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434530
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4519795
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434530
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Yoruba/Numbers
|
1- Oókan<br>
2- Eéjì<br>
3 - Ẹẹ́ta<br>
4 - Ẹẹ́rin<br>
5- Aárùn-ún<br>
6- Ẹẹ́fà<br>
7- Eéje<br>
8 - Ẹẹ́jọ<br>
9 - Ẹẹ́sàán<br>
10- Ẹẹ́wàá<br>
11 - Ọọ́kànlá<br>
12- Eéjìlá<br>
13- Ẹẹ́tàlá<br>
14 - Ẹ́rìnlá<br>
15 - Márùndínlógún/Mẹ́ẹ̀ẹ́dógún<br>
16 - Ẹ́rìndínlógún<br>
17 - Ẹ́tàdínlógún<br>
18 - Éjìdínlógún<br>
19 - Ọ́kàndínlógún<br>
20 - Ogún<br>
21 - Ọ́kànlélógún<br>
22 - Méjìlélógún<br>
23 - Mẹ́tàlélógún<br>
24 - Mẹ́rìnlélógún<br>
25 - Márùndínlọ́gbọ̀n<br>
26 - Mẹ́rìndínlọ́gbọ̀n<br>
27 - Mẹ́tàdínlọ́gbọ̀n<br>
28 - Méjìdínlọ́gbọ̀n<br>
29 - Ọ̀kándínlọ́gbọ̀n<br>
30 - Ọgbọ̀n<br>
40 - Ogójì<br>
50 - Àádọ́ta<br>
60 - Ọgọ́ta<br>
70 - Àádọ́rin<br>
80 - Ọgọ́rin<br>
90 - Àádọ́rùn-ún<br>
100 - Ọgọ́rùn-ún<br>
101 - Ọ́kàn lé lọ́gọ́rùn-ún<br>
102 - Méjì lé lọ́gọ́rùn-ún<br>
103 - Mẹ́tà lé lọ́gọ́rùn-ún<br>
104 - Mẹ́rìn lé lọ́gọ́rùn-ún<br>
105 - Márùn dín láàádọ́fà<br>
110 - Àádọ́fà<br>
120 - Ọgọ́fà<br>
130 - Àádọ́je<br>
140 - Ọgọ́je<br>
150 - Àádọ́jọ<br>
160 - Ọgọ́jọ<br>
170 - Àádọ́sàn-án<br>
180 - Ọgọ́sàn-án<br>
190 - Àádọ́wàá<br>
200 - Igba<br>
300 - Ọ̀ọ́dúnrún<br>
400 - Irinwó<br>
500 - Ẹ̀ẹ́dẹ́gbẹ̀ta<br>
600 - Ẹgbẹ̀ta<br>
700 - Ẹ̀ẹ́dẹ́gbẹ̀rin<br>
800 - Ẹgbẹ̀rin<br>
900 - Ẹ̀ẹ́dẹ́gbẹ̀rún<br>
1,000 - Ẹgbẹ̀rún<br>
2,000 - Ẹgbẹ̀wá/Ẹgbàá<br>
2,500 - Ẹ̀ẹ́dẹ́gbẹ̀tàlá<br>
3,000 - Ẹgbẹ̀ẹ̀ẹ́dógún<br>
4,000 - Ẹgbààjì<br>
5,000 - Ẹ̀ẹ́dẹ́gbàta<br>
6,000 - Ẹgbàáta<br>
7,000 - Ẹ̀ẹ́dẹ́gbàrin<br>
8,000 - Ẹgbàárin<br>
9,000 - Ẹ̀ẹ́dẹ́gbàrún<br>
10,000 - Ẹgbààrún<br>
20,000 - Ọ̀kẹ́<br>
50,000 - Ọ̀kẹ́ méjì (àti) ààbọ̀<br>
100,000 - Ọ̀kẹ́ márùn-ún<br>
1,000,000 - Àádọ́ta ọ̀kẹ́ / egberun egberun / egbelegbe
10,000,000 - egbelegbe mewaa
100,000,000 - egbelegbe ogorun
1,000,000,000 - egbelegbéji
10,000,000,000 - egbelegbéta<br>
100,000,000,000 - egbelegbérin
1,000,000,000,000 - egbelegbarun
10,000,000,000,000 - egbelegbéfà
100,000,000,000,000 - egbelegbèje
1,000,000,000,000,000 - egbelegbéjo
For more information on Yorùbá numbers, visit Wikipedia's page on or the website Yoruba Numeral.
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434536
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434536
|
Emulation/PlayStation 2
|
About PlayStation 2.
The PlayStation 2 was a very popular game console in the 2000's. As a result it has a large library of historically and culturally important titles.
PlayStation 2 Emulators.
Official.
Some models of PlayStation 3 used emulation software to play PlayStation 2 games after PlayStation 2 hardware was removed and before the feature was removed in later revisions.
PCSX2.
PCSX2 is the premiere PlayStation 2 emulator. It is open source and runs under Windows, Mac, and GNU/Linux. PCSX2 is pluginless, which helps maintainability and usability. PCSX2 supports Vulkan and OpenGL.
AetherSX2.
Semi-open port of PCSX2 for Android devices. Free (gratis).
DobieStation.
An open source and accuracy focused PlayStation 2 emulator. Very early in development as of 2021.
Play!
Open source high level emulator for traditional computers and mobile. Uses OpenGL or Vulkan. Does not require a PS2 BIOS for operation, but compatibility is lower then some other emulators.
System Files.
The PlayStation 2 uses a BIOS, which emulators do not include. To use most PS2 emulators, one must dump a BIOS from a PlayStation 2 they own. There are some emulators which are able to run without a BIOS file.
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434537
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434537
|
Emulation/PlayStation 3
|
RPCS3.
RPCS3 is the premiere PlayStation 3 emulator. It is capable of booting all known PS3 software, though not all software boots into a fully playable state. It is open source and runs under Windows, GNU/Linux, and BSD.
|
434538
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434538
|
Emulation/Xbox
|
About the Xbox.
The original Xbox is notoriously difficult to emulate. The emulation community once commonly underestimated the difficulty of emulating the Xbox due to its similarities with a PC. However, the Xbox is notably different than a standard PC in a number of ways.
Xbox Emulators.
Official.
The Xbox 360 line, Xbox One line, and Xbox Series line all use emulation to offer backwards compatibility with Xbox games. While not all Xbox games are supported through this lineup, many are, and for these games this option is by far the easiest way to emulate them.
Wikipedia maintains a List of backward-compatible games for Xbox One and Series X, as well as a List of Xbox games compatible with Xbox 360.
CXBX Family.
CXBX Reloaded.
A more current version of CXBX with somewhat higher capability than the original.
CXBX also aims to emulate Sega Chihiro arcade hardware, which is itself derivative of the Xbox.
CXBX.
Among the first Xbox emulators, based on high level emulation. Capable of running homebrew. Limited compatibility.
Dxbx.
A now discontinued fork of Dxbx written in Delphi object Pascal. It contained some unique features that other members of the family lack, including a symbol scanning engine.
XQEMU.
A low level open source and portable emulator.
Very computationally demanding and requires numerous files to be dumped from a system to operate.
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434539
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49843
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434539
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Emulation/Xbox 360
|
About Xbox 360.
The Xbox 360 is notoriously difficult to emulate, though for different reasons then it's predecessor. Unlike its predecessor or successor, it uses a completely different processor architecture. It runs an advanced operating system, and featured fairly powerful hardware that was difficult to emulate on common consumer hardware until the late 2010's.
Xenia.
As of 2021 Xenia is currently among the most workable emulators for the Xbox 360.
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434540
|
3421666
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434540
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Emulation/Nintendo Switch
|
About the Nintendo Switch.
While the Switch uses a great deal of custom hardware, its computer is very well understood. This is because it is based on a SOC which was also used in other products, making its technical details much better known and accessible than the computer hardware of most consoles.
Nintendo Switch Emulators.
Yuzu.
Yuzu is an open source emulator for Nintendo Switch software that can run under Windows and Linux. It has some compatibility with homebrew and commercial titles.
Ryujinx.
Ryujinx is an open source Nintendo Switch emulator.
Skyline.
Mobile specific emulator for Android with limited compatibility. HLE open source emulator.
Strato Emulator.
Strato Emulator is an open-source compatibility layer for the Nintendo Switch that runs on Android. It is a fork of Skyline Emulator that focuses on the continuation of the original project as Skyline Emulator's development has been put on halt due to copyright reasons.
Hardware considerations.
Many major Nintendo Switch games used the touchscreen sparingly, if at all. Thus touch input hardware on the host system is somewhat less important than for other handhelds.
JoyCons, and other switch controllers typically connect over Bluetooth, with some controllers supporting wired USB communication. Both are common standards.
Software considerations.
As with any emulator, the primary use of a Switch emulator is to maintain backups of games you own. They can also be used to run and develop homebrew.
The open source Mesosphere firmware is capable of booting some commercial games.
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434541
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434541
|
Emulation/Nintendo 3DS
|
About Nintendo 3DS.
The Nintendo 3DS is a handheld game console that was popular throughout most of the 2010's. Fitted with an autostereoscopic display, the 3DS developed an impressive library of culturally relevant games and software.
Citra.
Citra is an open source emulator for Nintendo 3DS software that can run under a number of operating systems. It has decent compatibility with commercial titles.
Hardware.
It may be desirable to use a stereoscopic display when emulating a 3DS to take advantage of the 3D effect.
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434542
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434542
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Emulation/Game Boy
|
About Game Boy.
While writing a good emulator is never trivial, the Game Boy is commonly considered one of the easier real game consoles to write an emulator for. This makes it a common choice for student projects looking to explore emulation.
Not all Game Boy emulators also emulate Game Boy Color games, as the Game Boy Color computer is different enough to make adding support non-trivial.
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434543
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434543
|
Emulation/SNES
|
About the SNES.
The SNES was host to a number of culturally and historically important video games.
SNES Emulators.
Higan.
Higan is an open source SNES emulator with an extremely high accuracy. Higan has expanded support to a number of other systems.
This emulator was formerly known as bsnes, and development began in 2004.
Snes9x.
Snes9x Source available for non-commercial use.
ZSNES.
ZSNES An early SNES emulator with lower accuracy, but higher performance.
Read more.
Read more at Super NES Programming/SNES Emulators.
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434544
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434544
|
Emulation/GameCube
|
GameCube Emulators.
Dolphin.
Dolphin is the premiere GameCube emulator. It is open source and runs under many operating systems.
Dolphin supports netplay for online multiplayer.
Dolphin can also load up to 4 GBA cores to seamlessly emulate GBA linked games, and is compatible with netplay. It can also link with a select few external GBA emulators
Hardware Considerations.
GameCube Optical Disks.
GameCube Optical disks are notoriously difficult to read with conventional hardware, often requiring a specific DVD drive being used in conjunction with aftermarket firmware and software. A modified Wii is perhaps the easiest way to read disks to create backup media.
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434545
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3181019
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434545
|
Emulation/Wii
|
Dolphin.
Dolphin is the premiere Wii emulator. It is open source and runs under many operating systems.
Wii Accessories.
Wii Optical Disks.
Wii Optical disks are notoriously difficult to read with conventional hardware. A modified Wii is the easiest way to read disks to create backup media.
Wiimotes.
Since Wiimotes use bluetooth, they are fairly compatible with most bluetooth supporting computers.
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434546
|
3095725
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434546
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Emulation/Wii U
|
About Wii U.
The Wii U was a console produced by Nintendo in the early to mid-2010s. It's unusual control scheme lead to a number of unique and historically significant games being developed for it.
Wii U Emulators.
Cemu.
Cemu is the most popular Wii U emulator.
Cemu runs on Windows, macOS, and Linux.
Decaf.
Decaf is an experimental open source Wii U emulator.
Hardware Considerations.
The Wii U touchpad is an unorthodox controller. Accurately capturing the feel of using a genuine Wii U gamepad with an emulator may be difficult.
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434547
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3181019
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434547
|
Emulation/N64
|
About the Nintendo 64.
As one of the first widespread 3D focused game consoles, the Nintendo 64 was host to a number of groundbreaking software titles which were historically and culturally important.
Nintendo 64 emulators.
Project64.
Project64 - Widely used open source Nintendo 64 emulator.
Mupen64Plus.
Mupen64Plus - Open source emulator.
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434548
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3181019
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434548
|
Emulation/NES
|
About the Nintendo Entertainment System.
The Nintendo Entertainment System and Famicom are historically and culturally important home video game consoles of the 1980's. A number of important series either saw their start on the Famicom or NES.
NES emulators.
FCEUX.
FCEUX is an open source NES emulator.
PuNES.
PuNES is an open source and highly accurate emulator.
Mesen.
Though the open source Mesen was discontinued in 2020, it is commonly considered among the best NES emulators. It is noted for its ability to apply 3rd party texture packs to games, greatly enhancing graphical fidelity and creating a remix culture of sorts among its users.
Nestopia.
Nestopia is an open source NES emulator focused on accuracy.
As of 2021 the original project is abandoned, but it's successor fork Nestopia UE (Undead Edition) remains relevant.
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434549
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49843
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434549
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Emulation/Nintendo DS
|
About the Nintendo DS.
There are significant software and hardware differences between the original DS / DS lite and the DSi. The DSi features a processor twice as fast as the prior models, and also sports four times as much RAM.
Nintendo DS Emulators.
melonDS.
melonDS is an open source and performant Nintendo DS emulator. Supports DSi games, microphone input, and local Wi-Fi emulation.
DeSmuME.
DeSmuME is a popular Nintendo DS emulator. It is open source and runs under many operating systems.
DraStic.
DraStic is a proprietary (closed source) Nintendo DS emulator. Available on Android, it costs money to buy.
No$GBA.
No$GBA is a freeware (Gratis) Game Boy Advance and Nintendo DS emulator. Supports DSi emulation.
Hardware Considerations.
It may be best to use a device with a touch input for Nintendo DS emulation.
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434551
|
1142086
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434551
|
Levantine Arabic/Verbs motion
|
This article is in South Levantine.
The present progressive is not used for verbs of motion. An ongoing motion is expressed by the active participle instead.
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434553
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3181019
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434553
|
Emulation/PC
|
About PC emulation.
PC emulation is a general topic, and can essentially be split into two specialties.
IBM Compatible and DOS.
Much of the focus of hobbyist PC emulation lies in emulating the original IBM PC and compatibles. These systems sported a standard architecture, and typically had limited auxiliary capabilities, making their sound, graphical, and other capabilities simple. The IBM compatible library of software is mind-boggling and massive, ranging from the work of bedroom coders to multinational corporations and covering essentially every software genre that was around in the 1980's.
Emulation of DOS may also be desirable for running serious applications. Many obsolete machines and older systems rely on legacy software which will only run under DOS. These machines and systems are often still functional, but require a DOS based computer. DOS emulation may thus be desirable as a way to help bridge a transition to a more sustainable and contemporary system.
Contemporary PC hardware.
As the 1990's progressed, operating systems, PC hardware, and other factors lead to much more complex home computer systems. At the same time, this is perhaps one of the most commercially relevant fields of emulation. As devices based on ARM and RISC-V can not natively run programs which are specifically designed for x86 platforms, emulation of x86 PCs has become a desired feature.
Alternatives to Emulation.
Techniques with lower overhead are often preferable to full hardware emulation. This is especially true in cases where high performance is required.
Read More.
There is a Wikibook on QEMU.
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434555
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3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434555
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Emulation/Amiga
|
About Amiga.
Amiga was a series of high end multimedia computers which were popular from 1985 to the early 1990's, before the original line was discontinued in 1996. Due to their high end graphics capabilities, a number of games were developed for them. A few emulators were actually written to run on the Amiga itself. A number of programmers cut their teeth on the Amiga, which was perhaps a factor which lead to a number of high quality emulators and software support.
Amiga Emulators.
UAE.
UAE is a common emulator of Amiga software. UAE is free and open source software. It has almost any feature one would need when emulating Amiga hardware, and a number of versions of UAE exist for different platforms.
Other.
Fellow is an older Amiga emulator, which was common on older hardware.
System Files.
Most Amiga emulators require an Amiga operating system and a boot ROM to run original Amiga software.
Amiga Forever.
A legal compilation of the Amiga operating system versions can be had by obtaining the proprietary "Amiga Forever" package. This is a commercial package from the rights holders which is available fairly cheaply digitally, or a bit more for a physical copy. It contains a number of operating system and boot ROM versions, as well as a number of games and demos.
Alternative Operating Systems.
A number of alternative operating systems have been developed to run on Amiga hardware, some of which may also run on Amiga emulators.
Alternatives to Amiga Emulation.
Contemporary hardware reimplementations of the Amiga exist, such as the Minimig.
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434559
|
6290
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434559
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Skaneateles Conservation Area/Invasive species/Viburnum opulus
|
« Moderately invasive plants at the SCA
"Viburnum opulus" (cranberrybush).
"Viburnum opulus" (highbush cranberry or cranberrybush viburnum) has two varieties that are similar in appearance and may both be present at the Skaneateles Conservation Area (SCA).
Even though the New York Flora Atlas only lists American cranberrybush in Onondaga County, we have only found European cranberrybush at the SCA and other nearby natural areas. Even the highbush cranberry that the New York State nursery sent with its wildlife packet and was planted in the windbreak is the European variety of cranberrybush, which New York lists as moderately invasive, and it seems to be spreading at the SCA.
Invasiveness ranking for "Viburnum opulus" var. "opulus" (Guelder rose).
