On 2 June 1972, a Phantom flying at supersonic speed shot down a MiG-19 over Thud Ridge in Vietnam with its cannon. At a recorded speed of Mach 1.2, Major Phil Handley's shoot down was the first and only recorded gun kill while flying at supersonic speeds.
In early December 1989, USAF F-4s, from Clark Air Base, participated in Operation Classic Resolve, President Bush's response to the 1989 Philippine coup attempt. The F-4s were ordered to buzz the rebel planes at their base, fire at them if any tried to take off, and shoot them down if they did. The buzzing by the US F-4s soon caused the coup to collapse. On December 2, President Bush reported that on 1 December, US fighter aircraft from Clark Air Base assisted Aquino repel a coup attempt.
On 15 August 1990, 24 F-4G Wild Weasel Vs and six RF-4Cs were deployed to Isa Air Base, Bahrain, for Operation Desert Storm. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | F-4 Phantom II | At a recorded speed of Mach 1.2, Major Phil Handley's shoot down was the first and only recorded gun kill while flying at supersonic speeds.
In early December 1989, USAF F-4s, from Clark Air Base, participated in Operation Classic Resolve, President Bush's response to the 1989 Philippine coup attempt. The F-4s were ordered to buzz the rebel planes at their base, fire at them if any tried to take off, and shoot them down if they did. The buzzing by the US F-4s soon caused the coup to collapse. On December 2, President Bush reported that on 1 December, US fighter aircraft from Clark Air Base assisted Aquino repel a coup attempt.
On 15 August 1990, 24 F-4G Wild Weasel Vs and six RF-4Cs were deployed to Isa Air Base, Bahrain, for Operation Desert Storm. The F-4G was the only aircraft in the USAF inventory equipped for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) role, and was needed to protect coalition aircraft from Iraq's extensive air defense system. The RF-4C was the only aircraft equipped with the ultra-long-range KS-127 LOROP (long-range oblique photography) camera and was used for a variety of reconnaissance missions. In spite of flying almost daily missions, only one RF-4C was lost in a fatal accident before the start of hostilities. One F-4G was lost when enemy fire damaged the fuel tanks and the aircraft ran out of fuel near a friendly airbase. The last USAF Phantoms, F-4G Wild Weasel Vs from 561st Fighter Squadron, were retired on 26 March 1996. The last operational flight of the F-4G Wild Weasel was from the 190th Fighter Squadron, Idaho Air National Guard, in April 1996. The last operational USAF/ANG F-4 to land was flown by Maj Mike Webb and Maj Gary Leeder of the Idaho ANG.
Like the Navy, the Air Force has operated QF-4 target drones, serving with the 82d Aerial Targets Squadron at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, and Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. It was expected that the F-4 would remain in the target role with the 82d ATRS until at least 2015, when they would be replaced by early versions of the F-16 Fighting Falcon converted to a QF-16 configuration. Several QF-4s also retain capability as manned aircraft and are maintained in historical color schemes, being displayed as part of Air Combat Command's Heritage Flight at air shows, base open houses, and other events while serving as non-expendable target aircraft during the week. On 19 November 2013, BAE Systems delivered the last QF-4 aerial target to the Air Force. The example had been in storage for over 20 years before being converted. Over 16 years, BAE had converted 314 F-4 and RF-4 Phantom IIs into QF-4s and QRF-4s, with each aircraft taking six months to adapt. As of December 2013, QF-4 and QRF-4 aircraft had flown over 16,000 manned and 600 unmanned training sorties, with 250 unmanned aircraft being shot down in firing exercises. The remaining QF-4s and QRF-4s held their training role until the first of 126 QF-16s were delivered by Boeing. The final flight of an Air Force QF-4 from Tyndall AFB took place on 27 May 2015 to Holloman AFB. After Tyndall AFB ceased operations, the 53d Weapons Evaluation Group at Holloman became the fleet of 22 QF-4s' last remaining operator. The base continued using them to fly manned test and unmanned live fire test support and Foreign Military Sales testing, with the final unmanned flight taking place in August 2016. The type was officially retired from US military service with a four–ship flight at Holloman during an event on 21 December 2016. The remaining QF-4s were to be demilitarized after 1 January 2017.
United States Navy: On 30 December 1960, VF-121 Pacemakers at NAS Miramar became the first Phantom operator with its F4H-1Fs (F-4As). The VF-74 Be-devilers at NAS Oceana became the first deployable Phantom squadron when it received its F4H-1s (F-4Bs) on 8 July 1961. The squadron completed carrier qualifications in October 1961 and Phantom's first full carrier deployment between August 1962 and March 1963 aboard Forrestal. The second deployable U.S. Atlantic Fleet squadron to receive F-4Bs was the VF-102 Diamondbacks, who promptly took their new aircraft on the shakedown cruise of Enterprise. The first deployable U.S. Pacific Fleet squadron to receive the F-4B was the VF-114 Aardvarks, which participated in the September 1962 cruise aboard USS Kitty Hawk.
By the time of the Tonkin Gulf incident, 13 of 31 deployable navy squadrons were armed with the type. F-4Bs from Constellation made the first Phantom combat sortie of the Vietnam War on 5 August 1964, flying bomber escort in Operation Pierce Arrow. Navy fighter pilots were unused to flying with a non-pilot RIO, but learned from air combat in Vietnam the benefits of the GiB "guy in back" or "voice in the luggage compartment" helping with the workload. The first Phantom air-to-air victory of the war took place on 9 April 1965 when an F-4B from VF-96 Fighting Falcons piloted by Lieutenant (junior grade) Terence M. Murphy and his RIO, Ensign Ronald Fegan, shot down a Chinese MiG-17. The Phantom was then shot down, probably by an AIM-7 Sparrow from one of its wingmen. There continues to be controversy over whether the Phantom was shot down by MiG guns or, as enemy reports later indicated, an AIM-7 Sparrow III from one of Murphy's and Fegan's wingmen. On 17 June 1965, an F-4B from VF-21 Freelancers piloted by Commander Louis Page and Lieutenant John C. Smith shot down the first North Vietnamese MiG of the war.
On 10 May 1972, Lieutenant Randy "Duke" Cunningham and Lieutenant (junior grade) William P. Driscoll flying an F-4J, call sign Showtime 100, shot down three MiG-17s to become the first American flying aces of the war. Their fifth victory was believed at the time to be over a mysterious North Vietnamese ace, Colonel Nguyen Toon, now considered mythical. On the return flight, the Phantom was damaged by an enemy surface-to-air missile. To avoid being captured, Cunningham and Driscoll flew their burning aircraft using only the rudder and afterburner (the damage to the aircraft rendered conventional control nearly impossible), until they could eject over water.
During the war, U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom squadrons participated in 84 combat tours with F-4Bs, F-4Js, and F-4Ns. The Navy claimed 40 air-to-air victories at a cost of 73 Phantoms lost in combat (seven to enemy aircraft, 13 to SAMs and 53 to AAA). An additional 54 Phantoms were lost in mishaps.
In 1984, all Navy F-4Ns were retired from Fleet service in deployable USN squadrons and by 1987 the last F-4Ss were retired from deployable USN squadrons. On 25 March 1986, an F-4S belonging to the VF-151 Vigilantes, became the last active duty U.S. Navy Phantom to launch from an aircraft carrier, in this case, Midway. On 18 October 1986, an F-4S from the VF-202 Superheats, a Naval Reserve fighter squadron, made the last-ever Phantom carrier landing while operating aboard America. In 1987, the last of the Naval Reserve-operated F-4S aircraft were replaced by F-14As. The last Phantoms in service with the Navy were QF-4N and QF-4S target drones operated by the Naval Air Warfare Center at NAS Point Mugu, California. These airframes were subsequently retired in 2004.
United States Marine Corps: The Marine Corps received its first F-4Bs in June 1962, with the Black Knights of VMFA-314 at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California becoming the first operational squadron. Marine Phantoms of VMFA-323, flying from Puerto Rico, provided air cover during Operation Power Pack for the evacuation of US citizens from the Dominican Republic and assisted the 508th Infantry Regiment in taking and securing a position east of the Duarte bridge. Marine Phantoms from VMFA-531 Grey Ghosts were assigned to Da Nang Air Base on South Vietnam's northeast coast on 10 May 1965 and were initially assigned to provide air defense for the USMC. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | F-4 Phantom II | The last Phantoms in service with the Navy were QF-4N and QF-4S target drones operated by the Naval Air Warfare Center at NAS Point Mugu, California. These airframes were subsequently retired in 2004.
United States Marine Corps: The Marine Corps received its first F-4Bs in June 1962, with the Black Knights of VMFA-314 at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California becoming the first operational squadron. Marine Phantoms of VMFA-323, flying from Puerto Rico, provided air cover during Operation Power Pack for the evacuation of US citizens from the Dominican Republic and assisted the 508th Infantry Regiment in taking and securing a position east of the Duarte bridge. Marine Phantoms from VMFA-531 Grey Ghosts were assigned to Da Nang Air Base on South Vietnam's northeast coast on 10 May 1965 and were initially assigned to provide air defense for the USMC. They soon began close air support missions (CAS) and VMFA-314, VMFA-232 Red Devils, VMFA-323 Death Rattlers and VMFA-542 Bengals soon arrived at the primitive airfield. Marine F-4 pilots claimed three enemy MiGs (two while on exchange duty with the USAF) at the cost of 75 aircraft lost in combat, mostly to ground fire, and four in accidents.
The VMCJ-1 Golden Hawks (later VMAQ-1 and VMAQ-4 which had the old RM tailcode) flew the first photo recon mission with an RF-4B variant on 3 November 1966 from Da Nang and remained there until 1970 with no RF-4B losses and only one aircraft damaged by anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire. VMCJ-2 and VMCJ-3 (now VMAQ-3) provided aircraft for VMCJ-1 in Da Nang and VMFP-3 was formed in 1975 at MCAS El Toro, CA consolidating all USMC RF-4Bs in one unit that became known as "The Eyes of the Corps." VMFP-3 disestablished in August 1990 after the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System was introduced for the F/A-18D Hornet.
The F-4 continued to equip fighter-attack squadrons in both active and reserve Marine Corps units throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and into the early 1990s. In the early 1980s, these squadrons began to transition to the F/A-18 Hornet, starting with the same squadron that introduced the F-4 to the Marine Corps, VMFA-314 at MCAS El Toro, California. On 18 January 1992, the last Marine Corps Phantom, an F-4S in the Marine Corps Reserve, was retired by the Cowboys of VMFA-112 at NAS Dallas, Texas, after which the squadron was re-equipped with F/A-18 Hornets.
Aerial combat in the Vietnam War: The USAF and the US Navy had high expectations of the F-4 Phantom, assuming that the massive firepower, the best available on-board radar, the highest speed and acceleration properties, coupled with new tactics, would provide Phantoms with an advantage over the MiGs. However, in confrontations with the lighter MiG-21, F-4s did not always succeed and began to suffer losses. Over the course of the air war in Vietnam, between 3 April 1965 and 8 January 1973, each side would ultimately claim favorable kill ratios.
During the war, U.S. Navy F-4 Phantoms claimed 40 air-to-air victories at a loss of seven Phantoms to enemy aircraft. USMC F-4 pilots claimed three enemy MiGs at the cost of one aircraft in air-combat. USAF F-4 Phantom crews scored 107+1⁄2 MiG kills (including 33+1⁄2 MiG-17s, eight MiG-19s and 66 MiG-21s) at a cost of 33 Phantoms in air-combat. F-4 pilots were credited with a total of 150+1⁄2 MiG kills at a cost of 42 Phantoms in air-combat.
According to the Vietnam People's Air Force (VPAF), 103 F-4 Phantoms were shot down by MiG-21s at a cost of 54 MiG-21s downed by F-4s. During the war, the VPAF lost 131 MiGs in air combat (63 MiG-17s, eight MiG-19s and 60 MiG-21s) of which one half were by F-4s.
From 1966 to November 1968, in 46 air battles conducted over North Vietnam between F-4s and MiG-21s, VPAF claimed 27 F-4s were shot down by MiG-21s at a cost of 20 MiG-21s In 1970, one F-4 Phantom was shot down by a MiG-21. The struggle culminated on 10 May 1972, with VPAF aircraft completing 64 sorties, resulting in 15 air battles. The VPAF claimed seven F-4s were shot down, while U.S. confirmed five F-4s were lost. The Phantoms, in turn, managed to destroy two MiG-21s, three MiG-17s, and one MiG-19. On 11 May, two MiG-21s, which played the role of "bait", brought the four F-4s to two MiG-21s circling at low altitude. The MiGs quickly engaged and shot down two F-4s. On 18 May, Vietnamese aircraft made 26 sorties in eight air engagements, which cost 4 F-4 Phantoms; Vietnamese fighters on that day did not suffer losses.
On 5 August 1967, the USS Forrestal was stationed off the Indochina coast to carry out strikes against North Vietnam. An electrical fault caused a Zuni rocket to be fired from an F-4. The rocket struck the fuel tank of an A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft, starting a fire which quickly spread to other airplanes, setting off several bombs. The fire and explosions killed 134 men and seriously wounded 161 more in what became known as the 1967 USS Forrestal fire.
Non-U.S. users: The Phantom has served with the air forces of many countries, including Australia, Egypt, Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Iran, Israel, Japan, Spain, South Korea and Turkey.
Australia: The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) leased 24 USAF F-4Es from 1970 to 1973 while waiting for their order for the General Dynamics F-111C to be delivered. They were so well-liked that the RAAF considered retaining the aircraft after the F-111Cs were delivered. They were operated from RAAF Amberley by No. 1 Squadron and No. 6 Squadron.
Egypt: In 1979, the Egyptian Air Force purchased 35 former USAF F-4Es along with a number of Sparrow, Sidewinder and Maverick missiles from the U.S. for $594 million as part of the "Peace Pharaoh" program. An additional seven surplus USAF aircraft were purchased in 1988. Three attrition replacements had been received by the end of the 1990s.
Egyptian F-4Es were retired in 2020, with their former base at Cairo West Air Base being reconfigured for the operation of F-16C/D Fighting Falcons.
Germany: The West German air force (Luftwaffe) initially ordered the reconnaissance RF-4E in 1969, receiving a total of 88 aircraft from January 1971. In 1973, under the "Peace Rhine" program, the Luftwaffe purchased 175 units of the F-4F. The “F” variant was a more agile version of the “E”, due to its lower weight and slatted wings. However this was achieved at the expense of reduced fuel capacity, and the elimination of AIM-7 Sparrow capability. These purchases made Germany the largest export customer for the Phantom.
In 1975, West Germany also received 10 F-4Es for training in the U.S. In the late 1990s, these were withdrawn from service after being replaced by F-4Fs. In 1982, the initially unarmed RF-4Es were given a secondary ground attack capability; these aircraft were retired in 1994. The F-4F was upgraded in the mid-1980s. West Germany also initiated the Improved Combat Efficiency (ICE) program in 1983. The 110 ICE-upgraded F-4Fs entered service in 1992, and were expected to remain in service until 2012. All the remaining Luftwaffe Phantoms were based at Wittmund with Jagdgeschwader 71 (fighter wing 71) in Northern Germany and WTD61 at Manching. A total of 24 German F-4F Phantom IIs were operated by the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing of the USAF at Holloman AFB to train Luftwaffe crews until December 2004. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | F-4 Phantom II | In 1982, the initially unarmed RF-4Es were given a secondary ground attack capability; these aircraft were retired in 1994. The F-4F was upgraded in the mid-1980s. West Germany also initiated the Improved Combat Efficiency (ICE) program in 1983. The 110 ICE-upgraded F-4Fs entered service in 1992, and were expected to remain in service until 2012. All the remaining Luftwaffe Phantoms were based at Wittmund with Jagdgeschwader 71 (fighter wing 71) in Northern Germany and WTD61 at Manching. A total of 24 German F-4F Phantom IIs were operated by the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing of the USAF at Holloman AFB to train Luftwaffe crews until December 2004. Phantoms were deployed to NATO states under the Baltic Air Policing starting in 2005, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012. The German Air Force retired its last F-4Fs on 29 June 2013. German F-4Fs flew 279,000 hours from entering service on 31 August 1973 until retirement.
Greece: In 1971, the Hellenic Air Force ordered brand new F-4E Phantoms, with deliveries starting in 1974. In the early 1990s, the Hellenic AF acquired surplus RF-4Es and F-4Es from the Luftwaffe and U.S. ANG. Following the success of the German ICE program, on 11 August 1997, a contract was signed between DASA of Germany and Hellenic Aerospace Industry for the upgrade of 39 aircraft to the very similar "Peace Icarus 2000" standard. On 5 May 2017, the Hellenic Air Force officially retired the RF-4E Phantom II during a public ceremony.
Iran: In the 1960s and 1970s when the U.S. and Iran were on friendly terms, the U.S. delivered 225 F-4D, F-4E, and RF-4E Phantoms to Iran, making it the second largest export customer. The Imperial Iranian Air Force saw at least one engagement, resulting in a loss, after an RF-4C was rammed by a Soviet MiG-21 during Project Dark Gene, an ELINT operation during the Cold War.
The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force Phantoms saw heavy action in the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s and were kept operational by overhaul and servicing from Iran's aerospace industry. Notable operations of Iranian F-4s during the war included Operation Scorch Sword, an attack by two F-4s against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor site near Baghdad on 30 September 1980, and the attack on H3, a 4 April 1981 strike by eight Iranian F-4s against the H-3 complex of air bases in the far west of Iraq, which resulted in many Iraqi aircraft being destroyed or damaged for no Iranian losses.
On 5 June 1984, two Saudi Arabian fighter pilots shot down two Iranian F-4 fighters. The Royal Saudi Air Force pilots were flying American-built F-15s and fired air-to-air missiles to bring down the Iranian planes. The Saudi fighter pilots had Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker planes and Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS surveillance planes assist in the encounter. The aerial fight occurred in Saudi airspace over the Persian Gulf near the Saudi island Al Arabiyah, about 60 miles northeast of Jubail.
Iranian F-4s were in use as of late 2014; the aircraft reportedly conducted air strikes on ISIS targets in the eastern Iraqi province of Diyala.
Israel: The Israeli Air Force acquired between 212 and 222 newly built and ex-USAF aircraft, and modified several as one-off special reconnaissance variants. The first F-4Es, nicknamed "Kurnass" (Sledgehammer), and RF-4Es, nicknamed "Orev" (Raven), were delivered in 1969 under the "Peace Echo I" program. Additional Phantoms arrived during the 1970s under "Peace Echo II" through "Peace Echo V" and "Nickel Grass" programs. Israeli Phantoms saw extensive combat during Arab–Israeli conflicts, first seeing action during the War of Attrition. In the 1980s, Israel began the "Kurnass 2000" modernization program which significantly updated avionics. The last Israeli F-4s were retired in 2004.
Japan: From 1968, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) purchased a total of 140 F-4EJ Phantoms without aerial refueling, AGM-12 Bullpup missile system, nuclear control system or ground attack capabilities. Mitsubishi built 138 under license in Japan and 14 unarmed reconnaissance RF-4Es were imported. One of the aircraft (17-8440) was the last of the 5,195 F-4 Phantoms to be produced. It was manufactured by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries on 21 May 1981. "The Final Phantom" served with 306th Tactical Fighter Squadron and later transferred to the 301st Tactical Fighter Squadron.
Of these, 96 F-4EJs were modified to the F-4EJ Kai (改, modified) standard. 15 F-4EJ and F-4EJ Kai were converted to reconnaissance aircraft designated RF-4EJ. Japan had a fleet of 90 F-4s in service in 2007. After studying several replacement fighters the F-35A Lightning II was chosen in 2011. The 302nd Tactical Fighter Squadron became the first JASDF F-35 Squadron at Misawa Air Base when it converted from the F-4EJ Kai on 29 March 2019. The JASDF's sole aerial reconnaissance unit, the 501st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, retired their RF-4Es and RF-4EJs on 9 March 2020, and the unit itself dissolved on 26 March.
The 301st Tactical Fighter Squadron then became the sole user of the F-4EJ in the Air Defense Command, with their retirement originally scheduled in 2021 along with the unit's transition to the F-35A. However, on 20 November 2020, the 301st Tactical Fighter Squadron announced the earlier retirement of their remaining F-4EJs, concluding the Phantom's long-running career in the JASDF Air Defense Command. Although retirement was announced, the 301st TFS continued operations up until 10 December 2020, with the squadron's Phantoms being decommissioned on 14 December. Two F-4EJs and a F-4EJ Kai continued to be operated by the Air Development and Test Wing in Gifu Prefecture until their retirement on 17 March 2021, marking an end of Phantom operations in Japan.
South Korea: The Republic of Korea Air Force received its first batch of used USAF F-4D Phantoms in 1969 under the "Peace Spectator" program. The F-4Ds continued to be delivered until 1988. The "Peace Pheasant II" program also provided new-built and former USAF F-4Es. In 1975, South Korea fundraised to buy five new F-4 Phantoms with the money donated from South Korean citizens in a national fundraising drive set up to buy the jets (a necessity at the time as South Korea was a poor country and in the aftermath of the Korean War, needed the extra jets to defend against North Korea which was had a larger air force back then). In total, the ROKAF operated 92 F-4Ds, 27 RF-4Cs, and 103 F-4Es. The last ROKAF F-4Es were retired on 7 June 2024.
Spain: The Spanish Air Force acquired its first batch of ex-USAF F-4C Phantoms in 1971 under the "Peace Alfa" program. Designated C.12, the aircraft were retired in 1989. At the same time, the air arm received a number of ex-USAF RF-4Cs, designated CR.12. In 1995–1996, these aircraft received extensive avionics upgrades. Spain retired its RF-4s in 2002.
Turkey: The Turkish Air Force (TAF) received 40 F-4Es in 1974, with a further 32 F-4Es and 8 RF-4Es in 1977–78 under the "Peace Diamond III" program, followed by 40 ex-USAF aircraft in "Peace Diamond IV" in 1987, and a further 40 ex-U.S. Air National Guard Aircraft in 1991. A further 32 RF-4Es were transferred to Turkey after being retired by the Luftwaffe between 1992 and 1994. In 1995, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) implemented an upgrade similar to Kurnass 2000 on 54 Turkish F-4Es which were dubbed the F-4E 2020 Terminator. Turkish F-4s, and more modern F-16s have been used to strike Kurdish PKK bases in ongoing military operations in Northern Iraq. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | F-4 Phantom II | Turkey: The Turkish Air Force (TAF) received 40 F-4Es in 1974, with a further 32 F-4Es and 8 RF-4Es in 1977–78 under the "Peace Diamond III" program, followed by 40 ex-USAF aircraft in "Peace Diamond IV" in 1987, and a further 40 ex-U.S. Air National Guard Aircraft in 1991. A further 32 RF-4Es were transferred to Turkey after being retired by the Luftwaffe between 1992 and 1994. In 1995, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) implemented an upgrade similar to Kurnass 2000 on 54 Turkish F-4Es which were dubbed the F-4E 2020 Terminator. Turkish F-4s, and more modern F-16s have been used to strike Kurdish PKK bases in ongoing military operations in Northern Iraq. On 22 June 2012, a Turkish RF-4E was shot down by Syrian air defenses while flying a reconnaissance flight near the Turkish-Syrian border. Turkey has stated the reconnaissance aircraft was in international airspace when it was shot down, while Syrian authorities stated it was inside Syrian airspace. Turkish F-4s remained in use as of 2020, and it plans to fly them at least until 2030.
On 24 February 2015, two RF-4Es crashed in the Malatya region in the southeast of Turkey, under yet unknown circumstances, killing both crew of two each. On 5 March 2015, an F-4E-2020 crashed in central Anatolia killing both crew. After the recent accidents, the TAF withdrew RF-4Es from active service. Turkey was reported to have used F-4 jets to attack PKK separatists and the ISIS capital on 19 September 2015. The Turkish Air Force has reportedly used the F-4E 2020s against the more recent Third Phase of the PKK conflict on heavy bombardment missions into Iraq on 15 November 2015, 12 January 2016, and 12 March 2016.
United Kingdom: The United Kingdom bought versions based on the U.S. Navy's F-4J for use with the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm. The UK was the only country outside the United States to operate the Phantom at sea, with them operating from HMS Ark Royal. The main differences were the use of the British Rolls-Royce Spey engines and of British-made avionics. The RN and RAF versions were given the designation F-4K and F-4M respectively, and entered service with the British military aircraft designations Phantom FG.1 (fighter/ground attack) and Phantom FGR.2 (fighter/ground attack/reconnaissance).
Initially, the FGR.2 was used in the ground attack and reconnaissance role, primarily with RAF Germany, while 43 Squadron was formed in the air defense role using the FG.1s that had been intended for the Fleet Air Arm for use aboard HMS Eagle. The superiority of the Phantom over the English Electric Lightning in terms of both range and weapons system capability, combined with the successful introduction of the SEPECAT Jaguar, meant that, during the mid-1970s, most of the ground attack Phantoms in Germany were redeployed to the UK to replace air defense Lightning squadrons. A second RAF squadron, 111 Squadron, was formed on the FG.1 in 1979 after the disbandment of 892 NAS.
In 1982, during the Falklands War, three Phantom FGR2s of No. 29 Squadron were on active Quick Reaction Alert duty on Ascension Island to protect the base from air attack. After the Falklands War, 15 upgraded ex-USN F-4Js, known as the F-4J(UK) entered RAF service to compensate for one interceptor squadron redeployed to the Falklands.
Around 15 RAF squadrons received various marks of Phantom, many of them based in Germany. The first to be equipped was No. 228 Operational Conversion Unit at RAF Coningsby in August 1968. One noteworthy operator was No. 43 Squadron where Phantom FG1s remained the squadron equipment for 20 years, arriving in September 1969 and departing in July 1989. During this period the squadron was based at Leuchars.
The interceptor Phantoms were replaced by the Panavia Tornado F3 from the late 1980s onwards. Originally to be used until 2003, it was set back to 1992 due to restructuring of the British Armed Forces and the last combat British Phantoms were retired in October 1992 when No. 74(F) Squadron was disbanded. Phantom FG.1 XT597 was the last British Phantom to be retired on 28 January 1994, it was used as a test jet by the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment for its whole service life.
Civilian use: In 1988, Sandia National Laboratories expended an F-4 mounted on a "rocket sled" in a crash test to record the results of an aircraft impacting a reinforced concrete structure, such as a nuclear power plant.
One aircraft, an F-4D (civilian registration NX749CF), is operated by the Massachusetts-based non-profit organization Collings Foundation as a "living history" exhibit. Funds to maintain and operate the aircraft, which is based in Houston, Texas, are raised through donations/sponsorships from public and commercial parties.
After finding the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter inadequate, NASA used the F-4 to photograph and film Titan II missiles after launch from Cape Canaveral during the 1960s. Retired U.S. Air Force colonel Jack Petry described how he put his F-4 into a Mach 1.2 dive synchronized to the launch countdown, then "walked the (rocket's) contrail". Petry's Phantom stayed with the Titan for 90 seconds, reaching 68,000 feet, then broke away as the missile continued into space.
NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center acquired an F-4A on 3 December 1965. It made 55 flights in support of short programs, chase on X-15 missions and lifting body flights. The F-4 also supported a biomedical monitoring program involving 1,000 flights by NASA Flight Research Center aerospace research pilots and students of the USAF Aerospace Research Pilot School flying high-performance aircraft. The pilots were instrumented to record accurate and reliable data of electrocardiogram, respiration rate, and normal acceleration. In 1967, the Phantom supported a brief military-inspired program to determine whether an airplane's sonic boom could be directed and whether it could be used as a weapon of sorts, or at least an annoyance. NASA also flew an F-4C in a spanwise blowing study from 1983 to 1985, after which it was returned.
Variants: F-4A, B, J, N and S
Variants for the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. F-4B was upgraded to F-4N, and F-4J was upgraded to F-4S.
F-110 (original USAF designation for F-4C), F-4C, D and E
Variants for the U.S. Air Force. F-4E introduced an internal M61 Vulcan cannon. The F-4D and E were the most numerously produced, widely exported, and also extensively used under the Semi Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) U.S. air defense system.
F-4G Wild Weasel V
A dedicated Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) variant for the U.S. Air Force with updated radar and avionics, converted from F-4E. The designation F-4G was applied earlier to an entirely different U.S. Navy Phantom.
F-4K and M
Variants for the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, respectively, re-engined with Rolls-Royce Spey turbofan engines.
F-4EJ and RF-4EJ
Simplified F-4E exported to and license-built in Japan. Some modified for reconnaissance role, carrying photographic and/or electronic reconnaissance pods and designated RF-4EJ.
F-4F
Simplified F-4E exported to Germany.
QRF-4C, QF-4B, E, G, N and S
Retired aircraft converted into remote-controlled target drones used for weapons and defensive systems research by USAF and USN / USMC.
RF-4B, C, and E
Tactical reconnaissance variants. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | F-4 Phantom II | Air Force with updated radar and avionics, converted from F-4E. The designation F-4G was applied earlier to an entirely different U.S. Navy Phantom.
F-4K and M
Variants for the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, respectively, re-engined with Rolls-Royce Spey turbofan engines.
F-4EJ and RF-4EJ
Simplified F-4E exported to and license-built in Japan. Some modified for reconnaissance role, carrying photographic and/or electronic reconnaissance pods and designated RF-4EJ.
F-4F
Simplified F-4E exported to Germany.
QRF-4C, QF-4B, E, G, N and S
Retired aircraft converted into remote-controlled target drones used for weapons and defensive systems research by USAF and USN / USMC.
RF-4B, C, and E
Tactical reconnaissance variants.