Guelder rose or European cranberry bush ("Viburnum opulus" var. "opulus") received an invasiveness score of 53/79 = 67.09%, which equates to a rank of Moderately Invasive.
This plant is therefore not regulated by New York State law.
1. Ecological impact (13/30).
1.1. Impact on Natural Ecosystem Processes and System-Wide Parameters: Unknown
1.2. Impact on Natural Community Structure: Influences structure in one layer. (3/10)
1.3. Impact on Natural Community Composition: Influences community composition (3/10)
1.4. Impact on other species or species groups: Moderate impact (7/10)
2. Biological characteristics and dispersal ability (16/22).
2.1. Mode and rate of reproduction: Abundant reproduction (4/4)
2.2. Innate potential for long-distance dispersal: Numerous opportunities (4/4)
2.3. Potential to be spread by human activities: Moderate (2/4)
2.4. Characteristics that increase competitive advantage: Two or more (6/6)
2.5. Growth vigor: Does not form thickets nor have a climbing or smothering growth habit (0/2)
2.6. Germination/Regeneration: Unknown (0/0)
2.7. Other species in the genus invasive in New York or elsewhere: No (0/3) → Yes (3/3)
The following "Viburnum" species were listed as invasive, but not assessed until shortly after Guelder rose. These all appear to be present in the LISMA PRISM.
3. Ecological amplitude and distribution (21/21).
3.1. Density of stands in natural areas in the northeastern USA and eastern Canada
3.2. Number of habitats the species may invade
3.3. Role of disturbance in establishment
3.4. Climate in native range
3.5. Current introduced distribution in the northeastern USA and eastern Canada
3.6. Current introduced distribution of the species in natural areas in the 8 NY PRISMs
4. Difficulty of control (3/6).
4.1. Seed banks
4.2. Vegetative regeneration
4.3. Level of effort required
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434562
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273871
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434562
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Pinyin/Johor Bahru
|
Johor Bahru is the capital of the state of Johor, Malaysia. It is also the center of technology, politics, finance, business and trade, tourism, culture and education in southern Malaysia.
Xīnshān shì Mǎláixīyà Róufú Zhōu de shǒufǔ, yì shì Mǎláixīyà nánbù zhī kējì, zhèngzhì, jīnróng, shāngyè yǔ màoyì, lǚyóu, wénhuà hé jiàoyù zhōngxīn.
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434565
|
273871
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434565
|
English-Hanzi/Iskandar Puteri
|
Iskandar Puteri is a city in the state of Johor, Malaysia. It is also the seat of the state administrative center. It is under the jurisdiction of Iskandar Puteri City Council.
依斯干达公主城是马来西亚柔佛州的城市，也是州行政中心所在地，隶属于依斯干达公主城市政厅。
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434566
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273871
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434566
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English-Hanzi/Johor Bahru
|
Johor Bahru is the capital of the state of Johor, Malaysia. It is also the center of technology, politics, finance, business and trade, tourism, culture and education in southern Malaysia.
新山是馬來西亞柔佛州的首府，亦是馬來西亞南部之科技、政治、金融、商業與貿易、旅遊、文化和教育中心。
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434569
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1387936
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434569
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History of wireless telegraphy and broadcasting in Australia/Topical/Biographies/John Vickery Brooks
|
John Vickery Brooks.
A comprehensive biography of John Vickery "Jack" Brooks has not yet been prepared for this Wikibook, however the following resources have been assembled in preparation:
Key internet links:
eg
Maxwell Hull, VK3ZS, Federal Historical Section WIA: biography "Walter Francis Maxwell Howden" in "Amateur Radio" of October 1983
Pending further progress on the foregoing, the following lovely article from xxxxx, summarising Jack's life to 19xx, touches briefly on how much Jack contributed to the development of wireless in Australia in the 1920s
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434575
|
1009988
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434575
|
Dag, Jonathan!
|
"Dag, Jonathan!" (Hello, Jonathan!) is the story of a young Englishman who goes to visit his friend in another European country. It is written entirely in the language Negerhollands. It begins with very simple language. The words the reader knows are repeated and new words are added slowly and in context, so that no dictionary is required to read it.
Negerhollands by the Direct Method with Vocabulary Notes.
This section introduces an alternative reading of the same story, with a focus on increasing the reader's understanding of vocabulary via notes on etymology (word history and makeup) and related words, particularly in English and Latin.
Die eerste Capittel.
Een Man le staen na een Stat. Die Man le skrief een Dag-Buk. Die Man le kik een Stat.
Die Man le staen na een Stat? Ja, hem le staen na een Stat.
Die Man le staen na…een Man? Neen, hem no staen na een Man. Hem le staen na een Stat.
Die Man le staen na een Trein? Neen, hem no le staen na een Trein. Hem le staen na een Stat. Die Man le staen na een Stat.
Die Man le skrief een Dag-Buk? Ja, hem le skrief een Dag-Buk.
Die Dag-Buk le skrief een Man? Neen, die Dag-Buk no le skrief een Man. Dag-Buk no skrief. Man skrief. Die Man le skrief een Dag-Buk.
Die Stat le kik die Man? Neen, die Stat no le kik die Man. Stat no kik. Man kik. Die Man le kik die Stat? Ja, die Man le kik die Stat.
Na wa die Man le staen? Hem le staen na een Stat. Wagut die Man le skrief? Hem le skrief een Dag-Buk. Die Man le kik een Man? Neen, hem no le kik een Man; hem le kik een Stat.
Die Man bin groot. Die Man bin fraej, en die Man bin wies. Hem le denk. Hem le denk na die Stat. Hem le denk: „Wagut die Stat bin? Die Stat bin fraej? Die Stat bin groot?”
Die Man le skrief een Stat? Neen, hem no skrief een Stat; Stat bin groot. Hem le skrief een Dag-Buk; Dag-Buk no bin groot.
Die Dag-Buk le denk na die Man? Neen, Dag-Buk no denk. Man denk. Hem le denk na die Dag-Buk, en hem le denk na die Stat.
En hem le skrief na binne die Dag-Buk. Hem le skrief van die Stat. Hem le skrief: „Die Stat bin fraej, en die Stat bin groot.”
Hem le denk: „Die Stat bin fraej”; hem le denk, dat die Stat bin fraej. Hem le denk: „Die Stat bin groot”; hem le denk, dat die Stat bin groot. Hem le denk na die Stat, en hem le denk na die Dag-Buk.
Wagut die Dag-Buk bin? Die Dag-Buk bin na wa die Man le skrief; hem le skrief na binne die Dag-Buk. Na binne die Dag-Buk, die Man le skrief van die Stat. Na binne die Dag-Buk, die Man no skrief van die Trein; die Man le staen na die Stat, no staen na die Trein. Hem no denk na die Trein; hem le denk na die Stat, die Stat München.
Wagut die Stat bin? Die Stat bin München. Na wa München bin? Die bin na wa die Man le staen. Na wa die Man bin? Hem bin na München.
Ja, München bin een groot Stat, en een fraej Stat. En die Man le denk, dat München bin een fraej Stat, en hem le denk, dat die bin een groot Stat. Die Man bin wies. Hem le seg: „Dag, München!” Hem bin een fraej Man.
Die Man le staen en denk: „Na wa die Trein bin?” hem le kik…hem le kik die Trein! Hem le denk: „Die Trein!” Nu hem no denk na die Dag-Buk en no denk na die Stat; hem le denk na die Trein!
Die tweede Capittel.
Nu die Man bin na binne die Trein. Hem no bin na München; hem bin na binne een Trein. Die Pat. Hem le denk: „Nu mie le loop [?] van München na Weenen. Die bin een fraej Pat. ”
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434579
|
3362771
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434579
|
Emulation/Mega Drive
|
About Mega Drive.
The Sega Mega Drive was a popular console in the 1990's, and continued to be a popular console in some geographic regions well into the 2010's.
Sega Mega Drive and Genesis Emulators.
SEGA Mega Drive and Genesis Classics.
An official emulator and ROM pack developed by SEGA. Includes over 50 officially licensed games as well as an easy to use launcher. ROMS included are compatible with other emulators.
Steam Page
Gens.
Gens is an open source Genesis emulator.
DGen.
DGen is an open source Genesis emulator.
GPGX.
An open source Mega Drive emulator focused on accuracy.
PicoDrive.
A source available Mega Drive emulator.
|
434583
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434583
|
Emulation/Pokémon Mini
|
About the Pokémon Mini.
The Pokémon Mini is a small cartridge based handheld sold in the early 2000s.
The GPU of the Pokemon Mini is framebuffer based.
Pokémon Mini Emulators.
Official.
"Pokémon Channel" for the Nintendo Gamecube contains a Pokémon Mini emulator.
GBE+.
GBE+ is an open source emulator that supports Pokémon Mini emulation. Notably supports IR multiplayer through netplay.
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434584
|
4320518
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434584
|
Emulation/PlayStation Vita
|
About PlayStation Vita.
Compared to its predecessor, the PlayStation Vita sports a significantly more complex computer. Combined with other factors, because of this little progress in PlayStation Vita emulation has been made.
PlayStation Vita Emulators.
Vita3K.
An experimental open source emulator. It used to have limited homebrew and commercial game compatibility, but recently it is able to play 1000+ games with minor to no issues.
|
434585
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434585
|
Emulation/MAME
|
MAME is an open source emulator of a huge number of systems, particularly arcade machines. If a machine was made before the 2000's, chances are good MAME supports it.
|
434586
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434586
|
Emulation/Other
|
Emulators exist for a number of niche computer systems.
Mainframes.
Sometimes it is desirable to emulate a mainframe computer. Hercules is a common emulator of IBM mainframes.
Pinball.
Visual Pinball is a source available pinball machine emulator.
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434588
|
2679710
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434588
|
Super Mario Bros. 3/Inventory items
|
Several of the power-ups and items in "Super Mario Bros. 3" were exclusive to said game and its ports ("Super Mario All-Stars" and "Super Mario Advance 4: Super Mario Bros. 3"). Exclusive power-ups were never in any game prior to "Super Mario Bros. 3" and were never usable in any game, with the exception of ports, that came after it.
Power-Ups.
Three of the power-ups in the game were "suits", and were the rare half of the powerups. All three of the suits were exclusive to Super Mario Bros. 3 and have not been usable since except in ports of the game.
Raccoon Leaf.
The Raccoon Leaf is the most common power-up exclusive to Super Mario Bros. 3. When worn by Mario or Luigi, the Raccoon Suit grants them the power of flight after a short run to build up momentum. It also allows for a slower descent by rapidly waving its tail. The third benefit of the raccoon was that it enables the wearer to perform a spinning tail-attack.
In "Super Smash Bros. Melee", a trophy of Mario's Raccoon Mario form can be obtained. Additionally, in "The Adventures of Super Mario Bros. 3", Super Leaves are often used by Mario and Luigi to become Raccoon Mario and Raccoon Luigi, the episode "Super Koopa" even has Bowser utilize a Super Leaf to become "Raccoon Koopa". In Nintendo Comics System, the Raccoon Suit appeared in the story "It's Always Fair Weather".
Although the Raccoon Leaf was missing from following games, functionally it was very similar to the feather introduced in "Super Mario World."
Frog Suit.
The Frog Suit greatly increases the wearer's speed and control in the water, at the cost of speed and control on land. The earliest this suit is available was in World 2 (to prepare for the water-filled World 3), making it the earliest available out of the suits. This suit also grants the ability to swim through jet-streams coming out of pipes.
In Nintendo Comics System, the Frog Suit's only appearance was "Love Flounders," where Mario is forced to fetch the rare Chuckberries for Princess Toadstool's breakfast cereal. He dons a Frog Suit in order to do this, and as a result is mistaken for a real frog by Bertha the Boss Bass (a former girlfriend of Stanley the Talking Fish), who does not realize her mistake until she kisses him, which removes his Frog Suit.
The Frog Suit was also featured frequently in the animated series based on the game. On "The Adventures of Super Mario Bros. 3", the characters often wore Frog Suits as scuba gear or in place of swimming trunks. One episode, "The Ugly Mermaid", featured a storyline like that of "Love Flounders", except in that case, Mario's would-be paramour, the mermaid princess Holly Mackerel, never finds out that Mario is not really a frog. The Princess and Toad are also shown using the Frog Suit, and Bowser even briefly uses it himself in the episode '"Super Koopa".
Tanooki Suit.
The Tanooki Suit is the second suit found in "Super Mario Bros. 3". It is usually found in treasure chests inside Toad's House.
Wearing the Tanooki Suit gives the wearer all the powers of Raccoon Mario with the added ability to turn into an invulnerable statue for a limited time. The statue has the appearance of Jizō, with Mario's mustache. If Mario jumps above an enemy and activate the statue power, then Mario crushes it, defeating it instantly. This tactic even works on enemies such as Thwomps, Boos and Buzzy Beetles.
The suit is based on the tanuki, a Raccoon Dog native to Japan which features heavily in Japanese mythology.
In Nintendo Comics System, the Tanooki Suit makes an appearance in the story "Tanooki Suits Me". In "Super Paper Mario", one of the items listed on nerdy chameleon Francis's to-buy list is a Tanooki Suit with "real Tanooki fur"; additionally, one of the Sammer Guys fought in the game is named "Cloak of Tanooki."
Hammer Bros. Suit.
Hammer Brothers' Suit is the third and final suit power-up in "Super Mario Bros. 3". There are only 3 ways to obtain it:
The suit allows the user to throw hammers at enemies, and to crouch into a gray shell invulnerable to most attacks. The hammers can kill nearly any enemy in the game, including several that can not be defeated using an invincibility star. These include the Thwomp, Dry Bones, Boo Diddly and Podoboo. It also enables Mario/Luigi to defeat Boom Boom in just one hit and King Bowser in ten hits.
Though Hammer Brothers Suit never officially appear in any episodes of "The Adventures of Super Mario Bros. 3", the episode "Reptiles in the Rose Garden" has Mario and Luigi dressed in the uniforms of two Sledge Brothers.
Exclusive inventory items.
These items were not only exclusive to the game, but were also only usable from the inventory on the world map screen.
P-Wing.
The P-Wing is rare, although not as rare as some items in the game. When used, it gives Mario or Luigi a Raccoon Suit, and the power of infinite flight for the next level that is entered. If Mario or Luigi is hit in this level, the Raccoon Suit and the infinite flight is lost. After completion of the level, the infinite flight power wears off, but Mario or Luigi keep the Raccoon Suit. These were awarded upon completion of worlds 1, 4, and 6.
In "The Adventures of Super Mario Bros. 3", the P-Wing made only one appearance, in the episode "Up, Up, and a Koopa" Toad and Princess Toadstool use it.
The P-Wing makes a cameo appearance in "". It appears on the side of some trucks in Mushroom Bridge and Mushroom City. The license plate of the truck that has the P-Wing on it is "SMB3," the short name for "Super Mario Bros. 3".
Jugem's Cloud.
The Jugem's Cloud (known as Lakitu's Cloud in the ports of the game, as Jugem was Lakitu's Japanese name) is a rare inventory item, which, when used, allows the player to skip over one unfinished stage. While it bypasses Hammer Brothers, all levels and even stone castles, it cannot be used on end castles. Once passed, if the player is not successful on the level after they go back to the last level beaten, wasting the effect.
Music Box.
When used, Music Boxes plays calming music which causes the wandering Hammer Bros. and the Piranha Plants on the world map to fall asleep. While the Hammer Bros. and Piranha Plants are asleep, Mario and Luigi can walk past them without triggering a battle with them.
Anchor.
The Anchor item stops the Airship from moving around on the map after Mario or Luigi make a failed attempt at beating it. The Anchor is one of the rarest items, and can be found after collecting either most or all of the coins in 2-2, 4-2, or 6-7 and earning a White Mushroom House.
Hammer.
The Hammer (not to be confused with the Hammer Bros. Suit) allows the player to break through stone barricades that block some paths. Usually this opens up shortcuts, although it's the only way to get to certain areas.
Warp Whistle.
Warp Whistles send the user by tornado to the Warp Zone, where the player can skip ahead in the game a few worlds. There are only three Warp Whistles in the entire game, two in World 1, and one in World 2. If one uses the Warp Whistle in the warp zone, they would automatically go to level 8. The Warp Whistle is a reference to the Recorder from "The Legend of Zelda". The Warp Zone is set up on four tiers, 1, 2-4, 5-7, then 8. Once at on a level included in that tier, you went to the next tier. For example, if you were already on level 2, you could not warp whistle to level 4, you'd have to choose from 5, 6 or 7.
P-Wing Tanooki Suit.
It is possible to combine the powers of the P-Wing and the Tanooki Suit to both wear the suit and have unlimited flight ability. If the player has infinite flight from a P-Wing and then finds a Tanooki Suit in the level, they'll have the use of both items. After completion of the level, the power of the P-Wing wears off, but the Tanooki Suit is still equipped. This is possible only in levels 4-5, 5-5, 6-3, and the first World 7 fortress.
Kuribo's Shoe.
"Kuribo", actually is the Japanese name of the Goombas. So, it means "Goomba's Shoe".
The Kuribo's Shoe is a power-up only available in one level, World 5-3. It can be taken from Goombas who wear it by breaking the blocks underneath them. If the Goombas are dispatched in this fashion, they drop a shoe that Mario or Luigi can ride the same way the Goombas do.
While riding in this shoe, Mario or Luigi can stomp on things that they cannot stomp normally, such as Piranha Plants, Nibblers and Spinies. When Mario or Luigi complete the level, the shoe "dies" just as on-screen enemies do when the level is completed, by falling off-screen. It is named Kuribo's Shoe after the Japanese name for Goomba, Kuribo.