Operators:
Current: Greece
Hellenic Air Force – 18 F-4E AUPs in service
Andravida Air Base, Elis
338th Fighter-Bomber Squadron
Iran
Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force – 62 F-4D, F-4E, and RF-4Es in service
Bandar Abbas Air Base, Hormozgan Province
91st Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4E)
Bushehr Air Base, Bushehr Province
61st Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4E)
Chabahar Konarak Air Base, Sistan and Baluchestan Province
101st Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4D)
Hamadan Air Base, Hamadan Province
31st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (RF-4E)
31st Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4E)
Turkey
Turkish Air Force – 54 F-4E 2020 Terminators in service
Eskişehir Air Base, Eskişehir Province
111 Filo
Former operators: Australia
Royal Australian Air Force (F-4E 1970 to 1973)
Egypt
Egyptian Air Force (F-4E 1977 to 2020)
Germany
German Air Force (RF-4E 1971 to 1994; F-4F 1973 to 2013; F-4E 1978 to 1992)
Greece
Hellenic Air Force (RF-4E 1978 to 2017)
Pahlavi Iran
Imperial Iranian Air Force (F-4D 1968 to 1979; F-4E 1971 to 1979; RF-4E 1971 to 1979)
Israel
Israeli Air Force (F-4E 1969 to 2004; RF-4C 1970 to 1971; RF-4E 1971 to 2004)
Japan
Japan Air Self-Defense Force (F-4EJ 1971 to 2021; RF-4E 1974 to 2020; RF-4EJ 1992 to 2020)
South Korea
Republic of Korea Air Force (F-4D 1969 to 2010; RF-4C 1989 to 2014; F-4E 1977 to 2024)
Spain
Spanish Air Force (F-4C 1971 to 1990; RF-4C 1978 to 2002)
Turkey
Turkish Air Force (RF-4E 1980 to 2015)
United Kingdom
Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment (F-4K 1970 to 1994)
Fleet Air Arm (F-4K 1968 to 1978)
Royal Air Force (F-4M 1968 to 1992; F-4K 1969 to 1990; F-4J(UK) 1984 to 1991)
United States
NASA (F-4A 1965 to 1967; F-4C 1983 to 1985)
United States Air Force (F-4B 1963 to 1964; F-4C 1964 to 1989; RF-4C 1964 to 1995; F-4D 1965 to 1992; F-4E 1967 to 1991; F-4G 1978 to 1996; QF-4 1996 to current, however aircraft are not able to be used in combat, thus functionally retired.
United States Marine Corps (F-4B 1962 to 1979; RF-4B 1965 to 1990; F-4J 1967 to 1984; F-4N 1973 to 1985; F-4S 1978 to 1992)
United States Navy (F-4A 1960 to 1968; F-4B 1961 to 1974; F-4J 1966 to 1982; F-4N 1973 to 1984; F-4S 1979 to 1987; QF-4 1983 to 2004)
Culture:
Nicknames: The Phantom gathered a number of nicknames during its career. Some of these names included "Snoopy", "Rhino", "Double Ugly", "Old Smokey", the "Flying Anvil", "Flying Footlocker", "Flying Brick", "Lead Sled", the "Big Iron Sled", and the "St. Louis Slugger" (owing to it being produced in St. Louis). In recognition of its record of downing large numbers of Soviet-built MiGs, it was called the "World's Leading Distributor of MiG Parts". As a reflection of excellent performance in spite of its bulk, the F-4 was dubbed "the triumph of thrust over aerodynamics." German Luftwaffe crews called their F-4s the Eisenschwein ("Iron Pig"), Fliegender Ziegelstein ("Flying Brick") and Luftverteidigungsdiesel ("Air Defense Diesel"). In the RAF it was most commonly referred to as “The Toom” (not tomb).
Reputation: Imitating the spelling of the aircraft's name, McDonnell issued a series of patches. Pilots became "Phantom Phlyers", backseaters became "Phantom Pherrets", fans of the F-4 "Phantom Phanatics", and call it the "Phabulous Phantom". Ground crewmen who worked on the aircraft are known as "Phantom Phixers".
Several active websites are devoted to sharing information on the F-4, and the aircraft is grudgingly admired as brutally effective by those who have flown it. Colonel (Ret.) Chuck DeBellevue reminisced, "The F-4 Phantom was the last plane that looked like it was made to kill somebody. It was a beast. It could go through a flock of birds and kick out barbeque from the back." It had "A reputation of being a clumsy bruiser reliant on brute engine power and obsolete weapons technology."
The Spook: The aircraft's emblem is a whimsical cartoon ghost called "The Spook", which was created by McDonnell Douglas technical artist, Anthony "Tony" Wong, for shoulder patches. The name "Spook" was coined by the crews of either the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing or the 4453rd Combat Crew Training Wing at MacDill AFB. The figure is ubiquitous, appearing on many items associated with the F-4. The Spook has followed the Phantom around the world adopting local fashions; for example, the British adaptation of the U.S. "Phantom Man" is a Spook that sometimes wears a bowler hat and smokes a pipe.
Aircraft on display: As a result of its extensive number of operators and large number of aircraft produced, there are many F-4 Phantom II of numerous variants on display worldwide.
Notable accidents: On 6 June 1971, Hughes Airwest Flight 706, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-31 collided in mid-air with a United States Marine Corps F-4B Phantom above the San Gabriel Mountains, while en route from Los Angeles International Airport to Salt Lake City. All 49 on board the DC-9 were killed, while the pilot of the F-4B was unable to eject and died when the aircraft crashed shortly afterwards. The F-4B's Radar Intercept Officer successfully ejected from the plane and parachuted to safety, being the sole survivor of the incident.
On 9 August 1974, a Royal Air Force Phantom FGR2 was involved in a fatal collision with a civilian PA-25-235 Pawnee crop-sprayer over Norfolk, England.
On 17 August 1978, during a training exercise of the Mediterranean Sea, a US Navy F-4 shot down another US Navy F-4 with an AIM-9H. The pilots of the downed aircraft ejected and were recovered.
On 21 March 1987, Captain Dean Paul Martin, a pilot in the 163d Tactical Fighter Group of the California Air National Guard and son of entertainer Dean Martin, crashed his F-4C into San Gorgonio Mountain, California, shortly after departure from March Air Force Base. Both Martin and his weapon systems officer (WSO) Captain Ramon Ortiz were killed. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | F-4 Phantom II | The F-4B's Radar Intercept Officer successfully ejected from the plane and parachuted to safety, being the sole survivor of the incident.
On 9 August 1974, a Royal Air Force Phantom FGR2 was involved in a fatal collision with a civilian PA-25-235 Pawnee crop-sprayer over Norfolk, England.
On 17 August 1978, during a training exercise of the Mediterranean Sea, a US Navy F-4 shot down another US Navy F-4 with an AIM-9H. The pilots of the downed aircraft ejected and were recovered.
On 21 March 1987, Captain Dean Paul Martin, a pilot in the 163d Tactical Fighter Group of the California Air National Guard and son of entertainer Dean Martin, crashed his F-4C into San Gorgonio Mountain, California, shortly after departure from March Air Force Base. Both Martin and his weapon systems officer (WSO) Captain Ramon Ortiz were killed.
On 22 September 1987, a US Air Force RF-4C Phantom II was shot down by a US Navy F-14 Tomcat during training NATO Exercise Display Determination 87 over the Mediterranean. The RF-4C was conducting a simulated attack on USS Saratoga when the F-14 pilot became confused and launched a live AIM-9 Sidewinder. The RF-4C crew ejected and were recovered.
On 30 January 2023, a Greek Air Force F-4E Phantom II crashed into the Ionian Sea. The aircraft was conducting a training exercise when it crashed 46 km south of the Andravida Air Base. The pilot, Captain Efstathios Tsitlakidis, and co-pilot, First Lieutenant Marios Michael Touroutsikas were killed in the crash.
Specifications (F-4E): Data from The Great Book of Fighters, Quest for Performance, Encyclopedia of USAF Aircraft, and McDonnell F-4 Phantom: Spirit in the SkiesGeneral characteristics
Crew: 2
Length: 63 ft 0 in (19.2 m)
Wingspan: 38 ft 5 in (11.7 m)
Width: 27 ft 7 in (8.4 m) wing folded
Height: 16 ft 5 in (5 m)
Wing area: 530 sq ft (49.2 m2)
Aspect ratio: 2.77
Airfoil: NACA 0006.4–64 root, NACA 0003-64 tip
Empty weight: 30,328 lb (13,757 kg)
Gross weight: 41,500 lb (18,824 kg)
Max takeoff weight: 61,795 lb (28,030 kg)
Maximum landing weight: 36,831 lb (16,706 kg)
Fuel capacity: 1,994 US gal (1,660 imp gal; 7,550 L) internal, 3,335 US gal (2,777 imp gal; 12,620 L) with 2x 370 US gal (310 imp gal; 1,400 L) external tanks on the outer wing hardpoints and either a 600 or 610 US gal (500 or 510 imp gal; 2,300 or 2,300 L) tank for the center-line station.
Powerplant: 2 × General Electric J79-GE-17A after-burning turbojet engines, 11,905 lbf (52.96 kN) thrust each dry, 17,845 lbf (79.38 kN) with afterburner
Performance
Maximum speed: 1,280 kn (1,470 mph, 2,370 km/h) at 40,000 ft (12,000 m)
Maximum speed: Mach 2.23
Cruise speed: 510 kn (580 mph, 940 km/h)
Combat range: 370 nmi (420 mi, 680 km)
Ferry range: 1,457 nmi (1,677 mi, 2,699 km)
Service ceiling: 60,000 ft (18,000 m)
Rate of climb: 41,300 ft/min (210 m/s)
Lift-to-drag: 8.58
Wing loading: 78 lb/sq ft (380 kg/m2)
Thrust/weight: 0.86 at loaded weight, 0.58 at MTOW
Takeoff roll: 4,490 ft (1,370 m) at 53,814 lb (24,410 kg)
Landing roll: 3,680 ft (1,120 m) at 36,831 lb (16,706 kg)
Armament
E-model has a 20 mm (0.787 in) M61A1 Vulcan cannon mounted internally under the nose, 640 rounds
Up to 18,650 lb (8,480 kg) of weapons on nine external hardpoints, including general-purpose bombs, cluster bombs, TV- and laser-guided bombs, rocket pods, air-to-ground missiles, anti-ship missiles, gun pods, and nuclear weapons. Reconnaissance, targeting, electronic countermeasures and baggage pods, and external fuel tanks may also be carried.
4× AIM-9 Sidewinders on wing pylons, Israeli F-4 Kurnass 2000 carried Python-3, Japanese F-4EJ Kai carry AAM-3.
4× AIM-7 Sparrow in fuselage recesses, upgraded Hellenic F-4E and German F-4F ICE carry AIM-120 AMRAAM, UK Phantoms carried Skyflash missiles
6× AGM-65 Maverick
4× AGM-62 Walleye
4× AGM-45 Shrike, AGM-88 HARM, AGM-78 Standard ARM
4× GBU-15
18× Mk.82, GBU-12
5× Mk.84, GBU-10, GBU-14
18× CBU-87, CBU-89, CBU-58
Nuclear weapons, including the B28EX, B61, B43 and B57
See also: F-4 Phantom II in fiction
Operation Bolo
Related development
McDonnell F3H Demon
McDonnell Douglas Phantom FG.1/FGR.2/F.3
Aircraft of comparable role, configuration, and era
Dassault Mirage III
English Electric Lightning
Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21
Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23
Republic F-105 Thunderchief
Saab 35 Draken
Shenyang J-8
Sukhoi Su-15
Vought XF8U-3 Crusader III
Related lists
List of fighter aircraft
List of military aircraft of the United States
List of military electronics of the United States
References:
Notes:
Citations:
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Davies, Peter E. USAF F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1972-73 (Osprey Combat Aircraft #55). |
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Swanborough, Gordon and Peter Bowers. United States Military Aircraft Since 1909. Washington, District of Columbia: Smithsonian, 1989. ISBN 0-87474-880-1.
Swanborough, Gordon and Peter Bowers. United States Navy Aircraft since 1911. London: Putnam, 1976. ISBN 0-370-10054-9.
Taylor, Michael J.H. Jane's American Fighting Aircraft of the 20th century. New York: Mallard Press, 1991. ISBN 0-7924-5627-0.
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Wilson, Stewart. Phantom, Hornet and Skyhawk in Australian Service. Weston Creek, ACT, Australia: Aerospace Publications, 1993. ISBN 1-875671-03-X.
External links:
F-4 Phantom II history page on Boeing.com
F-4 Phantom II Society site
PhantomF4K.org – Fleet Air Arm – Royal Navy site
F-4.nl site
Countering Israeli Reaction to F-4 Sales to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Archived 20 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine
8th Tactical Fighter Wing site
F-4 Phantom II articles and publications, theaviationindex.com
The Phantom page with images on fas.org
""'Silver Lobos' fly into retirement", af.mil". 22 December 2004. Archived from the original on 12 February 2020. Retrieved 23 December 2004.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
"The Phantom Turns 50" article at Fence Check site
F-4 Phantom page on Aerospaceweb.org
RAF Phantom Losses
The Phantom Zone
A film clip of McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II is available for viewing at the Internet Archive
Phantom 50th Anniversary Slideshow |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fabian strategy | Rome versus Carthage: The Second Punic War: This strategy derives its name from Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, the dictator of the Roman Republic given the task of defeating the great Carthaginian general Hannibal in southern Italy during the Second Punic War (218–201 BC). At the start of the war, Hannibal boldly crossed the Alps and invaded Italy. Due to his skill as a general, Hannibal repeatedly inflicted devastating losses on the Romans—quickly achieving two crushing victories over Roman armies at Trebia in 218 BC and Lake Trasimene in 217 BC. After these disasters, the Romans gave full authority to Fabius Maximus as dictator. Fabius initiated a war of attrition, fought through constant skirmishes, limiting the ability of the Carthaginians to forage for food and denying them significant victories.
Hannibal was handicapped by two weaknesses. First, he was commander of an invading foreign army (on Italian soil), and was effectively cut off from his home country in North Africa by difficulty of seaborne resupply over the Mediterranean Sea. As long as Rome's allies remained loyal, there was little he could do to win. Hannibal tried to convince the allies of Rome that it was more beneficial for them to side with Carthage (through a combination of victory and negotiation). Fabius calculated that, in order to defeat Hannibal, he had to avoid engaging him altogether (so as to deprive him of victories). He determined that Hannibal's largely extended supply lines (as well as the cost of maintaining the Carthaginian army in the field) meant that Rome had time on its side.
Fabius avoided battle as a deliberate strategy. He sent out small military units to attack Hannibal's foraging parties while keeping the Roman army in hilly terrain to nullify Carthaginian cavalry superiority. Residents of small villages in the path of the Carthaginians were ordered by Fabius to burn their crops creating scorched earth and take refuge in fortified towns. Fabius used interior lines to ensure that Hannibal could not march directly on Rome without having to first abandon his Mediterranean ports (supply lines). At the same time, Fabius began to inflict constant, small, debilitating defeats on the Carthaginians. This, Fabius had concluded, would wear down the invaders' endurance and discourage Rome's allies from switching sides, without challenging the Carthaginians to major battles. Once the Carthaginians were sufficiently weakened and demoralized by lack of food and supplies, Fabius and his well-fed legions would then fight a decisive battle in the hope of crushing the Carthaginians once and for all.
Hannibal's second weakness was that much of his army was made up of Spanish mercenaries and Gaulish allies. Their loyalty to Hannibal was shallow; though they disliked Rome, they mainly desired quick battles and raids for plunder. They were unsuited for long sieges, and possessed neither the equipment nor the patience for such tactics. The tedium of countless small-skirmish defeats sapped their morale, and they began to desert.
With no main Roman army to attack, Hannibal's army became virtually no threat to Rome, which was a walled city that required a long siege to take. Fabius's strategy struck at the heart of Hannibal's weakness. Time, not major battles, would cripple Hannibal.
Political opposition: Fabius's strategy, though a military success and tolerable to wiser minds in the Roman Senate, was unpopular; the Romans had been long accustomed to facing and besting their enemies directly on the field of battle. The Fabian strategy was, in part, ruined because of a lack of unity in the command of the Roman army. The magister equitum, Marcus Minucius Rufus, a political enemy of Fabius, famously exclaiming:
Are we come here to see our allies butchered, and their property burned, as a spectacle to be enjoyed? And if we are not moved with shame on account of any others, are we not on account of these citizens... which now not the neighboring Samnite wastes with fire, but a Carthaginian foreigner, who has advanced even this far from the remotest limits of the world, through our dilatoriness and inactivity?
As the memory of the shock of Hannibal's victories grew dimmer, the Roman populace gradually started to question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy, the very thing which had given them time to recover. It was especially frustrating to the mass of the people, who were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war. Moreover, it was widely believed that if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, the allies, believing that Rome was incapable of protecting them, might defect to the Carthaginians.
Since Fabius won no large-scale victories, the Senate removed him from command in 216 BC. Their chosen replacement, Gaius Terentius Varro, led the Roman army into a debacle at the Battle of Cannae. The Romans, after experiencing this catastrophic defeat and losing countless other battles, had by this point learned their lesson. They utilized the strategies that Fabius had taught them, which, they finally realized, were the only feasible means of driving Hannibal from Italy.
This strategy of attrition earned Fabius the cognomen "Cunctator" (The Delayer).
Later examples: During Antony's Atropatene campaign, the Parthians first destroyed the isolated baggage train and siege engines of the invaders. As Antony proceeded to lay siege on the Atropatenian capital, they began harassing the besiegers, forcing them to retreat.
During the Hanzhong Campaign in 219 AD, one year before the fall of ancient China's Han Dynasty, the warlord Liu Xuande and his strategist Fa Xiaozhi utilized a Fabian strategy to target and capture strategic locations from the forces of the rival warlord Cao Mengde. One of these attacks would result in the death of one of Mengde's top generals, Xiahou Miaocai.
During the Roman campaign against Persia prosecuted by Julian in 363 AD, the main Persian army under Shapur II let the numerically superior Romans advance deep into their territory, avoiding a full-scale battle at the expense of the destruction of their fortresses. As the fortified Persian capital seemed impregnable, Julian was lured into Persia's interior, where the Persians employed scorched earth tactics. Shapur II's army appeared later and engaged in continuous skirmishes only after the starving Romans were in retreat, resulting in a disastrous Roman defeat.
It is the strategy used by King Robert the Bruce in combination with scorched earth in the First War of Scottish Independence against the English after the disastrous defeats at the Battle of Dunbar, Battle of Falkirk and Battle of Methven. Eventually King Robert was able to regain the entire kingdom of Scotland which had been conquered by the English.
The strategy was used by the medieval French general Bertrand du Guesclin during the Hundred Years' War against the English following a series of disastrous defeats in pitched battles against Edward, the Black Prince. Eventually du Guesclin was able to recover most of the territory that had been lost.
The most noted use of Fabian strategy in American history was by George Washington, sometimes called the "American Fabius" for his use of the strategy during the first year of the American Revolutionary War. While Washington had initially pushed for traditional direct engagements using battle lines, he was convinced of the merits of using his army to harass the British rather than engage them, both by the urging of his generals in his councils of war, and by the pitched-battle disasters of 1776, especially the Battle of Long Island. In addition, given his background as a colonial officer who had participated in asymmetric campaigns against Native Americans, Washington predicted that this style would aid in defeating the traditional tactics of the British Army. John Adams' dissatisfaction with Washington's conduct of the war led him to declare, "I am sick of Fabian systems in all quarters."
Throughout history, the Fabian strategy has been employed all over the world. Used against Napoleon's Grande Armée in combination with scorched earth and guerrilla war, it proved decisive in defeating the French invasion of Russia. Sam Houston effectively employed a Fabian defense in the aftermath of the Battle of the Alamo, using delaying tactics and small-unit harrying against Santa Anna's much larger force, to give time for the Army of Texas to grow into a viable fighting force. When he finally met Santa Anna at San Jacinto, the resulting victory ensured the establishment of the Republic of Texas. During the First World War in German East Africa, Generals Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and Jan Smuts both used the Fabian strategy in their campaigns.
During the First Indochina War, the Viet Minh used the strategy by utilizing delaying and hit-and-run tactics and scorched-earth strategy against the better-equipped French forces, which prolonged the war and caused both the French high command and home front to grow weary of the fighting, ending with the decisive Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu. The Viet Cong and the PAVN would later use this strategy against the Americans and ARVN forces during the Vietnam War.
There are some indications that the Ukraine strategy in the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a war of attrition.
Fabian socialism: Fabian socialism, the ideology of the Fabian Society (founded in 1884), significantly influenced the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. It utilizes the same strategy of a "war of attrition" to facilitate the society's aim to bring about a socialist state. The advocation of gradualism distinguished this brand of socialism from those who favor revolutionary action.
See also: Attrition warfare
Battle of annihilation
Fleet in being
Guerrilla warfare
U.S. Army Strategist
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fifth column | History:
Origin: The term "fifth column" originated in Spain (originally quinta columna) during the early phase of the Spanish Civil War. It gained popularity in the Loyalist faction media in early October 1936 and immediately started to spread abroad.
The exact origins of the term are not clear. Its first known appearance is in a secret telegram dated 30 September 1936, that was sent to Berlin by the German chargé d'affaires in Alicante, Hans Hermann Völckers. In the telegram, he referred to an unidentified "supposed statement by Franco" that "is being circulated" (apparently in the Republican zone or in the Republican-held Levantine zone). This "supposed statement" held that Franco had claimed that there were four Nationalist columns approaching Madrid, and a fifth column waiting to attack from the inside. The telegram was part of the secret German diplomatic correspondence and was discovered long after the civil war.
The first identified public use of the term is in the 3 October 1936 issue of the Madrid Communist daily Mundo Obrero. In a front-page article, the party propagandist Dolores Ibárruri referred to a statement very similar (or identical) to the one that Völckers had referred to in his telegram, but attributed it to General Emilio Mola rather than to Franco. On the same day, the PCE activist Domingo Girón made a similar claim during a public rally. During the next few days, various Republican papers repeated the story, but with differing detail; some attributed the phrase to General Queipo de Llano, while later some Soviet propagandists would claim it was coined by general Varela. By mid-October, the media was already warning of the "famous fifth column".
Historians have never identified the original statement referred to by Völckers, Ibárruri, Girón, de Jong, and others. The transcripts of Francisco Franco's, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano's, and Emilio Mola's radio addresses have been published, but they do not contain the term, and no other original statement containing this phrase has ever surfaced. Australian journalist Noel Monks, who took part in Mola's press conference on 28 October 1936, claimed that Mola referred to quinta columna on that day, but by that time the term had already been in use in the Republican press for more than three weeks.
Historiographic works offer differing perspectives on authorship of the term. Many scholars have no doubt about Mola's role and refer to "fifth column" as "a term coined in 1936 by General Emilio Mola", though they acknowledge that his exact statement cannot be verified. In some sources, Mola is named as a person who had used the term during an impromptu press interview, and different—though detailed—versions of the exchange are offered. Probably the most popular version describes the theory of Mola's authorship with a grade of doubt, either noting that it is presumed but has never been proven, or that the phrase "is attributed" to Mola, who "apparently claimed" so, or else noting that "la famosa quinta columna a la que parece que se había referido el general Mola" (the famous fifth column that General Mola seems to have referred to) Some authors consider it possible if not likely that the term has been invented by the Communist propaganda with the purpose of either raising morale or providing justification for terror and repression; initially it might have been part of the whispering campaign, but was later openly floated by Communist propagandists. There are also other theories afloat.
Some writers, mindful of the origin of the phrase, use it only in reference to military operations rather than the broader and less well-defined range of activities that sympathizers might engage in to support an anticipated attack.
Second World War: By the late 1930s, as American involvement in the war in Europe became more likely, the term "fifth column" was commonly used to warn of potential sedition and disloyalty within the borders of the United States. The fear of betrayal was heightened by the rapid fall of France in 1940, which some blamed on internal weakness and a pro-German "fifth column". A series of photos run in the June 1940 issue of Life magazine warned of "signs of Nazi Fifth Column Everywhere". In a speech to the House of Commons that same month, Winston Churchill reassured MPs that "Parliament has given us the powers to put down Fifth Column activities with a strong hand." In July 1940, Time magazine referred to talk of a fifth column as a "national phenomenon".
In August 1940, The New York Times mentioned "the first spasm of fear engendered by the success of fifth columns in less fortunate countries". One report identified participants in Nazi "fifth columns" as "partisans of authoritarian government everywhere", citing Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, and the Netherlands. During the Nazi invasion of Norway, the head of the Norwegian fascist party, Vidkun Quisling, proclaimed the formation of a new fascist government in control of Norway, with himself as Prime Minister, by the end of the first day of fighting. The word "quisling" soon became a byword for "collaborator" or "traitor".
The New York Times on 11 August 1940, featured three editorial cartoons using the term. John Langdon-Davies, a British journalist who covered the Spanish Civil War, wrote an account called The Fifth Column which was published the same year. In November 1940, Ralph Thomson, reviewing Harold Lavine's Fifth Column in America, a study of Communist and fascist groups in the US, in The New York Times, questioned his choice of that title: "the phrase has been worked so hard that it no longer means much of anything".
Immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, US Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox issued a statement that "the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the exception of Norway". In a column published in The Washington Post, dated 12 February 1942, the columnist Walter Lippmann wrote of imminent danger from actions that might be taken by Japanese Americans. Titled "The Fifth Column on the Coast", he wrote of possible attacks that could be made along the West Coast of the United States that would amplify damage inflicted by a potential attack by Japanese naval and air forces. Suspicion about an active fifth column on the coast led eventually to the internment of Japanese Americans.
During the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, an article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette in December 1941 said the indigenous Moro Muslims were "capable of dealing with Japanese fifth columnists and invaders alike". Another in the Vancouver Sun the following month alleged that the large population of Japanese immigrants in Davao in the Philippines welcomed the invasion: "the first assault on Davao was aided by numbers of Fifth Columnists–residents of the town". However, postwar analysis of both Japanese and American military records, including the interrogation of surviving Japanese officers, fail to support the claims of a Japanese fifth column existing in the Philippines prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
Later usage: German minority organizations in Czechoslovakia formed the Sudeten German Free Corps, which aided Nazi Germany. Some claimed they were "self-defense formations" created in the aftermath of World War I and unrelated to the German invasion two decades later. More often their origins were discounted and they were defined by the role they played in 1938–39: "The same pattern was repeated in Czechoslovakia. Henlein's Free Corps played in that country the part of fifth column".
In 1945, a document produced by the US Department of State compared the earlier efforts of Nazi Germany to mobilize the support of sympathizers in foreign nations to the superior efforts of the international communist movement at the end of World War II: "a communist party was in fact a fifth column as much as any [German] Bund group, except that the latter were crude and ineffective in comparison with the Communists". Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., wrote in 1949: "the special Soviet advantage—the warhead—lies in the fifth column; and the fifth column is based on the local Communist parties".
In 1979, Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, orchestrated a purge of political dissidents within the Ba'ath Party. Hussein claimed that he had uncovered a fifth column within the organization and ordered Muhyi Abdul-Hussein Mashhadi to confess his alleged involvement and that of 68 other politicians, who were promptly arrested. Twenty-two of the arrested, including Mashhadi, were executed.
Zainichi Koreans living in Japan, particularly those affiliated with the organization Chongryun (which is itself affiliated with the government of North Korea) are sometimes seen as a "fifth column" by some Japanese, and have been the victims of verbal and physical attacks. These have occurred more frequently since the government of Kim Jong Il acknowledged it had abducted Japanese citizens from Japan and tested ballistic missiles near the waters of and over mainland Japan.
A significant number of Israeli Arabs, who compose approximately 20% of Israel's population, identify more with the Palestinian cause than with the State of Israel or Zionism. As a result, many Israeli Jews, including politicians, rabbis, journalists, and historians, view them (and/or the main Israeli Arab political group, the Joint List) as a fifth column. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fifth column | Twenty-two of the arrested, including Mashhadi, were executed.
Zainichi Koreans living in Japan, particularly those affiliated with the organization Chongryun (which is itself affiliated with the government of North Korea) are sometimes seen as a "fifth column" by some Japanese, and have been the victims of verbal and physical attacks. These have occurred more frequently since the government of Kim Jong Il acknowledged it had abducted Japanese citizens from Japan and tested ballistic missiles near the waters of and over mainland Japan.
A significant number of Israeli Arabs, who compose approximately 20% of Israel's population, identify more with the Palestinian cause than with the State of Israel or Zionism. As a result, many Israeli Jews, including politicians, rabbis, journalists, and historians, view them (and/or the main Israeli Arab political group, the Joint List) as a fifth column.
Counter-jihad literature has sometimes portrayed Western Muslims as a "fifth column", collectively seeking to destabilize Western nations' identity and values for the benefit of an international Islamic movement intent on the establishment of a caliphate in Western countries. Following the 2015 attack by French-born Muslims on the offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the leader of the UK Independence Party Nigel Farage said that Europe had "a fifth column living within our own countries". In 2001, Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn talked about Muslim immigrants being a "fifth column", on the night he was dismissed as leader of Liveable Netherlands.
In 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin called Russian citizens who are against the Russian invasion of Ukraine as fifth columnists and "national traitors".
Members of the American and European far-right have been widely described as fifth columnists in light of Russian interference in the 2016 United States presidential election and presidency of Donald Trump and leading up to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. American conservative journalist Tucker Carlson, in particular, has faced allegations of fifth columnist behavior, especially after he decided to visit Russia and interview Vladimir Putin.
In 2024, following claims that taxpayer funds were improperly given to the UNRWA due to family interests in Gaza during the Israel–Hamas war, Humza Yousaf, the First Minister of Scotland, revealed that he had been subjected to "smears" throughout his political life including allegations he was a "fifth columnist" because of his faith and race.
In popular culture: The title of Ernest Hemingway's only play "The Fifth Column" (1938) is a translation of General Mola's phrase la quinta columna In early 1937, Hemingway had been in Madrid, reporting the war from the loyalist side, and helping make the film The Spanish Earth. He returned to the US to publicize the film and wrote the play, in the Hotel Florida in Madrid, on his next visit to Spain later that year.
In the US, an Australian radio play, The Enemy Within, proved to be very popular, though this popularity was due to the belief that the stories of fifth column activities were based on real events. In December 1940, the Australian censors had the series banned.
British reviewers of Agatha Christie's 1941 novel N or M? used the term to describe the plot's depiction of two British turncoats working on behalf the German government in Britain during World War II.
In Frank Capra's film Meet John Doe (1941), newspaper editor Henry Connell warns the politically naïve protagonist, John Doe, about a businessman's plans to promote his own political ambitions using the apolitical John Doe Clubs. Connell says to John: "Listen, pal, this fifth-column stuff is pretty rotten, isn't it?", identifying the businessman with anti-democratic interests in the United States. When Doe agrees, he adds: "And you'd feel like an awful sucker if you found yourself marching right in the middle of it, wouldn't you?"
Alfred Hitchcock's Saboteur (1942) features Robert Cummings asking for help against "fifth columnists" conspiring to sabotage the American war effort. The film was also released under the name Fifth Column in Dutch (Die van de 5de kolom), Finnish (Viidennen kolonnan mies) and French (Cinquième colonne). Soon the term was being used in popular entertainment.
Several World War II–era animated shorts include the term. Cartoons of Porky Pig asked any "fifth columnists" in the audience to leave the theater immediately. In Looney Tunes' Foney Fables, the narrator of a comic fairy tale described a wolf in sheep's clothing as a "fifth columnist". There was a Merrie Melodies cartoon released in 1943 titled The Fifth-Column Mouse. Comic books also contained references to the fifth column.
Graham Greene, in The Quiet American (1955), uses the phrase "Fifth Column, Third Force, Seventh Day" in the second chapter.
In the 1959 British action film Operation Amsterdam, the term "fifth columnists" is used repeatedly to refer to Nazi-sympathizing members of the Dutch Army.
The V franchise is a set of TV shows, novels and comics about an alien invasion of Earth. A group of aliens opposed to the invasion and assist the human Resistance Movement is called The Fifth Column.
In the episode "Flight Into the Future" from the 1960s TV show Lost In Space, Dr. Smith is referred to as the fifth columnist of the Jupiter 2 expedition. In the first episode, he was a secret agent sent to sabotage the mission who got caught on board at liftoff.
There is an American weekly news podcast called "The Fifth Column", hosted by Kmele Foster, Matt Welch, Michael C. Moynihan, and Anthony Fisher.
Robert A. Heinlein's 1941 story "The Day After Tomorrow", originally titled "Sixth Column", refers to a fictional fifth column that
destroyed the European democracies from within in the tragic days that led up to the final blackout of European civilization. But this would not be a fifth column of traitors, but a sixth column of patriots whose privilege it would be to destroy the morale of invaders, make them afraid, unsure of themselves.
In Foyle's War, series 2 episode 3, "War Games", one line reads: "It's the Second salvage collection I've missed, they've got me down as a fifth columnist."
In Fallout: London, a total conversion mod for the 2015 Bethesda Softworks action role-playing game Fallout 4, there is a populist faction known as the "5th Column" whose declared aim is to tear down the existing government and rebuild it. Their propaganda style and black uniforms are a likely reference to the British Union of Fascists, which was founded in 1932 by Sir Oswald Mosley and banned by the British government in 1940 after the start of World War II amid suspicion that its supporters might form a pro- Nazi "fifth column".
See also:
Notes:
References:
Further reading:
Mylonas, Harris; Radnitz, Scott (2022). Enemies Within: The Global Politics of Fifth Columns. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-762794-5.
The German Fifth Column in Poland. London: Polish Ministry of Info. 1941.
Bilek, Bohumil (1945). Fifth Column at Work. London: Trinity.
Loeffel, Robert (2015). The Fifth Column in World War II: Suspected Subversives in the Pacific War and Australia. Palgrave.
Britt G. The Fifth column is Here / George Britt. New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1940
Lavine H. Fifth column in America / Harold Lavine (1915-). New York: Doubleday, Doran, Incorporated, 1940 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | History: Since World War I, achieving and maintaining air superiority has been considered essential for victory in conventional warfare.
Fighters continued to be developed throughout World War I, to deny enemy aircraft and dirigibles the ability to gather information by reconnaissance over the battlefield. Early fighters were very small and lightly armed by later standards, and most were biplanes built with a wooden frame covered with fabric, and a maximum airspeed of about 100 mph (160 km/h). As control of the airspace over armies became increasingly important, all of the major powers developed fighters to support their military operations. Between the wars, wood was largely replaced in part or whole by metal tubing, and finally aluminum stressed skin structures (monocoque) began to predominate.
By World War II, most fighters were all-metal monoplanes armed with batteries of machine guns or cannons and some were capable of speeds approaching 400 mph (640 km/h). Most fighters up to this point had one engine, but a number of twin-engine fighters were built; however they were found to be outmatched against single-engine fighters and were relegated to other tasks, such as night fighters equipped with radar sets.
By the end of the war, turbojet engines were replacing piston engines as the means of propulsion, further increasing aircraft speed. Since the weight of the turbojet engine was far less than a piston engine, having two engines was no longer a handicap and one or two were used, depending on requirements. This in turn required the development of ejection seats so the pilot could escape, and G-suits to counter the much greater forces being applied to the pilot during maneuvers.
In the 1950s, radar was fitted to day fighters, since due to ever increasing air-to-air weapon ranges, pilots could no longer see far enough ahead to prepare for the opposition. Subsequently, radar capabilities grew enormously and are now the primary method of target acquisition. Wings were made thinner and swept back to reduce transonic drag, which required new manufacturing methods to obtain sufficient strength. Skins were no longer sheet metal riveted to a structure, but milled from large slabs of alloy. The sound barrier was broken, and after a few false starts due to required changes in controls, speeds quickly reached Mach 2, past which aircraft cannot maneuver sufficiently to avoid attack.
Air-to-air missiles largely replaced guns and rockets in the early 1960s since both were believed unusable at the speeds being attained, however the Vietnam War showed that guns still had a role to play, and most fighters built since then are fitted with cannon (typically between 20 and 30 mm (0.79 and 1.18 in) in caliber) in addition to missiles. Most modern combat aircraft can carry at least a pair of air-to-air missiles.
In the 1970s, turbofans replaced turbojets, improving fuel economy enough that the last piston engine support aircraft could be replaced with jets, making multi-role combat aircraft possible. Honeycomb structures began to replace milled structures, and the first composite components began to appear on components subjected to little stress.
With the steady improvements in computers, defensive systems have become increasingly efficient. To counter this, stealth technologies have been pursued by the United States, Russia, India and China. The first step was to find ways to reduce the aircraft's reflectivity to radar waves by burying the engines, eliminating sharp corners and diverting any reflections away from the radar sets of opposing forces. Various materials were found to absorb the energy from radar waves, and were incorporated into special finishes that have since found widespread application. Composite structures have become widespread, including major structural components, and have helped to counterbalance the steady increases in aircraft weight—most modern fighters are larger and heavier than World War II medium bombers.
Because of the importance of air superiority, since the early days of aerial combat armed forces have constantly competed to develop technologically superior fighters and to deploy these fighters in greater numbers, and fielding a viable fighter fleet consumes a substantial proportion of the defense budgets of modern armed forces.
The global combat aircraft market was worth $45.75 billion in 2017 and is projected by Frost & Sullivan at $47.2 billion in 2026: 35% modernization programs and 65% aircraft purchases, dominated by the Lockheed Martin F-35 with 3,000 deliveries over 20 years.
Classification: A fighter aircraft is primarily designed for air-to-air combat. A given type may be designed for specific combat conditions, and in some cases for additional roles such as air-to-ground fighting. Historically the British Royal Flying Corps and Royal Air Force referred to them as "scouts" until the early 1920s, while the U.S. Army called them "pursuit" aircraft until the late 1940s (using the designation P, as in Curtiss P-40 Warhawk, Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and Bell P-63 Kingcobra). The UK changed to calling them fighters in the 1920s, while the US Army did so in the 1940s. A short-range fighter designed to defend against incoming enemy aircraft is known as an interceptor.
Recognized classes of fighter include:
Air superiority fighter
Fighter-bomber
Heavy fighter
Interceptor
Light fighter
All-weather fighter (including the night fighter)
Reconnaissance fighter
Strategic fighter (including the escort fighter and strike fighter)
Of these, the Fighter-bomber, reconnaissance fighter and strike fighter classes are dual-role, possessing qualities of the fighter alongside some other battlefield role. Some fighter designs may be developed in variants performing other roles entirely, such as ground attack or unarmed reconnaissance. This may be for political or national security reasons, for advertising purposes, or other reasons.
The Sopwith Camel and other "fighting scouts" of World War I performed a great deal of ground-attack work. In World War II, the USAAF and RAF often favored fighters over dedicated light bombers or dive bombers, and types such as the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and Hawker Hurricane that were no longer competitive as aerial combat fighters were relegated to ground attack. Several aircraft, such as the F-111 and F-117, have received fighter designations though they had no fighter capability due to political or other reasons. The F-111B variant was originally intended for a fighter role with the U.S. Navy, but it was canceled. This blurring follows the use of fighters from their earliest days for "attack" or "strike" operations against ground targets by means of strafing or dropping small bombs and incendiaries. Versatile multi role fighter-bombers such as the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet are a less expensive option than having a range of specialized aircraft types.
Some of the most expensive fighters such as the US Grumman F-14 Tomcat, McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and Russian Sukhoi Su-27 were employed as all-weather interceptors as well as air superiority fighter aircraft, while commonly developing air-to-ground roles late in their careers. An interceptor is generally an aircraft intended to target (or intercept) bombers and so often trades maneuverability for climb rate.
As a part of military nomenclature, a letter is often assigned to various types of aircraft to indicate their use, along with a number to indicate the specific aircraft. The letters used to designate a fighter differ in various countries. In the English-speaking world, "F" is often now used to indicate a fighter (e.g. Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II or Supermarine Spitfire F.22), though "P" used to be used in the US for pursuit (e.g. Curtiss P-40 Warhawk), a translation of the French "C" (Dewoitine D.520 C.1) for Chasseur while in Russia "I" was used for Istrebitel, or exterminator (Polikarpov I-16).
Air superiority fighter: As fighter types have proliferated, the air superiority fighter emerged as a specific role at the pinnacle of speed, maneuverability, and air-to-air weapon systems – able to hold its own against all other fighters and establish its dominance in the skies above the battlefield.
Interceptor: The interceptor is a fighter designed specifically to intercept and engage approaching enemy aircraft. There are two general classes of interceptor: relatively lightweight aircraft in the point-defence role, built for fast reaction, high performance and with a short range, and heavier aircraft with more comprehensive avionics and designed to fly at night or in all weathers and to operate over longer ranges. Originating during World War I, by 1929 this class of fighters had become known as the interceptor.
Night and all-weather fighters: The equipment necessary for daytime flight is inadequate when flying at night or in poor visibility. The night fighter was developed during World War I with additional equipment to aid the pilot in flying straight, navigating and finding the target. From modified variants of the Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.2c in 1915, the night fighter has evolved into the highly capable all-weather fighter.
Strategic fighters: The strategic fighter is a fast, heavily armed and long-range type, able to act as an escort fighter protecting bombers, to carry out offensive sorties of its own as a penetration fighter and maintain standing patrols at significant distance from its home base.
Bombers are vulnerable due to their low speed, large size and poor maneuvrability. The escort fighter was developed during World War II to come between the bombers and enemy attackers as a protective shield. The primary requirement was for long range, with several heavy fighters given the role. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | Night and all-weather fighters: The equipment necessary for daytime flight is inadequate when flying at night or in poor visibility. The night fighter was developed during World War I with additional equipment to aid the pilot in flying straight, navigating and finding the target. From modified variants of the Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.2c in 1915, the night fighter has evolved into the highly capable all-weather fighter.
Strategic fighters: The strategic fighter is a fast, heavily armed and long-range type, able to act as an escort fighter protecting bombers, to carry out offensive sorties of its own as a penetration fighter and maintain standing patrols at significant distance from its home base.
Bombers are vulnerable due to their low speed, large size and poor maneuvrability. The escort fighter was developed during World War II to come between the bombers and enemy attackers as a protective shield. The primary requirement was for long range, with several heavy fighters given the role. However they too proved unwieldy and vulnerable, so as the war progressed techniques such as drop tanks were developed to extend the range of more nimble conventional fighters.
The penetration fighter is typically also fitted for the ground-attack role, and so is able to defend itself while conducting attack sorties.
Piston engine fighters:
1914–1918: World War I: The word "fighter" was first used to describe a two-seat aircraft carrying a machine gun (mounted on a pedestal) and its operator as well as the pilot. Although the term was coined in the United Kingdom, the first examples were the French Voisin pushers beginning in 1910, and a Voisin III would be the first to shoot down another aircraft, on 5 October 1914.
However at the outbreak of World War I, front-line aircraft were mostly unarmed and used almost exclusively for reconnaissance. On 15 August 1914, Miodrag Tomić encountered an enemy airplane while on a reconnaissance flight over Austria-Hungary which fired at his aircraft with a revolver, so Tomić fired back. It was believed to be the first exchange of fire between aircraft. Within weeks, all Serbian and Austro-Hungarian aircraft were armed.
Another type of military aircraft formed the basis for an effective "fighter" in the modern sense of the word. It was based on small fast aircraft developed before the war for air racing such with the Gordon Bennett Cup and Schneider Trophy. The military scout airplane was not expected to carry serious armament, but rather to rely on speed to "scout" a location, and return quickly to report, making it a flying horse. British scout aircraft, in this sense, included the Sopwith Tabloid and Bristol Scout. The French and the Germans didn't have an equivalent as they used two seaters for reconnaissance, such as the Morane-Saulnier L, but would later modify pre-war racing aircraft into armed single seaters. It was quickly found that these were of little use since the pilot couldn't record what he saw while also flying, while military leaders usually ignored what the pilots reported.
Attempts were made with handheld weapons such as pistols and rifles and even light machine guns, but these were ineffective and cumbersome. The next advance came with the fixed forward-firing machine gun, so that the pilot pointed the entire aircraft at the target and fired the gun, instead of relying on a second gunner. Roland Garros bolted metal deflector plates to the propeller so that it would not shoot itself out of the sky and a number of Morane-Saulnier Ns were modified. The technique proved effective, however the deflected bullets were still highly dangerous.
Soon after the commencement of the war, pilots armed themselves with pistols, carbines, grenades, and an assortment of improvised weapons. Many of these proved ineffective as the pilot had to fly his airplane while attempting to aim a handheld weapon and make a difficult deflection shot. The first step in finding a real solution was to mount the weapon on the aircraft, but the propeller remained a problem since the best direction to shoot is straight ahead. Numerous solutions were tried. A second crew member behind the pilot could aim and fire a swivel-mounted machine gun at enemy airplanes; however, this limited the area of coverage chiefly to the rear hemisphere, and effective coordination of the pilot's maneuvering with the gunner's aiming was difficult. This option was chiefly employed as a defensive measure on two-seater reconnaissance aircraft from 1915 on. Both the SPAD S.A and the Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.9 added a second crewman ahead of the engine in a pod but this was both hazardous to the second crewman and limited performance. The Sopwith L.R.T.Tr. similarly added a pod on the top wing with no better luck.
An alternative was to build a "pusher" scout such as the Airco DH.2, with the propeller mounted behind the pilot. The main drawback was that the high drag of a pusher type's tail structure made it slower than a similar "tractor" aircraft.
A better solution for a single seat scout was to mount the machine gun (rifles and pistols having been dispensed with) to fire forwards but outside the propeller arc. Wing guns were tried but the unreliable weapons available required frequent clearing of jammed rounds and misfires and remained impractical until after the war. Mounting the machine gun over the top wing worked well and was used long after the ideal solution was found. The Nieuport 11 of 1916 used this system with considerable success, however, this placement made aiming and reloading difficult but would continue to be used throughout the war as the weapons used were lighter and had a higher rate of fire than synchronized weapons. The British Foster mounting and several French mountings were specifically designed for this kind of application, fitted with either the Hotchkiss or Lewis Machine gun, which due to their design were unsuitable for synchronizing. The need to arm a tractor scout with a forward-firing gun whose bullets passed through the propeller arc was evident even before the outbreak of war and inventors in both France and Germany devised mechanisms that could time the firing of the individual rounds to avoid hitting the propeller blades. Franz Schneider, a Swiss engineer, had patented such a device in Germany in 1913, but his original work was not followed up. French aircraft designer Raymond Saulnier patented a practical device in April 1914, but trials were unsuccessful because of the propensity of the machine gun employed to hang fire due to unreliable ammunition. In December 1914, French aviator Roland Garros asked Saulnier to install his synchronization gear on Garros' Morane-Saulnier Type L parasol monoplane. Unfortunately the gas-operated Hotchkiss machine gun he was provided had an erratic rate of fire and it was impossible to synchronize it with the propeller. As an interim measure, the propeller blades were fitted with metal wedges to protect them from ricochets. Garros' modified monoplane first flew in March 1915 and he began combat operations soon after. Garros scored three victories in three weeks before he himself was downed on 18 April and his airplane, along with its synchronization gear and propeller was captured by the Germans. Meanwhile, the synchronization gear (called the Stangensteuerung in German, for "pushrod control system") devised by the engineers of Anthony Fokker's firm was the first system to enter service. It would usher in what the British called the "Fokker scourge" and a period of air superiority for the German forces, making the Fokker Eindecker monoplane a feared name over the Western Front, despite its being an adaptation of an obsolete pre-war French Morane-Saulnier racing airplane, with poor flight characteristics and a by now mediocre performance. The first Eindecker victory came on 1 July 1915, when Leutnant Kurt Wintgens, of Feldflieger Abteilung 6 on the Western Front, downed a Morane-Saulnier Type L. His was one of five Fokker M.5K/MG prototypes for the Eindecker, and was armed with a synchronized aviation version of the Parabellum MG14 machine gun. The success of the Eindecker kicked off a competitive cycle of improvement among the combatants, both sides striving to build ever more capable single-seat fighters. The Albatros D.I and Sopwith Pup of 1916 set the classic pattern followed by fighters for about twenty years. Most were biplanes and only rarely monoplanes or triplanes. The strong box structure of the biplane provided a rigid wing that allowed the accurate control essential for dogfighting. They had a single operator, who flew the aircraft and also controlled its armament. They were armed with one or two Maxim or Vickers machine guns, which were easier to synchronize than other types, firing through the propeller arc. Gun breeches were in front of the pilot, with obvious implications in case of accidents, but jams could be cleared in flight, while aiming was simplified. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The success of the Eindecker kicked off a competitive cycle of improvement among the combatants, both sides striving to build ever more capable single-seat fighters. The Albatros D.I and Sopwith Pup of 1916 set the classic pattern followed by fighters for about twenty years. Most were biplanes and only rarely monoplanes or triplanes. The strong box structure of the biplane provided a rigid wing that allowed the accurate control essential for dogfighting. They had a single operator, who flew the aircraft and also controlled its armament. They were armed with one or two Maxim or Vickers machine guns, which were easier to synchronize than other types, firing through the propeller arc. Gun breeches were in front of the pilot, with obvious implications in case of accidents, but jams could be cleared in flight, while aiming was simplified.
The use of metal aircraft structures was pioneered before World War I by Breguet but would find its biggest proponent in Anthony Fokker, who used chrome-molybdenum steel tubing for the fuselage structure of all his fighter designs, while the innovative German engineer Hugo Junkers developed two all-metal, single-seat fighter monoplane designs with cantilever wings: the strictly experimental Junkers J 2 private-venture aircraft, made with steel, and some forty examples of the Junkers D.I, made with corrugated duralumin, all based on his experience in creating the pioneering Junkers J 1 all-metal airframe technology demonstration aircraft of late 1915. While Fokker would pursue steel tube fuselages with wooden wings until the late 1930s, and Junkers would focus on corrugated sheet metal, Dornier was the first to build a fighter (the Dornier-Zeppelin D.I) made with pre-stressed sheet aluminum and having cantilevered wings, a form that would replace all others in the 1930s. As collective combat experience grew, the more successful pilots such as Oswald Boelcke, Max Immelmann, and Edward Mannock developed innovative tactical formations and maneuvers to enhance their air units' combat effectiveness.
Allied and – before 1918 – German pilots of World War I were not equipped with parachutes, so in-flight fires or structural failures were often fatal. Parachutes were well-developed by 1918 having previously been used by balloonists, and were adopted by the German flying services during the course of that year. The well known and feared Manfred von Richthofen, the "Red Baron", was wearing one when he was killed, but the allied command continued to oppose their use on various grounds.
In April 1917, during a brief period of German aerial supremacy a British pilot's average life expectancy was calculated to average 93 flying hours, or about three weeks of active service. More than 50,000 airmen from both sides died during the war.
1919–1938: Inter-war period: Fighter development stagnated between the wars, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, where budgets were small. In France, Italy and Russia, where large budgets continued to allow major development, both monoplanes and all metal structures were common. By the end of the 1920s, however, those countries overspent themselves and were overtaken in the 1930s by those powers that hadn't been spending heavily, namely the British, the Americans, the Spanish (in the Spanish civil war) and the Germans.
Given limited budgets, air forces were conservative in aircraft design, and biplanes remained popular with pilots for their agility, and remained in service long after they ceased to be competitive. Designs such as the Gloster Gladiator, Fiat CR.42 Falco, and Polikarpov I-15 were common even in the late 1930s, and many were still in service as late as 1942. Up until the mid-1930s, the majority of fighters in the US, the UK, Italy and Russia remained fabric-covered biplanes.
Fighter armament eventually began to be mounted inside the wings, outside the arc of the propeller, though most designs retained two synchronized machine guns directly ahead of the pilot, where they were more accurate (that being the strongest part of the structure, reducing the vibration to which the guns were subjected). Shooting with this traditional arrangement was also easier because the guns shot directly ahead in the direction of the aircraft's flight, up to the limit of the guns range; unlike wing-mounted guns which to be effective required to be harmonised, that is, preset to shoot at an angle by ground crews so that their bullets would converge on a target area a set distance ahead of the fighter. Rifle-caliber .30 and .303 in (7.62 and 7.70 mm) calibre guns remained the norm, with larger weapons either being too heavy and cumbersome or deemed unnecessary against such lightly built aircraft. It was not considered unreasonable to use World War I-style armament to counter enemy fighters as there was insufficient air-to-air combat during most of the period to disprove this notion.
The rotary engine, popular during World War I, quickly disappeared, its development having reached the point where rotational forces prevented more fuel and air from being delivered to the cylinders, which limited horsepower. They were replaced chiefly by the stationary radial engine though major advances led to inline engines gaining ground with several exceptional engines—including the 1,145 cu in (18,760 cm3) V-12 Curtiss D-12. Aircraft engines increased in power several-fold over the period, going from a typical 180 hp (130 kW) in the 900 kg (2,000 lb) Fokker D.VII of 1918 to 900 hp (670 kW) in the 2,500 kg (5,500 lb) Curtiss P-36 of 1936. The debate between the sleek in-line engines versus the more reliable radial models continued, with naval air forces preferring the radial engines, and land-based forces often choosing inlines. Radial designs did not require a separate (and vulnerable) radiator, but had increased drag. Inline engines often had a better power-to-weight ratio.
Some air forces experimented with "heavy fighters" (called "destroyers" by the Germans). These were larger, usually twin-engined aircraft, sometimes adaptations of light or medium bomber types. Such designs typically had greater internal fuel capacity (thus longer range) and heavier armament than their single-engine counterparts. In combat, they proved vulnerable to more agile single-engine fighters.
The primary driver of fighter innovation, right up to the period of rapid re-armament in the late 1930s, were not military budgets, but civilian aircraft racing. Aircraft designed for these races introduced innovations like streamlining and more powerful engines that would find their way into the fighters of World War II. The most significant of these was the Schneider Trophy races, where competition grew so fierce, only national governments could afford to enter.
At the very end of the inter-war period in Europe came the Spanish Civil War. This was just the opportunity the German Luftwaffe, Italian Regia Aeronautica, and the Soviet Union's Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily needed to test their latest aircraft. Each party sent numerous aircraft types to support their sides in the conflict. In the dogfights over Spain, the latest Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters did well, as did the Soviet Polikarpov I-16. The later German design was earlier in its design cycle, and had more room for development and the lessons learned led to greatly improved models in World War II. The Russians failed to keep up and despite newer models coming into service, I-16s remaining the most common Soviet front-line fighter into 1942 despite being outclassed by the improved Bf 109s in World War II. For their part, the Italians developed several monoplanes such as the Fiat G.50 Freccia, but being short on funds, were forced to continue operating obsolete Fiat CR.42 Falco biplanes.
From the early 1930s the Japanese were at war against both the Chinese Nationalists and the Russians in China, and used the experience to improve both training and aircraft, replacing biplanes with modern cantilever monoplanes and creating a cadre of exceptional pilots. In the United Kingdom, at the behest of Neville Chamberlain (more famous for his 'peace in our time' speech), the entire British aviation industry was retooled, allowing it to change quickly from fabric covered metal framed biplanes to cantilever stressed skin monoplanes in time for the war with Germany, a process that France attempted to emulate, but too late to counter the German invasion. The period of improving the same biplane design over and over was now coming to an end, and the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire started to supplant the Gloster Gladiator and Hawker Fury biplanes but many biplanes remained in front-line service well past the start of World War II. While not a combatant in Spain, they too absorbed many of the lessons in time to use them.
The Spanish Civil War also provided an opportunity for updating fighter tactics. One of the innovations was the development of the "finger-four" formation by the German pilot Werner Mölders. Each fighter squadron (German: Staffel) was divided into several flights (Schwärme) of four aircraft. Each Schwarm was divided into two Rotten, which was a pair of aircraft. Each Rotte was composed of a leader and a wingman. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The period of improving the same biplane design over and over was now coming to an end, and the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire started to supplant the Gloster Gladiator and Hawker Fury biplanes but many biplanes remained in front-line service well past the start of World War II. While not a combatant in Spain, they too absorbed many of the lessons in time to use them.
The Spanish Civil War also provided an opportunity for updating fighter tactics. One of the innovations was the development of the "finger-four" formation by the German pilot Werner Mölders. Each fighter squadron (German: Staffel) was divided into several flights (Schwärme) of four aircraft. Each Schwarm was divided into two Rotten, which was a pair of aircraft. Each Rotte was composed of a leader and a wingman. This flexible formation allowed the pilots to maintain greater situational awareness, and the two Rotten could split up at any time and attack on their own. The finger-four would be widely adopted as the fundamental tactical formation during World War Two, including by the British and later the Americans.
1939–1945: World War II: World War II featured fighter combat on a larger scale than any other conflict to date. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel noted the effect of airpower: "Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage…" Throughout the war, fighters performed their conventional role in establishing air superiority through combat with other fighters and through bomber interception, and also often performed roles such as tactical air support and reconnaissance.
Fighter design varied widely among combatants. The Japanese and Italians favored lightly armed and armored but highly maneuverable designs such as the Japanese Nakajima Ki-27, Nakajima Ki-43 and Mitsubishi A6M Zero and the Italian Fiat G.50 Freccia and Macchi MC.200. In contrast, designers in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States believed that the increased speed of fighter aircraft would create g-forces unbearable to pilots who attempted maneuvering dogfights typical of the First World War, and their fighters were instead optimized for speed and firepower. In practice, while light, highly maneuverable aircraft did possess some advantages in fighter-versus-fighter combat, those could usually be overcome by sound tactical doctrine, and the design approach of the Italians and Japanese made their fighters ill-suited as interceptors or attack aircraft.
European theater: During the invasion of Poland and the Battle of France, Luftwaffe fighters—primarily the Messerschmitt Bf 109—held air superiority, and the Luftwaffe played a major role in German victories in these campaigns. During the Battle of Britain, however, British Hurricanes and Spitfires proved roughly equal to Luftwaffe fighters. Additionally Britain's radar-based Dowding system directing fighters onto German attacks and the advantages of fighting above Britain's home territory allowed the RAF to deny Germany air superiority, saving the UK from possible German invasion and dealing the Axis a major defeat early in the Second World War. On the Eastern Front, Soviet fighter forces were overwhelmed during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa. This was a result of the tactical surprise at the outset of the campaign, the leadership vacuum within the Soviet military left by the Great Purge, and the general inferiority of Soviet designs at the time, such as the obsolescent Polikarpov I-15 biplane and the I-16. More modern Soviet designs, including the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3, LaGG-3 and Yakolev Yak-1, had not yet arrived in numbers and in any case were still inferior to the Messerschmitt Bf 109. As a result, during the early months of these campaigns, Axis air forces destroyed large numbers of Red Air Force aircraft on the ground and in one-sided dogfights. In the later stages on the Eastern Front, Soviet training and leadership improved, as did their equipment. By 1942 Soviet designs such as the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5 had performance comparable to the German Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190. Also, significant numbers of British, and later U.S., fighter aircraft were supplied to aid the Soviet war effort as part of Lend-Lease, with the Bell P-39 Airacobra proving particularly effective in the lower-altitude combat typical of the Eastern Front. The Soviets were also helped indirectly by the American and British bombing campaigns, which forced the Luftwaffe to shift many of its fighters away from the Eastern Front in defense against these raids. The Soviets increasingly were able to challenge the Luftwaffe, and while the Luftwaffe maintained a qualitative edge over the Red Air Force for much of the war, the increasing numbers and efficacy of the Soviet Air Force were critical to the Red Army's efforts at turning back and eventually annihilating the Wehrmacht.
Meanwhile, air combat on the Western Front had a much different character. Much of this combat focused on the strategic bombing campaigns of the RAF and the USAAF against German industry intended to wear down the Luftwaffe. Axis fighter aircraft focused on defending against Allied bombers while Allied fighters' main role was as bomber escorts. The RAF raided German cities at night, and both sides developed radar-equipped night fighters for these battles. The Americans, in contrast, flew daylight bombing raids into Germany delivering the Combined Bomber Offensive. Unescorted Consolidated B-24 Liberators and Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers, however, proved unable to fend off German interceptors (primarily Bf 109s and Fw 190s). With the later arrival of long range fighters, particularly the North American P-51 Mustang, American fighters were able to escort far into Germany on daylight raids and by ranging ahead attrited the Luftwaffe to establish control of the skies over Western Europe.
By the time of Operation Overlord in June 1944, the Allies had gained near complete air superiority over the Western Front. This cleared the way both for intensified strategic bombing of German cities and industries, and for the tactical bombing of battlefield targets. With the Luftwaffe largely cleared from the skies, Allied fighters increasingly served as ground attack aircraft.
Allied fighters, by gaining air superiority over the European battlefield, played a crucial role in the eventual defeat of the Axis, which Reichmarshal Hermann Göring, commander of the German Luftwaffe summed up when he said: "When I saw Mustangs over Berlin, I knew the jig was up."
Pacific theater: Major air combat during the war in the Pacific began with the entry of the Western Allies following Japan's attack against Pearl Harbor. The Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service primarily operated the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, and the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service flew the Nakajima Ki-27 and the Nakajima Ki-43, initially enjoying great success, as these fighters generally had better range, maneuverability, speed and climb rates than their Allied counterparts. Additionally, Japanese pilots were well trained and many were combat veterans from Japan's campaigns in China. They quickly gained air superiority over the Allies, who at this stage of the war were often disorganized, under-trained and poorly equipped, and Japanese air power contributed significantly to their successes in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and Burma.
By mid-1942, the Allies began to regroup and while some Allied aircraft such as the Brewster Buffalo and the P-39 Airacobra were hopelessly outclassed by fighters like Japan's Mitsubishi A6M Zero, others such as the Army's Curtiss P-40 Warhawk and the Navy's Grumman F4F Wildcat possessed attributes such as superior firepower, ruggedness and dive speed, and the Allies soon developed tactics (such as the Thach Weave) to take advantage of these strengths. These changes soon paid dividends, as the Allied ability to deny Japan air superiority was critical to their victories at Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal and New Guinea. In China, the Flying Tigers also used the same tactics with some success, although they were unable to stem the tide of Japanese advances there.