In "", the Kuribo Shoe can be found in a few of the game's unlockable levels; additionally, a few of the beta levels of "Super Mario Bros. 3" feature the Kuribo Shoe.
In "The Adventures of Super Mario Bros. 3", the Kuribo Shoe, despite appearing prominently in the show's opening cinematic, appears in only one episode "Super Koopa"; the Kuribo Shoe is referred to as "Kurobe Shoe" in this appearance.
In "Super Paper Mario", one of the Sammer Guys fought in the game is known as Shoe of Kuribo, which is an obvious homage to the Kuribo Shoe.
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434589
|
248949
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434589
|
Mario franchise strategy guide/Enemies/Fly Guy
|
Fly Guys are a fictional species in the Mario series of video games. They are mostly found in the Yoshi series and in Mario spin-offs. Fly Guys are often mistakened for Shy Guys, but the difference between them is that Fly Guys have propellers sticking out of their heads while Shy Guys don't.
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434590
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434590
|
Emulation/Sega Saturn
|
About the Sega Saturn.
The Sega Saturn is an early 3D capable console of the mid-1990s. The Sega Saturn had a very unusual architecture, increasing its historic relevance, while also its difficulty in emulation.
Sega Saturn Emulators.
Mednafen.
Mednafen is a multi system emulator with support for the Sega Saturn.
Yabause.
Yabause is an open source Sega Saturn emulator.
|
434591
|
715252
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434591
|
Paper Mario/Bosses/Bosses/General Guy
|
Backstory.
General Guy is one of the bosses in Paper Mario. He was really just a regular Shy Guy until King Bowser Koopa gave him one of the Star Spirits to guard. He resides in Shy Guys' Toy Box, along with the rest of the Shy Guy community. He wanted all the rest of the Shy Guys to follow his orders, but never was able to get them to listen. When Bowser used the Star Rod on General Guy, he became a General among the Shy Guy's and commands them to stop Mario and his friends from rescuing Muskular, the fourth Star Spirit.
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434592
|
3181019
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434592
|
Emulation/Sega Dreamcast
|
About the Sega Dreamcast.
The Dreamcast was Sega's final major home video game console.
Sega Dreamcast Emulators.
Reicast.
An open source and portable Sega Dreamcast emulator.
Redream.
A proprietary Sega Dreamcast emulator.
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434612
|
1009988
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434612
|
Salom, Jonatan!
|
Salom, Jonatan! Globasa by the Direct Method"Salom, Jonatan! Globasa yon Jinji Metode"
A Globasa translation of "Salute, Jonathan!", originally written in Occidental.
"Globasali trasbasa fe Salute, Jonathan!, aselli eskrido in Okcidental."
Chapters ("monlari").
Chapter 1 —
Chapter 2 —
Chapter 3 —
Chapter 4 —
Chapter 5 —
Chapter 6 —
Chapter 7 —
Chapter 8 —
Chapter 9 —
Chapter 10 —
Chapter 11 —
Chapter 12 —
Chapter 13 —
Chapter 14 —
Chapter 15 —
Chapter 16 —
Chapter 17 -
Chapter 18 —
Chapter 19 —
Chapter 20 —
Chapter 21 —
Chapter 22 —
Chapter 23 —
Chapter 24 —
Chapter 25 —
Chapter 26 —
Chapter 27 —
Chapter 28 —
Chapter 29 —
Chapter 30 —
Chapter 31 —
Chapter 32 —
Chapter 33 —
Chapter 34 —
Chapter 35 —
Chapter 36 —
Chapter 37 —
Chapter 38 —
Chapter 39 —
Chapter 40 —
Chapter 41 —
Chapter 42 —
Chapter 43 —
Chapter 44 —
Chapter 45 —
Chapter 46 —
Chapter 47 —
Chapter 48 —
Chapter 49 —
Chapter 50 —
Chapter 51 —
Chapter 52 —
Chapter 53 —
Chapter 54 —
Chapter 55 —
Chapter 56 —
Chapter 57 —
Chapter 58 —
Chapter 59 —
Chapter 60 —
Chapter 61 —
Chapter 62 —
Chapter 63 —
Chapter 64 —
Chapter 65 —
Chapter 66 —
Chapter 67 —
Chapter 68 —
Chapter 69 —
Chapter 70 —
Chapter 71 —
Chapter 72 —
Chapter 73 —
Chapter 74 —
Chapter 75 —
Chapter 76 —
Chapter 77 —
Chapter 78 —
Chapter 79 —
Chapter 80 —
Chapter 81 —
Chapter 82 —
Chapter 83 —
Chapter 84 —
Chapter 85 —
Chapter 86 —
Chapter 87 —
Chapter 88 —
Chapter 89 —
Chapter 90 —
Chapter 91 —
Chapter 92 —
Chapter 93 —
Chapter 94 —
Chapter 95 —
Chapter 96 —
Chapter 97 —
Chapter 98 —
Chapter 99 —
Chapter 100
|
434613
|
3117360
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434613
|
Salom, Jonatan!/Mon 1
|
Mon 1
Unyum mon (1yum mon).
Un de mesi lima (1 de mesi 5).
Ixu estay in xaher. Ixu eskri din-kitabu. Ixu oko xaher.
Kam ixu estay in xaher? Si, te estay in xaher.
Kam ixu estay in…ixu? No, te no estay in ixu. Te estay in xaher.
Kam ixu estay in tren? No, te no estay in tren. Te estay in xaher.
Kam ixu eskri din-kitabu? Si, te eskri din-kitabu.
Kam din-kitabu eskri ixu? No, din-kitabu no eskri ixu. Din-kitabu no eskri. Ixu eskri. Ixu eskri din-kitabu.
Kam xaher oko ixu? No, xaher no oko ixu. Xaher no oko. Ixu oko.
Kam ixu oko xaher? Si, ixu oko xaher.
Ixu estay keloka? Te estay in xaher. Ixu eskri keto? Te eskri din-kitabu. Ixu oko keto? Te oko xaher. Te estay in xaher, ji te eskri din-kitabu, ji te oko xaher.
Kam ixu "estay" in din-kitabu? No, te "eskri" in din-kitabu. Kam ixu oko ixu? No, te no oko ixu; te oko xaher.
Ixu sen day. Ixu sen bon, ji ixu sen cinonpul. Te fikir. Te fikir tem xaher. Te fikir: “Xaher sen kepul? Kam xaher sen bon? Kam xaher sen day?”
Kam ixu eskri xaher? No, te no eskri xaher; xaher sen day. Te eskri din-kitabu; din-kitabu no sen day.
Kam din-kitabu fikir tem ixu? No, din-kitabu no fikir. Ixu fikir. Te fikir tem din-kitabu, ji fikir tem xaher.
Te eskri in din-kitabu. Te eskri tem xaher. Te eskri, “Xaher sen bon, ji xaher sen day.”
Te fikir, “Xaher sen bon”; te fikir ki xaher sen bon. Te fikir, “Xaher sen day”; te fikir ki xaher sen day. Te fikir tem xaher, ji te fikir tem din-kitabu.
Din-kitabu sen keto? Din-kitabu sen denloka hu ixu eskri; te eskri in din-kitabu. In din-kitabu, ixu eskri tem xaher. In din-kitabu, ixu no eskri tem tren; ixu estay in xaher, no in tren. Te no fikir tem tren; te fikir tem xaher, xaher Muncen.
Xaher sen keto? To sen Muncen. Muncen sen keto? To sen denloka hu ixu estay. Ixu sen keloka? Te sen in Muncen.
Si, Muncen sen day xaher ji bon xaher. Ixu fikir ki Muncen sen bon xaher, ji te fikir ki to sen day xaher. Ixu sen cinonpul. Te loga, “Salom, Muncen!” Te sen bon ixu!
Ixu estay ji fikir, “Tren sen keloka?” Te oko…te oko tren! Te fikir, “Tren!” Fe nunya, te no fikir tem din-kitabu, ji no fikir tem xaher; te fikir tem tren!
Am loga:.
1
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434615
|
3117360
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434615
|
Salom, Jonatan!/Mon 2
|
Duayum mon (2yum mon).
Dua de mesi lima (2 de mesi 5).
Fe nunya, ixu sen in tren. Te no sen in Muncen; te sen in tren. Te turi. Te fikir, “Fe nunya, mi turi of Muncen cel Vina. To sen bon turi. Mi suki turi.”
Te fikir tem Muncen. Te fikir, “Fe nunya, mi sen in tren, mas jaledin, mi le sen in Muncen. Ji fe nunya, mi eskri din-kitabu in tren, mas jaledin, mi le eskri din-kitabu in Muncen. Ji fe nunya, mi fikir in tren, mas jaledin, mi le fikir in Muncen. Jaledin, mi fikir tem Muncen in Muncen, ji fe nunya, mi fikir tem Vina in tren. Fe nunya, mi sen in tren, no in Vina. Mas mi fikir ji eskri tem Vina.”
Kam ixu, fe nunya, fikir in Muncen? No, te, fe nunya, no fikir in Muncen. Te fikir in tren. Jaledin, te le fikir in Muncen. Te loga, “Salom, tren!”
Ixu sen in tren, ji te turi cel xaher. Xaher no sen Muncen; Muncen sen xaher de jaledin. Xaher sen Vina; Vina sen xaher fe nundin.
Ixu fikir tem Muncen ji Vina. Te fikir, “Muncen le sen xaher fe jaledin, ji Muncen le sen bon. Fe nunya, to sen nundin, ji mi sen in tren; tren sen bon. Kam Vina xa sen bon?”
Ixu fikir tem Muncen: Muncen le sen xaher de jaledin. Te fikir in tren: te sen in tren de nundin. Ji te fikir tem Vina: Vina xa sen xaher fe jaxadin.
Ji te fikir, “Muncen le sen day. Tren sen day. Kam Vina xa sen day?”
Ji te fikir, “In Muncen, mi le eskri in din-kitabu. In tren, mi eskri in din-kitabu. Kam in Vina, mi xa eskri in din-kitabu? Si, jaxadin in Vina, mi xa eskri in din-kitabu. Mi suki din-kitabu.” Ixu multi fikir (te multi fikir = te fikir ji fikir ji fikir), ji te multi eskri. Si, te sen cinonpul ixu. Cinonpul ixu multi eskri ji multi fikir. Te sen Jonatan; Jonatan sen cinonpul ixu.
Te eskri, “Mi sen Jonatan. Mi sen in tren. Jaledin, mi le estay in Muncen; jaxadin, mi xa estay in Vina.”
Te fikir, ji eskri, “Hin tren…to sen bon, mas lama. To no sen neo; to sen lama. Kam in Muncen, tren sen lama? Si, tren in Muncen sen lama. Mas tren in Muncen sen bon, ji mi suki tren de Muncen. Jaledin, mi le suki tren in Muncen, ji nundin, mi suki tren fe nunya, ji jaxadin, mi xa suki tren in Vina. Mi suki tren!”
Jonatan eskri, “Muncen sen bon xaher ji lama xaher, ji Vina sen bon xaher ji lama xaher. Muncen ji Vina no sen neo, mas sen bon. Muncen ji Vina sen lama, mas bon xaher. Xaher no sen neo, mas bon. Mi suki xaher!”
Jonatan fikir ki duayum din fe turi sen bon. Te loga, “Nundin le sen bon duayum din fe turi. Mi suki turi!”
Am loga:.
2
|
434617
|
3117360
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434617
|
Salom, Jonatan!/Mon 3
|
Tigayum mon (3yum mon).
Dua de mesi lima (2 de mesi 5).
Jonatan estay in Vina: xaher Vina. Jonatan fikir ki Vina sen bon, ji ki Vina sen meli. Jonatan no fikir ki Vina sen colo; te fikir ki Vina sen meli. Te loga, “Vina sen meli xaher! Mi xa eskri tem to!” Ji te eskri in din-kitabu tem Vina. In din-kitabu, te eskri, “Misu tigayum din sen daymo bon! In duayum din, mi le estay in Muncen. Mas fe nunya, mi estay in Vina: Vina no sen Muncen. Muncen ji Vina sen dua xaher; Muncen no sen Vina, ji Vina no sen Muncen. Mi estay in Vina, ji xaher sen daymo meli. Mi suki Vina; xaher no sen colo. Vina sen daydenmo meli! Mas mi hare problema.”
Keto? Jonatan hare problema? Ke problema? Fe nunya, te no oko din-kitabu; te oko xaher ji fikir. Te multi fikir tem problema.
Problema de Jonatan sen ki te suki Vina, mas te no hare watu.
Te fikir, “Em. Fe nunya, to sen satu sabe (7). Fe satu des (10), tren xoridi. Satu des (10) minus satu sabe (7) sen tiga (3) satu. Satu tiga no sen multi watu cel meli xaher! Mi no hare watu. Na hare watu sen bon, mas mi no hare to! Na eskri din-kitabu sen bon, mas mi no hare watu cel na eskri to! Na fale keto in Vina?”
Te fikir, “Mi no hare multi watu. Na fale keto—eskri din-kitabu, or yam, or oko xaher? Mi xa fale keto?”
Te max fikir, ji loga, “Mi hare bon idey! Un momento…mi fikir. Misu tren xoridi fe satu des (10). Kam hay tren xafe to, fe satu des un (11), or satu des dua (12), des tiga (13), des care (14), or des lima (15)?”
Te oko…si! Hay tren hu "da" xoridi fe satu des lima. Fe nunya, Jonatan sen hox.
Jonatan loga, “Des lima (15) minus sabe (7) sen oco (8). Fe nunya, mi hare oco satu fe watu! Mi xa fale keto?”
Te loga, “Mi jixi! Mi xa yam bisteki. Ji mi xa glu bira. Un momento…no, mi xa glu dua bira, or tiga bira. Bon idey!”
Fe nunya, Jonatan glu bira in Vina, ji yam bisteki. Te sen hox. Te loga, “Mi sen daydenmo hox! Mi suki xaher Vina. Mi daydenmo suki turi!”
Gramati.
satu.
satu
Satu = 60 minuto. Un satu = 60 minuto, dua satu = 120 minuto. 6:00 sen satu sisa, ji 2:00 sen satu dua. 6:00 minus 2:00 sen care satu.
Lexilari.
3
|
434618
|
3240846
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434618
|
Traditional Abacus and Bead Arithmetic/Introduction
|
Forewords.
The eastern abacus (simplified Chinese: 算盘; traditional Chinese: 算盤; pinyin: suànpán, Japanese: そろばん soroban, simply "the abacus" in this textbook), as an abacus of fixed beads sliding on rods, originated in China at an uncertain date, but by the late 16th century its use had entirely displaced counting rods as a computing tool in its home country. From China its use spread to other neighboring countries, especially Japan, Korea and Vietnam, remaining as the main calculation instrument until modern times. The way in which it was used, the “Traditional Method”, remained stable for at least four centuries until the end of the 19th century, when an evolution began towards what we will call the “Modern Method”, that makes use of a “Modern Abacus”. This textbook is intended as an introduction to the traditional method, and is aimed at people who already know how to use a modern abacus using the modern method.
Modern and traditional abacus.
Modern abacus is of the 4+1 type, i.e. it has four beads on the lower deck and one on the upper deck.
This is all that is needed to be able to perform decimal arithmetic with the abacus. However, traditional abacuses had additional beads, the most frequent being the 5+2 type (although the 5+1 type were also popular in Japan) and occasionally the 5+3 type.
With three upper beads we can store up to 20 on a single rod, which is convenient for traditional division and multiplication techniques. With two upper beads we can achieve the same by using the suspended bead technique (懸珠, "Xuán zhū" in Chinese, "kenshu" in Japanese), a kind of simulated or virtual upper third bead for the rare occasions when this third bead is required (see figure from 15 to 20).
With a lower fifth bead, we have two different ways to represent the numbers 5, 10 and 15. This means that we have options from which we can choose the one that is most convenient for us. In the case of addition and subtraction, the possibility of choosing between two representations for 5 and 10 will allow us to simplify the calculations somewhat.
Traditional techniques can be used on any type of abacus, with only the obvious exception of the use of the lower fifth bead on a 4+1 abacus, the difference between having or not additional upper beads is more a matter of comfort and reliability than of efficiency or capabilities.
Modern and traditional methods.
Traditional method was used for at least four centuries, covering Ming and Qing dynasties in China and Edo period in Japan. Beginning with the Meiji Restoration in Japan, students of the abacus changed in the sense that they already knew written mathematics before they began to study the abacus, whereas students of earlier times did not know anything about mathematics previously. For most, the abacus was the only form of math they were going to know. This caused a slow adaptation of the teaching and the methods of the abacus to the new times and circumstances, giving rise, after several decades, to what we now call the Modern Method, in fact, a simplified method.
In the English language, the following two works by Takashi Kojima are frequently cited in reference to the modern method:
Several editions of these books can still be found, including e-books formats, and the first one can be consulted at . In this wikibook, the reader is assumed to be familiar with the content of at least the first of these works.
Today, the modern method may seem optimal in many ways and we may think that some "oddities" of the traditional method, especially the way of organizing the division on the abacus, lack practical sense; but if the traditional method remained stable for centuries despite millions of users, including great figures of mathematics like Seki Takakazu who was a great promoter of the use of the soroban abacus in Japan, it can only be because it was also considered optimal by its users. Only the optimality criterion of the ancients differed from the one we may have today.
Unfortunately, no one in the past bothered to write "why" things were done that way, they just wrote about "how" to do things, and we can only speculate on the reasons underlying some of these ancient techniques.
Main differences between traditional and modern methods.
These are the three most important points that differentiate traditional techniques from modern ones:
The principle of least effort.
As mentioned above, no author in the past has written about why things were done this way, only about how to do things; so we can only guess to try to understand why. But the reader will see throughout this book that the traditional techniques suppose, by comparison to the modern ones, a reduction of the mental effort necessary to use the abacus. This is especially clear in the case of division that uses a division table, but also in the rest of the techniques that will be described since they effectively involve a reduction in the number and/or the extent of "gestures" required to complete an operation. We call gesture here to:
and each of these gestures,
so that we can expect, by reducing the number and extension of these gestures, a somewhat faster, more relaxed and reliable calculation.
In view of the above, one is tempted to think that by adopting this principle of minimum effort, traditional techniques evolved in the sense of making life with the abacus easier, which could explain its validity throughout the centuries, but it is nothing more than a conjecture without documentary support.
If we think of the modern method, polarized towards simplicity, speed and effectiveness, we could say that it is the "sprinter method" while the traditional method is the "Marathon runner method".
The reader, after following this textbook, will be able to draw their own conclusions about it.
Abacus procedure tables, some terms and notation.
As usual, in this book we will use tables to describe procedures on the abacus, for example:
Where, on the left, either the digit by digit evolution of the state of the abacus or the current addition or subtraction operation is shown along with comments, on the right, about what is being done. The columns of the abacus are labeled with letters at the top (blank spaces represent unused / cleared rods).
This representation, which is perfect for the modern abacus, needs a couple of refinements to adapt it to the traditional abacus.
and is represented in procedure table as
External resources.
Soroban Trainer.
If you are interested in traditional techniques but do not have a traditional abacus yet, you can use the JavaScript application
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434619
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3240846
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434619
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Traditional Abacus and Bead Arithmetic/Addition and subtraction
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Introduction.
With any abacus type, addition is simulated by gathering the sets of counters representing the two addends, while subtraction is simulated by removing from the set of counters representing the minuend a set of counters representing the subtrahend. Addition and subtraction are the only two possible operations on any type of abacus. Everything else has to be decomposed into a sequence of addition and subtraction.
There is hardly any difference between addition and subtraction with a modern abacus or a traditional one, if the reader already knows how to perform these two operations fluently with a modern abacus, he will also do well with a traditional one. The only two additional points to consider are:
of which the first is by far the most important.
5th lower bead.
The lower fifth bead can be used in addition and subtraction operations just like its companions. Its use is demonstrated in some ancient books such as: "Computational Methods with the Beads in a Tray" ("Pánzhū Suànfǎ" 盤珠算法) by Xú Xīnlǔ 徐心魯 (1573), but over time it ceased to appear in the manuals, perhaps as a non-fundamental technique it was no longer explained in the concise books of the past but surely it continued to be taught verbally, as a trick to abbreviate the operations. We dedicate the following chapter: Use of the 5th lower bead to this subject.
Reverse operation.
Some old books on the abacus, for instance, "Mathematical Track" ("Shùxué Tōngguǐ" 數學通軌) by Kē Shàngqiān (柯尚遷) (1578), demonstrate the addition using an alternating direction of operation with the obvious intention of saving hand movements. If the reader has already studied the modern abacus he knows for sure why it is preferable to operate from left to right, and this is not only a question of the use of the abacus. In the 19th century, the well-known Canadian-American astronomer Simon Newcomb, a renowned human computer, recommended the practice of adding and subtracting from left to right using pencil and paper in the introduction to his tables of logarithms.
Therefore, the alternation of direction of operation should be considered a secondary matter. If it is mentioned here, it is because regardless of its limited usefulness it is a very interesting exercise that can be difficult at first, resulting in a small challenge that can lead the reader to interesting reflections on the order of movement of the fingers; in particular, on whether carries and borrows should be done "before" or "after".
Chapter Extending the 123456789 exercise proposes its daily use as a way to perfect our understanding of "beading".
Learning the abacus in the past.
It may be of interest to know that in the past people learned the abacus without having prior knowledge of mathematics, in particular without knowing anything like an addition or subtraction table; instead they memorized a series of mnemonic rules, verses or rhymes, short phrases in Chinese that indicated which beads had to be moved to result in the addition or subtraction of one digit to/from another digit. We have an example in English of what these types of rules were like thanks to the booklet: "The Fundamental Operations in Bead Arithmetic, How to Use the Chinese Abacus" by Kwa Tak Ming, Printed in Hong Kong (unknown publisher and date), a work aimed to English-speaking Filipinos according to the author. Here are rules/rhymes/verses that appear on it and whose interpretation is left to the reader:
Clearly, the table above does not contain the " trivial rules "; eg. "to add two, activate two lower beads" or "to subtract 6, deactivate both an upper and a lower bead". In the event that we cannot proceed with such rules because we do not have the necessary beads at our disposal, then, we use the "non-trivial rules" listed in the table.
Once the students learned to add and subtract with these types of rules, they began to memorize the multiplication and division tables also in the form of verses or rymas. In total, learning the basics of the abacus required memorizing about 150 rules that had to be recited or sung while applied.
We will have a chance to see more rules by studying the traditional division in this book.
Chapters.
Use of the 5th lower bead.
The specialized use of the 5th lower bead and the non-unique representation of numbers 5, 10 and 15 to simplify operations.
Extending the 123456789 exercise.
A plethora of addition and subtraction exercises that can be done without an exercise sheet.
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434621
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1087545
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434621
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Zelda franchise strategy guide/Enemies/Deku Baba
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Deku Babas are a fictional species of enemy that appears in the "Legend of Zelda" series. They are carnivorous plants, with a venus fly trap-like mouth, and sprout from the ground whenever their roots detect any potential prey. They are known to lash out at an enemy with no provocation (possibly for food, like a Venus fly trap). Sometimes, their stems can be used to fashion Deku Sticks. They also sometimes contain Deku Seeds that are dropped when they die.
Deku Babas by game.
Ocarina of Time" and "Majora's Mask.
In "Ocarina of Time", there are two main variations of Deku Babas. The first kind will shoot straight up (wiggling occasionally) and will yield Deku Sticks once "killed". However, the roots will remain, allowing the Deku Baba to regenerate (these are usually found in areas where a Deku Stick is required, as they can produce an infinite number of Deku Sticks). The second kind will lunge at Link and will be stunned by an attack. If killed normally, it will yield a Deku Nut. If stunned, it will produce a Deku Stick. Unlike the previous kind, these cannot regenerate.
Twilight Princess.
Deku Babas in this game are similar to the second variation in "Ocarina of Time"/"Majora's Mask". However, if they hit Link, they will grab him in their jaws.
Related Creatures.
Baba Serpent/Hebi Baba.
Baba Serpents are only found in "Twilight Princess". They look like regular Deku Babas with an orange coloration. Once the stem is cut, however, it will either crawl around and attempt to clamp its jaws onto Link, or, if Link is too far away, it will reattach itself to the roots.
Big Baba.
Big Babas are massive variations of the Deku Baba found in "Twilight Princess". They, too, are orange in color. They are Baba Serpents and Deku Likes combined. Once the head is killed, it will be destroyed, but the base will remain. The base will open up, allowing Link to throw a bomb into the mouth and kill the Big Baba.
Big Deku Baba.
In "Ocarina of Time", a larger, stronger species terrorized the village where the Kokiri lived. Link was able to remove them after destroying Phantom Ganon, an evil being created by Ganondorf, in the . All Big Deku Babas in the village were destroyed after that (the ones in the Forest Temple, however, remained). In this game, if destroyed normally, they would drop three Deku nuts. However, if they were slain when stunned by a Deku nut, the Hookshot, or sword attack, they would yield a Deku Stick.
Bio Deku Baba.
Bio Deku Baba are vicious plants are located in the Great Bay and Stone Tower Temples, and can only be taken out by one hit with a Powder Keg or a very precise throw of Zora Link's fins. Anything else will sever the stem, allowing the plant to walk freely around its environment. On land this can be very irritating and difficult to time with any form of attack, although the sword works best, while underwater Zora Link's barrier attack is the best option.
Boko Baba.
In "The Wind Waker", no Deku Babas appear. Instead, a larger and more vicious kind of Baba called Boko Babas appeared. At a distance, they resemble Baba Buds, but if Link comes closer the head emerges and attempts to eat him. They are destroyed by stunning them with a jump-attack and then cutting the stem, which forms a Boko Stick. After obtaining the Boomerang, if you fire it at a Boko Baba it will die instantly. They can also be killed by several shots with the Hero's Bow. They appear mainly in the Forest Haven and Forbidden Woods. They usually drop their seeds after they are defeated. In the Forest Haven, there is a Korok who can make a Blue Potion (which restores all health and magic) with four of them if Link is carrying an empty bottle.
Diababa.
The boss of the Forest Temple in "Twilight Princess". In the first form, two large Deku Baba heads come out of a pool of a toxic purple liquid. Link must use the Gale Boomerang to transport a Bombling to the head. In the second form, a third, even larger head comes out with an eye on its tongue. Ook will carry a Bombling that Link must again use the Gale Boomerang to hit the head, causing it to reveal its eye. Link must then slash the eye repeatedly with the sword.
Mini Baba.
This species of Deku Baba is exclusive to "Majora's Mask". They act very much like the unaggresive, regenerating species of Deku Baba. However, this form has no stem and thus will only yield Deku Nuts.
Twilit Deku Baba.
Twilit versions of Deku Babas in "Twilight Princess". They are almost identical to the Deku Babas or Baba Serpents of that game, except for their color. Their colour stays the same, and the only way to distinguish which Baba (Deku or Serpent) they are is only how they react to getting their stems cut.
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434627
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660399
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434627
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Oberon/ETH Oberon/2.3.7/Input.Mod
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(* ETH Oberon, Copyright 1990-2003 Computer Systems Institute, ETH Zurich, CH-8092 Zurich.
Refer to the license.txt file provided with this distribution. *)
MODULE Input; (** portable, except where noted *) (* pjm *)
(*
Native Oberon Input, pjm 09.06.95
Mouse protocol information from XFree in X11R6 distribution (Thomas Roell & David Dawes)
PS/2 Aux port information from Linux (Johan Myreen et al.)
Added support for 82C710 controller (QuickPort), pr 12.09.2000
- information about 82C710 from Linux (qpmouse.c, 8-Sep-95)
Module Input is responsible for event timing, mouse and keyboard input.
IMPORT
Files, Kernel, V24, SYSTEM;
CONST
TimeUnit* = 1000; (** portable, but VAR on other ports *) (** timer ticks per second (platform dependent). *)
SHIFT* = 0; CTRL* = 1; ALT* = 2; (** for KeyState *)
BufSize = 32; (* keyboard buffer size *)
AuxSize = 301; (* PS/2 aux port buffer size (multiple of 3 + 1)*)
ScrollLock = 0; NumLock = 1; CapsLock = 2; LAlt = 3; RAlt = 4;
LCtrl = 5; RCtrl = 6; LShift = 7; RShift = 8; GreyEsc = 9;
Resetting = 10; SetTypematic = 11; SendingLEDs = 12;
MenuShift = 13;
DeadKey = 0;
AUX = -1; NONE = -2;
Trace = FALSE;
(* mouse types *)
MinType = 0; MaxType = 9;
MS = 0; MSC1 = 1; MM = 2; Logi = 3; MSC2 = 4; LogiMan = 5; PS2 = 6; MSI = 7; MSC3 = 8; MSC4 = 9;
(* Native.Install.Text & build tool
0 Microsoft serial (2-button)
1 Mouse Systems Corp serial type a (dtr on, rts on)
2 Logitech serial Type a (old models)
3 Logitech serial Type b (old models)
4 Mouse Systems Corp serial type b (dtr off, rts off)
5 Logitech serial Type c (new models)
6 PS/2 mouse (default)
7 Microsoft serial IntelliMouse
8 Mouse Systems Corp serial type c (dtr off, rts on)
9 Mouse Systems Corp serial type d (dtr on, rts off)
MT=PS2 PS/2 or built-in
MT=LM1 Logitech 1
MT=LM2 Logitech 2
MT=LM3 Logitech 3
MT=MS1 Mouse Systems 1
MT=MS2 Mouse Systems 2
MT=MS3 Mouse Systems 3
MT=MS4 Mouse Systems 4
MT=MSM Microsoft (2-button)
MT=MSI Microsoft IntelliMouse
MP=1
MP=2
(* 82C710 controller command and status bits *)
QpDevIdle = 0;
QpRxFull = 1;
QpTxIdle = 2;
QpReset = 3;
QpIntsOn = 4;
QpErrorFlag = 5;
QpClear = 6;
QpEnable = 7;
TYPE
PollMouse* = PROCEDURE (VAR keys: SET; VAR dx, dy, dz: INTEGER): BOOLEAN; (** non-portable *)
PollKeyboard* = PROCEDURE (VAR ch: CHAR; VAR keys: SET): BOOLEAN; (** non-portable *)
MousePoller = POINTER TO RECORD
poll: PollMouse;
next: MousePoller
END;
KeyboardPoller = POINTER TO RECORD
poll: PollKeyboard;
next: KeyboardPoller
END;
KeyTable = POINTER TO ARRAY OF CHAR;
VAR
mouseErrors, auxoverflows: LONGINT;
(* mouse state *)
mouse: MousePoller;
minX, minY, maxX, maxY, mouseX, mouseY, height: LONGINT;
port, oldport, newport, rate: INTEGER; (* Serial mouse port, bps and report rate (if supported) *)
bps: LONGINT;
type: SHORTINT; (* mouse type *)
buttons: SHORTINT; (* -2, -3, 2, 3 *)
mapkeys: ARRAY 8 OF SET;
mbufp, numb: SHORTINT; (* buffer pointer & protocol bytes *)
mbuf: ARRAY 5 OF SET; (* protocol buffer *)
mask0, val0, mask1, val1, lastkeys: SET; (* protocol parameters *)
auxbuf: ARRAY AuxSize OF CHAR; (* aux port buffer *)
auxhd, auxtl: INTEGER; (* aux buffer pointers *)
threshold: INTEGER; (* speedup threshold *)
speedup: LONGINT;
auxinit: BOOLEAN;
auxId: CHAR;
(* 82C710 mouse port *)
qp: BOOLEAN;
qpStatusPort: LONGINT;
qpDataPort: LONGINT;
(* keyboard state *)
keyboard: KeyboardPoller;
buffer: ARRAY 1+BufSize OF CHAR; (* first byte not used (System.State security) *)
head, tail, dkey: SHORTINT;
lastport: LONGINT;
lastvalue: SYSTEM.BYTE;
keyval: INTEGER;
table: LONGINT;
flags, pollkeys: SET;
breakproc, timerproc: Kernel.Proc;
keytable: KeyTable; (* anchor for keyboard table loaded from file *)
kpmap: SET;
kdx, kdy, counter0, counter1: INTEGER;
(* ---- Keyboard Driver ---- *)
(* Translation table format:
table = { scancode unshifted-code shifted-code flags } 0FFX .
scancode = <scancode byte from keyboard, bit 7 set for "grey" extended keys>
unshifted-code = <CHAR produced by this scancode, without shift>
shifted-code = <CHAR produced by this scancode, with shift>
flags = <bit-mapped flag byte indicating special behaviour>
flag bit function
0 01 DeadKey: Set dead key flag according to translated key code (1-7)
1 02 NumLock: if set, the state of NumLock will reverse the action of shift (for num keypad)
2 04 CapsLock: if set, the state of CapsLock will reverse the action of shift (for alpha keys)
3 08 LAlt: \ the state of these two flags in the table and the current state of the two...
4 10 RAlt: / ...Alt keys must match exactly, otherwise the search is continued.