By 1943, the Allies began to gain the upper hand in the Pacific Campaign's air campaigns. Several factors contributed to this shift. First, the Lockheed P-38 Lightning and second-generation Allied fighters such as the Grumman F6 Hellcat and later the Vought F4 Corsair, the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and the North American P-51 Mustang, began arriving in numbers. These fighters outperformed Japanese fighters in all respects except maneuverability. Other problems with Japan's fighter aircraft also became apparent as the war progressed, such as their lack of armor and light armament, which had been typical of all pre-war fighters worldwide, but the problem was particularly difficult to rectify on the Japanese designs. This made them inadequate as either bomber-interceptors or ground-attack aircraft, roles Allied fighters were still able to fill. Most importantly, Japan's training program failed to provide enough well-trained pilots to replace losses. In contrast, the Allies improved both the quantity and quality of pilots graduating from their training programs. By mid-1944, Allied fighters had gained air superiority throughout the theater, which would not be contested again during the war. The extent of Allied quantitative and qualitative superiority by this point in the war was demonstrated during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, a lopsided Allied victory in which Japanese fliers were shot down in such numbers and with such ease that American fighter pilots likened it to a great 'turkey shoot'. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | This made them inadequate as either bomber-interceptors or ground-attack aircraft, roles Allied fighters were still able to fill. Most importantly, Japan's training program failed to provide enough well-trained pilots to replace losses. In contrast, the Allies improved both the quantity and quality of pilots graduating from their training programs. By mid-1944, Allied fighters had gained air superiority throughout the theater, which would not be contested again during the war. The extent of Allied quantitative and qualitative superiority by this point in the war was demonstrated during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, a lopsided Allied victory in which Japanese fliers were shot down in such numbers and with such ease that American fighter pilots likened it to a great 'turkey shoot'. Late in the war, Japan began to produce new fighters such as the Nakajima Ki-84 and the Kawanishi N1K to replace the Zero, but only in small numbers, and by then Japan lacked the trained pilots or sufficient fuel to mount an effective challenge to Allied attacks. During the closing stages of the war, Japan's fighter arm could not seriously challenge raids over Japan by American Boeing B-29 Superfortresses, and was largely reduced to Kamikaze attacks.
Technological innovations: Fighter technology advanced rapidly during the Second World War. Piston-engines, which powered the vast majority of World War II fighters, grew more powerful: at the beginning of the war fighters typically had engines producing between 1,000 hp (750 kW) and 1,400 hp (1,000 kW), while by the end of the war many could produce over 2,000 hp (1,500 kW). For example, the Spitfire, one of the few fighters in continuous production throughout the war, was in 1939 powered by a 1,030 hp (770 kW) Merlin II, while variants produced in 1945 were equipped with the 2,035 hp (1,517 kW) Rolls-Royce Griffon 61. Nevertheless, these fighters could only achieve modest increases in top speed due to problems of compressibility created as aircraft and their propellers approached the sound barrier, and it was apparent that propeller-driven aircraft were approaching the limits of their performance. German jet and rocket-powered fighters entered combat in 1944, too late to impact the war's outcome. The same year the Allies' only operational jet fighter, the Gloster Meteor, also entered service. World War II fighters also increasingly featured monocoque construction, which improved their aerodynamic efficiency while adding structural strength. Laminar flow wings, which improved high speed performance, also came into use on fighters such as the P-51 Mustang, while the Messerschmitt Me 262 and the Messerschmitt Me 163 featured swept wings that dramatically reduced drag at high subsonic speeds. Armament also advanced during the war. The rifle-caliber machine guns that were common on prewar fighters could not easily down the more rugged warplanes of the era. Air forces began to replace or supplement them with cannons, which fired explosive shells that could blast a hole in an enemy aircraft – rather than relying on kinetic energy from a solid bullet striking a critical component of the aircraft, such as a fuel line or control cable, or the pilot. Cannons could bring down even heavy bombers with just a few hits, but their slower rate of fire made it difficult to hit fast-moving fighters in a dogfight. Eventually, most fighters mounted cannons, sometimes in combination with machine guns. The British epitomized this shift. Their standard early war fighters mounted eight .303 in (7.7 mm) caliber machine guns, but by mid-war they often featured a combination of machine guns and 20 mm (0.79 in) cannons, and late in the war often only cannons. The Americans, in contrast, had problems producing a cannon design, so instead placed multiple .50 in (12.7 mm) heavy machine guns on their fighters. Fighters were also increasingly fitted with bomb racks and air-to-surface ordnance such as bombs or rockets beneath their wings, and pressed into close air support roles as fighter-bombers. Although they carried less ordnance than light and medium bombers, and generally had a shorter range, they were cheaper to produce and maintain and their maneuverability made it easier for them to hit moving targets such as motorized vehicles. Moreover, if they encountered enemy fighters, their ordnance (which reduced lift and increased drag and therefore decreased performance) could be jettisoned and they could engage enemy fighters, which eliminated the need for fighter escorts that bombers required.
Heavily armed fighters such as Germany's Focke-Wulf Fw 190, Britain's Hawker Typhoon and Hawker Tempest, and America's Curtiss P-40, F4U Corsair, P-47 Thunderbolt and P-38 Lightning all excelled as fighter-bombers, and since the Second World War ground attack has become an important secondary capability of many fighters.
World War II also saw the first use of airborne radar on fighters. The primary purpose of these radars was to help night fighters locate enemy bombers and fighters. Because of the bulkiness of these radar sets, they could not be carried on conventional single-engined fighters and instead were typically retrofitted to larger heavy fighters or light bombers such as Germany's Messerschmitt Bf 110 and Junkers Ju 88, Britain's de Havilland Mosquito and Bristol Beaufighter, and America's Douglas A-20, which then served as night fighters. The Northrop P-61 Black Widow, a purpose-built night fighter, was the only fighter of the war that incorporated radar into its original design. Britain and America cooperated closely in the development of airborne radar, and Germany's radar technology generally lagged slightly behind Anglo-American efforts, while other combatants developed few radar-equipped fighters.
A concept originated from German engineer Bernhard J. Schrage in 1943 as a response to the increasing threat posed by Allied heavy bombers, particularly at night. The Schrage Musik system involved mounting upward-facing cannon turrets, typically twin 20mm or 30mm guns, in the belly of German night fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf 110 and later versions of the Junkers Ju 88. These guns were angled upwards to target the vulnerable underside of enemy bombers.
1946–present: Post–World War II period: Several prototype fighter programs begun early in 1945 continued on after the war and led to advanced piston-engine fighters that entered production and operational service in 1946. A typical example is the Lavochkin La-9 'Fritz', which was an evolution of the successful wartime Lavochkin La-7 'Fin'. Working through a series of prototypes, the La-120, La-126 and La-130, the Lavochkin design bureau sought to replace the La-7's wooden airframe with a metal one, as well as fit a laminar flow wing to improve maneuver performance, and increased armament. The La-9 entered service in August 1946 and was produced until 1948; it also served as the basis for the development of a long-range escort fighter, the La-11 'Fang', of which nearly 1200 were produced 1947–51. Over the course of the Korean War, however, it became obvious that the day of the piston-engined fighter was coming to a close and that the future would lie with the jet fighter.
This period also witnessed experimentation with jet-assisted piston engine aircraft. La-9 derivatives included examples fitted with two underwing auxiliary pulsejet engines (the La-9RD) and a similarly mounted pair of auxiliary ramjet engines (the La-138); however, neither of these entered service. One that did enter service – with the U.S. Navy in March 1945 – was the Ryan FR-1 Fireball; production was halted with the war's end on VJ-Day, with only 66 having been delivered, and the type was withdrawn from service in 1947. The USAAF had ordered its first 13 mixed turboprop-turbojet-powered pre-production prototypes of the Consolidated Vultee XP-81 fighter, but this program was also canceled by VJ Day, with 80% of the engineering work completed.
Rocket-powered fighters: The first rocket-powered aircraft was the Lippisch Ente, which made a successful maiden flight in March 1928. The only pure rocket aircraft ever mass-produced was the Messerschmitt Me 163B Komet in 1944, one of several German World War II projects aimed at developing high speed, point-defense aircraft. Later variants of the Me 262 (C-1a and C-2b) were also fitted with "mixed-power" jet/rocket powerplants, while earlier models were fitted with rocket boosters, but were not mass-produced with these modifications.
The USSR experimented with a rocket-powered interceptor in the years immediately following World War II, the Mikoyan-Gurevich I-270. Only two were built.
In the 1950s, the British developed mixed-power jet designs employing both rocket and jet engines to cover the performance gap that existed in turbojet designs. The rocket was the main engine for delivering the speed and height required for high-speed interception of high-level bombers and the turbojet gave increased fuel economy in other parts of flight, most notably to ensure the aircraft was able to make a powered landing rather than risking an unpredictable gliding return. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | Later variants of the Me 262 (C-1a and C-2b) were also fitted with "mixed-power" jet/rocket powerplants, while earlier models were fitted with rocket boosters, but were not mass-produced with these modifications.
The USSR experimented with a rocket-powered interceptor in the years immediately following World War II, the Mikoyan-Gurevich I-270. Only two were built.
In the 1950s, the British developed mixed-power jet designs employing both rocket and jet engines to cover the performance gap that existed in turbojet designs. The rocket was the main engine for delivering the speed and height required for high-speed interception of high-level bombers and the turbojet gave increased fuel economy in other parts of flight, most notably to ensure the aircraft was able to make a powered landing rather than risking an unpredictable gliding return.
The Saunders-Roe SR.53 was a successful design, and was planned for production when economics forced the British to curtail most aircraft programs in the late 1950s. Furthermore, rapid advancements in jet engine technology rendered mixed-power aircraft designs like Saunders-Roe's SR.53 (and the following SR.177) obsolete. The American Republic XF-91 Thunderceptor –the first U.S. fighter to exceed Mach 1 in level flight– met a similar fate for the same reason, and no hybrid rocket-and-jet-engine fighter design has ever been placed into service.
The only operational implementation of mixed propulsion was Rocket-Assisted Take Off (RATO), a system rarely used in fighters, such as with the zero-length launch, RATO-based takeoff scheme from special launch platforms, tested out by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and made obsolete with advancements in surface-to-air missile technology.
Jet-powered fighters: It has become common in the aviation community to classify jet fighters by "generations" for historical purposes. No official definitions of these generations exist; rather, they represent the notion of stages in the development of fighter-design approaches, performance capabilities, and technological evolution. Different authors have packed jet fighters into different generations. For example, Richard P. Hallion of the Secretary of the Air Force's Action Group classified the F-16 as a sixth-generation jet fighter.
The timeframes associated with each generation remain inexact and are only indicative of the period during which their design philosophies and technology employment enjoyed a prevailing influence on fighter design and development. These timeframes also encompass the peak period of service entry for such aircraft.
1940s–1950s: First-generation: The first generation of jet fighters comprised the initial, subsonic jet-fighter designs introduced late in World War II (1939–1945) and in the early post-war period. They differed little from their piston-engined counterparts in appearance, and many employed unswept wings. Guns and cannon remained the principal armament. The need to obtain a decisive advantage in maximum speed pushed the development of turbojet-powered aircraft forward. Top speeds for fighters rose steadily throughout World War II as more powerful piston engines developed, and they approached transonic flight-speeds where the efficiency of propellers drops off, making further speed increases nearly impossible.
The first jets developed during World War II and saw combat in the last two years of the war. Messerschmitt developed the first operational jet fighter, the Me 262A, primarily serving with the Luftwaffe's JG 7, the world's first jet-fighter wing. It was considerably faster than contemporary piston-driven aircraft, and in the hands of a competent pilot, proved quite difficult for Allied pilots to defeat. The Luftwaffe never deployed the design in numbers sufficient to stop the Allied air campaign, and a combination of fuel shortages, pilot losses, and technical difficulties with the engines kept the number of sorties low. Nevertheless, the Me 262 indicated the obsolescence of piston-driven aircraft. Spurred by reports of the German jets, Britain's Gloster Meteor entered production soon after, and the two entered service around the same time in 1944. Meteors commonly served to intercept the V-1 flying bomb, as they were faster than available piston-engined fighters at the low altitudes used by the flying bombs. Nearer the end of World War II, the first military jet-powered light-fighter design, the Luftwaffe intended the Heinkel He 162A Spatz (sparrow) to serve as a simple jet fighter for German home defense, with a few examples seeing squadron service with JG 1 by April 1945. By the end of the war almost all work on piston-powered fighters had ended. A few designs combining piston- and jet-engines for propulsion – such as the Ryan FR Fireball – saw brief use, but by the end of the 1940s virtually all new fighters were jet-powered.
Despite their advantages, the early jet-fighters were far from perfect. The operational lifespan of turbines were very short and engines were temperamental, while power could be adjusted only slowly and acceleration was poor (even if top speed was higher) compared to the final generation of piston fighters. Many squadrons of piston-engined fighters remained in service until the early to mid-1950s, even in the air forces of the major powers (though the types retained were the best of the World War II designs). Innovations including ejection seats, air brakes and all-moving tailplanes became widespread in this period.
The Americans began using jet fighters operationally after World War II, the wartime Bell P-59 having proven a failure. The Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star (soon re-designated F-80) was more prone to wave drag than the swept-wing Me 262, but had a cruise speed (660 km/h (410 mph)) as high as the maximum speed attainable by many piston-engined fighters. The British designed several new jets, including the distinctive single-engined twin boom de Havilland Vampire which Britain sold to the air forces of many nations.
The British transferred the technology of the Rolls-Royce Nene jet-engine to the Soviets, who soon put it to use in their advanced Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighter, which used fully swept wings that allowed flying closer to the speed of sound than straight-winged designs such as the F-80. The MiG-15s' top speed of 1,075 km/h (668 mph) proved quite a shock to the American F-80 pilots who encountered them in the Korean War, along with their armament of two 23 mm (0.91 in) cannons and a single 37 mm (1.5 in) cannon. Nevertheless, in the first jet-versus-jet dogfight, which occurred during the Korean War on 8 November 1950, an F-80 shot down two North Korean MiG-15s.
The Americans responded by rushing their own swept-wing fighter – the North American F-86 Sabre – into battle against the MiGs, which had similar transsonic performance. The two aircraft had different strengths and weaknesses, but were similar enough that victory could go either way. While the Sabres focused primarily on downing MiGs and scored favorably against those flown by the poorly-trained North Koreans, the MiGs in turn decimated US bomber formations and forced the withdrawal of numerous American types from operational service.
The world's navies also transitioned to jets during this period, despite the need for catapult-launching of the new aircraft. The U.S. Navy adopted the Grumman F9F Panther as their primary jet fighter in the Korean War period, and it was one of the first jet fighters to employ an afterburner. The de Havilland Sea Vampire became the Royal Navy's first jet fighter. Radar was used on specialized night-fighters such as the Douglas F3D Skyknight, which also downed MiGs over Korea, and later fitted to the McDonnell F2H Banshee and swept-wing Vought F7U Cutlass and McDonnell F3H Demon as all-weather / night fighters. Early versions of Infra-red (IR) air-to-air missiles (AAMs) such as the AIM-9 Sidewinder and radar-guided missiles such as the AIM-7 Sparrow whose descendants remain in use as of 2021, were first introduced on swept-wing subsonic Demon and Cutlass naval fighters.
1950s–1960s: Second-generation: Technological breakthroughs, lessons learned from the aerial battles of the Korean War, and a focus on conducting operations in a nuclear warfare environment shaped the development of second-generation fighters. Technological advances in aerodynamics, propulsion and aerospace building-materials (primarily aluminum alloys) permitted designers to experiment with aeronautical innovations such as swept wings, delta wings, and area-ruled fuselages. Widespread use of afterburning turbojet engines made these the first production aircraft to break the sound barrier, and the ability to sustain supersonic speeds in level flight became a common capability amongst fighters of this generation.
Fighter designs also took advantage of new electronics technologies that made effective radars small enough to carry aboard smaller aircraft. Onboard radars permitted detection of enemy aircraft beyond visual range, thereby improving the handoff of targets by longer-ranged ground-based warning- and tracking-radars. Similarly, advances in guided-missile development allowed air-to-air missiles to begin supplementing the gun as the primary offensive weapon for the first time in fighter history. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | Technological advances in aerodynamics, propulsion and aerospace building-materials (primarily aluminum alloys) permitted designers to experiment with aeronautical innovations such as swept wings, delta wings, and area-ruled fuselages. Widespread use of afterburning turbojet engines made these the first production aircraft to break the sound barrier, and the ability to sustain supersonic speeds in level flight became a common capability amongst fighters of this generation.
Fighter designs also took advantage of new electronics technologies that made effective radars small enough to carry aboard smaller aircraft. Onboard radars permitted detection of enemy aircraft beyond visual range, thereby improving the handoff of targets by longer-ranged ground-based warning- and tracking-radars. Similarly, advances in guided-missile development allowed air-to-air missiles to begin supplementing the gun as the primary offensive weapon for the first time in fighter history. During this period, passive-homing infrared-guided (IR) missiles became commonplace, but early IR missile sensors had poor sensitivity and a very narrow field of view (typically no more than 30°), which limited their effective use to only close-range, tail-chase engagements. Radar-guided (RF) missiles were introduced as well, but early examples proved unreliable. These semi-active radar homing (SARH) missiles could track and intercept an enemy aircraft "painted" by the launching aircraft's onboard radar. Medium- and long-range RF air-to-air missiles promised to open up a new dimension of "beyond-visual-range" (BVR) combat, and much effort concentrated on further development of this technology.
The prospect of a potential third world war featuring large mechanized armies and nuclear-weapon strikes led to a degree of specialization along two design approaches: interceptors, such as the English Electric Lightning and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21F; and fighter-bombers, such as the Republic F-105 Thunderchief and the Sukhoi Su-7B. Dogfighting, per se, became de-emphasized in both cases. The interceptor was an outgrowth of the vision that guided missiles would completely replace guns and combat would take place at beyond-visual ranges. As a result, strategists designed interceptors with a large missile-payload and a powerful radar, sacrificing agility in favor of high speed, altitude ceiling and rate of climb. With a primary air-defense role, emphasis was placed on the ability to intercept strategic bombers flying at high altitudes. Specialized point-defense interceptors often had limited range and few, if any, ground-attack capabilities. Fighter-bombers could swing between air-superiority and ground-attack roles, and were often designed for a high-speed, low-altitude dash to deliver their ordnance. Television- and IR-guided air-to-surface missiles were introduced to augment traditional gravity bombs, and some were also equipped to deliver a nuclear bomb.
1960s–1970s: Third-generation jet fighters: The third generation witnessed continued maturation of second-generation innovations, but it is most marked by renewed emphases on maneuverability and on traditional ground-attack capabilities. Over the course of the 1960s, increasing combat experience with guided missiles demonstrated that combat would devolve into close-in dogfights. Analog avionics began to appear, replacing older "steam-gauge" cockpit instrumentation. Enhancements to the aerodynamic performance of third-generation fighters included flight control surfaces such as canards, powered slats, and blown flaps. A number of technologies would be tried for vertical/short takeoff and landing, but thrust vectoring would be successful on the Harrier.
Growth in air-combat capability focused on the introduction of improved air-to-air missiles, radar systems, and other avionics. While guns remained standard equipment (early models of F-4 being a notable exception), air-to-air missiles became the primary weapons for air-superiority fighters, which employed more sophisticated radars and medium-range RF AAMs to achieve greater "stand-off" ranges, however, kill probabilities proved unexpectedly low for RF missiles due to poor reliability and improved electronic countermeasures (ECM) for spoofing radar seekers. Infrared-homing AAMs saw their fields of view expand to 45°, which strengthened their tactical usability. Nevertheless, the low dogfight loss-exchange ratios experienced by American fighters in the skies over Vietnam led the U.S. Navy to establish its famous "TOPGUN" fighter-weapons school, which provided a graduate-level curriculum to train fleet fighter-pilots in advanced Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) and Dissimilar air combat training (DACT) tactics and techniques.
This era also saw an expansion in ground-attack capabilities, principally in guided missiles, and witnessed the introduction of the first truly effective avionics for enhanced ground attack, including terrain-avoidance systems. Air-to-surface missiles (ASM) equipped with electro-optical (E-O) contrast seekers – such as the initial model of the widely used AGM-65 Maverick – became standard weapons, and laser-guided bombs (LGBs) became widespread in an effort to improve precision-attack capabilities. Guidance for such precision-guided munitions (PGM) was provided by externally-mounted targeting pods, which were introduced in the mid-1960s.
The third generation also led to the development of new automatic-fire weapons, primarily chain-guns that use an electric motor to drive the mechanism of a cannon. This allowed a plane to carry a single multi-barrel weapon (such as the 20 mm (0.79 in) Vulcan), and provided greater accuracy and rates of fire. Powerplant reliability increased, and jet engines became "smokeless" to make it harder to sight aircraft at long distances.
Dedicated ground-attack aircraft (like the Grumman A-6 Intruder, SEPECAT Jaguar and LTV A-7 Corsair II) offered longer range, more sophisticated night-attack systems or lower cost than supersonic fighters. With variable-geometry wings, the supersonic F-111 introduced the Pratt & Whitney TF30, the first turbofan equipped with afterburner. The ambitious project sought to create a versatile common fighter for many roles and services. It would serve well as an all-weather bomber, but lacked the performance to defeat other fighters. The McDonnell F-4 Phantom was designed to capitalize on radar and missile technology as an all-weather interceptor, but emerged as a versatile strike-bomber nimble enough to prevail in air combat, adopted by the U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. Despite numerous shortcomings that would not be fully addressed until newer fighters, the Phantom claimed 280 aerial kills (more than any other U.S. fighter) over Vietnam. With range and payload capabilities that rivaled that of World War II bombers such as B-24 Liberator, the Phantom would become a highly successful multirole aircraft.
1970s–2000s: Fourth-generation: Fourth-generation fighters continued the trend towards multirole configurations, and were equipped with increasingly sophisticated avionics- and weapon-systems. Fighter designs were significantly influenced by the Energy-Maneuverability (E-M) theory developed by Colonel John Boyd and mathematician Thomas Christie, based upon Boyd's combat experience in the Korean War and as a fighter-tactics instructor during the 1960s. E-M theory emphasized the value of aircraft-specific energy maintenance as an advantage in fighter combat. Boyd perceived maneuverability as the primary means of getting "inside" an adversary's decision-making cycle, a process Boyd called the "OODA loop" (for "Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action"). This approach emphasized aircraft designs capable of performing "fast transients" – quick changes in speed, altitude, and direction – as opposed to relying chiefly on high speed alone.
E-M characteristics were first applied to the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, but Boyd and his supporters believed these performance parameters called for a small, lightweight aircraft with a larger, higher-lift wing. The small size would minimize drag and increase the thrust-to-weight ratio, while the larger wing would minimize wing loading; while the reduced wing loading tends to lower top speed and can cut range, it increases payload capacity and the range reduction can be compensated for by increased fuel in the larger wing. The efforts of Boyd's "Fighter mafia" would result in the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon (now Lockheed Martin's).
The F-16's maneuverability was further enhanced by its slight aerodynamic instability. This technique, called "relaxed static stability" (RSS), was made possible by introduction of the "fly-by-wire" (FBW) flight-control system (FLCS), which in turn was enabled by advances in computers and in system-integration techniques. Analog avionics, required to enable FBW operations, became a fundamental requirement, but began to be replaced by digital flight-control systems in the latter half of the 1980s. Likewise, Full Authority Digital Engine Controls (FADEC) to electronically manage powerplant performance was introduced with the Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan. The F-16's sole reliance on electronics and wires to relay flight commands, instead of the usual cables and mechanical linkage controls, earned it the sobriquet of "the electric jet". Electronic FLCS and FADEC quickly became essential components of all subsequent fighter designs. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The F-16's maneuverability was further enhanced by its slight aerodynamic instability. This technique, called "relaxed static stability" (RSS), was made possible by introduction of the "fly-by-wire" (FBW) flight-control system (FLCS), which in turn was enabled by advances in computers and in system-integration techniques. Analog avionics, required to enable FBW operations, became a fundamental requirement, but began to be replaced by digital flight-control systems in the latter half of the 1980s. Likewise, Full Authority Digital Engine Controls (FADEC) to electronically manage powerplant performance was introduced with the Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan. The F-16's sole reliance on electronics and wires to relay flight commands, instead of the usual cables and mechanical linkage controls, earned it the sobriquet of "the electric jet". Electronic FLCS and FADEC quickly became essential components of all subsequent fighter designs.
Other innovative technologies introduced in fourth-generation fighters included pulse-Doppler fire-control radars (providing a "look-down/shoot-down" capability), head-up displays (HUD), "hands on throttle-and-stick" (HOTAS) controls, and multi-function displays (MFD), all essential equipment as of 2019. Aircraft designers began to incorporate composite materials in the form of bonded-aluminum honeycomb structural elements and graphite epoxy laminate skins to reduce weight. Infrared search-and-track (IRST) sensors became widespread for air-to-ground weapons delivery, and appeared for air-to-air combat as well. "All-aspect" IR AAM became standard air superiority weapons, which permitted engagement of enemy aircraft from any angle (although the field of view remained relatively limited). The first long-range active-radar-homing RF AAM entered service with the AIM-54 Phoenix, which solely equipped the Grumman F-14 Tomcat, one of the few variable-sweep-wing fighter designs to enter production. Even with the tremendous advancement of air-to-air missiles in this era, internal guns were standard equipment.
Another revolution came in the form of a stronger reliance on ease of maintenance, which led to standardization of parts, reductions in the numbers of access panels and lubrication points, and overall parts reduction in more complicated equipment like the engines. Some early jet fighters required 50 man-hours of work by a ground crew for every hour the aircraft was in the air; later models substantially reduced this to allow faster turn-around times and more sorties in a day. Some modern military aircraft only require 10-man-hours of work per hour of flight time, and others are even more efficient.
Aerodynamic innovations included variable-camber wings and exploitation of the vortex lift effect to achieve higher angles of attack through the addition of leading-edge extension devices such as strakes.
Unlike interceptors of the previous eras, most fourth-generation air-superiority fighters were designed to be agile dogfighters (although the Mikoyan MiG-31 and Panavia Tornado ADV are notable exceptions). The continually rising cost of fighters, however, continued to emphasize the value of multirole fighters. The need for both types of fighters led to the "high/low mix" concept, which envisioned a high-capability and high-cost core of dedicated air-superiority fighters (like the F-15 and Su-27) supplemented by a larger contingent of lower-cost multi-role fighters (such as the F-16 and MiG-29).
Most fourth-generation fighters, such as the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, HAL Tejas, JF-17 and Dassault Mirage 2000, are true multirole warplanes, designed as such from the start. This was facilitated by multimode avionics that could switch seamlessly between air and ground modes. The earlier approaches of adding on strike capabilities or designing separate models specialized for different roles generally became passé (with the Panavia Tornado being an exception in this regard). Attack roles were generally assigned to dedicated ground-attack aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-25 and the A-10 Thunderbolt II.
A typical US Air Force fighter wing of the period might contain a mix of one air superiority squadron (F-15C), one strike fighter squadron (F-15E), and two multirole fighter squadrons (F-16C). Perhaps the most novel technology introduced for combat aircraft was stealth, which involves the use of special "low-observable" (L-O) materials and design techniques to reduce the susceptibility of an aircraft to detection by the enemy's sensor systems, particularly radars. The first stealth aircraft introduced were the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk attack aircraft (introduced in 1983) and the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit bomber (first flew in 1989). Although no stealthy fighters per se appeared among the fourth generation, some radar-absorbent coatings and other L-O treatments developed for these programs are reported to have been subsequently applied to fourth-generation fighters.
1990s–2000s: 4.5-generation: The end of the Cold War in 1992 led many governments to significantly decrease military spending as a "peace dividend". Air force inventories were cut. Research and development programs working on "fifth-generation" fighters took serious hits. Many programs were canceled during the first half of the 1990s, and those that survived were "stretched out". While the practice of slowing the pace of development reduces annual investment expenses, it comes at the penalty of increased overall program and unit costs over the long-term. In this instance, however, it also permitted designers to make use of the tremendous achievements being made in the fields of computers, avionics and other flight electronics, which had become possible largely due to the advances made in microchip and semiconductor technologies in the 1980s and 1990s. This opportunity enabled designers to develop fourth-generation designs – or redesigns – with significantly enhanced capabilities. These improved designs have become known as "Generation 4.5" fighters, recognizing their intermediate nature between the 4th and 5th generations, and their contribution in furthering development of individual fifth-generation technologies.
The primary characteristics of this sub-generation are the application of advanced digital avionics and aerospace materials, modest signature reduction (primarily RF "stealth"), and highly integrated systems and weapons. These fighters have been designed to operate in a "network-centric" battlefield environment and are principally multirole aircraft. Key weapons technologies introduced include beyond-visual-range (BVR) AAMs; Global Positioning System (GPS)–guided weapons, solid-state phased-array radars; helmet-mounted sights; and improved secure, jamming-resistant datalinks. Thrust vectoring to further improve transient maneuvering capabilities has also been adopted by many 4.5th generation fighters, and uprated powerplants have enabled some designs to achieve a degree of "supercruise" ability. Stealth characteristics are focused primarily on frontal-aspect radar cross section (RCS) signature-reduction techniques including radar-absorbent materials (RAM), L-O coatings and limited shaping techniques.
"Half-generation" designs are either based on existing airframes or are based on new airframes following similar design theory to previous iterations; however, these modifications have introduced the structural use of composite materials to reduce weight, greater fuel fractions to increase range, and signature reduction treatments to achieve lower RCS compared to their predecessors. Prime examples of such aircraft, which are based on new airframe designs making extensive use of carbon-fiber composites, include the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, Saab JAS 39 Gripen, and HAL Tejas Mark 1A.
Apart from these fighter jets, most of the 4.5 generation aircraft are actually modified variants of existing airframes from the earlier fourth generation fighter jets. Such fighter jets are generally heavier and examples include the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, which is an evolution of the F/A-18 Hornet, the F-15E Strike Eagle, which is a ground-attack/multi-role variant of the F-15 Eagle, the Su-30SM and Su-35S modified variants of the Sukhoi Su-27, and the MiG-35 upgraded version of the Mikoyan MiG-29. The Su-30SM/Su-35S and MiG-35 feature thrust vectoring engine nozzles to enhance maneuvering. The upgraded version of F-16 is also considered a member of the 4.5 generation aircraft.
Generation 4.5 fighters first entered service in the early 1990s, and most of them are still being produced and evolved. It is quite possible that they may continue in production alongside fifth-generation fighters due to the expense of developing the advanced level of stealth technology needed to achieve aircraft designs featuring very low observables (VLO), which is one of the defining features of fifth-generation fighters. Of the 4.5th generation designs, the Strike Eagle, Super Hornet, Typhoon, Gripen, and Rafale have been used in combat.
The U.S. government has defined 4.5 generation fighter aircraft as those that "(1) have advanced capabilities, including— (A) AESA radar; (B) high capacity data-link; and (C) enhanced avionics; and (2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments."
2000s–2020s: Fifth-generation: Currently the cutting edge of fighter design, fifth-generation fighters are characterized by being designed from the start to operate in a network-centric combat environment, and to feature extremely low, all-aspect, multi-spectral signatures employing advanced materials and shaping techniques. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | Of the 4.5th generation designs, the Strike Eagle, Super Hornet, Typhoon, Gripen, and Rafale have been used in combat.
The U.S. government has defined 4.5 generation fighter aircraft as those that "(1) have advanced capabilities, including— (A) AESA radar; (B) high capacity data-link; and (C) enhanced avionics; and (2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments."
2000s–2020s: Fifth-generation: Currently the cutting edge of fighter design, fifth-generation fighters are characterized by being designed from the start to operate in a network-centric combat environment, and to feature extremely low, all-aspect, multi-spectral signatures employing advanced materials and shaping techniques. They have multifunction AESA radars with high-bandwidth, low-probability of intercept (LPI) data transmission capabilities. The infra-red search and track sensors incorporated for air-to-air combat as well as for air-to-ground weapons delivery in the 4.5th generation fighters are now fused in with other sensors for Situational Awareness IRST or SAIRST, which constantly tracks all targets of interest around the aircraft so the pilot need not guess when he glances. These sensors, along with advanced avionics, glass cockpits, helmet-mounted sights (not currently on F-22), and improved secure, jamming-resistant LPI datalinks are highly integrated to provide multi-platform, multi-sensor data fusion for vastly improved situational awareness while easing the pilot's workload. Avionics suites rely on extensive use of very high-speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) technology, common modules, and high-speed data buses. Overall, the integration of all these elements is claimed to provide fifth-generation fighters with a "first-look, first-shot, first-kill capability".
A key attribute of fifth-generation fighters is a small radar cross-section. Great care has been taken in designing its layout and internal structure to minimize RCS over a broad bandwidth of detection and tracking radar frequencies; furthermore, to maintain its VLO signature during combat operations, primary weapons are carried in internal weapon bays that are only briefly opened to permit weapon launch. Furthermore, stealth technology has advanced to the point where it can be employed without a tradeoff with aerodynamics performance, in contrast to previous stealth efforts. Some attention has also been paid to reducing IR signatures, especially on the F-22. Detailed information on these signature-reduction techniques is classified, but in general includes special shaping approaches, thermoset and thermoplastic materials, extensive structural use of advanced composites, conformal sensors, heat-resistant coatings, low-observable wire meshes to cover intake and cooling vents, heat ablating tiles on the exhaust troughs (seen on the Northrop YF-23), and coating internal and external metal areas with radar-absorbent materials and paint (RAM/RAP).
The AESA radar offers unique capabilities for fighters (and it is also quickly becoming essential for Generation 4.5 aircraft designs, as well as being retrofitted onto some fourth-generation aircraft). In addition to its high resistance to ECM and LPI features, it enables the fighter to function as a sort of "mini-AWACS", providing high-gain electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic warfare (EW) jamming functions. Other technologies common to this latest generation of fighters includes integrated electronic warfare system (INEWS) technology, integrated communications, navigation, and identification (CNI) avionics technology, centralized "vehicle health monitoring" systems for ease of maintenance, fiber optics data transmission, stealth technology and even hovering capabilities. Maneuver performance remains important and is enhanced by thrust-vectoring, which also helps reduce takeoff and landing distances. Supercruise may or may not be featured; it permits flight at supersonic speeds without the use of the afterburner – a device that significantly increases IR signature when used in full military power.
Such aircraft are sophisticated and expensive. The fifth generation was ushered in by the Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor in late 2005. The U.S. Air Force originally planned to acquire 650 F-22s, but now only 187 will be built. As a result, its unit flyaway cost (FAC) is around US$150 million. To spread the development costs – and production base – more broadly, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program enrolls eight other countries as cost- and risk-sharing partners. Altogether, the nine partner nations anticipate procuring over 3,000 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighters at an anticipated average FAC of $80–85 million. The F-35, however, is designed to be a family of three aircraft, a conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) fighter, a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) fighter, and a Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) fighter, each of which has a different unit price and slightly varying specifications in terms of fuel capacity (and therefore range), size and payload.
Other countries have initiated fifth-generation fighter development projects. In December 2010, it was discovered that China is developing the 5th generation fighter Chengdu J-20. The J-20 took its maiden flight in January 2011. The Shenyang FC-31 took its maiden flight on 31 October 2012, and developed a carrier-based version based on Chinese aircraft carriers. United Aircraft Corporation with Russia's Mikoyan LMFS and Sukhoi Su-75 Checkmate plan, Sukhoi Su-57 became the first fifth-generation fighter jets in service with the Russian Aerospace Forces on 2020, and launch missiles in the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022. Japan is exploring its technical feasibility to produce fifth-generation fighters. India is developing the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a medium weight stealth fighter jet designated to enter into serial production by late 2030s. India also had initiated a joint fifth generation heavy fighter with Russia called the FGFA. As of 2018 May, the project is suspected to have not yielded desired progress or results for India and has been put on hold or dropped altogether. Other countries considering fielding an indigenous or semi-indigenous advanced fifth generation aircraft include South Korea, Sweden, Turkey and Pakistan.
2020s–present: Sixth-generation: As of November 2018, France, Germany, China, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have announced the development of a sixth-generation aircraft program.
France and Germany will develop a joint sixth-generation fighter to replace their current fleet of Dassault Rafales, Eurofighter Typhoons, and Panavia Tornados by 2035. The overall development will be led by a collaboration of Dassault and Airbus, while the engines will reportedly be jointly developed by Safran and MTU Aero Engines. Thales and MBDA are also seeking a stake in the project. Spain officially joined the Franco-German project to develop a Next-Generation Fighter (NGF) that will form part of a broader Future Combat Air Systems (FCAS) with the signing of a letter of intent (LOI) on February 14, 2019.
Currently at the concept stage, the first sixth-generation jet fighter is expected to enter service in the United States Navy in 2025–30 period. The USAF seeks a new fighter for the 2030–50 period named the "Next Generation Tactical Aircraft" ("Next Gen TACAIR"). The US Navy looks to replace its F/A-18E/F Super Hornets beginning in 2025 with the Next Generation Air Dominance air superiority fighter.
The United Kingdom's proposed stealth fighter is being developed by a European consortium called Team Tempest, consisting of BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, Leonardo S.p.A. and MBDA. The aircraft is intended to enter service in 2035.
Weapons: Fighters were typically armed with guns only for air to air combat up through the late 1950s, though unguided rockets for mostly air to ground use and limited air to air use were deployed in WWII. From the late 1950s forward guided missiles came into use for air to air combat. Throughout this history fighters which by surprise or maneuver attain a good firing position have achieved the kill about one third to one half the time, no matter what weapons were carried. The only major historic exception to this has been the low effectiveness shown by guided missiles in the first one to two decades of their existence.
From WWI to the present, fighter aircraft have featured machine guns and automatic cannons as weapons, and they are still considered as essential back-up weapons today. The power of air-to-air guns has increased greatly over time, and has kept them relevant in the guided missile era. In WWI two rifle (approximately 0.30) caliber machine guns was the typical armament, producing a weight of fire of about 0.4 kg (0.88 lb) per second. In WWII rifle caliber machine guns also remained common, though usually in larger numbers or supplemented with much heavier 0.50 caliber machine guns or cannons. The standard WWII American fighter armament of six 0.50-cal (12.7mm) machine guns fired a bullet weight of approximately 3.7 kg/sec (8.1 lbs/sec), at a muzzle velocity of 856 m/s (2,810 ft/s). British and German aircraft tended to use a mix of machine guns and autocannon, the latter firing explosive projectiles. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The power of air-to-air guns has increased greatly over time, and has kept them relevant in the guided missile era. In WWI two rifle (approximately 0.30) caliber machine guns was the typical armament, producing a weight of fire of about 0.4 kg (0.88 lb) per second. In WWII rifle caliber machine guns also remained common, though usually in larger numbers or supplemented with much heavier 0.50 caliber machine guns or cannons. The standard WWII American fighter armament of six 0.50-cal (12.7mm) machine guns fired a bullet weight of approximately 3.7 kg/sec (8.1 lbs/sec), at a muzzle velocity of 856 m/s (2,810 ft/s). British and German aircraft tended to use a mix of machine guns and autocannon, the latter firing explosive projectiles. Later British fighters were exclusively cannon-armed, the US were not able to produce a reliable cannon in high numbers and most fighters remained equipped only with heavy machine guns despite the US Navy pressing for a change to 20 mm.
Post war 20–30 mm revolver cannon and rotary cannon were introduced. The modern M61 Vulcan 20 mm rotary cannon that is standard on current American fighters fires a projectile weight of about 10 kg/s (22 lb/s), nearly three times that of six 0.50-cal machine guns, with higher velocity of 1,052 m/s (3450 ft/s) supporting a flatter trajectory, and with exploding projectiles. Modern fighter gun systems also feature ranging radar and lead computing electronic gun sights to ease the problem of aim point to compensate for projectile drop and time of flight (target lead) in the complex three dimensional maneuvering of air-to-air combat. However, getting in position to use the guns is still a challenge. The range of guns is longer than in the past but still quite limited compared to missiles, with modern gun systems having a maximum effective range of approximately 1,000 meters. High probability of kill also requires firing to usually occur from the rear hemisphere of the target. Despite these limits, when pilots are well trained in air-to-air gunnery and these conditions are satisfied, gun systems are tactically effective and highly cost efficient. The cost of a gun firing pass is far less than firing a missile, and the projectiles are not subject to the thermal and electronic countermeasures than can sometimes defeat missiles. When the enemy can be approached to within gun range, the lethality of guns is approximately a 25% to 50% chance of "kill per firing pass".
The range limitations of guns, and the desire to overcome large variations in fighter pilot skill and thus achieve higher force effectiveness, led to the development of the guided air-to-air missile. There are two main variations, heat-seeking (infrared homing), and radar guided. Radar missiles are typically several times heavier and more expensive than heat-seekers, but with longer range, greater destructive power, and ability to track through clouds.
The highly successful AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking (infrared homing) short-range missile was developed by the United States Navy in the 1950s. These small missiles are easily carried by lighter fighters, and provide effective ranges of approximately 10 to 35 kilometres (6 to 20 mi). Beginning with the AIM-9L in 1977, subsequent versions of Sidewinder have added all-aspect capability, the ability to use the lower heat of air to skin friction on the target aircraft to track from the front and sides. The latest (2003 service entry) AIM-9X also features "off-boresight" and "lock on after launch" capabilities, which allow the pilot to make a quick launch of a missile to track a target anywhere within the pilot's vision. The AIM-9X development cost was U.S. $3 billion in mid to late 1990s dollars, and 2015 per unit procurement cost is $0.6 million each. The missile weighs 85.3 kg (188 lbs), and has a maximum range of 35 km (22 miles) at higher altitudes. Like most air-to-air missiles, lower altitude range can be as limited as only about one third of maximum due to higher drag and less ability to coast downward.
The effectiveness of infrared homing missiles was only 7% early in the Vietnam War, but improved to approximately 15%–40% over the course of the war. The AIM-4 Falcon used by the USAF had kill rates of approximately 7% and was considered a failure. The AIM-9B Sidewinder introduced later achieved 15% kill rates, and the further improved AIM-9D and J models reached 19%. The AIM-9G used in the last year of the Vietnam air war achieved 40%. Israel used almost totally guns in the 1967 Six-Day War, achieving 60 kills and 10 losses. However, Israel made much more use of steadily improving heat-seeking missiles in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In this extensive conflict Israel scored 171 of 261 total kills with heat-seeking missiles (65.5%), 5 kills with radar guided missiles (1.9%), and 85 kills with guns (32.6%). The AIM-9L Sidewinder scored 19 kills out of 26 fired missiles (73%) in the 1982 Falklands War. But, in a conflict against opponents using thermal countermeasures, the United States only scored 11 kills out of 48 fired (Pk = 23%) with the follow-on AIM-9M in the 1991 Gulf War.
Radar guided missiles fall into two main missile guidance types. In the historically more common semi-active radar homing case the missile homes in on radar signals transmitted from launching aircraft and reflected from the target. This has the disadvantage that the firing aircraft must maintain radar lock on the target and is thus less free to maneuver and more vulnerable to attack. A widely deployed missile of this type was the AIM-7 Sparrow, which entered service in 1954 and was produced in improving versions until 1997. In more advanced active radar homing the missile is guided to the vicinity of the target by internal data on its projected position, and then "goes active" with an internally carried small radar system to conduct terminal guidance to the target. This eliminates the requirement for the firing aircraft to maintain radar lock, and thus greatly reduces risk. A prominent example is the AIM-120 AMRAAM, which was first fielded in 1991 as the AIM-7 replacement, and which has no firm retirement date as of 2016. The current AIM-120D version has a maximum high altitude range of greater than 160 km (100 mi), and cost approximately $2.4 million each (2016). As is typical with most other missiles, range at lower altitude may be as little as one third that of high altitude.
In the Vietnam air war radar missile kill reliability was approximately 10% at shorter ranges, and even worse at longer ranges due to reduced radar return and greater time for the target aircraft to detect the incoming missile and take evasive action. At one point in the Vietnam war, the U.S. Navy fired 50 AIM-7 Sparrow radar guided missiles in a row without a hit. Between 1958 and 1982 in five wars there were 2,014 combined heat-seeking and radar guided missile firings by fighter pilots engaged in air-to-air combat, achieving 528 kills, of which 76 were radar missile kills, for a combined effectiveness of 26%. However, only 4 of the 76 radar missile kills were in the beyond-visual-range mode intended to be the strength of radar guided missiles. The United States invested over $10 billion in air-to-air radar missile technology from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Amortized over actual kills achieved by the U.S. and its allies, each radar guided missile kill thus cost over $130 million. The defeated enemy aircraft were for the most part older MiG-17s, −19s, and −21s, with new cost of $0.3 million to $3 million each. Thus, the radar missile investment over that period far exceeded the value of enemy aircraft destroyed, and furthermore had very little of the intended BVR effectiveness.
However, continuing heavy development investment and rapidly advancing electronic technology led to significant improvement in radar missile reliabilities from the late 1970s onward. Radar guided missiles achieved 75% Pk (9 kills out of 12 shots) in operations in the Gulf War in 1991. The percentage of kills achieved by radar guided missiles also surpassed 50% of total kills for the first time by 1991. Since 1991, 20 of 61 kills worldwide have been beyond-visual-range using radar missiles. Discounting an accidental friendly fire kill, in operational use the AIM-120D (the current main American radar guided missile) has achieved 9 kills out of 16 shots for a 56% Pk. Six of these kills were BVR, out of 13 shots, for a 46% BVR Pk. Though all these kills were against less capable opponents who were not equipped with operating radar, electronic countermeasures, or a comparable weapon themselves, the BVR Pk was a significant improvement from earlier eras. However, a current concern is electronic countermeasures to radar missiles, which are thought to be reducing the effectiveness of the AIM-120D. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The percentage of kills achieved by radar guided missiles also surpassed 50% of total kills for the first time by 1991. Since 1991, 20 of 61 kills worldwide have been beyond-visual-range using radar missiles. Discounting an accidental friendly fire kill, in operational use the AIM-120D (the current main American radar guided missile) has achieved 9 kills out of 16 shots for a 56% Pk. Six of these kills were BVR, out of 13 shots, for a 46% BVR Pk. Though all these kills were against less capable opponents who were not equipped with operating radar, electronic countermeasures, or a comparable weapon themselves, the BVR Pk was a significant improvement from earlier eras. However, a current concern is electronic countermeasures to radar missiles, which are thought to be reducing the effectiveness of the AIM-120D. Some experts believe that as of 2016 the European Meteor missile, the Russian R-37M, and the Chinese PL-15 are more resistant to countermeasures and more effective than the AIM-120D.
Now that higher reliabilities have been achieved, both types of missiles allow the fighter pilot to often avoid the risk of the short-range dogfight, where only the more experienced and skilled fighter pilots tend to prevail, and where even the finest fighter pilot can simply get unlucky. Taking maximum advantage of complicated missile parameters in both attack and defense against competent opponents does take considerable experience and skill, but against surprised opponents lacking comparable capability and countermeasures, air-to-air missile warfare is relatively simple. By partially automating air-to-air combat and reducing reliance on gun kills mostly achieved by only a small expert fraction of fighter pilots, air-to-air missiles now serve as highly effective force multipliers.
See also: List of fighter aircraft
List of United States fighter aircraft
Warbird
Notes:
References:
Citations:
Bibliography: Ahlgren, Jan; Linner, Anders; Wigert, Lars (2002), Gripen, the First Fourth Generation Fighter, Swedish Air Force and Saab Aerospace, ISBN 91-972803-8-0
Burton, James (1993), The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 978-1-61251-369-0
Blume, August G. (1968). Miller, Jr., Thomas G. (ed.). "Cross and Cockade Journal". History of the Serbian Air Force. Vol. 9, no. 3. Whittier, California: The Society of World War I Aero Historians.
Buttar, Prit (20 June 2014). Collision of Empires: The War on the Eastern Front in 1914. Bloomsbury USA. ISBN 978-1-78200648-0 – via Google Books.*Coox, Alvin (1985), Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939, Stanford University Press, ISBN 0-8047-1160-7
Coram, Robert (2002), Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, Little, Brown, and Company, ISBN 0-316-88146-5
Cross, Roy (1962), The Fighter Aircraft Pocket Book, Jarrold and Sons, Ltd.
Eden, Paul (2004). The Encyclopedia of Aircraft of WWII. Amber Books, Ltd, London. ISBN 1-904687-07-5.
Glenny, Misha (2012). The Balkans: 1804–2012. New York, New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-1-77089-273-6.
Grove, Eric; Ireland, Bernard (1997). Jane's War at Sea. Harper Collins. ISBN 0-00-472065-2.
Gunston, Bill; Spick, Mike (1983), Modern Air Combat, Crescent Books, ISBN 91-972803-8-0
Hammond, Grant T. (2001), The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security, Smithsonian Institution Press, ISBN 1-56098-941-6
Higby, Patrick (March 2005), Promise and Reality: Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air-To-Air Combat (PDF), Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, archived from the original (PDF) on 31 January 2017, retrieved 24 December 2016
Huenecke, Klaus (1987), Modern Combat Aircraft Design, Airlife Publishing Limited, ISBN 0-517-412659
Lee, John (1942). Fighter Facts and Fallacies. William Morrow and Company.
Munson, Kenneth (1976). Fighters Attack and Training Aircraft 1914-1919 (Revised ed.). Blandford.
Shaw, Robert (1985). Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-059-9.
Spick, Mike (1995), Designed for the Kill: The Jet Fighter—Development and Experience, United States Naval Institute, ISBN 0-87021-059-9
Spick, Mike (1987), An Illustrated Guide to Modern Fighter Combat, Salamander Books Limited, ISBN 0-86101-319-0
Spick, Mike (2000). Brassey's Modern Fighters. Pegasus Publishing Limited. ISBN 1-57488-247-3.
Sprey, Pierre (1982), "Comparing the Effectiveness of Air-to-Air Fighters: F-86 to F-18" (PDF), U.S. DoD Contract MDA 903-81-C-0312, archived from the original (PDF) on 27 August 2021, retrieved 2 July 2016
Stevenson, James (1993), The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 1-55750-775-9
Stimson, George (1983), Introduction to Airborne Radar, Hughes Aircraft Company
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Wagner, Raymond (2000), Mustang Designer: Edgar Schmued and the P-51, Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press
External links:
Fighter generations comparison chart on theaviationist.com |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter pilot | Recruitment: Fighter pilots are one of the most highly regarded and desirable positions of any air force. Selection processes only accept the elite out of all the potential candidates. An individual who possesses an exceptional academic record, physical fitness, healthy well-being, and a strong mental drive will have a higher chance of being selected for pilot training. Candidates are also expected to exhibit strong leadership and teamwork abilities. In nearly all air forces, fighter pilots are commissioned officers. This is also true for pilots of most other aircraft.
Fitness: Fighter pilots must be in optimal health to handle the physical demands of modern aerial warfare. Excellent heart condition is required, as the increased "G's" a pilot experiences in a turn can cause stress on the cardiovascular system. One "G" is equal to the force of gravity experienced under normal conditions, two "G"s would be twice the force of normal gravity. Some fighter aircraft can accelerate to up to 9 G's. Fighter pilots also require strong muscle tissue along the extremities and abdomen, for performing an anti-G straining maneuver (AGSM, see below) when performing tight turns and other highly accelerated maneuvers. Better-than-average visual acuity is also a highly desirable and valuable trait.
Tactics:
Offensive: Modern medium and long range active radar homing and semi-active radar homing missiles can be fired at targets outside or beyond visual range. However, when a pilot is dogfighting at short-range, his position relative to the opponent is decidedly important. Outperformance of another pilot and that pilot's aircraft is critical to maintain the upper-hand. A common saying for dogfighting is "lose sight, lose fight".
If one pilot had a greater missile range than the other, he would choose to fire his missile first, before being in range of the enemy's missile. Normally, the facts of an enemy's weapon payload is unknown, and are revealed as the fight progresses.
Some air combat maneuvers form the basis for the sport of aerobatics:
Basic
Split S
Immelmann turn
Thach Weave
The Scissors
Chandelle
Complex
Pugachev's Cobra
Herbst maneuver
Defensive: Pilots are trained to employ specific tactics and maneuvers when they are under attack. Attacks from missiles are usually countered with electronic countermeasures, Flares and chaff. Missiles like the AIM-120 AMRAAM, however, can actively home in on jamming signals.
Dogfighting at 1 to 4 miles (1,600 to 6,400 m) is considered "close". Pilots perform stressful maneuvers to gain advantage in the dogfight. Pilots need to be in good shape in order to handle the high G-forces caused by aerial combat. Pilots flex their legs and torso to keep blood from draining out of the head. This is known as the AGSM or the M1 or, sometimes, as the "grunt".
Defense against missiles: Many early air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles had very simple infrared homing ("heat seeking") guidance systems with a narrow field of view. These missiles could be avoided by simply turning sharply, which essentially caused the missile to lose sight of the target aircraft. Another tactic was to exploit a missile's limited range by performing evasive maneuvers until the missiles had run out of fuel.
Modern infrared missiles, like the AIM-9 Sidewinder, have a more advanced guidance system. Supercooled infrared detectors help the missile find a possible exhaust source, and software assists the missile in flying towards its target. Pilots normally drop flares to confuse or decoy these missiles by creating more multiple heat signatures hotter than that of the aircraft for the missile to lock onto and guide away from the defending aircraft.
Radar homing missiles could sometimes be confused by surface objects or geographical features causing clutter for the guidance system of either the missile or ground station guiding it. Chaff is another option in the case that the aircraft is too high up to use geographical obstructions. Pilots have to be aware of the potential threats and learn to distinguish between the two where possible. They use the radar warning receiver (RWR) to discern the types of signals hitting their aircraft.
G-force: When maneuvering fiercely during engagements, pilots are subjected to high G-force. G-forces express the magnitude of gravity, with 1G being equivalent to Earth's normal pull of gravity. Because modern jet aircraft are highly agile and have the capacity to make very sharp turns, the pilot's body is often pushed to the limit.
When executing a "positive G" maneuver like turning upwards the force pushes the pilot down. The most serious consequence of this is that the blood in the pilot's body is also pulled down and into their extremities. If the forces are great enough and over a sufficient period of time this can lead to blackouts (called G-induced loss of consciousness or G-LOC), because not enough blood is reaching the pilot's brain. To counteract this effect pilots are trained to tense their legs and abdominal muscles to restrict the "downward" flow of blood. This is known as the "grunt" or the "Hick maneuver". Both names allude to the sounds the pilot makes, and is the primary method of resisting G-LOCs. Modern flight suits, called G-suits, are worn by pilots to contract around the extremities exerting pressure, providing about 1G of extra tolerance.
Notable fighter pilots: Some notable fighter pilots, including some for being flying aces and others who went on to non-fighter pilot notability (record-breaking test pilots, astronauts and cosmonauts, politicians, business leaders, etc.):
Female fighter pilots: Until the early 1990s, women were disqualified from becoming fighter pilots in most of the air forces throughout the world. The exceptions being Turkey where Sabiha Gökçen became the first female fighter pilot in history in 1936 and went on to fly fast jets well into the 1950s, and the USSR during the Second World War 1942–1945 where many women were trained as fighter pilots in the 586th Fighter Aviation Regiment including Lilya Litvyak who became the top scoring woman ace of all time with 12 kills and Katya Budanova a close second with 11 kills, although both were killed in combat. During the 1990s, a number of air forces removed the bar on women becoming fighter pilots:
Bulgaria – On 30 October 1912 Rayna Kasabova has become the world's first woman in the world who participated in a military flight on a Voisin aircraft above Edirne during the First Balkan War.
France – Marie Marvingt was a record-breaking balloonist, an aviator, and during World War I she became the first female combat pilot. Marie Marvingt received a pilot's license from the Aéro-Club de France (Aero Club of France) on 8 November 1910. Licensed No. 281, she was the third Frenchwoman to be registered after Raymonde de Laroche (No. 36) and Marthe Niel (No. 226). In her first 900 flights she never "broke wood" in a crash, a record unequaled at that time. Marie flew in a number of air meets, bombed a German airbase twice as an unofficial pilot in World War I, flew on reconnaissance missions in the "pacification" of North Africa, and was the only woman to hold four pilot's licenses simultaneously: balloon, airplane, hydroplane and helicopter. In 1915 Marvingt became the first woman in the world to fly combat missions when she became a volunteer pilot flying bombing missions over German-held territory and she received the Croix de guerre (Military Cross) for her aerial bombing of a German military base in Metz.
Turkey – In 1936 Sabiha Gökçen became world's first female combat pilot while in 1958 Leman Altınçekiç was first female accredited jet pilot in NATO.
Soviet Union - Lydia Vladimirovna Litvyak was a fighter pilot in the Soviet Air Force during World War II. She was the first female fighter pilot to shoot down an enemy aircraft, the first of two female fighter pilots who have earned the title of fighter ace and the holder of the record for the greatest number of kills by a female fighter pilot. She was shot down near Orel during the Battle of Kursk as she attacked a formation of German aircraft. She was nicknamed the "White Lily of Stalingrad".
Soviet Union - Yekaterina "Katya" Budanova was another fighter pilot in the Soviet Air Force during World War II and along with Lydia Litvyak, she is often considered one of the world's two female fighter aces credited with five or more aerial victories, She was shot down by either Luftwaffe ace Georg Schwientek of JG 52 or ace Emil Bitsch, of JG 3.
Soviet Union - Mariya Kuznetsova was a Soviet fighter pilot who originally flew with the women's 586th Fighter Aviation Regiment but was later transferred to the 437th Fighter Aviation Regiment with Yekaterina Budanova, Lydia Litvyak, and several other members of the unit in September 1942. She flew over 100 sorties.
Soviet Union - Raisa Belyaeva was one of the first Russian female fighter pilots. She fought alongside Lydia Litvyak and was credited with up to three aerial victories. She died in combat in a crash on 19 July 1943. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter pilot | Soviet Union - Mariya Kuznetsova was a Soviet fighter pilot who originally flew with the women's 586th Fighter Aviation Regiment but was later transferred to the 437th Fighter Aviation Regiment with Yekaterina Budanova, Lydia Litvyak, and several other members of the unit in September 1942. She flew over 100 sorties.
Soviet Union - Raisa Belyaeva was one of the first Russian female fighter pilots. She fought alongside Lydia Litvyak and was credited with up to three aerial victories. She died in combat in a crash on 19 July 1943.
Soviet Union - Mariya Tolstova a Soviet flight commander in the 175th Guards Attack Aviation Regiment, and one of the few women to fly the Il-2.
Soviet Union - Tamara Kazarinova was a Soviet pilot and the commander of the 586th Fighter Aviation Regiment during the Second World War.
Soviet Union - Olga Yamshchikova was Soviet fighter pilot squadron commander, credited with three shootdowns during World War II who became a test pilot after the war. During her postwar aviation career she became the first woman to fly the MiG-19.
Soviet Union - Tamara Konstantinova was Ilyushin Il-2 pilot and deputy squadron commander in the Soviet Air Force during the Second World War.
Soviet Union - Lidiya Shulaykina was one of the few women Ilyushin Il-2 pilots and the only female ground-attack pilot in naval aviation during the Second World War.
USA - Jacqueline "Jackie" Cochran was a pioneer in women's aviation, one of the most prominent racing pilots of her generation. She set numerous records and was the first woman to break the sound barrier on 18 May 1953 in an F-86 Sabrejet. She was the wartime head of the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASP) (1943–1944), which employed about 1000 civilian American women in a non-combat role to ferry planes from factories to port cities. On September 9, 1948, Cochran joined the U.S. Air Force Reserve as a lieutenant colonel. She was promoted to colonel in 1969 and retired in 1970. Postwar, Cochran began flying new jet aircraft, setting numerous records. She became the first woman pilot to "go supersonic". Among her many record accomplishments, from August to October 1961, as a consultant to Northrop Corporation, Cochran set a series of speed, distance and altitude records while flying a Northrop T-38A-30-NO Talon supersonic trainer. On the final day of the record series, she set two Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) world records, taking the T-38 to altitudes of 55,252.625 feet (16,841 m) in horizontal flight and reaching a peak altitude of 56,072.835 feet (17,091 m). Cochran was also the first woman to land and take off from an aircraft carrier, the first woman to pilot a bomber across the North Atlantic (in 1941) and later to fly a jet aircraft on a transatlantic flight, the first woman to make a blind (instrument) landing, the only woman ever to be president of the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (1958–1961), the first woman to fly a fixed-wing, jet aircraft across the Atlantic, the first pilot to fly above 20,000 feet (6,096 m) with an oxygen mask, and the first woman to enter the Bendix Transcontinental Race. She still holds more distance and speed records than any pilot living or dead, male or female.