5 20 \
6 40 > dead key number (0-7), must match current dead key flag
7 80 /
The table is scanned sequentially (speed not critical). Ctrl-Break, Ctrl-F10 and Ctrl-Alt-Del
are always defined and are not in the table. The control keys are also always defined. *)
(* TableUS - US keyboard translation table (dead keys: ^=1, '=2, `=3, ~=4, "=5) *)
PROCEDURE TableUS: LONGINT;
CALL L1
L1:
POP EAX
ADD EAX,8
POP EBP
RET
(* alphabet *)
DB 1EX, "a", "A", 4X, 30X, "b", "B", 4X, 2EX, "c", "C", 4X, 20X, "d", "D", 4X
DB 12X, "e", "E", 4X, 21X, "f", "F", 4X, 22X, "g", "G", 4X, 23X, "h", "H", 4X
DB 17X, "i", "I", 4X, 24X, "j", "J", 4X, 25X, "k", "K", 4X, 26X, "l", "L", 4X
DB 32X, "m", "M", 4X, 31X, "n", "N", 4X, 18X, "o", "O", 4X, 19X, "p", "P", 4X
DB 10X, "q", "Q", 4X, 13X, "r", "R", 4X, 1FX, "s", "S", 4X, 14X, "t", "T", 4X
DB 16X, "u", "U", 4X, 2FX, "v", "V", 4X, 11X, "w", "W", 4X, 2DX, "x", "X", 4X
DB 15X, "y", "Y", 4X, 2CX, "z", "Z", 4X
(* Oberon accents (LAlt & RAlt) *)
DB 1EX, "ä", "Ä", 0CX, 12X, "ë", 0FFX, 0CX, 18X, "ö", "Ö", 0CX, 16X, "ü", "Ü", 0CX
DB 17X, "ï", 0FFX, 0CX, 1FX, "ß", 0FFX, 0CX, 2EX, "ç", 0FFX, 0CX, 31X, "ñ", 0FFX, 0CX
DB 1EX, "ä", "Ä", 14X, 12X, "ë", 0FFX, 14X, 18X, "ö", "Ö", 14X, 16X, "ü", "Ü", 14X
DB 17X, "ï", 0FFX, 14X, 1FX, "ß", 0FFX, 14X, 2EX, "ç", 0FFX, 14X, 31X, "ñ", 0FFX, 14X
(* dead keys (LAlt & RAlt) *)
DB 07X, 0FFX, 1X, 9X, 28X, 2X, 5X, 9X, 29X, 3X, 4X, 9X,
DB 07X, 0FFX, 1X, 11X, 28X, 2X, 5X, 11X, 29X, 3X, 4X, 11X,
(* following keys *)
DB 1EX, "â", 0FFX, 20X, 12X, "ê", 0FFX, 20X, 17X, "î", 0FFX, 20X, 18X, "ô", 0FFX, 20X
DB 16X, "û", 0FFX, 20X, 1EX, "à", 0FFX, 60X, 12X, "è", 0FFX, 60X, 17X, "ì", 0FFX, 60X
DB 18X, "ò", 0FFX, 60X, 16X, "ù", 0FFX, 60X, 1EX, "á", 0FFX, 40X, 12X, "é", 0FFX, 40X
DB 1EX, "ä", "Ä", 0A4X, 12X, "ë", 0FFX, 0A0X, 17X, "ï", 0FFX, 0A0X, 18X, "ö", "Ö", 0A4X
DB 16X, "ü", "Ü", 0A4X, 31X, "ñ", 0FFX, 80X
(* numbers at top *)
DB 0BX, "0", ")", 0X, 02X, "1", "!", 0X, 03X, "2", "@", 0X, 04X, "3", "#", 0X
DB 05X, "4", "$", 0X, 06X, "5", "%", 0X, 07X, "6", "^", 0X, 08X, "7", "&", 0X
DB 09X, "8", "*", 0X, 0AX, "9", "(", 0X
(* symbol keys *)
DB 28X, "'", 22X, 0X, 33X, ",", "<", 0X, 0CX, "-", "_", 0X, 34X, ".", ">", 0X
DB 35X, "/", "?", 0X, 27X, ";", ":", 0X, 0DX, "=", "+", 0X, 1AX, "[", "{", 0X
DB 2BX, "\", "|", 0X, 1BX, "]", "}", 0X, 29X, "`", "~", 0X
(* control keys *)
DB 0EX, 7FX, 7FX, 0X (* backspace *)
DB 0FX, 09X, 09X, 0X (* tab *)
DB 1CX, 0DX, 0DX, 0X (* enter *)
DB 39X, 20X, 20X, 0X (* space *)
DB 01X, 1BX, 1BX, 0X (* esc *)
(* keypad *)
DB 4FX, 0A9X, "1", 2X (* end/1 *)
DB 50X, 0C2X, "2", 2X (* down/2 *)
DB 51X, 0A3X, "3", 2X (* pgdn/3 *)
DB 4BX, 0C4X, "4", 2X (* left/4 *)
DB 4CX, 0FFX, "5", 2X (* center/5 *)
DB 4DX, 0C3X, "6", 2X (* right/6 *)
DB 47X, 0A8X, "7", 2X (* home/7 *)
DB 48X, 0C1X, "8", 2X (* up/8 *)
DB 49X, 0A2X, "9", 2X (* pgup/9 *)
DB 52X, 0A0X, "0", 2X (* insert/0 *)
DB 53X, 0A1X, 2EX, 2X (* del/. *)
(* grey keys *)
DB 4AX, "-", "-", 0X (* grey - *)
DB 4EX, "+", "+", 0X (* grey + *)
DB 0B5X, "/", "/", 0X (* grey / *)
DB 37X, "*", "*", 0X (* grey * *)
DB 0D0X, 0C2X, 0C2X, 0X (* grey down *)
DB 0CBX, 0C4X, 0C4X, 0X (* grey left *)
DB 0CDX, 0C3X, 0C3X, 0X (* grey right *)
DB 0C8X, 0C1X, 0C1X, 0X (* grey up *)
DB 09CX, 0DX, 0DX, 0X (* grey enter *)
DB 0D2X, 0A0X, 0A0X, 0X (* grey ins *)
DB 0D3X, 0A1X, 0A1X, 0X (* grey del *)
DB 0C9X, 0A2X, 0A2X, 0X (* grey pgup *)
DB 0D1X, 0A3X, 0A3X, 0X (* grey pgdn *)
DB 0C7X, 0A8X, 0A8X, 0X (* grey home *)
DB 0CFX, 0A9X, 0A9X, 0X (* grey end *)
(* function keys *)
DB 3BX, 0A4X, 0FFX, 0X (* F1 *)
DB 3CX, 0A5X, 0FFX, 0X (* F2 *)
DB 3DX, 1BX, 0FFX, 0X (* F3 *)
DB 3EX, 0A7X, 0FFX, 0X (* F4 *)
DB 3FX, 0F5X, 0FFX, 0X (* F5 *)
DB 40X, 0F6X, 0FFX, 0X (* F6 *)
DB 41X, 0F7X, 0FFX, 0X (* F7 *)
DB 42X, 0F8X, 0FFX, 0X (* F8 *)
DB 43X, 0F9X, 0FFX, 0X (* F9 *)
DB 44X, 0FAX, 0FFX, 0X (* F10 *)
DB 57X, 0FBX, 0FFX, 0X (* F11 *)
DB 58X, 0FCX, 0FFX, 0X (* F12 *)
DB 0FFX
END TableUS;
PROCEDURE TableFromFile(name: ARRAY OF CHAR): KeyTable;
VAR f: Files.File; r: Files.Rider; len: LONGINT; t: KeyTable;
BEGIN
Kernel.WriteString("Keyboard: "); Kernel.WriteString(name);
f := Files.Old(name);
IF f # NIL THEN
len := Files.Length(f);
IF len MOD 4 = 0 THEN
NEW(t, len+1);
Files.Set(r, f, 0); Files.ReadBytes(r, t^, len);
IF r.res = 0 THEN
Kernel.WriteLn;
t[len] := 0FFX;
RETURN t
END
END
END;
Kernel.WriteString(" not used"); Kernel.WriteLn;
RETURN NIL
END TableFromFile;
(* Translate - Translate scan code "c" to key. *)
PROCEDURE Translate(flags: SET; c: CHAR): INTEGER;
CONST
Alt = {LAlt, RAlt}; Ctrl = {LCtrl, RCtrl}; Shift = {LShift, RShift};
VAR a: LONGINT; s1: CHAR; s: SET; k: INTEGER; dkn: SHORTINT;
BEGIN
IF (c = 46X) & (flags * Ctrl # {}) THEN RETURN -2 END; (* Ctrl-Break - break *)
IF (c = 44X) & (flags * Ctrl # {}) THEN RETURN 0FFH END; (* Ctrl-F10 - exit *)
IF (c = 53X) & (flags * Ctrl # {}) & (flags * Alt # {}) THEN RETURN 0FFH END; (* Ctrl-Alt-Del - exit *)
IF GreyEsc IN flags THEN c := CHR(ORD(c)+80H) END;
a := table;
LOOP
SYSTEM.GET(a, s1);
IF s1 = 0FFX THEN (* end of table, unmapped key *)
k := -1; dkey := 0; EXIT
ELSIF s1 = c THEN (* found scan code in table *)
SYSTEM.GET(a+3, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s)); (* flags from table *)
dkn := SHORT(SHORT(SYSTEM.VAL(LONGINT, SYSTEM.LSH(s * {5..7}, -5))));
s := s * {DeadKey, NumLock, CapsLock, LAlt, RAlt, LCtrl, RCtrl}; k := 0;
IF ((s * Alt = flags * Alt) OR (NumLock IN s)) & (dkn = dkey) THEN (* Alt & dead keys match exactly *)
IF flags * Shift # {} THEN INCL(s, LShift) END; (* check if shift pressed *)
(* handle CapsLock *)
IF (CapsLock IN s) & (CapsLock IN flags) THEN s := s / {LShift} END;
(* handle NumLock *)
IF NumLock IN s THEN
IF flags * Alt # {} THEN INCL(s, LShift)
END
END;
(* get key code *)
IF LShift IN s THEN SYSTEM.GET(a+2, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, k)) (* shifted value *)
ELSE SYSTEM.GET(a+1, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, k)) (* unshifted value *)
END;
IF (DeadKey IN s) & (k <= 7) THEN (* dead key *)
dkey := SHORT(k); k := -1 (* set new dead key state *)
ELSIF k = 0FFH THEN (* unmapped key *)
k := -1; dkey := 0 (* reset dead key state *)
ELSE (* mapped key *)
IF flags * Ctrl # {} THEN
IF ((k >= 64) & (k <= 95)) OR ((k >= 97) & (k <= 122)) THEN
k := SHORT(SYSTEM.VAL(LONGINT, SYSTEM.VAL(SET, k) * {0..4})) (* control *)
ELSIF k = 13 THEN (* Ctrl-Enter *)
k := 10
END
END;
IF flags * Alt # {} THEN (* Alt-keypad *)
IF (k >= ORD("0")) & (k <= ORD("9")) & (NumLock IN s) THEN (* keypad num *)
IF keyval = -1 THEN keyval := k-ORD("0")
ELSE keyval := (10*keyval + (k-ORD("0"))) MOD 1000
END;
k := -1
END
END;
dkey := 0 (* reset dead key state *)
END;
EXIT
END
END;
INC(a, 4)
END; (* LOOP *)
RETURN k
END Translate;
(* Wait - Wait for keyboard serial port to acknowledge byte. *)
PROCEDURE Wait;
VAR t: Kernel.MilliTimer; s: SET;
BEGIN
Kernel.SetTimer(t, Kernel.TimeUnit DIV 50); (* wait up to 17 ms *)
REPEAT
SYSTEM.PORTIN(64H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s))
UNTIL ~(1 IN s) OR Kernel.Expired(t)
END Wait;
(* SendByte - Send a byte to the keyboard. *)
PROCEDURE SendByte(port: LONGINT; value: SYSTEM.BYTE);
BEGIN
Wait; SYSTEM.PORTOUT(port, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, value));
lastport := port; lastvalue := value
END SendByte;
(* ShiftKey - Handle shift keys. *)
PROCEDURE ShiftKey(left, right: SHORTINT; in: BOOLEAN);
BEGIN
IF in THEN
IF GreyEsc IN flags THEN INCL(flags, right)
ELSE INCL(flags, left)
END
ELSE
IF GreyEsc IN flags THEN EXCL(flags, right)
ELSE EXCL(flags, left)
END
END
END ShiftKey;
(* LedKey - Handle "lock" keys. *)
PROCEDURE LedKey(VAR flags: SET; lock: SHORTINT; c: CHAR;
VAR k: INTEGER);
BEGIN
IF flags * {LAlt, RAlt, LCtrl, RCtrl, LShift, RShift} = {} THEN
ELSE
k := Translate(flags, c)
END
END LedKey;
(* DisableInterrupts - Disable interrupts and return original flags state *)
PROCEDURE -DisableInterrupts: SET;
PUSHFD
POP EAX
CLI
END DisableInterrupts;
(* RestoreInterrupts - Set flags state to restore interrupts to previous state *)
PROCEDURE -RestoreInterrupts(state: SET);
POPFD
END RestoreInterrupts;
(* MapScanCode - Map a scan code "c" to a key code. *)
PROCEDURE MapScanCode(c: CHAR): INTEGER;
VAR k: INTEGER; oldleds, state: SET;
BEGIN
SendByte(64H, 0ADX); Wait; (* disable keyboard *)
k := -1; oldleds := flags * {ScrollLock, NumLock, CapsLock};
IF c = 0X THEN (* overrun, ignore *)
ELSIF c = 0FAX THEN (* keyboard ack *)
IF Resetting IN flags THEN
EXCL(flags, Resetting); INCL(flags, SendingLEDs);
SendByte(60H, 0EDX) (* set keyboard LEDs *)
ELSIF SendingLEDs IN flags THEN
SendByte(60H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, oldleds));
EXCL(flags, SendingLEDs)
ELSIF SetTypematic IN flags THEN
EXCL(flags, SetTypematic); INCL(flags, Resetting);
SendByte(60H, 020X) (* 30Hz, 500 ms *)
ELSE (* assume ack was for something else *)
END
ELSIF c = 0FEX THEN (* keyboard resend *)
SendByte(lastport, lastvalue)
ELSIF c = 038X THEN (* Alt make *)
ShiftKey(LAlt, RAlt, TRUE)
ELSIF c = 01DX THEN (* Ctrl make *)
ShiftKey(LCtrl, RCtrl, TRUE)
ELSIF c = 02AX THEN (* LShift make *)
INCL(flags, LShift)
ELSIF c = 036X THEN (* RShift make *)
INCL(flags, RShift)
ELSIF c = 05DX THEN (* menu make *)
INCL(flags, MenuShift)
ELSIF c = 03AX THEN (* Caps make *)
LedKey(flags, CapsLock, c, k)
ELSIF c = 046X THEN (* Scroll make *)
LedKey(flags, ScrollLock, c, k);
state := DisableInterrupts;
IF ScrollLock IN flags THEN
IF Kernel.timer = NIL THEN Kernel.timer := timerproc END
ELSE
IF Kernel.timer = timerproc THEN Kernel.timer := NIL END
END;
RestoreInterrupts(state)
ELSIF c = 045X THEN (* Num make *)
LedKey(flags, NumLock, c, k)
ELSIF c = 0B8X THEN (* Alt break *)
ShiftKey(LAlt, RAlt, FALSE);
IF (keyval >= 0) & (keyval < 255) THEN k := keyval END; (* exclude 255 - reboot *)
keyval := -1
ELSIF c = 09DX THEN (* Ctrl break *)
ShiftKey(LCtrl, RCtrl, FALSE)
ELSIF c = 0AAX THEN (* LShift break *)
EXCL(flags, LShift)
ELSIF c = 0B6X THEN (* RShift break *)
EXCL(flags, RShift)
ELSIF c = 0DDX THEN (* menu break *)
EXCL(flags, MenuShift)
ELSIF (flags * {ScrollLock, GreyEsc} = {ScrollLock}) & (c >= 47X) & (c <= 53X) & (c # 4AX) & (c # 4EX) THEN (* key mouse *)
INCL(kpmap, ORD(c)-47H)
ELSIF c < 080X THEN (* Other make *)
k := Translate(flags, c)
ELSIF (flags * {ScrollLock, GreyEsc} = {ScrollLock}) & (c >= 0C7X) & (c <= 0D3X) THEN (* key mouse *)
EXCL(kpmap, ORD(c)-0C7H)
ELSE (* ignore *)
END;
IF c = 0E0X THEN INCL(flags, GreyEsc) ELSE EXCL(flags, GreyEsc) END;
IF flags * {ScrollLock, NumLock, CapsLock} # oldleds THEN
INCL(flags, SendingLEDs);
SendByte(60H, 0EDX) (* set keyboard LEDs *)
END;
SendByte(64H, 0AEX); (* enable keyboard *)
RETURN k
END MapScanCode;
(*
PROCEDURE -CS: LONGINT
033H, 0C0H, (* XOR EAX,EAX *)
066H, 08CH, 0C8H; (* MOV AX,CS *)
PROCEDURE -CS: LONGINT;
XOR EAX, EAX
MOV AX, CS
END CS;
(* KeyboardInterrupt - Handle interrupts from keyboard *)
PROCEDURE KeyboardInterrupt;
VAR
m: SET; c: CHAR; k: INTEGER; fp, esp, tmp, cs: LONGINT; i: SHORTINT;
BEGIN
SYSTEM.PORTIN(060H, c); (* get scan code *)
SYSTEM.PORTIN(061H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, m));
INCL(m, 7); SYSTEM.PORTOUT(061H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, m));
EXCL(m, 7); SYSTEM.PORTOUT(061H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, m)); (* ack *)
SYSTEM.STI;
k := MapScanCode(c);
IF k = -2 THEN (* break *)
head := 0; tail := 0; (* clear buffer *)
IF ~Kernel.break THEN (* first try: soft break *)
Kernel.break := TRUE
ELSIF ~Kernel.inGC THEN (* second try: do hard break *)
Kernel.break := FALSE; (* cancel other break *)
SYSTEM.GETREG(5, fp); (* EBP *)
SYSTEM.GET(fp+52, tmp); (* get CS'' *)
cs := CS;
IF tmp MOD 4 # cs MOD 4 THEN (* we interrupted at different level *)
(* assume we are currently on system stack *)
(* simulate a CALL to breakproc *)
SYSTEM.GET(fp+48, tmp); (* save old EIP *)
SYSTEM.PUT(fp+48, breakproc);
SYSTEM.GET(fp+60, esp); (* get outer ESP *)
DEC(esp, 4);
SYSTEM.PUT(fp+60, esp);
SYSTEM.PUT(esp, tmp) (* PUSH old EIP *)
ELSE (* we interrupted at same level *)
(* simulate a JMP to breakproc *)
SYSTEM.PUT(fp+48, breakproc)
END
END
ELSIF k >= 0 THEN
i := (tail+1) MOD BufSize;
IF i # head THEN
buffer[1+tail] := CHR(k); tail := i
END
END
END KeyboardInterrupt;
(* InitKeyboard - Initialise the keyboard. *)
PROCEDURE InitKeyboard;
VAR s: SET; c: CHAR; i: SHORTINT; k: ARRAY 8 OF CHAR;
BEGIN
head := 0; tail := 0; keyval := -1; buffer[0] := 0X;
(* Get table *)