France - Jacqueline Auriol was a French aviator who set several world speed records. She earned a military pilot license in 1950 then qualified as one of the first female test pilots. She was among the first women to break the sound barrier and set five world speed records in the 1950s and 1960s in French fighter jets like the Mystère and Dassault Mirages.
North Korea - In late 1952, with the Korean War in full swing, the North Korean Air Force was the only one in the world with female jet fighter pilots. One of them, Tha Sen Hi, flew MiG-15s in combat and eventually rose to squadron leader. She was honoured with the title of Hero of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.
Somalia – Asli Hassan Asli Hassan Abade – on 9 September 1976, is the first African female pilot in the (Somali Air Force – SAF). She soloed her first flight – MiG-21.
USA – Captain Rosemary "Sabre" Bryant Mariner was an American jet pilot and one of the first six women to earn their wings as a United States Naval Aviator in 1974. She was the first female military pilot to fly a tactical jet and the first to achieve command of an operational aviation squadron. She was designated a Naval Aviator in June 1974 and became one of the first six women to earn their wings as a United States Naval Aviator, alongside Barbara Allen Rainey, Jane Skiles O'Dea, Judith Ann Neuffer, Ana Marie Fuqua, and Joellen Drag. In 1975, Mariner was one of the first female military aviators to fly a tactical strike aircraft, a single seat A-4L Skyhawk. In 1976, she transitioned to the A-7E Corsair II, making her the first woman to fly a front-line tactical strike aircraft. During Operation Desert Storm in 1990, she commanded US Navy Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron Thirty Four (VAQ-34).
USA - Until the 1970s, aviation had been a traditionally male occupation in the United States. Commerce Department regulations virtually required pilots to have flown in the military to acquire sufficient flight hours, and until the 1970s, the U.S. Air Force and Navy barred women from flying and they were routinely denied work in commercial piloting. The US military did not open fighter jet flights to women until 1993. In the 1970s, women were again, for the first time since WWII, permitted to fly in the United States Armed Forces, beginning with the Navy and the Army in 1974, and then the Air Force in 1976. The first graduating class of ten female Air Force officers earned their Silver Wings on September 2, 1977. These ten women were part of Class 77-08 and graduated at Williams Air Force Base. These female aviators were Captains Connie Engel, Kathy La Sauce, Mary Donahue, Susan Rogers and Christine Schott; First Lieutenants Sandra Scott and Victoria Crawford; Second Lieutenants Mary Livingston, Carol Scherer and Kathleen Rambo.
USA - On 2 May 1977 First Lieutenant Christine E. Schott, USAF, was the first woman in the Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training Program to solo in the Northrop T-38A Talon supersonic flight trainer at Williams AFB, Arizona. She was a member of Class 77–08, which entered on 19 September 1976.
Russia - Svetlana Savitskaya is a Russian former jet aviator and Soviet cosmonaut who flew aboard Soyuz T-7 in 1982, becoming the second woman in space. On her 1984 Soyuz T-12 mission she became the first woman to fly to space twice, and the first woman to perform a spacewalk. After graduating from the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI) in 1972, she trained as a test pilot at the Fedotov Test Pilot School, graduating in 1976. In May 1978 she start working for aircraft manufacturer Yakovlev, as a test pilot. Between 1969 and 1977 she was a member of the Soviet national aerobatics team. Savitskaya retired in 1993 from the Russian Air Force in the rank of Major. She set several FAI world records as a MiG-21 & MiG-25 pilot.
Algeria – In 1982 Hakima Abdessamad became the first Algerian female fighter pilot in the Algerian Air Force after qualifying to fly the MiG-15, the MiG-17 and the MiG-21.
Canada – In 1989 Dee Brasseur and Jane Foster became the first female fighter pilots in the Royal Canadian Air Force after qualifying to fly the CF-18 Hornet.
Sweden – In 1991 Anna Dellham became Sweden's first female fighter pilot serving with a Viggen squadron, before in 2011 qualifying to fly the Gripen.
Norway – In 1992 Mette "Jet-Mette" Grøtteland became the first female fighter pilot in the Royal Norwegian Air Force after qualifying to fly the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon.
Netherlands – Between 1993 and 1997 Manja Blok the first female fighter pilot in the Royal Netherlands Air Force was active flying a General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon over Bosnia enforcing the no fly zone. She had qualified on the F-16 in 1991. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter pilot | Canada – In 1989 Dee Brasseur and Jane Foster became the first female fighter pilots in the Royal Canadian Air Force after qualifying to fly the CF-18 Hornet.
Sweden – In 1991 Anna Dellham became Sweden's first female fighter pilot serving with a Viggen squadron, before in 2011 qualifying to fly the Gripen.
Norway – In 1992 Mette "Jet-Mette" Grøtteland became the first female fighter pilot in the Royal Norwegian Air Force after qualifying to fly the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon.
Netherlands – Between 1993 and 1997 Manja Blok the first female fighter pilot in the Royal Netherlands Air Force was active flying a General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon over Bosnia enforcing the no fly zone. She had qualified on the F-16 in 1991.
USA – In 1993 Jeannie "Tally" Leavitt became the first female USAF fighter pilot, initially being assigned to a McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle squadron, and subsequently flying 300 combat hours, mostly over Afghanistan and Iraq. She was the first woman to command a USAF combat fighter wing, the 4th Fighter Wing on June 14, 2012 . She became commander of a second fighter wing on April 16, 2016, taking command of the 57th Wing at the Nellis Air Force Base. She is the first woman fighter pilot in the USAF who got promoted to the high rank of major general on September 2, 2019. She logged more than 3,000 fight hours as pilot in command, including over 300 combat hours.
UK – In 1994 Jo Salter was declared combat ready by the Royal Air Force flying a Panavia Tornado in 617 Squadron becoming Britains first female fighter pilot.
Belgium – In 1994 Anne-Marie "Mie" Jansen becomes the first Belgian female fighter pilot, flying the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. She also survived a F-16 mishap, ejecting safely, after running of the runway and collapsing inverted on May 12, 1995.
USA – Then Lieutenant Bobbi J. Doorenbos became the first female USAF Air National Guard F-16 fighter pilot with the 185th Fighter Wing in June 1997. In 2015, by then promoted to colonel, she became the first female commander of the 188th Fighter Wing of the Arkansas Air National Guard. Doorenbos a senior fighter pilot with more than 1,200 hours in the F-16C got promoted to the first female brigadier general of the USAF Air National Guard on September 28, 2017.
USA – In August 1999 Lieutenant Colonel Shawna Rochelle Kimbrell became the first female African-American fighter pilot in the history of the US Air Force. She flew the F-16 Fighting Falcon during combat missions in Operation Northern Watch and is stationed at Nellis Air Force Base.
France – In 1999 Caroline Aigle became the first woman to receive the French Air Force's coveted fighter pilot wings. She was assigned to fly the Mirage 2000-5.
Canada – In November 2000, Maryse Carmichael was selected to fly with the Canadian Forces Snowbirds aerobatic team, becoming the first woman on the team. In May 2010 she was named the commander of the Snowbirds, becoming the first female pilot to lead the squad.
South Africa – Catherine "Siren" Labuschagne got her wings in 2000 and flew the Impala and Hawk before in 2010 completing her maiden solo flight in the South African Air Force's Gripen Jas 39C, becoming the first woman fighter pilot ever to fly the Gripen.
Israel – In 2001 Roni Zuckerman became the first Israeli woman to qualify as a fighter pilot.
Finland – In 2002 Inka Niskanen became Finland's first female fighter pilot, flying BAE Hawks and F/A-18 Hornets. In January 2019, Niskanen took command of the Karelia Air Command 31 Squadron, as the first woman to hold such a post in Finland.
Uruguay – In 2002 María Eugenia Etcheverry, A-37B Dragonfly pilot and Carolina Arévalo, IA 58 Pucará pilot became first female fighter pilots in both Uruguayan Air Force and Latin America.
Singapore – In 2003 Khoo Teh Lynn became Singapore's first female fighter pilot, flying General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons.
Denmark – In 2005 Line Bonde graduated from the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training program at Sheppard Air Force Base in Texas, US, as Denmark's first female fighter pilot.
Italy - Samantha Cristoforetti is an Italian European Space Agency astronaut, and former Italian Air Force fighter pilot and engineer. She holds the record for the longest uninterrupted spaceflight by a European astronaut (199 days, 16 hours), She graduated in Aeronautics Sciences (University 'Federico II', Naples) at the Accademia Aeronautica in Pozzuoli, becoming one of the first women to be a lieutenant and fighter pilot in the Italian Air Force. In 2005/2006 as part of her training in the US, she completed the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) program. She has logged over 500 hours and has flown six types of military aircraft: SF-260, T-37, T-38, MB-339A, MB-339CD and AM-X. She was assigned to 51° Stormo, 132° Gruppo.
USA From November 2005 till November 2007 (now retired) Colonel Nicole "Fifi" Malachowski was the first female pilot selected to fly as part of the USAF Air Demonstration Squadron, better known as the Thunderbirds in their F-16 Fighting Falcons. Prior to that she was an F-15E Pilot, Instructor Pilot, Chief of Life Support, Assistant Chief of Scheduling, Weapons Flight Electronic Combat Pilot, Functional Check Flight Pilot, Supervisor of Flying at the 336th Fighter Squadron. On 18 November 2011, she took command of the 333d Fighter Squadron at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. After successfully completing her tour with the USAF Thunderbirds in November 2007, including approximately 140 performances, Malachowski served on staff of the Commander, United States Air Force Warfare Center, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, to June 2008.
Pakistan - In March 2006, the Pakistan Air Force officially inducted a batch of 34 fighter pilots which included the organization's first four female fighter pilots. Three years of fighter pilot training had been completed by the pilots at PAF Academy - Risalpur flying amongst other the Cessna T-37 Tweet basic jet trainer and K-8 intermediate jet trainer, before they graduated and were awarded their Flying Badges during the ceremony. Certificates of honour were handed to the successful cadets by General Ahsan Saleem Hayat, then the vice-chief of the Pakistan Army, who acknowledged that the PAF was the first branch of the Pakistani military to introduce women to its combat units. One of the women, Flying Officer Nadia Gul, was awarded a trophy for best academic achievement. The other female graduates were Mariam Khalil, Saira Batool and Cadet Saba Khan. A second batch of pilots, including three female pilots, graduated from the 117th Pilot course at PAF Academy - Risalpur in September 2006. The Sword of Honour for best all-round performance was awarded to Aviation Cadet Saira Amin, the first female pilot to win the award. Aviation Cadet Saira Amin also had won the Asghar Hussain Trophy for best performance in academics.
Spain - Rosa García-Malea López became the first female fighter pilot in the Spanish Air Force after qualifying to fly F/A-18 Hornet jet fighter aircraft in 2006. With more than 1,250 flight hours and after participating in the Libyan war in 2011, after 15 years service in Spanish air force, she joined Patrulla Águila the aerobatic demonstration team as a Casa C-101 pilot.
Chile – In 2006 Karina Miranda started her flight training on Northrop F-5 and made her solo flight with F-5 Tiger III on April 29, 2010, became first female fighter pilot in Chilean Air Force.
Malaysia – In 2007 Patricia Yapp Syau Yin from Royal Malaysian Air Force became the first Asian female fighter Pilot for Mikoyan MiG-29 after four years for flying an Aermacchi MB-339CM. She also performed inside RMAF aerobatics team, Smokey Bandits inside the squadrons.
Germany – In 2007 Ulrike Flender graduated from Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training program to become Germany's first female fighter pilot.
Germany In 2007 then Oberleutnant Nicola "Niki Bam Bam" Winter – Baumann became the second female fighter pilot in the history of the German Air Force flying both Tornado and Eurofighter Typhoon in the German Air Force. As a fighter pilot, now Major, Nicola Baumann applied to be Germany's first female astronaut among 86 candidates on the list as of September 2016 and was one of 30 women taking part in the final selection process as of December 2016. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter pilot | She also performed inside RMAF aerobatics team, Smokey Bandits inside the squadrons.
Germany – In 2007 Ulrike Flender graduated from Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training program to become Germany's first female fighter pilot.
Germany In 2007 then Oberleutnant Nicola "Niki Bam Bam" Winter – Baumann became the second female fighter pilot in the history of the German Air Force flying both Tornado and Eurofighter Typhoon in the German Air Force. As a fighter pilot, now Major, Nicola Baumann applied to be Germany's first female astronaut among 86 candidates on the list as of September 2016 and was one of 30 women taking part in the final selection process as of December 2016. She was selected as one of two winners, but later withdrew from the programme.
Morocco - In 2007 Sub-Lieutenant Hanae Zarouali became the first Moroccan female jet pilot in service of the Royal Moroccan Air Force.
South Korea – In 2008 Ha Jeong-mi became the first South Korean female fighter pilot, flying the KF-16 fighter.
UK - On 13 May 2009, the Red Arrows announced including their first female display pilot. Flt. Lt. Kirsty Moore (née Stewart) joined for the 2010 season. She joined the Royal Air Force in 1998 and was a qualified flying instructor on the Hawk aircraft at RAF Valley. Prior to joining the team, she flew the Tornado GR4 at RAF Marham.
Ukraine – Nadiya Savchenko is a former Army aviation pilot in the Ukrainian Ground Forces, one of Ukraine's first women to train as a military aeroplane pilot in 2009, and is the only female aviator to pilot the Sukhoi Su-24 bomber and the Mil Mi-24 helicopter.
France – Commandant Virginie Guyot a Mirage F1-CR fighter pilot of the Armée de l'Air who achieved an historical first when she was appointed leader of the Patrouille de France, becoming the first woman in the world to command a precision aerobatic demonstration team on 25 November 2009. At the same time, she was the first woman to join the Patrouille de France, one of the world's oldest and most skilled demonstration teams.
USA – In 2011 the first all-female U.S. Air Force combat mission is flown by Maj. Christine Mau, Maj. Tracy Schmidt, Capt. Leigh Larkin, and Capt. Jennifer Morton, called the "Strike Eagles of 'Dudette 07'". They fly two F-15E jets in a sortie over Afghanistan.
Brazil – On May 3, 2011, Carla Alexandre Borges became the first woman to fly an FAB AMX A-1 fighter aircraft.
USA – In 2011 Lt. Col. (then Major) Caroline "Blaze" Jensen was the third woman and the first mother to fly in the USAF Air Demonstration Squadron Thunderbirds team. As the daughter of a Marine helicopter pilot in Vietnam, she graduated from the Air Force Academy with a bachelor's degree in English and spent more than 10 years on active duty as a reservist with more than 3500 flying hours. She's the first female reserve officer to fly with the Thunderbirds. She also flew over 200 combat hours in the F-16 Fighting Falcon over Iraq. Jensen also became the first qualified female pilot in the T-7A Red Hawk.
Poland – In 2012 it was reported that Katarzyna Tomiak had become a Mig-29 fighter pilot in the Polish Air Force.
China – In 2013 China publicised the graduation of six of the PLAAF's first-batch of female fighter pilots.
Pakistan – In 2013 Ayesha Farooq became Pakistan's first female fighter pilot flying the Chinese-made F-7PG fighter jet. Out of six female fighter pilots in the PAF, Flight Lieutenant Farooq is the first qualified for combat and to fly sorties along the border. Farooq is one of 19 women to have become pilots in the PAF since the 2000s.
USA – On 22 December 2013 Cmdr. Sara Annette "Clutch" Joyner became the first female strike fighter pilot to command a Navy carrier air wing after earlier commanded a US Navy fighter squadron. She became a fighter pilot in 1996, flying an F/A-18 Hornet with VFA-147. She assumed command of Strike Fighter Squadron 105 from Cmdr. Douglas C. Verissimo on 2 March 2007 as the first female to do so. She turned over command to Cmdr. Thomas R. Tennant on 9 June 2008. She later became deputy commander of Carrier Air Wing Three, assuming full command from Capt. Michael S. Wallace on 4 January 2013. The air wing embarked on a deployment aboard USS Harry S. Truman on 22 July 2013. She commanded the air wing until relieved by Capt. George M. Wikoff.
USA - In February 2014 Major General Sherrie L. McCandless became the first woman to command the 124th Fighter Wing and, therefore, the first female wing commander in Idaho Air National Guard history. She is an experienced F-16C/D Fighter Pilot and Instructor Pilot and has commanded units at the squadron levels. She is the Commanding General, District of Columbia National Guard.
Czech Republic – In 2014 Lt. Katerina Hlavsova became the first female Czech Air Force Aero L-39 Albatros and L-159 Fighter Pilot.
United Arab Emirates – In 2014 Mariam al-Mansuri was UAEs first female fighter pilot, flying General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons in combat missions against ISIS in Syria.
Taiwan – In 2014 three female aviators graduated from the Taiwanese Air Force Academy's class, becoming the nation's first female fighter pilots Cpt. Chiang Ching-hua pilots the Mirage 2000, Cpt. Chiang Hui-yu pilots the F-16 Fighting Falcon, and Cpt. Fan Yi-lin who pilots the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) the AIDC F-CK-1 Ching-kuo.
USA - Lt. Col. Christine "Grinder" Mau of the U.S. Air Force became the first U.S. female pilot to fly the F-35 Lightning II jet in 2015.
India – In June 2016 Flight cadets Avani Chaturvedi of Madhya Pradesh, Mohana Singh of Rajasthan and Bhawana Kanth of Bihar, all in their early-20s, bring in a new era for the Indian defense forces. Mohana Singh Jitarwal became the first Indian women fighter pilot fully operational on the Hawk Mk.132 advance jet trainer. Chaturvedi became the first Indian woman pilot to take a solo flight in a MIG-21 Bison and was promoted to the rank of Flight Lieutenant in 2018. Chaturvedi is now part of Indian Air Force No. 23 Squadron Panthers. Kanth, who like the two others first trained on BAE Hawk Mk.132 advance jet trainers, is now flying the MIG-21 Bison with the Indian Air Force's No. 3 Squadron Cobras.
Greece - In 2016 Ioanna Chrysaugi became the first Greek female fighter pilot flying the RF-4E Phantom II in the Hellenic Air Force. Squadron Leader Chrysaugi now is a pilot trainer.
Zambia – In 2016 Thokozile Muwamba became the first female fighter pilot in Zambia, flying the K-8 and the L-15Z in the Zambian Air Force.
Canada – In 2016 Capt. Sarah Dallaire, made history as the first husband-and-wife team to fly with the same Canadian Snowbirds 431 Air Demonstration Squadron. Dallaire, only the 2nd Snowbird female pilot ever, flew in the Canadair CT-114 Tutor as Snowbird 2 on the inner right wing, while her husband Capt. Kevin Domon-Grenier, flew as Snowbird 5 in the second line astern position.
USA – In 2017 Capt. Kelsey "Pug" Casey became the United States Marine Corps' only female AV-8B Harrier "jump jet" pilot. She also made another unique move. She was selected to enter training to join the Joint Strike Fighter F35B Lightning II program as the first female Harrier pilot in 2019.
Australia – In December 2017 Australia graduated its first female jet fighter pilots.
Zimbabwe – Squadron Leader Angeline Bosha qualified as a fighter jet pilot after she completed a year-long training course in China in the year 2018 flying the K-8 Karakorum as Zimbabwe's first female fighter jet pilot.
Japan – In August 2018 First lieutenant Misa Matsushima became the first Japanese female fighter pilot, flying the F-15J Eagle with the 305th Tactical Fighter Squadron.
USA – Major Michelle "Mace" Curran was the first woman to fly as part of the 335th Fighter Squadron of the USAF. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter pilot | She also made another unique move. She was selected to enter training to join the Joint Strike Fighter F35B Lightning II program as the first female Harrier pilot in 2019.
Australia – In December 2017 Australia graduated its first female jet fighter pilots.
Zimbabwe – Squadron Leader Angeline Bosha qualified as a fighter jet pilot after she completed a year-long training course in China in the year 2018 flying the K-8 Karakorum as Zimbabwe's first female fighter jet pilot.
Japan – In August 2018 First lieutenant Misa Matsushima became the first Japanese female fighter pilot, flying the F-15J Eagle with the 305th Tactical Fighter Squadron.
USA – Major Michelle "Mace" Curran was the first woman to fly as part of the 335th Fighter Squadron of the USAF. She was an F-16 instructor before joining the USAF Air Demonstration Squadron Thunderbirds in 2019 as the Lead Solo Pilot for the Squadron. Curran was the fifth woman to fly with the Thunderbirds for three years till October 2021.
Switzerland – In February 2019 Fanny Chollet became the first Swiss female fighter pilot, flying the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet in the Swiss Air Force.
Mexico – Lieutenant Karen Vanessa Velázquez Ruiz, the first Mexican female pilot to fly the Northrop F-5 fighter plane at the Mexican Military Parade Day on 16 September 2019.
USA – United States Air Force fighter pilot Captain Melanie Ziebart became the first female exchange pilot flying with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 121 Green Knights, reinforcing Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 265, aboard the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6). Operating the US Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II aircraft aboard the ship. Ziebart was chosen for the Euro-NATO Joint Jet pilot training program at Sheppard Air Force Base where she was officially selected as a fighter pilot and chosen to fly the F-16C Viper at the 80th Fighter Squadron at Kunsan Air Base, Korea. Accidentally the same aircraft her father, a retired USAF fighter pilot with the 35th Fighter Squadron also at Kunsan Air Base, flew. Ziebart's inter-service experience has been eye-opening. After her exchange with the Marines, she returns to an Air Force squadron and her goal is to teach and mentor young fighter pilots as an instructor.
Indonesia – In May 2020 Second lieutenant Ajeng Tresna Dwi Wijayanti became the first Indonesian female fighter pilot, flying the KAI T-50 Golden Eagle.
USA – In February 2020 then Captain Kristin "Beo" Wolfe was announced as the new Commander and Demo Pilot of the F-35A Lightning II Demonstration Team and became the first female USAF F-35A Demo Team Pilot. Her father was an F-4 Phantom WSO and later became an F-15 pilot. After graduating pilot training she started her career flying the F-22A Raptor at the 94th Fighter Squadron "Hat in the Ring" at Langley Air Force Base (VA) for three years before eventually transitioning to the F-35A. When she is not busy with F-35A Demo tasks, she integrates back in to the 421st Fighter Squadron "Black Widows" and acts as an instructor and flies regular combat training missions in the rank of Major.
Italy - In September 2021, Major Ilaria Ragona became commander of the 18º Gruppo caccia (18th Fighter Group), first woman in command of a hunting group that is part of the 37th Stormo of the Italian Air Force flying the Eurofighter Typhoon.
Philippines - 1st Lt. Jul Laiza Mae Camposano-Beran was introduced by the Philippine Air Force as its first ever female jet fighter pilot on March 30, 2022. She is regarded as an SIAI-Marchetti A-211 jet combat mission ready pilot and wingman as of April 2022. She is a member of PAF's 5th Fighter Wing stationed at the Cesar Basa Air Base in Floridablanca, Pampanga. Camposano-Beran graduated from the Philippine Air Force Flying School in 2017 after completing her military pilot training. She was the first combat ready out of three female pilots undergoing training on flying and handling the AS-211 fighter jet.
USA – On May 25, 2022, Lt. Amanda "Stalin" Lee was named as the first ever woman selected for the US Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron Blue Angels as a demo F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter pilot.
See also: Fighter aircraft
Flying aces
List of aces of aces
Military aviation
Operation Red Flag
United States Navy Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor program
References:
Works cited: Ganson, Barbara (February 21, 2015). "U.S. Women of Military Aviation History Since World War I". Women of Aviation Week. Vancouver, Canada: Institute for Women Of Aviation Worldwide. Archived from the original on 26 December 2016. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
Getline, Meryl (March 1, 2005). "Becoming a female pilot: then and now". USA Today. McLean, Virginia. Archived from the original on 1 February 2014. Retrieved 2012-05-18.
Goodpaster, Amy (2007). Flying for Her Country: the American and Soviet women military pilots of World War II. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-275-99434-1.
Gordon, Yefim (2001). Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 : the Soviet Union's long-lived Korean War fighter. Hinckley: Midland Pub. ISBN 1-85780-105-9.
Milanetti, Gian Piero (2011). Le Streghe della Notte: La storia non detta delle eroiche ragazze-pilota dell'Unione Sovietica nella Grande Guerra Patriottica (in Italian). Istituto Bibliografico Napoleone, Roma, Italia. ISBN 978-88-7565-100-8.
Skogen, Jenny (2014). Yes She Did!: Aerospace. La Jolla, California: Scobre Educational. ISBN 978-1-62920-327-0.
Swopes, Brian R. (2015). "2 September 1977: Class 77-08". Women in Aerospace History. Archived from the original on 28 December 2016. Retrieved 28 December 2016.
Turner, Denice (2011). Writing the Heavenly Frontier: Metaphor, Geography, and Flight Autobiography in America 1927–1954. Costerus New Series 187. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Rodopi. ISBN 978-90-420-3297-2.
Further reading:
Non-fiction: Amir, Brig. Gen. Amos (2005). Fire in the Sky: Flying in Defence of Israel. Pen & Sword Aviation. ISBN 1-84415-156-5
Lewis, Cecil Sagittarius Rising. Warner Books (1936). ISBN 0-7515-0931-0
Bell, Ken (1993). 100 Missions North: A Fighter Pilots Story of the Vietnam War. Brassey's. ISBN 1-57488-639-8
Chesire, John. Flitetime: A U.S. Navy Fighter Pilot Autobiography, by John Chesire.
Franks, Norman, Bailey, Frank, and Guest, Russell (1994). Above the Lines: A Complete Record of the Fighter Aces of the German Air Service, Naval Air Service and Flanders Marine Corps 1914–1918. Grub Street. ISBN 0-948817-73-9.
Jackson, Robert (1979). Fighter: The Story of Air Combat 1936–1945. Arthur Baker Ltd. ISBN 0-213-16717-4.
O'Grady, Scott with Coplan, Jeff (1995). Return with Honour. Harper. ISBN 0-06-101147-9
Olds, Robin with Olds, Christina, and Rasimus, Ed (2010). Fighter Pilot: The Memoirs of Legendary Ace Robin Olds. St. Martins Press. ISBN 978-0-312-56023-2.
Olynk, Frank (1995).Stars & Bars: A Tribute to the American Fighter Ace 1920–1973. Grub Street. ISBN 1-898697-17-5
Polak, Tomas with Shores, Christopher (1999). Stalins Falcons: The Aces of the Red Star. Grub Street. ISBN 1-902304-01-2.
Romm, Major Gen. Giora (2014). Solitary: The Crash, Captivity and Comeback of an Ace Fighter Pilot. Black Irish. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter pilot | Harper. ISBN 0-06-101147-9
Olds, Robin with Olds, Christina, and Rasimus, Ed (2010). Fighter Pilot: The Memoirs of Legendary Ace Robin Olds. St. Martins Press. ISBN 978-0-312-56023-2.
Olynk, Frank (1995).Stars & Bars: A Tribute to the American Fighter Ace 1920–1973. Grub Street. ISBN 1-898697-17-5
Polak, Tomas with Shores, Christopher (1999). Stalins Falcons: The Aces of the Red Star. Grub Street. ISBN 1-902304-01-2.
Romm, Major Gen. Giora (2014). Solitary: The Crash, Captivity and Comeback of an Ace Fighter Pilot. Black Irish. ISBN 978-1-936891-28-3
Rosenkranz, Keith (2002).Diary of a Gulf War Fighter Pilot. McGraw Hill. ISBN 0-07-140040-0.
Shores, Christopher, Franks, Norman, and Guest, Russell (1990). Above the Trenches: A Complete Record of the Fighter Aces and Units of the British Empire Air Forces 1915–1920. Grub Street. ISBN 0-948817-19-4.
Shores, Christopher and Williams, Clive (1994). Aces High: A Tribute to the Most Notable Fighter Pilots of the British and Commonwealth Forces in WWII. Grub Street. ISBN 1-898697-00-0.
Spector, Brig Gen. Iftach. Loud and Clear: The Memoir of an Israeli Fighter Pilot. Zenith Press (2009). ISBN 978-07603-3630-4.
Toliver, Raymond F. and Constable, Brig. Gen. Trevor J. (1968). Horrido: Fighter Aces of the Luftwaffe. Arthur Barker Ltd. ISBN 0-213-76381-8.
Toliver, Raymond F. and Constable, Trevor J. (1970). The Blonde Knight of Germany: A Biography of Erich Hartmann. TAB Aero. ISBN 0-8306-8189-2.
Ward, Nigel "Sharkey" (1992). Sea Harrier Over the Falklands. Orion. ISBN 1-85797-102-7.
Yeager, Chuck with Janos, Leo (1985). Yeager: An Autobiography. Century Huitchinson. ISBN 0-7126-9493-5.
Fiction: Berent, Mark. Eagle Station. G P Putnam's Sons (1992). ISBN 0-399-13722-X.
Berent, Mark. Phantom Leader. Jove Books (1991). ISBN 0-515-10785-9.
Berent, Mark. Rolling Thunder. Corgi Books (1989). ISBN 0-552-13620-4.
Berent, Mark. Steel Tiger. Jove Books (1990). ISBN 0-515-10467-1.
Berent, Mark. Storm Flight. G P Putnam's Sons (1993). ISBN 0-399-13814-5.
Deighton, Len. Goodbye, Mickey Mouse. Hutchinson and Co (1982). ISBN 978-0-586-05448-2.
Robinson, Derek. A Good Clean Fight. HarperCollins (1993). ISBN 0-00-647605-8.
Robinson, Derek. A Splendid Little War. Maclehose Press (2013). ISBN 978-0-85705-232-2
Robinson, Derek. Goshawk Squadron. Maclehose Press (1971). ISBN 978-0857052247.
Robinson, Derek. Hornet's Sting. The Harvill Press (1999). ISBN 1-86046-606-0.
Robinson, Derek. Piece of Cake. Pan (1983). ISBN 0-330-28404-5.
Robinson, Derek. War Story. Pan (1987). ISBN 0-00-647332-6.
Salter, James. The Hunters. Vintage International (1956). ISBN 0-375-70392-6.
Smith, Frederick E. A Killing for the Hawks. Harrap (1966) ASIN B0000CN76J.
Yeates, V. M. Winged Victory. Jonathon Cape (1934). ISBN 0-907675-45-X.
External links:
Air Aces Homepage (A. Magnus)
Air Aces Website (Jan Šafařík)
Air Combat Information Group Website
An Autobiographical Sketch of a U. S. Naval Aviator and Fighter Pilot
Fly like a fighter: Minimum fuel
New Zealand Fighter Pilots Museum |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter-bomber | Development: Prior to World War II, general limitations in available engine and aeronautical technology required that each proposed military aircraft have its design tailored to a specific prescribed role. Engine power grew dramatically during the early period of the war, roughly doubling between 1939 and 1943. The Bristol Blenheim, a typical light bomber of the opening stages of the war, was originally designed in 1934 as a fast civil transport to meet a challenge by Lord Rothermere, owner of the Daily Mail. It had two Bristol Mercury XV radial engines of 920 hp (690 kW) each, a crew of three, and its payload was just 1,200 lb (540 kg) of bombs. The Blenheim suffered disastrous losses over France in 1939 when it encountered Messerschmitt Bf 109s, and light bombers were quickly withdrawn.
In contrast, the Vought F4U Corsair fighter—which entered service in December 1942—had in common with its eventual U.S. Navy stablemate, the Grumman F6F Hellcat and the massive, seven-ton USAAF Republic P-47 Thunderbolt—a single Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp radial engine of 2,000 hp (1,500 kW) in a much smaller, simpler and less expensive single-seat aircraft, and was the first aircraft design to ever fly with the Double Wasp engine in May 1940. With less airframe and crew to lift, the Corsair's ordnance load was either four High Velocity Aircraft Rockets or 2,000 lb (910 kg) of bombs; a later version could carry eight rockets or 4,000 lb (1,800 kg) of bombs. The massive, powerful 18-cylinder Double Wasp engine weighed almost a ton—half as much again as the V12 Rolls-Royce Merlin and twice as much as the 9-cylinder Bristol Mercury that powered some heavy fighters.
Increased engine power meant that many existing fighter designs could carry useful bomb loads, and adapt to the fighter-bomber role. Notable examples include the Focke-Wulf Fw 190, Hawker Typhoon and Republic P-47 Thunderbolt. Various bombing tactics and techniques could also be used: some designs were intended for high-level bombing, others for the low-level semi-horizontal bombing, or even for low-level steep dive bombing as exemplified by the Blackburn Skua and North American A-36 Apache.
Larger twin-engined aircraft were also used in the fighter-bomber role, especially where longer ranges were needed for naval strikes. Examples include the Lockheed P-38 Lightning, the Bristol Beaufighter (developed from a torpedo bomber), and de Havilland Mosquito (developed from an unarmed fast bomber). The Beaufighter MkV had a Boulton-Paul turret with four 0.303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns mounted aft of the cockpit but only two were built. Bristol's Blenheim was even pushed into service as a fighter during the Battle of Britain but it was not fast enough. Equipped with an early Airborne Interception (AI) radar set, however, it proved to be an effective night fighter.
First World War: The first single-seat fighters to drop bombs were on the Western Front, when fighter patrols were issued with bombs and ordered to drop them at random if they met no German fighters. The Sopwith Camel, the most successful Allied aircraft of the First World War with 1,294 enemy aircraft downed, was losing its edge by 1918, especially over 12,000 ft (3,700 m). During the final German offensive in March 1918, it dropped 25 lb (11 kg) Cooper bombs on advancing columns: whilst puny by later standards, the four fragmentation bombs carried by a Camel could cause serious injuries to exposed troops. Pilot casualties were also high. The Royal Aircraft Factory S.E.5. was used in the same role.
The Royal Flying Corps received the first purpose-built fighter-bomber just as the war was ending. It was not called a fighter bomber at the time, but a Trench Fighter as that was what it was designed to attack. The Sopwith Salamander was based on the Sopwith Snipe fighter but had armour plating in the nose to protect the pilot and fuel system from ground fire. Originally it was intended to have two machine guns jutting through the cockpit floor so as to spray trenches with bullets as it passed low overhead. But this did not work and it was fitted with four Cooper bombs, instead. It was ordered in very large numbers, but most were canceled after the Armistice.
In February and April 1918 the Royal Flying Corps conducted bombing tests at Orfordness, Suffolk dropping dummy bombs at various dive angles at a flag stuck into a shingle beach. Both WW1 fighter bombers were used with novice and experienced pilots. The best results were achieved with a vertical dive into the wind using the Aldis Sight to align the aircraft. But they were not considered good enough to justify the expected casualty rate.
Second World War: When war broke out in Europe, Western Allied Air Forces employed light twin-engined bombers in the tactical role for low-level attacks. These were found to be extremely vulnerable both to ground fire and to single-engine fighters. The German and Japanese Air Forces had chosen dive bombers which were similarly vulnerable. The Ilyushin Il-2 is a heavily armoured two-seat single-engine ground-attack aircraft. It first flew a month later although few had reached the Soviet Air Force in time for Operation Barbarossa. Naval forces chose both torpedo and dive bombers. None of these could be considered as fighter bombers as they could not combat fighters.
Germany: During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe conducted fighter-bomber attacks on the United Kingdom from September to December 1940. A larger fighter-bomber campaign was conducted against the UK from March 1942 until June 1943. These operations were successful in tying down Allied resources at a relatively low cost to the Luftwaffe, but the British Government regarded the campaign as a nuisance given the small scale of the individual raids.
In August 1941, RAF pilots reported encountering a very fast radial engine fighter over France. First thought to be captured French Curtiss 75 Mohawks, they turned out to be Focke-Wulf Fw 190s, slightly faster and more heavily armed than the current Spitfire V. Kurt Tank had designed the aircraft when the Spitfire and Bf 109 were the fastest fighters flying; he called them racehorses, fast but fragile. As a former World War I cavalryman, Tank chose to design a warhorse. With a BMW 801 radial engine, wide-set undercarriage, and two 20mm cannons as well as machine guns it became a better fighter-bomber than either of the pure fighters.
By mid-1942, the first of these "Jagdbombers" (literally "fighter" or "hunter" bomber, known for short as "Jabos") was operating over Kent. On October 31, 60 Fw 190s bombed Canterbury with only one aircraft lost, killing 32 civilians and injuring 116, in the largest raid since the Blitz. Flying at sea level, under the radar, these raids were hard to intercept. The Jabos reached the Eastern Front in time to bomb Russian positions in Stalingrad. By July 1943 Fw 190s were replacing the vulnerable Stukas over the Battle of Kursk: although winning the air war, they were unable to prevent subsequent Red Army advances.
On New Year's Day 1945 in Operation Bodenplatte, over 1,000 aircraft (including more than 600 Fw 190s) launched a last-ditch attempt to destroy Allied planes on the ground in support of the Battle of the Bulge. Allied fighter aircraft and fighter-bomber losses were downplayed, at the time. Seventeen airfields were targeted, of which seven lost many aircraft. The surprise was complete as the few Ultra intercepts had not been understood. At the worst hit, the Canadian base at Eindhoven, 26 Typhoons and 6 Spitfires were destroyed and another 30 Typhoons damaged. In total, 305 aircraft, mostly fighters, and fighter-bombers were destroyed and another 190 damaged. The Luftwaffe lost 143 pilots killed, 71 captured and 20 wounded, making the worst one-day loss in its history; it never recovered.
United Kingdom: The Bristol Blenheim and Douglas A-20 Havoc (which the RAF called Boston) were used as night fighters during the Blitz, as they could carry the heavy early airborne radars.
The Hawker Henley, a two-seat version of the Battle of Britain-winning Hawker Hurricane, was designed as a dive bomber. It might have proved to be a capable fighter-bomber but overheating of its Rolls-Royce Merlin engine in this installation led to its relegation to a target tug role, where it could match the speed of the German bombers whilst towing a drone.
In 1934, the British Air Ministry called for a carrier aircraft that could combine the roles of the dive bomber and fighter, to save limited space on small carriers. The Blackburn Skua was not expected to encounter land-based fighters but was to intercept long-range bombers attacking the fleet and also to sink ships. As a two-seater, it could not fight the Messerschmitt Bf 109 on equal terms. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter-bomber | The Hawker Henley, a two-seat version of the Battle of Britain-winning Hawker Hurricane, was designed as a dive bomber. It might have proved to be a capable fighter-bomber but overheating of its Rolls-Royce Merlin engine in this installation led to its relegation to a target tug role, where it could match the speed of the German bombers whilst towing a drone.
In 1934, the British Air Ministry called for a carrier aircraft that could combine the roles of the dive bomber and fighter, to save limited space on small carriers. The Blackburn Skua was not expected to encounter land-based fighters but was to intercept long-range bombers attacking the fleet and also to sink ships. As a two-seater, it could not fight the Messerschmitt Bf 109 on equal terms. But the second seat carried a radio operator with a homing device that could find the carrier even when it had moved, in foul North Sea weather. It achieved one of the first kills of the war, when three from HMS Ark Royal downed a German Dornier Do 18 flying boat over the North Sea.
On April 10, 1940, 16 Skuas operating from RNAS Hatston in Orkney under Commander William Lucy sank the German cruiser Königsberg which was tied to a mole in Bergen harbour. The Germans recorded five hits or near misses and as the ship started to sink, electric power failed, dooming the ship. The German cruiser Köln had departed during the night.
With the failing of the Hawker Henley and the gradual fading of the Hawker Hurricane's performance compared to the latest German fighters, it was modified to carry four 20mm cannon and two 500 lb (230 kg) bombs; once bombs were jettisoned the aircraft could put up a reasonable fight. Inevitably the type became known in the RAF as the “Hurribomber”, reaching squadrons in June 1941.
It was soon found that it was hardly possible to hit fast-moving Panzers in the Western Desert, with bombs and cannon fire-making little impact on their armour. Daylight bombing raids were made on the French and Belgian coasts, targeting mostly oil and gas works. Losses were heavy, often more than the numbers of enemy fighters destroyed. By May 1942 Hurricane IICs with 40-imperial-gallon (180 L) drop tanks were intruding at night over France. On the night of May 4–5, Czech pilot Karel Kuttelwascher flying from RAF Tangmere with No 1 Squadron shot down three Dornier Do 17s as they slowed to land at Saint-André-de-Bohon after raiding England.
On September 25, 1942, the Gestapo HQ in Oslo was attacked by four de Havilland Mosquitoes, which had flown over the North Sea below 100 ft (30 m) by dead reckoning navigation from RAF Leuchars, Scotland, carrying four 500 lb (230 kg) bombs each. The next day the RAF unveiled its new fast bomber. On December 31, 1944, the same aircraft was used against the same target, this time from RAF Peterhead in Scotland, flying high and diving onto the building. In February 1941 the Mosquito with two Rolls-Royce Merlin engines and a streamlined wooden fuselage achieved 392 mph (631 km/h), 30 mph (48 km/h) faster than the current Spitfire. It was used on all kinds of missions, including silencing Hermann Göring's Berlin Nazi anniversary broadcast on January 20, 1943, leading him to tell Erhard Milch, Air Inspector General that “when I see the Mosquito I am yellow and green with envy. (The British) have the geniuses and we have the nincompoops.”
Initially used for high-level photo-reconnaissance, the Mosquito was adapted to precision bombing, night fighter, and fighter bomber roles. It was built in Canada and Australia as well as the UK. Fitted with a British Army Ordnance QF 6 pounder (57 mm) gun it could sink U-boats found on the surface. On April 9, 1945, three were sunk en route to Norway, and in the following month, Mosquitos sank two more.
The Hawker Typhoon was being designed as a replacement for the Hurricane in March 1937 before production had even started. The reason was to take advantage of the new 2,000 hp (1,500 kW) engines then being planned, either the Napier Sabre or Rolls-Royce Vulture which required a larger airframe than the nimble Hurricane. At the prototype stage, there were problems with the new engines and stability of the aircraft itself, which led the Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbrook to decree that production must focus on Spitfires and Hurricanes.
The Typhoon disappointed as a fighter, especially at altitude but found its true niche as a fighter bomber from September 1942. It was fitted with racks to carry two 500 lb (230 kg) and then two 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs. By September 1943 it was fitted with eight RP-3 rockets each with a 60 lb (27 kg) warhead, equivalent to the power of a naval destroyer's broadside.
Claims of German tanks destroyed by rocket-armed Typhoons in Normandy after D-Day were exaggerated. In Operation Goodwood, the attempt by British and Canadian forces to surround Caen of 75 tanks recorded as lost by the Germans, only 10 were found to be due to rocket-firing Typhoons.
At Mortain, where the German counter-offensive Operation Lüttich came within 2 miles (3.2 km) of cutting through US forces to Avranches, Typhoons destroyed 9 of 46 tanks lost but were more effective against unarmoured vehicles and troops and cause the armoured vehicles to seek cover. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, said "The chief credit in smashing the enemy's spearhead, however, must go to the rocket-firing Typhoon aircraft of the Second Tactical Air Force. The result of the strafing was that the enemy attack was effectively brought to a halt, and a threat was turned into a great victory".
The disparity between claims and actual destruction at about 25-1 owed much to the difficulty of hitting a fast-moving tank with an unguided rocket, even from a stable aircraft like the Typhoon. But soft targets were simpler. When the 51st Highland Division moved to block German panzers reaching Antwerp in the Battle of the Bulge Tommy Macpherson saw a half-track full of SS soldiers. All were uninjured, powerful men over 6 ft (180 cm) tall. All were dead, killed by the air blast from a Typhoon rocket.
The Bristol Beaufighter was a long-range twin-engine heavy fighter derived from the Bristol Beaufort torpedo bomber but with the 1,600 hp (1,200 kW) Bristol Hercules radial engine to give it a top speed 50 mph (80 km/h) faster. By late 1942 the Beaufighter was also capable of carrying torpedoes or rockets. The main user was RAF Coastal Command although it was also used in the Royal Australian Air Force with some aircraft assembled in Australia and by the USAAF.
Over 30 Beaufighters flying from RAF Dallachy in Scotland from Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand squadrons attacked the German destroyer Z33 sheltering in Førde Fjord Norway. They were escorted by only 10 to 12 North American P-51 Mustangs. German destroyers escorted convoys of Swedish iron ore, which in winter were forced to creep along the Atlantic Coast by night, hiding deep inside fjords by day. Z33 was moored close to the vertical cliffside of the fjords so Beaufighters had to attack singly with rockets without the normal tactic of having simultaneous attacks by other Beaufighters firing cannon at the numerous flak gunners. Twelve Focke-Wulf Fw 190s surprised the Mustangs and Norway's biggest ever air battle was soon raging. Nine Beaufighters and one Mustang were lost as were five Fw 190s. The destroyer was damaged and February 9, 1945, became known as Black Friday.
Typhoons were involved in one of the worst tragedies at the end of the war when four squadrons attacked the luxury liners SS Deutschland and the SS Cap Arcona and two smaller ships SS Athen and SS Thielbek moored off Neustadt in Lübeck Bay The Cap Arcona had 4,500 concentration camp inmates and the Thielbek another 2,800 as well as SS Guards. The Deutschland had a Red Cross flag painted on at least one funnel. The previous day the Captain of the Cap Arcona refused to take any more inmates on board. On return to shore in longboats they were gunned down by Hitler Jugend, SS Guards and German Marines. Of an estimated 14,500 victims in the area two days earlier only 1,450 survived.
The Hawker Tempest was a development of the Typhoon using the thin wing with an aerofoil developed by NACA and a more powerful version of the Napier Sabre engine, giving a top speed of 432 miles per hour (695 km/h). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter-bomber | The Deutschland had a Red Cross flag painted on at least one funnel. The previous day the Captain of the Cap Arcona refused to take any more inmates on board. On return to shore in longboats they were gunned down by Hitler Jugend, SS Guards and German Marines. Of an estimated 14,500 victims in the area two days earlier only 1,450 survived.
The Hawker Tempest was a development of the Typhoon using the thin wing with an aerofoil developed by NACA and a more powerful version of the Napier Sabre engine, giving a top speed of 432 miles per hour (695 km/h). At a low level, it was faster than any other Allied or German aircraft, but slower than the Spitfire above 22,000 ft (6,700 m). Fitted with four 20mm cannon it was a formidable fighter, respected even by Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter pilots as their most dangerous opponent. At its debut over the Normandy Beaches on D-Day +2, Tempests shot down three German fighters, without loss. Tempests supported the ambitious attempt to capture the bridge at Arnhem in Operation Market Garden in mid-September 1944. David C. Fairbanks, an American who joined the Royal Canadian Air Force was the top Tempest ace with 12 victories including an Arado Ar 234 jet bomber.
United States: General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the United States Army Air Forces, urged the adoption of the Mosquito by the U.S. but was overruled by those who felt that the as yet untried Lockheed P-38 Lightning also twin-engined, could fulfill the same role. Although Lightning got its name from the RAF, the British eventually rejected it. Too slow and cumbersome to match Bf 109s as an escort fighter over Germany, it did fly over Normandy as a fighter bomber, where one tried skip-bombing a 1,000 lb (450 kg) bomb through the door of Field Marshal Günther von Kluge's OB West HQ. A Lightning squadron also killed Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto over Bougainville in the Pacific acting on an Ultra intercept.
The Republic P-47 Thunderbolt was a larger, evolutionary development of the P-43/P-44 fighter undertaken after the United States Army Air Forces observed Messerschmitt Bf 109s performing in the Battle of Britain. It was a massive aircraft built around the powerful Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp engine and weighed up to eight tons with ordnance. The P-47 was twice as heavy and had four times the fuselage size of a Spitfire. Armed with eight .50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns it could outshoot any enemy fighter, and as a fighter-bomber, it could carry half the bomb load of a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress or 10 five-inch (127 mm) High Velocity Aircraft Rockets.
The first pilots to fly the Thunderbolt from England were Americans who had been flying Spitfires in the RAF before the U.S. joined the war. They were not impressed initially; the Thunderbolt lost out to the more nimble Spitfire so consistently in mock dogfights that these encounters were eventually banned. But by November 25, 1943 Thunderbolts had found their true niche, attacking a Luftwaffe airfield at Saint-Omer near Calais, France. On October 13, 1944, a Thunderbolt from 9th Air Force damaged the German Torpedoboot Ausland 38 (formerly the Italian 750 ton torpedo boat Spada) so badly near Trieste with gunfire alone that the ship was scuttled.
The Vought F4U Corsair was built around the same Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp engine as the Thunderbolt, but for the U.S. Navy. Difficulties with carrier landings meant that the first aircraft were used by the United States Marine Corps from Henderson Field, Guadalcanal from February 12, 1943. In its first combat action, the following day over Kahili airfield two Corsairs and eight other aircraft were lost when attacked by 50 Mitsubishi A6M Zeros. This became known as the St Valentine's Day massacre. Despite this initiation the Corsair soon proved to be an effective fighter bomber, mostly flown by the Marine Corps, but also by the United States Navy, Fleet Air Arm and Royal New Zealand Air Force in the Pacific theater.
When the British Purchasing Commission invited James H. Kindelberger, President of North American Aviation, to assemble the Curtiss P-40 Warhawk in an underutilized plant, he promised a better fighter on the same timing. The resulting North American P-51 Mustang powered by a Packard-built Rolls-Royce Merlin engine became the outstanding long-range fighter of the war. When Lend-lease funding for the RAF Mustangs was exhausted, Kindleberger tried to interest the USAAC but no funds were available for a fighter; instead, the Mustang was fitted with dive brakes and emerged as the North American A-36 Apache, a dive bomber almost as fast as the Mustang itself. By April 1943 USAAF Apaches were in Morocco supporting Operation Torch, and they continued bombing trains and gun emplacements northwards through Italy.
Korean War: When Soviet-backed North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, their forces quickly routed the South Korean army which lacked tanks, anti-tank and heavy artillery. Its Air Force had 22 planes, none of which were fighters, or jets. During a Soviet boycott of the United Nations, a vote was carried without Soviet veto, to intervene in support of the South. Most readily available were U.S. and British Commonwealth forces occupying Japan and the Pacific fleets. The first arrivals were fighter-bombers, which helped to repulse the Northern attack on the vital port of Pusan, the last small territory held by the South. Some strategists felt that air and battleship strikes alone could halt the invasion.
USAF North American F-82 Twin Mustangs had the range to reach the front line from Japanese bases. The last piston-engined aircraft, produced in the U.S., it looked like two Mustangs, with two pilots in separate fuselages, bolted together. Initially intended to escort bombers over Japan from remote Pacific island bases, hence its long-range, it missed WWII and first saw action in Korea. Plain North American P-51 Mustangs of the Royal Australian Air Force soon also flew across from Japan.
Vought F4U Corsairs and Hawker Sea Furys from U.S., British and Australian carriers in the Yellow Sea and later from Korean airfields, also attacked the Pusan perimeter. The Sea Fury, a development of the Hawker Tempest had a Bristol Centaurus engine of 2,480 hp (1,850 kW) giving a 485 mph (781 km/h) top speed, one of the fastest piston-engined aircraft ever built. Initially, United Nations air forces using piston-engined fighter-bombers and straight wing jet fighters easily drove the North Koreans out of the sky and so disrupted logistics and hence the attack on Pusan.
All changed when the Soviet Air Force intervened with swept-wing Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15s flown by Russian pilots on November 1. The planes had Korean markings and the pilots had been taught a few Korean words, in a thin sham that the USSR was not fighting. The MiG-15 used captured German swept wing technology and tools and British jet engines, 25 of which had been a gift from Stafford Cripps the president of the Board of Trade and were quickly copied. Josef Stalin remarked “What fool will sell us his secrets?” The MiG's Rolls-Royce Nene had 5,000 lbf (2,300 kgf) thrust, twice as much as the jets of its main British and US opponents, which used the older Rolls-Royce Derwent design. Only the Navy Grumman F9F Panther used a version of the Nene and could match the MiG-15, accounting for seven during November.
Daylight heavy bomber raids over North Korea ceased and the Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star and its all-weather variant the Lockheed F-94 Starfire were focused on bombing missions whilst the North American F-86 Sabre was rushed to Korea to combat the MiG-15s. There is much debate as to which was the better fighter. Recent research suggests a 13-10 advantage to the Sabre against Russian pilots, but the US pilots were mostly WWII veterans whilst the Russians were often “volunteers” with only a few hours aloft. The Australians converted from Mustangs to Gloster Meteor fighter-bombers, the first Allied jet fighter of WWII but no match for a MiG-15. It was pressed into combat but after four were lost when the squadron was bounced by 40 Mig-15s, reverted to ground attack, carrying 16 60 lb (27 kg) rockets. Although Meteors shot down 6 MiG-15s, 30 were lost, but mainly to ground fire. Both Corsairs and Sea Furies also shot down MiG-15s, but were vulnerable to the faster jet.
Post-war: Fighter-bombers became increasingly important in the 1950s and 1960s, as new jet engines dramatically improved the power of even the smallest fighter designs. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter-bomber | The Australians converted from Mustangs to Gloster Meteor fighter-bombers, the first Allied jet fighter of WWII but no match for a MiG-15. It was pressed into combat but after four were lost when the squadron was bounced by 40 Mig-15s, reverted to ground attack, carrying 16 60 lb (27 kg) rockets. Although Meteors shot down 6 MiG-15s, 30 were lost, but mainly to ground fire. Both Corsairs and Sea Furies also shot down MiG-15s, but were vulnerable to the faster jet.
Post-war: Fighter-bombers became increasingly important in the 1950s and 1960s, as new jet engines dramatically improved the power of even the smallest fighter designs. Many aircraft initially designed as fighters or interceptors found themselves in the fighter-bomber role at some point in their career. Notable among these is the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, first designed as a high-performance day fighter and then adapted to the nuclear strike role for European use. Other U.S. examples include the North American F-100 Super Sabre and the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, each of which was widely used during the Vietnam War. An example of a modern purpose-designed fighter bomber is the Sukhoi Su-34.
See also: Dive bomber
Light bomber
Tactical bombing
Attack aircraft
Multirole combat aircraft
Strike fighter
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Finger-four | Description: The formation consists of a flight of four aircraft, consisting of a "lead element" and a "second element", each of two aircraft. When viewing the formation from above, the positions of the planes resemble the tips of the four fingers of a human right hand (without the thumb), giving the formation its name.
The lead element is made up of the flight leader at the very front of the formation and one wingman to his rear left. The second element is made up of an additional two planes, the element leader and his wingman. The element leader is to the right and rear of the flight leader, followed by the element wingman to his right and rear.
Both the flight leader and element leader have offensive roles, in that they are the ones to open fire on enemy aircraft while the flight remains intact. Their wingmen have a defensive role—the flight wingman covers the rear of the second element and the element wingman covers the rear of the lead element.
Four of these flights can be assembled to form a squadron formation which consists of two staggered lines of fighters, one in front of the other. Each flight is usually designated by a color (i.e. Red, Blue, Yellow, and Green).
One disadvantage of the finger-four formation was that it left the least-experienced flier, the number two wingman, in the most exposed position (as "tail-end Charlie"). These were particularly vulnerable to a surprise diving attack, and in some cases could be picked off without the others in the formation even noticing.
History: The formation was developed by several air forces independently in the 1930s. The Finnish Air Force adopted it in 1934 and 1935. Luftwaffe pilots developed the formation independently in 1938 during the Spanish Civil War, and were the first to use it in combat.
Finnish experiment: During the 1930s, the Finnish Air Force, aware of its weakness in numbers compared to its neighbours, sought to offset the disadvantage by a radical rethink of its tactics.
The new tactical philosophy emphasized aggression, a willingness to attack regardless of the odds, as well as shooting accuracy at a time when aerobatic skill was prized by most air forces. Hand in hand with the changes was the adoption of the pair and finger-four formation, which allowed economy and gave the flexibility that the new tactics required. The aircraft in the new formations had greater vertical and horizontal separation and so they were free to scan in all directions for enemy aircraft, rather than focusing on maintaining a close formation. That allowed the pilots to maintain greater situational awareness and reduced their chance of being spotted by the enemy. The two pairs could split and attack on their own. The pilot who spotted the enemy would become the leader of the pair or even the whole flight for the duration of the attack, as he had the best situational awareness at that moment.
With no guarantee of success, the FAF adopted the new tactics and was later to find the validity of this approach during the Winter War (1939–1940) with the Soviet Union. The Finnish Air Force proved their effectiveness by achieving a 16:1 kill ratio with the finger-four against the Soviet Air Force, which used the conventional Vic formation.
German experience in Spain: Involvement in the Spanish Civil War gave the fledgling Luftwaffe an early experience of combat conditions, but the "Condor Legion" quickly found its main fighter aircraft, the He 51, was outclassed by the Soviet I-16 in service with the Republicans. The new Bf 109B was effective but in short supply. For some time, only six were available, making the 3-plane Kette impractical. Flying in pairs (Rotte) or a two-pair Schwarm and using a more open formation (made possible by radio communication between aircraft) was found to confer other benefits.
Most notable in its development and use in the Luftwaffe were Günther Lützow and Werner Mölders and their fellow airmen. In the Luftwaffe, the flight (German: Schwarm) was made up of two pairs (German: Rotte) of aircraft. Each Rotte was composed of a leader and a wingman. The Rottenführer (pair leader) would attack enemy aircraft, leave his wingman to scan for threats and protect him while he engaged the enemy. The Germans thus eschewed the Finnish Air Force's more flexible approach.
The Luftwaffe continued the use of the formation during its Battle of France, the Battle of Britain and the invasion of the Soviet Union in which its effectiveness was shown to be considerably greater than the standard three-aircraft "Vic" close formation used by its opponents. Later, the RAF, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and Soviet Air Forces adapted their tactics.
Other operators: The Soviet Air Force units in the Spanish Civil War soon adopted the formation flying against the Germans and in 1938 recommended its use when they returned home. However, most of the Spanish veterans were swept away during Stalin's Great Purge of the armed forces, and the more conservative "Vic" remained the standard Soviet formation. The pary and zveno were not reintroduced until the after Operation Barbarossa forced reforms by Alexander Novikov in 1942 and 1943.
The RAF similarly could not radically reform their fighter tactics until the end of the Battle of Britain. The easing of the pressure and a switch to a more offensive stance led to various experiments with formations. The flying ace Douglas Bader was the first RAF pilot to try the formation, in May 1941. After some refining it became the standard formation of his Duxford Wing and eventually spread throughout RAF.
The United States Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation began using a concept called "Fighting Pair" from 1940 to 1941. Japan also adopted the finger-four formation during World War II.
Missing man formation: The finger-four formation became less common after World War II. However, it is still used in the "Missing Man Formation" at pilots' funeral ceremonies. The formation performs a fly-by in level flight over the funeral, at which point the second element leader climbs vertically and departs the formation, symbolizing the departure of the person being honored.
See also: Thach Weave
Footnotes:
References: Bader, Douglas Stewart (1973). Fight for the Sky: The Story of the Spitfire and the Hurricane. Sidwik and Jackson Ltd. p. 132-133. ISBN 0-283-97984-4.
Bickers, Richard Townshend (1996). Von Richthofen: the legend evaluated. Naval Institute Press. p. 892. ISBN 1-55750-571-3.
Boyne, Walter J. (2003). The influence of air power upon history. Pelican Publishing Company. p. 447. ISBN 1-58980-034-6.
Buell, Thomas; Griess, Thomas E.; Bradley, John H.; Dice, Jack W. (2002). The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. Square One Publishers. p. 448. ISBN 0-7570-0160-2.
Burns, Michael (1990 reprint 1998) Bader: the man and his men Cassell ISBN 0-304-35052-4
Gray, Stephen Roberts (2007). Rampant Raider: an A-4 Skyhawk pilot in Vietnam. Naval Institute Press. p. 284. ISBN 978-1-59114-342-0.
Hardesty, Von (1982) Red Phoenix: the rise of Soviet air power 1941-1945 Arms and Armour Press ISBN 0-85368-565-7
Holmes, Tony (2007). Spitfire VS Bf 109: Battle of Britain. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-84603-190-7
Spick, Mike (1996) Luftwaffe Fighter Aces Greenhill Books ISBN 1-85367-560-1
Johnson J.E. (1964) Full Circle Cassell Military Paperbacks ISBN 0-304-35860-6
Further reading: Air power history: turning points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo
Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific
Officers in Flight Suits: The Story of American Air Force Fighter Pilots in the Korean War
Eagles of the Third Reich - Men of Luftwaffe
The Luftwaffe Over Germany: Defense of the Reich By Donald Caldwell, Richard Muller |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire-control radar | Operational phases: Fire-control radars operate in three different phases:
Designation or vectoring phase
The fire-control radar must be directed to the general location of the target due to the radar's narrow beam width. This phase is also called "lighting up". It ends when lock-on is acquired.
Acquisition phase
The fire-control radar switches to the acquisition phase of operation once the radar is in the general vicinity of the target. During this phase, the radar system searches in the designated area in a predetermined search pattern until the target is located or redesignated. This phase terminates when a weapon is launched.