Setting("Keyboard");
(* install interrupt *)
flags := {};
Kernel.InstallIP(KeyboardInterrupt, Kernel.IRQ+1);
(* clear the keyboard's internal buffer *)
i := 8;
LOOP
SYSTEM.PORTIN(64H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
IF ~(0 IN s) OR (i = 0) THEN EXIT END;
SYSTEM.PORTIN(60H, c); (* read byte *)
SYSTEM.PORTIN(61H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
INCL(s, 7); SYSTEM.PORTOUT(61H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
EXCL(s, 7); SYSTEM.PORTOUT(61H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s)); (* ack *)
DEC(i)
END;
flags := {SetTypematic};
Kernel.GetConfig("NumLock", k);
IF k[0] = "1" THEN INCL(flags, NumLock) END;
SendByte(60H, 0F3X) (* settypedel, will cause Ack from keyboard *)
END InitKeyboard;
(* ---- PS/2 aux port driver ---- *)
PROCEDURE PollAux;
VAR s: SET; t: Kernel.MilliTimer; i: SHORTINT;
BEGIN
i := 10; (* up to 0.2s! *)
LOOP
IF qp THEN
SYSTEM.PORTIN(qpStatusPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
IF (s * {QpRxFull, QpTxIdle, QpDevIdle} = {QpTxIdle, QpDevIdle}) OR (i = 0) THEN EXIT END;
SYSTEM.PORTIN(qpStatusPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
IF s * {QpRxFull} = {QpRxFull} THEN SYSTEM.PORTIN(qpDataPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s)) END; (* byte avail *)
ELSE
SYSTEM.PORTIN(64H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
IF (s * {0,1} = {}) OR (i = 0) THEN EXIT END;
SYSTEM.PORTIN(64H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
IF s * {0,5} = {0,5} THEN SYSTEM.PORTIN(60H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s)) END; (* byte avail *)
END;
Kernel.SetTimer(t, TimeUnit DIV 50); (* 20ms *)
REPEAT UNTIL Kernel.Expired(t);
DEC(i)
END
END PollAux;
PROCEDURE InAux: CHAR;
VAR s: SET; ch: CHAR; t: Kernel.MilliTimer; i: SHORTINT;
BEGIN
i := 10; (* up to 0.2s! *)
REPEAT
IF qp THEN
SYSTEM.PORTIN(qpStatusPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
IF s * {QpRxFull} = {QpRxFull} THEN (* byte avail *)
SYSTEM.PORTIN(qpDataPort, ch);
RETURN ch
END
ELSE
SYSTEM.PORTIN(64H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
IF s * {0,5} = {0,5} THEN (* byte avail *)
SYSTEM.PORTIN(60H, ch);
RETURN ch
END
END;
Kernel.SetTimer(t, TimeUnit DIV 50); (* 20ms *)
REPEAT UNTIL Kernel.Expired(t);
DEC(i);
UNTIL i = 0;
RETURN 0X
END InAux;
PROCEDURE WriteDev(b: CHAR);
BEGIN
IF qp THEN
PollAux; SYSTEM.PORTOUT(qpDataPort, b)
ELSE
PollAux; SYSTEM.PORTOUT(64H, 0D4X); (* aux data coming *)
PollAux; SYSTEM.PORTOUT(60H, b)
END
END WriteDev;
PROCEDURE WriteAck(b: CHAR);
VAR s: SET; t: Kernel.MilliTimer; i: SHORTINT;
BEGIN
WriteDev(b); i := 10; (* up to 0.2s! *)
LOOP
IF qp THEN
SYSTEM.PORTIN(qpStatusPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
IF (s * {QpRxFull} = {QpRxFull}) OR (i = 0) THEN EXIT END;
ELSE
SYSTEM.PORTIN(64H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s));
IF (s * {0,5} = {0,5}) OR (i = 0) THEN EXIT END;
END;
Kernel.SetTimer(t, TimeUnit DIV 50); (* 20ms *)
REPEAT UNTIL Kernel.Expired(t);
DEC(i)
END;
IF i # 0 THEN (* byte avail *)
IF qp THEN SYSTEM.PORTIN(qpDataPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s))
ELSE SYSTEM.PORTIN(60H, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, s))
END
END
END WriteAck;
PROCEDURE WriteCmd(b: CHAR);
BEGIN
ASSERT(~qp, 100);
PollAux; SYSTEM.PORTOUT(64H, 60X);
PollAux; SYSTEM.PORTOUT(60H, b)
END WriteCmd;
PROCEDURE AuxInterrupt;
VAR c: CHAR; t: INTEGER;
BEGIN
IF qp THEN SYSTEM.PORTIN(qpDataPort, c); (* read byte *)
ELSE SYSTEM.PORTIN(60H, c); (* read byte *)
END;
t := (auxtl+1) MOD AuxSize;
IF t # auxhd THEN auxbuf[auxtl] := c; auxtl := t
ELSE INC(auxoverflows)
END
END AuxInterrupt;
PROCEDURE SerialRead(port: LONGINT; VAR c: SYSTEM.BYTE);
VAR state: SET; res: LONGINT;
BEGIN
IF port = AUX THEN
REPEAT UNTIL auxhd # auxtl;
state := DisableInterrupts;
c := auxbuf[auxhd]; auxhd := (auxhd+1) MOD AuxSize;
RestoreInterrupts(state);
res := 0
ELSE
V24.Receive(port, c, res)
END
END SerialRead;
PROCEDURE SerialWrite(port: LONGINT; c: SYSTEM.BYTE);
VAR res: LONGINT;
BEGIN
IF port # AUX THEN
V24.Send(port, c, res)
END
END SerialWrite;
PROCEDURE SerialAvailable(port: LONGINT): LONGINT;
VAR n: LONGINT; state: SET;
BEGIN
IF port = AUX THEN
state := DisableInterrupts;
n := auxtl-auxhd;
RestoreInterrupts(state);
IF n < 0 THEN INC(n, AuxSize) END
ELSIF port # NONE THEN
n := V24.Available(port)
ELSE
n := 0
END;
RETURN n
END SerialAvailable;
PROCEDURE StartAux;
VAR state, status: SET;
PROCEDURE SetRate(r: INTEGER);
BEGIN WriteAck(0F3X); WriteAck(CHR(r))
END SetRate;
BEGIN
state := DisableInterrupts;
auxhd := 0; auxtl := 0;
RestoreInterrupts(state);
IF ~auxinit THEN
auxinit := TRUE;
PollAux;
IF qp THEN
SYSTEM.PORTIN(qpStatusPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, status));
INCL(status, QpEnable + QpReset);
SYSTEM.PORTOUT(qpStatusPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, status));
EXCL(status, QpReset);
SYSTEM.PORTOUT(qpStatusPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, status));
ELSE
SYSTEM.PORTOUT(64H, 0A8X); (* enable aux *)
END;
(* enable MS Intellimouse 3rd button *)
SetRate(200); SetRate(100); SetRate(80); SetRate(rate);
WriteAck(0F2X); auxId := InAux; (*Ident*)
WriteAck(0E8X); WriteAck(3X); (* 8 counts/mm *)
WriteAck(0E7X); (* 2:1 scale *)
PollAux;
Kernel.InstallIP(AuxInterrupt, Kernel.IRQ+12);
WriteDev(0F4X); (* enable aux device *)
IF qp THEN
INCL(status, QpIntsOn);
SYSTEM.PORTOUT(qpStatusPort, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, status))
ELSE
WriteCmd(47X) (* controller interrupts on *)
END;
PollAux
END
END StartAux;
(* ---- Mouse driver ---- *)
(* SetSpeed - Set mouse speed *)
PROCEDURE SetSpeed(old, new: LONGINT);
VAR word, stop, par: INTEGER; c: CHAR; res: LONGINT; timer: Kernel.MilliTimer;
BEGIN
IF port # AUX THEN
IF (oldport # NONE) & (oldport # AUX) THEN V24.Stop(oldport) END;
oldport := port;
CASE type OF
MS: word := 7; stop := V24.Stop1; par := V24.ParNo |
MSC1, MSC2, MSC3, MSC4: word := 8; stop := V24.Stop2; par := V24.ParNo |
MM: word := 8; stop := V24.Stop1; par := V24.ParOdd |
Logi: word := 8; stop := V24.Stop2; par := V24.ParNo |
LogiMan: word := 7; stop := V24.Stop1; par := V24.ParNo |
MSI: word := 7; stop := V24.Stop1; par := V24.ParNo
END;
IF (type = Logi) OR (type = LogiMan) THEN
V24.Start(port, old, word, par, stop, res);
IF res = V24.Ok THEN
IF new = 9600 THEN c := "q"
ELSIF new = 4800 THEN c := "p"
ELSIF new = 2400 THEN c := "o"
ELSE c := "n"
END;
SerialWrite(port, "*"); SerialWrite(port, c);
Kernel.SetTimer(timer, TimeUnit DIV 10);
REPEAT UNTIL Kernel.Expired(timer);
V24.Stop(port)
END
END;
V24.Start(port, new, word, par, stop, res);
IF res = V24.Ok THEN
V24.SetMC(port, {V24.DTR, V24.RTS})
END
END
END SetSpeed;
(* InitMouse - Initialise mouse.
"type" - mouse type from list
"port" - V24.COM[12], AUX
"bps" - V24.BPS*
"rate" - sample rate (not all mice support this) *)
PROCEDURE InitMouse;
VAR c: CHAR; timer: Kernel.MilliTimer; n: INTEGER;
BEGIN
port := newport;
mouseErrors := 0; auxoverflows := 0;
IF (oldport # NONE) & (oldport # AUX) THEN V24.Stop(oldport) END;
oldport := NONE;
IF port = AUX THEN
StartAux; oldport := port
ELSE
IF type = LogiMan THEN
SetSpeed(1200, 1200);
SerialWrite(port, "*"); SerialWrite(port, "X");
SetSpeed(1200, bps)
ELSE
SetSpeed(9600, bps);
SetSpeed(4800, bps);
SetSpeed(2400, bps);
SetSpeed(1200, bps);
IF type = Logi THEN
SerialWrite(port, "S"); type := MM; SetSpeed(bps, bps); type := Logi
END;
(* set sample rate *)
IF rate <= 0 THEN c := "O" (* continuous - don't use *)
ELSIF rate <= 15 THEN c := "J" (* 10 Hz *)
ELSIF rate <= 27 THEN c := "K" (* 20 *)
ELSIF rate <= 42 THEN c := "L" (* 35 *)
ELSIF rate <= 60 THEN c := "R" (* 50 *)
ELSIF rate <= 85 THEN c := "M" (* 70 *)
ELSIF rate <= 125 THEN c := "Q" (* 100 *)
ELSE c := "N" (* 150 *)
END;
SerialWrite(port, c);
IF type = MSC2 THEN V24.ClearMC(port, {V24.DTR, V24.RTS})
ELSIF type = MSC3 THEN V24.ClearMC(port, {V24.DTR})
ELSIF type = MSC4 THEN V24.ClearMC(port, {V24.RTS})
END
END
END;
mbufp := 0; lastkeys := {};
(* protocol parameters *)
CASE type OF
MS: numb := 3; mask0 := {6}; val0 := {6}; mask1 := {6}; val1 := {} |
MSC1, MSC2, MSC3, MSC4: numb := 5; mask0 := {3..7}; val0 := {7}; mask1 := {}; val1 := {} |
MM: numb := 3; mask0 := {5..7}; val0 := {7}; mask1 := {7}; val1 := {} |
Logi: numb := 3; mask0 := {5..7}; val0 := {7}; mask1 := {7}; val1 := {} |
LogiMan: numb := 3; mask0 := {6}; val0 := {6}; mask1 := {6}; val1 := {} |
PS2: IF auxId # 0X THEN numb := 4 ELSE numb := 3 END;
mask0 := {6,7}; val0 := {}; mask1 := {}; val1 := {} |
END;
(* ignore the first few bytes from the mouse (e.g. Logitech MouseMan Sensa) *)
n := 4;
REPEAT
WHILE SerialAvailable(port) # 0 DO SerialRead(port, c) END;
Kernel.SetTimer(timer, TimeUnit DIV n); DEC(n); (* wait 1/4s, 1/3s, 1/2s, 1s *)
REPEAT UNTIL Kernel.Expired(timer);
UNTIL (SerialAvailable(port) = 0) OR (n = 0);
(* Lower/Raise DTR/RTS for autodetection, and to start an Intellimouse *)
IF port # AUX THEN
V24.ClearMC(port, {V24.DTR, V24.RTS});
Kernel.SetTimer(timer, TimeUnit DIV 4);
REPEAT UNTIL Kernel.Expired(timer);
V24.SetMC(port, {V24.DTR, V24.RTS});
Kernel.SetTimer(timer, TimeUnit DIV 4);
REPEAT UNTIL Kernel.Expired(timer)
END
END InitMouse;
(* GetMouseEvent - Read a mouse event *)
PROCEDURE GetMouseEvent(VAR keys: SET; VAR dx, dy, dz: INTEGER): BOOLEAN;
VAR b: SET;
BEGIN
WHILE SerialAvailable(port) > 0 DO
b := {}; SerialRead(port, SYSTEM.VAL(CHAR, b));
(* check for resync *)
IF (mbufp # 0) & (type # PS2) & ((b * mask1 # val1) OR (b = {7})) THEN mbufp := 0 END;
IF (mbufp = 0) & (b * mask0 # val0) THEN
(* skip package, unless it is a LogiMan middle button... *)
IF ((type = MS) OR (type = LogiMan)) & (b * {2..4,6,7} = {}) THEN
keys := lastkeys * {0,2};
IF 5 IN b THEN INCL(keys, 1) END;
dx := 0; dy := 0;
RETURN TRUE
ELSE
INC(mouseErrors)
END
ELSE
mbuf[mbufp] := b; INC(mbufp);
IF mbufp = numb THEN
CASE type OF
MS, LogiMan:
keys := lastkeys * {1};
IF 5 IN mbuf[0] THEN INCL(keys, 2) END;
IF 4 IN mbuf[0] THEN INCL(keys, 0) END;
dx := LONG(SYSTEM.VAL(SHORTINT, SYSTEM.LSH(mbuf[0] * {0,1}, 6) + mbuf[1] * {0..5}));
dy := LONG(SYSTEM.VAL(SHORTINT, SYSTEM.LSH(mbuf[0] * {2,3}, 4) + mbuf[2] * {0..5})) |
MSC1, MSC2, MSC3, MSC4:
keys := {0..2} - (mbuf[0] * {0..2});
dx := LONG(SYSTEM.VAL(SHORTINT, mbuf[1])) + LONG(SYSTEM.VAL(SHORTINT, mbuf[3]));
dy := -(LONG(SYSTEM.VAL(SHORTINT, mbuf[2])) + LONG(SYSTEM.VAL(SHORTINT, mbuf[4]))) |
MM, Logi:
keys := mbuf[0] * {0..2};
dx := SYSTEM.VAL(INTEGER, mbuf[1]);
IF ~(4 IN mbuf[0]) THEN dx := -dx END;
dy := SYSTEM.VAL(INTEGER, mbuf[2]);
IF 3 IN mbuf[0] THEN dy := -dy END |
PS2:
keys := {};
IF 2 IN mbuf[0] THEN INCL(keys, 1) END;
IF 1 IN mbuf[0] THEN INCL(keys, 0) END;
IF 0 IN mbuf[0] THEN INCL(keys, 2) END;
dx := SYSTEM.VAL(INTEGER, mbuf[1]);
IF 4 IN mbuf[0] THEN DEC(dx, 256) END;
dy := -SYSTEM.VAL(INTEGER, mbuf[2]);
IF 5 IN mbuf[0] THEN INC(dy, 256) END |
MSI:
keys := {};
IF 4 IN mbuf[0] THEN INCL(keys, 0) END;
IF 5 IN mbuf[0] THEN INCL(keys, 2) END;
IF 3 IN mbuf[3] THEN INCL(keys, 3) END;
IF 4 IN mbuf[3] THEN INCL(keys, 1) END;
IF ~(3 IN mbuf[3]) & (mbuf[3] * {0..2} # {}) THEN INCL(keys, 4) END;
dx := LONG(SYSTEM.VAL(SHORTINT, SYSTEM.LSH(mbuf[0] * {0,1}, 6) + mbuf[1] * {0..7}));
dy := LONG(SYSTEM.VAL(SHORTINT, SYSTEM.LSH(mbuf[0] * {2,3}, 4) + mbuf[2] * {0..7}))
END; (* CASE *)
mbufp := 0;
RETURN TRUE
END
END
END;
keys := lastkeys; dx := 0; dy := 0;
RETURN FALSE
END GetMouseEvent;
(* ---- Interface ---- *)
(** Returns the number of keystrokes in the keyboard input buffer. *)
PROCEDURE Available* : INTEGER;
VAR state, keys: SET; p: KeyboardPoller; x: INTEGER; ch: CHAR; i: SHORTINT;
BEGIN
(* poll all extra keyboards *)
p := keyboard; pollkeys := {};
WHILE p # NIL DO
IF p.poll(ch, keys) THEN
state := DisableInterrupts;
i := (tail+1) MOD BufSize;
IF i # head THEN
buffer[1+tail] := ch; tail := i
END;
RestoreInterrupts(state)
END;
pollkeys := pollkeys + keys;
p := p.next
END;
(* check buffer *)
state := DisableInterrupts;
x := (tail-head) MOD BufSize;
RestoreInterrupts(state);
RETURN x
END Available;
(** Reads the current mouse position x, y and the key state of the mouse buttons
(also called keys). The mouse buttons are numbered from the right to the left as
0, 1, 2 (i.e. 1 is the middle mouse button). For example, when the left and middle
buttons are pressed, keys will be set to {1, 2}. *)
PROCEDURE Mouse*(VAR keys: SET; VAR x, y: INTEGER);
VAR dx, dy, dz: INTEGER; ok: BOOLEAN; mousekeys, rawkeys, state: SET; p: MousePoller;
BEGIN
IF Kernel.break THEN Kernel.break := FALSE; SYSTEM.HALT(13) END;
IF ScrollLock IN flags THEN
keys := {};
IF 11 IN kpmap THEN INCL(keys, 2) END;
IF 5 IN kpmap THEN INCL(keys, 1) END;
IF 12 IN kpmap THEN INCL(keys, 0) END;
state := DisableInterrupts;
INC(mouseX, LONG(kdx));
INC(mouseY, LONG(kdy));
kdx := 0; kdy := 0;
RestoreInterrupts(state)
ELSE
REPEAT (* get all available mouse events, or until keys change *)
p := mouse; rawkeys := {}; ok := FALSE;
WHILE p # NIL DO (* poll all mice and sum keys and movements *)
IF p.poll(mousekeys, dx, dy, dz) THEN
ok := TRUE;
rawkeys := rawkeys + mousekeys;
IF (ABS(dx) > threshold) OR (ABS(dy) > threshold) THEN
dx := SHORT(dx*speedup DIV 10); dy := SHORT(dy*speedup DIV 10)
END;
INC(mouseX, LONG(dx)); INC(mouseY, LONG(dy))
END;
p := p.next
END
UNTIL ~ok OR (rawkeys # lastkeys);
IF ok THEN
IF ~(1 IN lastkeys) & (1 IN rawkeys) THEN (* mouse generated middle button *)
IF buttons = -3 THEN buttons := 3 END (* switch off emulation *)
END;
lastkeys := rawkeys (* save last known mouse key state *)
ELSE
rawkeys := lastkeys (* restore last known mouse key state *)
END;
IF MenuShift IN flags THEN (* menu key emulates middle button *)
INCL(rawkeys, 1);
IF buttons = -3 THEN buttons := 3 END (* switch off emulation *)
END;
(* middle button emulation *)
IF buttons # 3 THEN (* -2, 2, -3 *)
IF buttons = 2 THEN (* 2 => Ctrl is middle button *)
IF flags * {LCtrl, RCtrl} # {} THEN INCL(rawkeys, 1)
ELSE EXCL(rawkeys, 1)
END
ELSE (* -2 OR -3 => MM OR Ctrl is middle button *)
IF flags * {LCtrl, RCtrl} # {} THEN INCL(rawkeys, 1) END
END
END;
(* key mapping *)
keys := mapkeys[SYSTEM.VAL(LONGINT, rawkeys * {0,1,2})]
END;
IF mouseX < minX THEN mouseX := minX
ELSIF mouseX > maxX THEN mouseX := maxX
END;
IF mouseY < minY THEN mouseY := minY
ELSIF mouseY > maxY THEN mouseY := maxY
END;
x := SHORT(mouseX); y := SHORT(height-1-mouseY)
END Mouse;
(** Read a character from the keyboard buffer. Blocks if no character is available. *)
PROCEDURE Read*(VAR ch: CHAR);
VAR state: SET;
BEGIN
REPEAT (* skip *) UNTIL (Available # 0) OR Kernel.break;
IF Kernel.break THEN Kernel.break := FALSE; SYSTEM.HALT(13) END;
state := DisableInterrupts;
ch := buffer[1+head]; head := (head+1) MOD BufSize;
RestoreInterrupts(state)
END Read;
(** Returns the elapsed number of timer ticks from Oberon startup. *)
PROCEDURE Time*: LONGINT;
BEGIN
IF Kernel.break THEN Kernel.break := FALSE; SYSTEM.HALT(13) END;
RETURN Kernel.GetTimer
END Time;
(** Return the state of the shift keys. *)
PROCEDURE KeyState*(VAR keys: SET);
BEGIN
keys := pollkeys;
IF flags * {LAlt, RAlt} # {} THEN INCL(keys, ALT) END;
IF flags * {LCtrl, RCtrl} # {} THEN INCL(keys, CTRL) END;
IF flags * {LShift, RShift} # {} THEN INCL(keys, SHIFT) END
END KeyState;
(** Restricts the extent of the mouse coordinates returned by Mouse. *)
PROCEDURE SetMouseLimits*(x, y, w, h: INTEGER); (** non-portable *)
BEGIN
IF height = 0 THEN height := h END;
y := SHORT(height-1) - y;
minX := x; maxY := y; maxX := x + w-1; minY := y - (h-1);
mouseX := minX + (maxX-minX) DIV 2;
mouseY := minY + (maxY-minY) DIV 2
END SetMouseLimits;
PROCEDURE SetMouseType(s: ARRAY OF CHAR);
BEGIN
type := MinType-1;
IF (s[0] >= "0") & (s[0] <= "9") THEN (* old style config *)
type := SHORT(ORD(s[0])-ORD("0"))
ELSE (* new style config *)
IF s = "" THEN
(* default if none specified *)
ELSIF (CAP(s[0]) = "L") & (CAP(s[1]) = "M") THEN (* Logitech *)
CASE s[2] OF
"1": type := LogiMan
|"2": type := MM
|"3": type := Logi
END
ELSIF (CAP(s[0]) = "M") & (CAP(s[1]) = "S") THEN (* Mouse Systems or Microsoft *)
IF CAP(s[2]) = "M" THEN type := MS
ELSIF CAP(s[2]) = "I" THEN type := MSI
ELSE
CASE s[2] OF
"1": type := MSC1
|"2": type := MSC2
|"3": type := MSC3
|"4": type := MSC4
END
END
ELSIF CAP(s[0]) = "P" THEN (* PS/2 *)
type := PS2
END
END;
IF (type < MinType) OR (type > MaxType) THEN type := PS2 END; (* unknown mouse type *)
IF type = PS2 THEN newport := AUX END;
IF Trace THEN
Kernel.WriteString("MouseType="); Kernel.WriteInt(type, 1);
Kernel.WriteChar(" "); Kernel.WriteInt(newport, 1);
Kernel.WriteLn
END;
InitMouse
END SetMouseType;
PROCEDURE Read710(adr: CHAR; VAR x: CHAR);
BEGIN
SYSTEM.PORTOUT(390H, adr);
SYSTEM.PORTIN(391H, x)
END Read710;
PROCEDURE Detect82C710;
VAR x: CHAR;
BEGIN
SYSTEM.PORTOUT(2FAH, 55X); SYSTEM.PORTOUT(3FAH, 0AAX);
SYSTEM.PORTOUT(3FAH, 36X); SYSTEM.PORTOUT(3FAH, 0E4X);
SYSTEM.PORTOUT(2FAH, 1BX);
Read710(0FX, x);
qp := x = 0E4X;
IF qp THEN
Read710(0DX, x);
qpDataPort := ORD(x)*4;
qpStatusPort := qpDataPort+1;
SYSTEM.PORTOUT(390H, 0FX); SYSTEM.PORTOUT(391H, 0FX)
END
END Detect82C710;
(* InitMouse lowered and raised DTR/RTS - place result in KBD buffer (ugh!) *)
PROCEDURE DetectMouse;
VAR state: SET; i: SHORTINT; res: LONGINT; ch: CHAR;
BEGIN
IF port = AUX THEN
Detect82C710
ELSE
LOOP
IF V24.Available(port) = 0 THEN EXIT END;
state := DisableInterrupts;
i := (tail+1) MOD BufSize;
IF i = head THEN RestoreInterrupts(state); EXIT END;
V24.Receive(port, ch, res); IF ch >= 80X THEN ch := CHR(ORD(ch)-80H) END;
buffer[1+tail] := ch; tail := i;
RestoreInterrupts(state)
END
END
END DetectMouse;
(** Configure input device parameters. Normally only used by installation program. *)
PROCEDURE Configure*(config, value: ARRAY OF CHAR); (** non-portable *)
VAR mk: ARRAY 3 OF LONGINT; kt: KeyTable; state: SET; i: SHORTINT;
BEGIN
IF Trace THEN
Kernel.WriteString("Input: "); Kernel.WriteString(config); Kernel.WriteChar("=");
Kernel.WriteString(value); Kernel.WriteLn
END;
IF config = "MT" THEN (* mouse type *)
SetMouseType(value);
DetectMouse
ELSIF config = "MTX" THEN (* mouse type explicit *)
SetMouseType(value)
ELSIF config = "MP" THEN (* mouse port *)
IF (value[0] >= "1") & (value[0] <= "4") THEN
newport := V24.COM1 + (ORD(value[0])-ORD("1"))
ELSE
newport := V24.COM1
END
ELSIF config = "MB" THEN (* mouse buttons *)
IF value = "2" THEN buttons := 2
ELSIF value = "3" THEN buttons := 3
ELSIF value = "-2" THEN buttons := -2
ELSE buttons := -3 (* default MM and Ctrl *)
END
ELSIF config = "MM" THEN (* mouse key remapping *)
mk[0] := 0; mk[1] := 1; mk[2] := 2;
IF value[0] # 0X THEN
mk[0] := ORD(value[0])-48;
IF value[1] # 0X THEN
mk[1] := ORD(value[1])-48;
IF value[2] # 0X THEN
mk[2] := ORD(value[2])-48
END
END
END;
FOR i := 0 TO 7 DO
mapkeys[i] := {};
IF 0 IN SYSTEM.VAL(SET, i) THEN INCL(mapkeys[i], mk[0]) END;
IF 1 IN SYSTEM.VAL(SET, i) THEN INCL(mapkeys[i], mk[1]) END;
IF 2 IN SYSTEM.VAL(SET, i) THEN INCL(mapkeys[i], mk[2]) END
END
ELSIF config = "Keyboard" THEN
i := 0; WHILE (value[i] # 0X) & (value[i] # ".") DO INC(i) END;
IF value[i] = "." THEN kt := TableFromFile(value) ELSE kt := NIL END;
(* atomically set the table *)
state := DisableInterrupts;
IF kt = NIL THEN table := TableUS
ELSE keytable := kt; table := SYSTEM.ADR(kt[0])
END;
dkey := 0;
RestoreInterrupts(state)
ELSE
IF Trace THEN Kernel.WriteString("Unknown setting"); Kernel.WriteLn END
END
END Configure;
(** Add a mouse driver. The poll procedure will be called from Mouse and should return the next mouse event, including the current key state. It returns TRUE iff a mouse event is available. *)
PROCEDURE AddMouse*(poll: PollMouse); (** non-portable *)
VAR n: MousePoller;
BEGIN
NEW(n); n.poll := poll; n.next := mouse; mouse := n
END AddMouse;
(** Remove a mouse driver. *)
PROCEDURE RemoveMouse*(poll: PollMouse); (** non-portable *)
VAR p, n: MousePoller;
BEGIN
p := NIL; n := mouse;
WHILE (n # NIL) & (n.poll # poll) DO p := n; n := n.next END;
IF n # NIL THEN
IF p = NIL THEN mouse := n.next
ELSE p.next := n.next
END
END
END RemoveMouse;
(** Add a keyboard driver. The poll procedure will be called from Available and Read and should return the next ASCII character. It returns TRUE iff a key is available. The current shift state (SHIFT, CTRL, ALT) should always be returned, and will be added to KeyState. *)
PROCEDURE AddKeyboard*(poll: PollKeyboard); (** non-portable *)
VAR n: KeyboardPoller;
BEGIN
NEW(n); n.poll := poll; n.next := keyboard; keyboard := n
END AddKeyboard;
(** Remove a keyboard driver. *)
PROCEDURE RemoveKeyboard*(poll: PollKeyboard); (** non-portable *)
VAR p, n: KeyboardPoller;
BEGIN
p := NIL; n := keyboard;
WHILE (n # NIL) & (n.poll # poll) DO p := n; n := n.next END;
IF n # NIL THEN
IF p = NIL THEN keyboard := n.next
ELSE p.next := n.next
END
END
END RemoveKeyboard;
PROCEDURE Setting(name: ARRAY OF CHAR);
VAR s: ARRAY 32 OF CHAR;
BEGIN
Kernel.GetConfig(name, s); Configure(name, s)
END Setting;
PROCEDURE ConfigMouse;
VAR s: ARRAY 16 OF CHAR; i: SHORTINT;
BEGIN
(* boot-time settings *)
Kernel.GetConfig("MouseBPS", s);
IF s = "9600" THEN bps := 9600 ELSE bps := 1200 END;
(* rate *)
Kernel.GetConfig("MouseRate", s);
rate := 0; i := 0;
WHILE s[i] # 0X DO rate := rate*10+ORD(s[i])-48; INC(i) END;
IF (rate <= 0) OR (rate > 150) THEN rate := 100 END;
(* threshold *)
Kernel.GetConfig("Threshold", s);
threshold := 0; i := 0;
WHILE s[i] # 0X DO threshold := threshold*10+ORD(s[i])-48; INC(i) END;
IF threshold <= 0 THEN threshold := 5 END;
(* speedup *)
Kernel.GetConfig("Speedup", s);
speedup := 0; i := 0;
WHILE s[i] # 0X DO speedup := speedup*10+ORD(s[i])-48; INC(i) END;
IF speedup <= 0 THEN speedup := 15 END;
Setting("MP"); Setting("MB"); Setting("MM");
Setting("MT") (* also calls InitMouse *)
END ConfigMouse;
PROCEDURE *UnsafeBreak;
VAR note1, note2, note3: ARRAY 32 OF CHAR;
BEGIN
note1 := "Warning: Interrupting a module";
note2 := "may invalidate its invariants";
note3 := "and make it unstable.";
SYSTEM.HALT(13)
END UnsafeBreak;
PROCEDURE *Timer;
VAR i: INTEGER;
BEGIN
IF counter1 = TimeUnit DIV 100 THEN
counter1 := 0;
IF kpmap * {0..2, 4, 6, 8..10} = {} THEN counter0 := 0
ELSIF counter0 < 100 THEN INC(counter0)
END;
i := counter0 DIV (100 DIV 12)+1;
IF kpmap * {0,4,8} # {} THEN DEC(kdx, i) END;
IF kpmap * {0,1,2} # {} THEN DEC(kdy, i) END;
IF kpmap * {2,6,10} # {} THEN INC(kdx, i) END;
IF kpmap * {8,9,10} # {} THEN INC(kdy, i) END
ELSE
INC(counter1)
END
END Timer;
BEGIN
mouse := NIL; keyboard := NIL; pollkeys := {};
AddMouse(GetMouseEvent);
timerproc := Timer; kpmap := {}; kdx := 0; kdy := 0; counter0 := 0;
maxX := 0; height := 0;
breakproc := UnsafeBreak;
InitKeyboard;
(* initialise mouse state *)
oldport := NONE; auxinit := FALSE;
ConfigMouse
END Input.
(** Remarks:
1. Keyboard character codes correspond to the ASCII character set.
Some other important codes are:
F1, SETUP 0A4X
F2, NEUTRALISE 0A5X
F3, SCRL 0A6X (used in Draw)
F4, NOSCRL 0A7X (used in Draw)
UP ARROW 0C1X
RIGHT ARROW 0C3X
DOWN ARROW 0C2X
LEFT ARROW 0C4X
INSERT 0A0X
DELETE 0A1X
PAGE-UP 0A2X
PAGE-DOWN 0A3X
, 131, 128
, 132, 129
, 133, 130
150
The module EditKeys allows you to determine the keyboard code of any key pressed.
For cross-platform portability, Oberon does not normally support all keys available
on your keyboard.
|
434628
|
660399
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434628
|
Oberon/ETH Oberon/Dialer
|
Dialer.Dial can be used to establish a modem connection from "home" to "office" for PPP. The office computer runs mgetty in Linux and answers the connection according to the ringback protocol. For Dialer to support ringback, the syntax of the Dial script is extended so that an empty modem command string invokes a pause; 11 "" is an 11 s pause in this script. The script belongs in the Oberon.Text.
{* This is for a USR Sportster modem on an Oberon system
calling a USR Sportster on a Linux system. *}
Ringback = {
Init = { COM1 19200 } {* modem port and speed *}
Dial = {
"ATZS0=0&F1&B1&C1"
10 "OK"
"ATDT16041234567,;H0"
10 "OK"
11 ""
"ATDT16041234567"
40 "LAPM)"
CALL "PPPMain.StartInst Ringback peter"
Dialer can also be used for frequently dialed voice calls. This is such a script, invoked with Dialer.Dial NuvoSomeone Device0 ~. Init specifies the COM port; why should Dial specify the device? A better syntax would allow Dialer.Dial Nuvo 6041234567 ~. That would work with various access protocols and destination numbers. Another detail to work on.
{* This is for the USR Sportster modem. *}
NuvoSomeone = {
Init = { COM1 19200 } {* modem port and speed *}
Dial = {
"ATZS0=0&F1&B1&C1"
2 "OK"
"ATDT<CardAccessNumber>,;DT<LanguageSelector>,,;"
20 "OK"
"ATDT<CardPINNumber>,,,;"
20 "OK"
"ATDT<DestinationNumber>,,,,;H0"
20 "OK"
|
434629
|
3316177
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434629
|
Proto-Turkic/Vocabulary
|
Welcome to fifth lesson in Proto-Turkic, wikibooks!
Vocabulary.
The four elements in Proto-Turkic.