Tracking phase
The fire-control radar enters into the track phase when the target is located. The radar system locks onto the target during this phase. This phase ends when the target is destroyed.
Performance: The performance of a fire-control radar is determined primarily by two factors: radar resolution and atmospheric conditions. Radar resolution is the ability of the radar to differentiate between two targets closely located. The first, and most difficult, is range resolution, finding exactly how far is the target. To do this well, in a basic fire-control radar system, it must send very short pulses. Bearing resolution is typically ensured by using a narrow (one or two degree) beam width. Atmospheric conditions, such as moisture lapse, temperature inversion, and dust particles affect radar performance as well. Moisture lapse and temperature inversion often cause ducting, in which RF energy is bent as it passes through hot and cold layers. This can either extend or shorten the radar horizon, depending on which way the RF is bent. Dust particles, as well as water droplets, cause attenuation of the RF energy, resulting in a loss of effective range. In both cases, a lower pulse repetition frequency makes the radar less susceptible to atmospheric conditions.
Countermeasures: Most fire-control radars have unique characteristics, such as radio frequency, pulse duration, pulse frequency and power. These can assist in identifying the radar, and therefore the weapon system it is controlling. This can provide valuable tactical information, like the maximum range of the weapon, or flaws that can be exploited, to combatants that are listening for these signs. During the Cold War Soviet fire control radars were often named and NATO pilots would be able to identify the threats present by the radar signals they received.
Surface based: One of the first successful fire-control radars, the SCR-584, was used effectively and extensively by the Allies during World War II for anti-aircraft gun laying. Since World War II, the U.S. Army has used radar for directing anti-aircraft missiles including the MIM-23 Hawk, the Nike series and currently the MIM-104 Patriot.
Ship based: Examples of fire-control radars currently in use by the United States Navy:
Mk 95 — Continuous Wave Illuminator (NATO Sea sparrow Surface Missile System)
Mk 92 — Combined Antenna System (Mk 75 Gun, formerly SM-1 missiles)
AN/SPG-62 — Continuous Wave Illuminator (AEGIS)
AN/SPQ-9B — Pulse Doppler (Mk 45 lightweight gun)
Aircraft based: After World War II, airborne fire control radars have evolved from the simpler gun and rocket laying AN/APG-36 system used in the F-86D to the active electronically scanned array-based AN/APG-81 of the F-35 Lightning II.
See also: Index of aviation articles
Radar configurations and types
List of radars
List of military electronics of the United States
Ship gun fire-control system
References: US Navy, Fire Controlman, Volume 02—Fire Control Radar Fundamentals (Revised)
External links: AN/APG Fire Control Systems at GlobalSecurity.org |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire-control system | Naval fire control:
Origins: The original fire-control systems were developed for ships.
The early history of naval fire control was dominated by the engagement of targets within visual range (also referred to as direct fire). In fact, most naval engagements before 1800 were conducted at ranges of 20 to 50 yards (20 to 50 m).
Even during the American Civil War, the famous engagement between USS Monitor and CSS Virginia was often conducted at less than 100 yards (90 m) range.
Rapid technical improvements in the late 19th century greatly increased the range at which gunfire was possible. Rifled guns of much larger size firing explosive shells of lighter relative weight (compared to all-metal balls) so greatly increased the range of the guns that the main problem became aiming them while the ship was moving on the waves. This problem was solved with the introduction of the gyroscope, which corrected this motion and provided sub-degree accuracies. Guns were now free to grow to any size, and quickly surpassed 10 inches (250 mm) calibre by the 1890s. These guns were capable of such great range that the primary limitation was seeing the target, leading to the use of high masts on ships.
Another technical improvement was the introduction of the steam turbine which greatly increased the performance of the ships. Earlier reciprocating engine powered capital ships were capable of perhaps 16 knots, but the first large turbine ships were capable of over 20 knots. Combined with the long range of the guns, this meant that the target ship could move a considerable distance, several ship lengths, between the time the shells were fired and landed. One could no longer eyeball the aim with any hope of accuracy. Moreover, in naval engagements it is also necessary to control the firing of several guns at once.
Naval gun fire control potentially involves three levels of complexity. Local control originated with primitive gun installations aimed by the individual gun crews. Director control aims all guns on the ship at a single target. Coordinated gunfire from a formation of ships at a single target was a focus of battleship fleet operations. Corrections are made for surface wind velocity, firing ship roll and pitch, powder magazine temperature, drift of rifled projectiles, individual gun bore diameter adjusted for shot-to-shot enlargement, and rate of change of range with additional modifications to the firing solution based upon the observation of preceding shots.
The resulting directions, known as a firing solution, would then be fed back out to the turrets for laying. If the rounds missed, an observer could work out how far they missed by and in which direction, and this information could be fed back into the computer along with any changes in the rest of the information and another shot attempted.
At first, the guns were aimed using the technique of artillery spotting. It involved firing a gun at the target, observing the projectile's point of impact (fall of shot), and correcting the aim based on where the shell was observed to land, which became more and more difficult as the range of the gun increased.
Between the American Civil War and 1905, numerous small improvements, such as telescopic sights and optical rangefinders, were made in fire control. There were also procedural improvements, like the use of plotting boards to manually predict the position of a ship during an engagement.
World War I: Then increasingly sophisticated mechanical calculators were employed for proper gun laying, typically with various spotters and distance measures being sent to a central plotting station deep within the ship. There the fire direction teams fed in the location, speed and direction of the ship and its target, as well as various adjustments for Coriolis effect, weather effects on the air, and other adjustments. Around 1905, mechanical fire control aids began to become available, such as the Dreyer Table, Dumaresq (which was also part of the Dreyer Table), and Argo Clock, but these devices took a number of years to become widely deployed. These devices were early forms of rangekeepers.
Arthur Pollen and Frederic Charles Dreyer independently developed the first such systems. Pollen began working on the problem after noting the poor accuracy of naval artillery at a gunnery practice near Malta in 1900. Lord Kelvin, widely regarded as Britain's leading scientist first proposed using an analogue computer to solve the equations which arise from the relative motion of the ships engaged in the battle and the time delay in the flight of the shell to calculate the required trajectory and therefore the direction and elevation of the guns.
Pollen aimed to produce a combined mechanical computer and automatic plot of ranges and rates for use in centralised fire control. To obtain accurate data of the target's position and relative motion, Pollen developed a plotting unit (or plotter) to capture this data. To this he added a gyroscope to allow for the yaw of the firing ship. Like the plotter, the primitive gyroscope of the time required substantial development to provide continuous and reliable guidance. Although the trials in 1905 and 1906 were unsuccessful, they showed promise. Pollen was encouraged in his efforts by the rapidly rising figure of Admiral Jackie Fisher, Admiral Arthur Knyvet Wilson and the Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes (DNO), John Jellicoe. Pollen continued his work, with occasional tests carried out on Royal Navy warships.
Meanwhile, a group led by Dreyer designed a similar system. Although both systems were ordered for new and existing ships of the Royal Navy, the Dreyer system eventually found most favour with the Navy in its definitive Mark IV* form. The addition of director control facilitated a full, practicable fire control system for World War I ships, and most RN capital ships were so fitted by mid 1916. The director was high up over the ship where operators had a superior view over any gunlayer in the turrets. It was also able to co-ordinate the fire of the turrets so that their combined fire worked together. This improved aiming and larger optical rangefinders improved the estimate of the enemy's position at the time of firing. The system was eventually replaced by the improved "Admiralty Fire Control Table" for ships built after 1927.
World War II: During their long service life, rangekeepers were updated often as technology advanced, and by World War II they were a critical part of an integrated fire-control system. The incorporation of radar into the fire-control system early in World War II provided ships the ability to conduct effective gunfire operations at long range in poor weather and at night. For U.S. Navy gun fire control systems, see ship gun fire-control systems.
The use of director-controlled firing, together with the fire control computer, removed the control of the gun laying from the individual turrets to a central position; although individual gun mounts and multi-gun turrets would retain a local control option for use when battle damage limited director information transfer (these would be simpler versions called "turret tables" in the Royal Navy). Guns could then be fired in planned salvos, with each gun giving a slightly different trajectory. Dispersion of shot caused by differences in individual guns, individual projectiles, powder ignition sequences, and transient distortion of ship structure was undesirably large at typical naval engagement ranges. Directors high on the superstructure had a better view of the enemy than a turret mounted sight, and the crew operating them were distant from the sound and shock of the guns. Gun directors were topmost, and the ends of their optical rangefinders protruded from their sides, giving them a distinctive appearance.
Unmeasured and uncontrollable ballistic factors, like high-altitude temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, wind direction and velocity, required final adjustment through observation of the fall of shot. Visual range measurement (of both target and shell splashes) was difficult prior to the availability of radar. The British favoured coincidence rangefinders while the Germans favoured the stereoscopic type. The former were less able to range on an indistinct target but easier on the operator over a long period of use, the latter the reverse.
Submarines were also equipped with fire control computers for the same reasons, but their problem was even more pronounced; in a typical "shot", the torpedo would take one to two minutes to reach its target. Calculating the proper "lead" given the relative motion of the two vessels was very difficult, and torpedo data computers were added to dramatically improve the speed of these calculations.
In a typical World War II British ship the fire control system connected the individual gun turrets to the director tower (where the sighting instruments were located) and the analogue computer in the heart of the ship. In the director tower, operators trained their telescopes on the target; one telescope measured elevation and the other bearing. Rangefinder telescopes on a separate mounting measured the distance to the target. These measurements were converted by the Fire Control Table into the bearings and elevations for the guns to fire upon. In the turrets, the gunlayers adjusted the elevation of their guns to match an indicator for the elevation transmitted from the Fire Control table—a turret layer did the same for bearing. When the guns were on target they were centrally fired.
Even with as much mechanization of the process, it still required a large human element; the Transmitting Station (the room that housed the Dreyer table) for HMS Hood's main guns housed 27 crew.
Directors were largely unprotected from enemy fire. It was difficult to put much weight of armour so high up on the ship, and even if the armour did stop a shot, the impact alone would likely knock the instruments out of alignment. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire-control system | Rangefinder telescopes on a separate mounting measured the distance to the target. These measurements were converted by the Fire Control Table into the bearings and elevations for the guns to fire upon. In the turrets, the gunlayers adjusted the elevation of their guns to match an indicator for the elevation transmitted from the Fire Control table—a turret layer did the same for bearing. When the guns were on target they were centrally fired.
Even with as much mechanization of the process, it still required a large human element; the Transmitting Station (the room that housed the Dreyer table) for HMS Hood's main guns housed 27 crew.
Directors were largely unprotected from enemy fire. It was difficult to put much weight of armour so high up on the ship, and even if the armour did stop a shot, the impact alone would likely knock the instruments out of alignment. Sufficient armour to protect from smaller shells and fragments from hits to other parts of the ship was the limit.
The performance of the analog computer was impressive. The battleship USS North Carolina during a 1945 test was able to maintain an accurate firing solution on a target during a series of high-speed turns.
It is a major advantage for a warship to be able to maneuver while engaging a target.
Night naval engagements at long range became feasible when radar data could be input to the rangekeeper. The effectiveness of this combination was demonstrated in November 1942 at the Third Battle of Savo Island when the USS Washington engaged the Japanese battleship Kirishima at a range of 8,400 yards (7.7 km) at night. Kirishima was set aflame, suffered a number of explosions, and was scuttled by her crew. She had been hit by at least nine 16-inch (410 mm) rounds out of 75 fired (12% hit rate).
The wreck of Kirishima was discovered in 1992 and showed that the entire bow section of the ship was missing.
The Japanese during World War II did not develop radar or automated fire control to the level of the US Navy and were at a significant disadvantage.
Post-1945: By the 1950s gun turrets were increasingly unmanned, with gun laying controlled remotely from the ship's control centre using inputs from radar and other sources.
The last combat action for the analog rangekeepers, at least for the US Navy, was in the 1991 Persian Gulf War when the rangekeepers on the Iowa-class battleships directed their last rounds in combat.
Aircraft based fire control:
World War II bomb sights: An early use of fire-control systems was in bomber aircraft, with the use of computing bombsights that accepted altitude and airspeed information to predict and display the impact point of a bomb released at that time. The best known United States device was the Norden bombsight.
World War II aerial gunnery sights: Simple systems, known as lead computing sights also made their appearance inside aircraft late in the war as gyro gunsights. These devices used a gyroscope to measure turn rates, and moved the gunsight's aim-point to take this into account, with the aim point presented through a reflector sight. The only manual "input" to the sight was the target distance, which was typically handled by dialing in the size of the target's wing span at some known range. Small radar units were added in the post-war period to automate even this input, but it was some time before they were fast enough to make the pilots completely happy with them. The first implementation of a centralized fire control system in a production aircraft was on the B-29.
Post-World War II systems: By the start of the Vietnam War, a new computerized bombing predictor, called the Low Altitude Bombing System (LABS), began to be integrated into the systems of aircraft equipped to carry nuclear armaments. This new bomb computer was revolutionary in that the release command for the bomb was given by the computer, not the pilot; the pilot designated the target using the radar or other targeting system, then "consented" to release the weapon, and the computer then did so at a calculated "release point" some seconds later. This is very different from previous systems, which, though they had also become computerized, still calculated an "impact point" showing where the bomb would fall if the bomb were released at that moment. The key advantage is that the weapon can be released accurately even when the plane is maneuvering. Most bombsights until this time required that the plane maintain a constant attitude (usually level), though dive-bombing sights were also common.
The LABS system was originally designed to facilitate a tactic called toss bombing, to allow the aircraft to remain out of range of a weapon's blast radius. The principle of calculating the release point, however, was eventually integrated into the fire control computers of later bombers and strike aircraft, allowing level, dive and toss bombing. In addition, as the fire control computer became integrated with ordnance systems, the computer can take the flight characteristics of the weapon to be launched into account.
Land based fire control:
Anti-aircraft based fire control: By the start of World War II, aircraft altitude performance had increased so much that anti-aircraft guns had similar predictive problems, and were increasingly equipped with fire-control computers. The main difference between these systems and the ones on ships was size and speed. The early versions of the High Angle Control System, or HACS, of Britain's Royal Navy were examples of a system that predicted based upon the assumption that target speed, direction, and altitude would remain constant during the prediction cycle, which consisted of the time to fuze the shell and the time of flight of the shell to the target. The USN Mk 37 system made similar assumptions except that it could predict assuming a constant rate of altitude change. The Kerrison Predictor is an example of a system that was built to solve laying in "real time", simply by pointing the director at the target and then aiming the gun at a pointer it directed. It was also deliberately designed to be small and light, in order to allow it to be easily moved along with the guns it served.
The radar-based M-9/SCR-584 Anti-Aircraft System was used to direct air defense artillery since 1943. The MIT Radiation Lab's SCR-584 was the first radar system with automatic following, Bell Laboratory's M-9 was an electronic analog fire-control computer that replaced complicated and difficult-to-manufacture mechanical computers (such as the Sperry M-7 or British Kerrison predictor). In combination with the VT proximity fuze, this system accomplished the astonishing feat of shooting down V-1 cruise missiles with less than 100 shells per plane (thousands were typical in earlier AA systems). This system was instrumental in the defense of London and Antwerp against the V-1.
Although listed in Land based fire control section anti-aircraft fire control systems can also be found on naval and aircraft systems.
Coast artillery fire control: In the United States Army Coast Artillery Corps, Coast Artillery fire control systems began to be developed at the end of the 19th century and progressed on through World War II.
Early systems made use of multiple observation or base end stations (see Figure 1) to find and track targets attacking American harbors. Data from these stations were then passed to plotting rooms, where analog mechanical devices, such as the plotting board, were used to estimate targets' positions and derive firing data for batteries of coastal guns assigned to interdict them.
U.S. Coast Artillery forts bristled with a variety of armament, ranging from 12-inch coast defense mortars, through 3-inch and 6-inch mid-range artillery, to the larger guns, which included 10-inch and 12-inch barbette and disappearing carriage guns, 14-inch railroad artillery, and 16-inch cannon installed just prior to and up through World War II.
Fire control in the Coast Artillery became more and more sophisticated in terms of correcting firing data for such factors as weather conditions, the condition of powder used, or the Earth's rotation. Provisions were also made for adjusting firing data for the observed fall of shells. As shown in Figure 2, all of these data were fed back to the plotting rooms on a finely tuned schedule controlled by a system of time interval bells that rang throughout each harbor defense system.
It was only later in World War II that electro-mechanical gun data computers, connected to coast defense radars, began to replace optical observation and manual plotting methods in controlling coast artillery. Even then, the manual methods were retained as a back-up through the end of the war.
Direct and indirect fire control systems: Land based fire control systems can be used to aid in both Direct fire and Indirect fire weapon engagement. These systems can be found on weapons ranging from small handguns to large artillery weapons.
Modern fire control systems: Modern fire-control computers, like all high-performance computers, are digital. The added performance allows basically any input to be added, from air density and wind, to wear on the barrels and distortion due to heating. These sorts of effects are noticeable for any sort of gun, and fire-control computers have started appearing on smaller and smaller platforms. Tanks were one early use that automated gun laying had, using a laser rangefinder and a barrel-distortion meter. Fire-control computers are useful not just for aiming large cannons, but also for aiming machine guns, small cannons, guided missiles, rifles, grenades, and rockets—any kind of weapon that can have its launch or firing parameters varied. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire-control system | Direct and indirect fire control systems: Land based fire control systems can be used to aid in both Direct fire and Indirect fire weapon engagement. These systems can be found on weapons ranging from small handguns to large artillery weapons.
Modern fire control systems: Modern fire-control computers, like all high-performance computers, are digital. The added performance allows basically any input to be added, from air density and wind, to wear on the barrels and distortion due to heating. These sorts of effects are noticeable for any sort of gun, and fire-control computers have started appearing on smaller and smaller platforms. Tanks were one early use that automated gun laying had, using a laser rangefinder and a barrel-distortion meter. Fire-control computers are useful not just for aiming large cannons, but also for aiming machine guns, small cannons, guided missiles, rifles, grenades, and rockets—any kind of weapon that can have its launch or firing parameters varied. They are typically installed on ships, submarines, aircraft, tanks and even on some small arms—for example, the grenade launcher developed for use on the Fabrique Nationale F2000 bullpup assault rifle. Fire-control computers have gone through all the stages of technology that computers have, with some designs based upon analogue technology and later vacuum tubes which were later replaced with transistors.
Fire-control systems are often interfaced with sensors (such as sonar, radar, infra-red search and track, laser range-finders, anemometers, wind vanes, thermometers, barometers, etc.) in order to cut down or eliminate the amount of information that must be manually entered in order to calculate an effective solution. Sonar, radar, IRST and range-finders can give the system the direction to and/or distance of the target. Alternatively, an optical sight can be provided that an operator can simply point at the target, which is easier than having someone input the range using other methods and gives the target less warning that it is being tracked. Typically, weapons fired over long ranges need environmental information—the farther a munition travels, the more the wind, temperature, air density, etc. will affect its trajectory, so having accurate information is essential for a good solution. Sometimes, for very long-range rockets, environmental data has to be obtained at high altitudes or in between the launching point and the target. Often, satellites or balloons are used to gather this information.
Once the firing solution is calculated, many modern fire-control systems are also able to aim and fire the weapon(s). Once again, this is in the interest of speed and accuracy, and in the case of a vehicle like an aircraft or tank, in order to allow the pilot/gunner/etc. to perform other actions simultaneously, such as tracking the target or flying the aircraft. Even if the system is unable to aim the weapon itself, for example the fixed cannon on an aircraft, it is able to give the operator cues on how to aim. Typically, the cannon points straight ahead and the pilot must maneuver the aircraft so that it oriented correctly before firing. In most aircraft the aiming cue takes the form of a "pipper" which is projected on the heads-up display (HUD). The pipper shows the pilot where the target must be relative to the aircraft in order to hit it. Once the pilot maneuvers the aircraft so that the target and pipper are superimposed, he or she fires the weapon, or on some aircraft the weapon will fire automatically at this point, in order to overcome the delay of the pilot. In the case of a missile launch, the fire-control computer may give the pilot feedback about whether the target is in range of the missile and how likely the missile is to hit if launched at any particular moment. The pilot will then wait until the probability reading is satisfactorily high before launching the weapon.
See also: Target acquisition
Counter-battery radar
Director (military)
Fire-control radar
List of U.S. Army fire control and sighting material by supply catalog designation
Predicted impact point
Ship gun fire-control systems
Tartar Guided Missile Fire Control System
References:
Further reading: Baxter, James Phinney (1946). Scientists Against Time. Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-26252-012-5.
Campbell, John (1985). Naval Weapons of World War Two. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-459-4.
Fairfield, A.P. (1921). Naval Ordnance. The Lord Baltimore Press.
Frieden, David R. (1985). Principles of Naval Weapons Systems. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-537-X.
Friedman, Norman (2008). Naval Firepower: Battleship Guns and Gunnery in the Dreadnought Era. Seaforth. ISBN 978-1-84415-701-3.
Hans, Mort; Taranovich, Steve (10 December 2012). "Design hindsight from the tail-gunner position of a WWII bomber, Part one". EDN. Retrieved 18 August 2020.
Pollen, Antony (1980). The Great Gunnery Scandal — The Mystery of Jutland. Collins. ISBN 0-00-216298-9.
Roch, Axel. "Fire-Control and Human-Computer Interaction: Towards a History of the Computer Mouse (1940-1965)". Stanford University. Archived from the original on 15 February 2020. Retrieved 18 August 2020.
Schleihauf, William (2001). "The Dumaresq and the Dreyer". Warship International. XXXVIII (1). International Naval Research Organization: 6–29. ISSN 0043-0374.
Schleihauf, William (2001). "The Dumaresq and the Dreyer, Part II". Warship International. XXXVIII (2). International Naval Research Organization: 164–201. ISSN 0043-0374.
Schleihauf, William (2001). "The Dumaresq and the Dreyer, Part III". Warship International. XXXVIII (3). International Naval Research Organization: 221–233. ISSN 0043-0374.
Wright, Christopher C. (2004). "Questions on the Effectiveness of U.S. Navy Battleship Gunnery: Notes on the Origin of U.S. Navy Gun Fire Control System Range Keepers". Warship International. XLI (1): 55–78. ISSN 0043-0374.
External links:
Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing Before Cybernetics – Google Books
BASIC programs for battleship and antiaircraft gun fire control Archived 2012-10-03 at the Wayback Machine
National Fire Control Symposium |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fleet in being | Use of the term: The term was first used in 1690 when Lord Torrington, commander of the Royal Navy forces in the English Channel, found himself facing a stronger French fleet. He proposed avoiding a sea battle, except under very favourable conditions, until he could be reinforced. By thus keeping his "fleet in being", he could maintain an active threat which would force the enemy to remain in the area and prevent them from taking the initiative elsewhere.
Secondary use: Rudyard Kipling published a series of articles about the British Channel Fleet under the title A Fleet in Being: Notes of Three Trips with the Channel Squadron in 1898, but did not use the term in the sense described here.
Concept: The "fleet in being" concept is based on the assumption that the fleet is relatively safe in port, even if near the enemy. While this is not necessarily true in the modern era, for much of human history a fleet that was at harbor was much less exposed to attack and to other hazards such as storms. This made it difficult, or even impossible, for an enemy to damage the fleet without taking disproportionate losses.
The enemy cannot simply ignore the fleet in being because it always has the option to sortie and attack wherever there are favourable terms. However, the blockading force has to be significant enough that the fleet in being cannot realistically attack it themselves. This creates a stalemate that favours the defender because the attacker always must deploy a superior force to counter them, and those units are unable to perform any other duties.
After the Battle of Taranto and the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, it became obvious that air power made a fleet concentrated in a port vulnerable, and a fleet in being became too risky to be practical. A port is a known location for an enemy to focus attacks on and a handful of aircraft or submarines can damage or sink multiple warships, even in the presence of advanced defenses. As a result, it is preferable for modern fleets to be at sea where their position is not fully known, which provides a degree of protection.
This has not made a fleet in being completely irrelevant because there are situations where an enemy is unwilling or unable to attack the fleet in harbour, such as for political reasons.
An example of this is during the Falklands Conflict. After looking at the alternatives, "The strategy that was accepted for the Argentine Navy [in the 1982 Falklands War] was one of a 'fleet in being' concept ... The fleet would not conduct a direct attack; they would only attack when the odds were in their favor. Otherwise, they would remain outside any declared British exclusion zones and wait for a target of opportunity." The Argentines were not able to make any positive use of their "fleet in being", because the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror showed that the World War II-era cruisers and other assets of the Argentine Navy were vulnerable to attack from contemporary submarines.
The idea of a "fleet in being" can be generalised to forces other than naval. A fortress under siege is essentially an "army in being", which ties up enemy forces without taking the risk of fighting a battle.
While less developed there are a few similar cases for air forces. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein used his air force with an operational doctrine analogous to "fleet in being". The mere presence of the Iraqi Air Force in hardened bunkers forced the coalition attacking Iraq to act cautiously and to escort its bomber sorties, until the aircraft shelters were found to be vulnerable.
In all cases the principle is the same. As long as a smaller force exists and has the choice to engage or not, the larger force is only able to conduct operations in sufficient strength to destroy the complete smaller force. This limits the enemy options significantly, and may even deny actions entirely. The closer that the smaller force is to the larger in strength, the more significant the effect will be.
History:
Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905: The first modern example was the stand-off between the Imperial Russian Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) at Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Russia possessed three battle-fleets: one in the Baltic Sea, the second in the Black Sea, and the third in the Far East. The Pacific squadron in the Far East was stationed at Vladivostok and Port Arthur. With the latter being closer to the land war, Port Arthur became strategically more important.
The IJN possessed only one battle-fleet to the Russian Navy's three; therefore it was imperative that the IJN not have to fight all three of them simultaneously. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 effectively eliminated the Black Sea fleet by keeping it blocked in the Black Sea, lest they risk war with Britain. However, the Baltic Fleet (later renamed the 2nd Pacific Squadron) had orders to reinforce the Port Arthur squadron sometime in 1905. It would be the IJN's mission to preempt that move.
Only after Port Arthur's "fleet in being" was eliminated could the Baltic Fleet and Japanese fleet square off; and this would happen the following year, during the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905.
In order to permanently eliminate Port Arthur's battle-squadron, the IJN initiated three operations. The first was a surprise destroyer torpedo attack inside the harbor in early February 1904. This was quickly followed up with an attempt to block the harbor's entrance by sinking old steam ships (block ships) in the channel. The third and final attempt of permanently bottling up the fleet was the mining of the waters surrounding the harbor's entrance. Although this last attempt also failed, it had the unintended consequence of robbing the Russian Navy of one of its most brilliant naval officers, Admiral Stepan Makarov. When his flagship, the battleship Petropavlovsk, struck one of those mines she sank almost immediately, drowning Makarov with the crew.
The "fleet in being" remained so, until under the new command of Admiral Vilgelm Vitgeft, the Port Arthur squadron was ordered to break out and steam for Vladivostok on 10 August 1904. Vitgeft's exit from Port Arthur resulted in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, an excessively long-ranged gun duel that resulted in no capital warships being sunk on either side, but finally eliminated Port Arthur's "fleet in being", as its warships became dispersed to neutral ports (where they were interned), and the survivors were so heavily damaged that they were no longer serviceable.
World War I: A later example is the stand-off between the German High Seas Fleet and the British Grand Fleet during World War I. Germany largely preferred to keep its fleet intact rather than taking the risk of losing a major engagement with the larger Royal Navy, particularly after the Battle of Jutland.
World War II: In World War II, actions of the Italian Regia Marina in 1940 also demonstrate the idea of a "fleet in being". After a number of minor battles against the Royal Navy that were mostly inconclusive, the bulk of Italian fleet was left in Taranto from where it could sortie very quickly against any British attempt to reach Malta, exerting a "disproportionate influence on British strategy and fleet disposition". Even after the great tactical success of the British aircraft carrier attack on Taranto in November 1940, the British failure to deliver a decisive blow to the Italian fleet resulted in the Royal Navy tying up substantial naval forces in the Mediterranean for the next three years.
Even more so than other surface vessels in Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine (navy), the German battleship Tirpitz served her entire career as a "fleet in being" in her own right. Although remarkably she never fired a shot at an enemy ship, her mere presence in the Norwegian fiords forced the Royal Navy and their allies to allocate powerful warships in defending Arctic convoys, and caused a major convoy (PQ 17) to scatter, suffering huge losses, mainly to U-boats and aircraft. A 1943 midget submarine attack and successive airstrikes launched by the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm removed the threat by November 1944, when the Tirpitz was sunk at Tromsø by Lancaster bombers.
See also: Command of the sea
Red Sea Flotilla
References:
General and cited references: Harper, Steven R. (17 June 1994). "Submarine Operations During the Falklands War (AD-A279 55)" (PDF). United States Naval War College. p. 12. Archived from the original on May 22, 2011.
Hattendorf, John B. (Winter 2014). "The Idea of a 'Fleet in Being' in Historical Perspective". Naval War College Review. 67 (1). Article 6. JSTOR 26397437. Archived from the original on 9 July 2020.
Mahan, Captain A. T. (June 1906). "Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea (Tsushima)". US Naval Institute Proceedings. XXXVI (2). US Naval Institute.
Maltby, William S. (1994). "The Origins of a global strategy: England from 1558 to 1713". In Williamson Murray; et al. (eds.). The making of strategy: rulers, states, and war. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-56627-8.
Tikowara, Hesibo (1907). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fleet in being | "The Idea of a 'Fleet in Being' in Historical Perspective". Naval War College Review. 67 (1). Article 6. JSTOR 26397437. Archived from the original on 9 July 2020.
Mahan, Captain A. T. (June 1906). "Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea (Tsushima)". US Naval Institute Proceedings. XXXVI (2). US Naval Institute.
Maltby, William S. (1994). "The Origins of a global strategy: England from 1558 to 1713". In Williamson Murray; et al. (eds.). The making of strategy: rulers, states, and war. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-56627-8.
Tikowara, Hesibo (1907). Before Port Arthur in a Destroyer: The Personal Diary of a Japanese Naval Officer. Translated by Captain R. Grant (from the Spanish) (1st and 2nd ed.). London: John Murray. OCLC 31387560.
Wennerholm, Colonel Bertil; Schyldt, Colonel Stig (23 May 2000). Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien avd III. Swedish Royal War Academy. p. 13.
Further reading: Virilio, Paul (1986) [1977]. Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology. New York: Semiotext(e). |
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