The words are short for the peoples who lead a nomadic life in the steppes of East Asia. Due to this lifestyle and various factors, people have formed words with one or two syllable roots. Long words are only provided with suffixes.
Foods in Proto-Turkic.
In today's Turkic languages, an old Common-Turkic word "*čiye" and Proto-Turkic *yidgelek are blended. Therefore, there is confusion in inheritances.
Animals in Proto-Turkic.
Animals have a very wide range in this language. It's not strange at all, considering the years it was spoken.
Next lesson: Genitive, accusative and dative cases
|
434637
|
396820
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434637
|
Accordion/Sample accordion music
|
ABC notation.
Traditional folk musicians and accordion players may find mainstream sheet music unhelpful, as it does not name the chords that correspond to bass buttons.
Software developer Chris Walshaw has improved on machine language (eg. MIDI, Lilypond) which enable computers to play music, and produced a compromise called ABC notation. Basically the format devotes a few lines to details of the piece, then note names are used rather than dots on lines. The result is music which can be played by computers, or read by the human eye (with some orientation). To hear the music on computer an ABC player is required. An ABC editor allows users to make changes. This format is in use by adherents of 'The Session' Irish folk website, 'Bush Traditions' wiki and the like.
Sample Hornpipe.
X:1
T:Brassey Hornpipe
%Second Earl Lord Brassey was governor of Victoria and leading proponent of Federation%
C:Anonymous 1897
O:Allan's Album No. 37 Melbourne, Australia
O:https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/15781307
L:1/16
M:2/4
R:H
K:C
ed| c2G2 G2dc | BcdB c2cd | efge defd | cdec dGed |
c2G2 G2dc | BcdB c2de | dgBe dcAB | G2G2G2AB |
cBcd ecde | f2F2 F2de | fefg afdc | B2g2 g2gf |
efec facf | egce facf | egce fdcB | c2c2c2:|
|
434643
|
3117360
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434643
|
Salom, Jonatan!/Mon 4
|
Careyum mon (4yum mon).
Jonatan sen keloka? Kam te estay in Vina? No, te estay in alo xaher. Te estay in Bistritsa. To sen xaher in Rumani. Fe nunya, turi xoru in Rumani.
Jonatan eskri in tesu din-kitabu, “Fe un de mesi lima, mi le sen in Muncen. Fe dua de mesi lima, mi le sen in Vina. Xafe to, mi le sen in Budapext. Budapext le sen meli. Mas mi no hare watu in Budapext. Mi oko dolo in Budapext. In Budapext, mi fikir, “Garebi fini hinloka, ji dongu xoru hinloka. Budapext sen alo.”
Te lilmo max fikir tem Budapext. Te fikir, “Mi sen person hu da ata of Engli, of London. Mi pala Englisa, koski person in Engli pala Englisa. Mas in Budapext, mi le no pala Englisa ton person; mi le pala Doycisa. Misu Doycisa no sen bon, mas person in Budapext no pala Englisa. Imi le pala Doycisa. Ki person in Budapext pala Doycisa sen interesne.
Fe nunya, Jonatan fikir tem tesu turi. Te fikir, “Mi le sen in museum in London. In museum, le hay kitabu tem alo dexa. Mi le doxo kitabu. In museum, le hay harita fe alo dexa. Mi le oko harita. Kitabu ji harita loga ki alo dexa sen teli, mas interesne. In alo dexa, hay multi person, multi alo person.”
Fe nunya, Jonatan max fikir tem tesu turi. Te fikir, “Jaledin, mi le sen in Kluj-Napoka. Mi le yam in Kluj-Napoka. Name de yamxey sen ‘paprika hendl’. Yamxey in Kluj-Napoka sen daymo bon. Hotel le sen bon, mas mi le no bon somno. Mas hin dexa sen daymo meli! In tren, mi le oko multi deha ji multi kastilo. Xaher sen maxmo day kom deha, mas deha sen daymo meli. Kastilo sen maxmo day kom hotel, ji maxmo meli kom hotel! Deha sen minmo day kom xaher, mas oto sen meli, ji hotel sen minmo day kom kastilo.”
Jonatan eskri max to in tesu din-kitabu, “Bistritsa sen interesne loka. Bistritsa sen lama loka, maxmo lama kom alo loka. Pia misu hotel in Bistritsa sen lama, maxmo lama kom alo hotel. In hotel, mi le loga misu name, ‘Mi sen Jonatan Harker’ ji ete le loga tas mi, ‘Bonata cel hotel.’ In hotel, mi le oko suratu tas mi. Fe nunya, mi xa doxo misu suratu.”
Jonatan doxo tesu suratu. To loga,
“Misu doste.—Bonata. Am bon somno. Mi sen in Bukovina; fe lutuf, ata cel Bukovina. Kam turi of London le sen bon? Misu dexa sen daymo meli. Bonata cel misu dexa.
Yusu doste, DRAKULA.”
Jonatan doxo suratu ji fikir tem tesu doste Konte Drakula. Te sen kete? Te no jixi. Mas tesu doste sen interesne. Pia deha Bistritsa sen interesne. Jonatan sen hox, ji fikir tem tesu doste. Xafe to, te somno.
Lexilari.
4
|
434668
|
2201314
|
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434668
|
Public International Law
|
Endorsements.
Public international law scholarship has since the days of its “founding fathers” been dominated by single authored sums. The biases inherent in such a model have become all too obvious, which is why Public International Law: A Multi-Perspective Approach is just the collection we needed. International law will only be reconfgured in decades to come if the extent to which it has meant very different things for different people is recognized in textbooks themselves. We owe the diversity of our students this very diversity of perspectives.
Preface.
The teaching of international law is governed by exclusions. Although international law – like no other field of law – is shaped by global, universal aspirations, its teaching is provincial financially, personally, geographically, and epistemologically. With this perspective in mind, we decided to initiate this textbook on public international law in spring 2021. It has been created within the fabric of OpenRewi. Initially, OpenRewi, which stands for open rechtswissenschaft (German: ‘legal scholarship’ or ‘legal science’), was founded in Germany and focused on publishing German textbooks and casebooks. The idea behind the initiative is to use the possibilities the internet offers to contribute to reducing some of the existing exclusions: today it is possible to publish digitally and make content available at no cost to everyone around the globe with an internet connection. Accordingly, all teaching materials created by OpenRewi are published as Open Educational Resources (OER). This allows students and teachers to freely access, use, modify, and share these resources independent of institutional affiliation, region, and economic status.
However, a perhaps even greater need for OER exists in the field of international law, with huge global disparities existing in terms of access to high quality teaching materials. It is not farfetched to say that the potential offered by the internet to make knowledge widely accessible has not been realised in international law. If textbooks are available digitally, they remain behind a paywall. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, not a single international law textbook exists which is freely accessible and reusable in line with Open Access terms.
Amid a global pandemic and after numerous all-too-familiar video conferences, we thus decided to fill this gap. Timidly and uncertainly, we published a call for authors. This call aimed at overcoming legal and technical barriers to create the first-ever collaboratively written and openly accessible textbook in international law. It quickly turned out that our worries were unfounded. Over 100 authors, among them both established scholars and younger researchers, responded with their ideas. It became obvious that the idea of an open textbook hit a nerve, and that many shared our feeling that teaching materials in international law need to become more accessible. However, it was evident to us that Open Access has to mean more than facilitating access. What need to be ‘opened’ are also processes of knowledge production and scholarship themselves.
The approach we thus opted for in elaborating this textbook is reflected in its title: we deliberately chose a multi-perspectivist approach. With this, we mean that the textbook aims to represent a diversity of perspectives in at least three ways: intellectual approaches, gender, and regional representation. We were partially successful in this respect. Never before have so many critical scholars contributed to a textbook on public international law. Never before have authors of an international law textbook lived on all inhabited continents. Never before have more women and non-binary people than men contributed to an international law textbook as authors. However, we must also concede and disclose that we did, to some extent, reproduce existing power structures and hierarchies when selecting authors. We have shared our call for authors on platforms that are primarily read by people from the Global North. We selected authors based on proposals that seemed familiar to us in terms of language and thinking. Only one author based at an institution on the African continent and one Chinese author contributed to our textbook. The textbook is published in English and therefore requires a certain language proficiency, which presupposes economic and cultural capital that is unequally distributed globally. Furthermore, selections also cause rejections, and so we would like to express gratitude to all unsuccessful applicants once again.
Multi-perspectivism for us also meant designing the writing process in ways that allowed for inclusivity. After we had selected the authors, further video conferences followed in which we discussed the structure, content, and approach of the textbook as a collective. The result of these discussions was the table of contents and didactic concept of this textbook described in more detail below. Based on this, all authors could choose their desired chapters. Like other OpenRewi projects, we used the Wikimedia Foundation’s open platform Wikibooks to create our textbook. The platform enables the free creation and publication of digital books. Each chapter of our book has been allocated its own page on Wikibooks. This allows readers, authors, and editors to track, comment, and correct all developments of a chapter.
The goal of this multi-perspectivist approach to producing a textbook consists in not only reproducing conventional knowledge about international law but also allowing students to question it. Multi-perspectivism, therefore, also means departing from the standard of the textbook genre. The genre of the textbook has been one of the main tools through which a particular perspective – the perspective of a white, European man – has been allowed to portray itself as objective and thus usurp the place of the universal. Three main features of the book’s composition are supposed to work to break up this standard narrative: First, even though there is a distinct part covering history, theory, and methodology, the chapters in this part are only supposed to deliver the relevant background knowledge to be able to understand the historical and theoretical underpinnings of each chapter. Most chapters contain extensive historical and theoretical contextualisations themselves instead of just reproducing the standard textbook narrative. Second, chapters on different approaches and methodologies are relatively detailed and focused on critical approaches. While it may be confusing for students to some degree to be introduced in relative detail (compared to other textbooks) to, for example, Feminist, Marxist, and Third World Approaches to International Law, and with interdisciplinarity, without first being introduced to the core concepts that usually stand at the beginning of a textbook, this confusion is not accidental but calculated. The idea is that students will encounter ways of looking critically at the standard way of conceiving international law before they encounter this standard narrative – not the other way around, as is most often the case. Third, and maybe most obviously, the book is not pretending to offer a single perspective that could be framed as universal. The authors who have contributed to the book come from diverse backgrounds and have received their professional formation in different ways. While we have, of course, striven for a degree of cohesiveness that allows students to work with this book as a coherent whole rather than as a set of loosely connected individual chapters, we have not imposed a single perspective or approach on our diverse authors. Their individual voice and perspective are palpable, and students will be able to appreciate each of these perspectives as what it is – a perspective that they can take as a reliable source for the knowledge and the skills they need in order to be able to craft an international legal argument but still one perspective that they are invited to question.
However, some limitations remain. Writing a textbook as a collective composed of a majority of female and non-binary scholars and of many scholars located in or having a diasporic or ancestral connection to the Global South does not eliminate all the problems of exclusion and hierarchisation inherent in writing a textbook. Writing a textbook that counts as an instance of the genre involves reproducing, at least to some degree, the standard textbook narrative associated with mainstream international law. Reproducing this standard narrative is not only a matter of complying with the conventions of the genre, but it also has connections to questions of how to contribute to a profession of international law that is more accessible. Access to the profession is mediated through examinations that students have to pass. These examinations, in most non-elite places of higher education, will ask students to reproduce the standard textbook narrative in some form. Therefore, where this textbook adheres to this narrative it does so not in spite of but because of the fact that this is the narrative that has established itself as dominant – not through intellectual persuasion but through imperialism and hegemonic moves. Part of the dominant narrative this textbook knowingly reproduces is the distinction between the different parts of the textbook, split into a first part covering ‘History, Theory, and Methods’, a second part devoted to ‘General International Law’, and a third part introducing students to ‘Specialised Fields’ of international law. Nothing beyond the conventions of the field provides an explanation for why, for example, international human rights law counts as a specialised field whereas the law of immunities or diplomatic relations pertains to ‘general international law’. The same can be said for many aspects reflected in the composition and content of the book. We hope, however, that the multi-perspectivist approach can allow students to not only familiarise themselves with the standard textbook narrative but to see its contingency from the beginning and therefore embark on their international law journey with their critical minds sharpened.
From the beginning, we wanted to publish the textbook in a printed version as well, with an established publisher, in order to raise its visibility, and to offer its readership a further seal of quality in addition to the open peer review process. After some informational contact with well-known publishers since the beginning of 2023, we were incredibly grateful when Routledge got back to us with enthusiasm. From that point on, it was clear to us that we wanted to publish the textbook with Routledge. We are sincerely grateful to Emily Kindleysides and Chloe Herbert at Routledge for their professional, kind, and efficient support. We received financial support from the German Centre for Integration and Migration Studies (DeZIM) with funds from the German Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. This financial support has made it possible for us to keep this publication Open Access. We therefore remain deeply grateful to DeZIM, particularly to Dr. Noa Ha, Volker Knoll-Hoyer, Dr. Cihan Sinanoglu, and Benjamin Schwarze. Eva Vogel has been immensely helpful, supporting us in finishing the manuscript and providing feedback from a student’s perspective.
Structure.
Bringing together a unique range of perspectives from around the world and from different theoretical approaches, this textbook introduces both the overarching questions and doctrines of public international law, as well as the specialised sub-felds. These include emerging felds such as international law in cyberspace, international migration law, and the international climate regime. The book includes numerous case examples, references to debates and controversies in the literature, and focus sections addressing topics in more depth. Featuring an array of pedagogical features, including learning objectives, suggested further reading and resources, and interactive exercises, this book is ideal for students studying this feld for the frst time and also offers something new for students who would like to deepen their knowledge via a diverse and engaging range of perspectives.
Fundamentally, our textbook targets students encountering these subjects for the first time. However, each chapter also incorporates advanced content tailored to graduate students or those pursuing doctoral studies, at least introductory. Additionally, the inclusion of further readings in every chapter serves as a resource not only for students but also for teachers seeking supplementary materials for their courses.
Our aim is to imbue the textbook with greater interactivity and utility while reimagining traditional forms of knowledge dissemination. The integration of interactive exercises serves to not only engage students more effectively but also to provide them with opportunities for self-assessment following class participation or textbook reading. Drawing from our collective experiences as teachers, and informed by student feedback, we recognize the value students place on such interactive elements.
About the Book.
This book is meant to be a living document. You will find invitations and hints for collaboration on every single page. We would be happy if you get in contact with the authors and contribute with comments. How to do that is described . More information about the project OpenRewi - Initiative for an Open Legal Science can be found on our website.
This book is licensed under [Commons BY-SA 4.0]. You may copy, distribute, or modify content from our book in any medium and format. However, you must give us appropriate credit. Also, if you modify our content, the modification must also be licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0. You will find more information in our . If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us.
This book is also published by Routledge. It can be purchased as a printed book or downloaded.
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434672
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3097823
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434672
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Public International Law/History of International Law
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Author: Jane Doe
Required knowledge: Link
Learning objectives: Gaining enough background-knowledge on international legal history to understand the references to histories in the following sub-chapters and other chapters of the book.
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A. Introduction.
Scholarly disciplines and fields of expertise more generally are constituted through how they tell their own history.
Therefore, it is impossible to understand public international law both as a field of study and as an area of practical expertise without understanding its history. This does not mean that one can 'uncover' the 'true nature' of international law by finding a fixed origin or reveal the right way of interpreting specific legal doctrines by looking at their origins. In her book on "International Law and the Politics of History", Anne Orford has powerfully laid out why international lawyers' thirst for certainty cannot be quenched by turning to history. What turning to history can do, however, is teach us something about the predominant self-images of the discipline through the way it habitually tells its own history. These self-images play such a crucial role in international legal histories that one may go as far as calling them 'fan fiction'. Of course, histories of international law also teach us something about how certain rules, institutions, concepts, doctrines, and apparent truths were created, and about how the law contributes to carrying 'past' injustices into the present. Perhaps most importantly, learning about how international law came about and about how it contributed to domination, exploitation, and injustice more generally means learning about how the world can be changed for the better.
To this end, the overall approach of this book is to include historical contextualisation in all parts of the book. The purpose of this chapter on the history of international law is to provide the necessary background knowledge to be able to connect these specific historical contextualisation and to place them in a broader picture. To this end, this introductory sub-chapter, first, offers some brief observations on the different ways in which international law as a discipline conceives of its origins, as well as on different ways in which 'origin stories' of individual areas of international law can be told. Second, it expands on some of the most important turning points, which mark a 'before' and 'after' and which are often referenced when talking about the development of important areas of international law. Third, it offers a glimpse into the contradictory nature of international law and its history, by introducing an account of the history of international law as a history of both empire and resistance. The following sub-chapters will then expand on selected topics, which are particularly important for understanding influential accounts of international law's origins, turning points, and contradictions. The origins of international law are further scrutinized in the sub-chapter on founding myths, while important turning points and accounts of domination and resistance are discussed in more detail in the sub-chapters on the nineteenth century and on decolonisation.
B. Origins and International Law.
Histories "of" something necessarily have to start somewhere. Different approaches to history as a discipline and to using history in international law are partly characterised by different ways of both choosing the starting point and portraying the role of this starting point. The standard way of telling the history of international law consists in presenting a starting point that offers a foundation to international law, a point in time that reflects international law's 'original identity', thus assuming ‘the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession’. The most popular starting point in this sense consists of the combination of Hugo Grotius' work "De jure belli ac pacis" (Latin: Of the Law on War and Peace) in 1625 and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This typical starting point in telling the history of international law also typically coincides with a conception of history as an endeavour that portrays 'how it really was' in the past.
A different way of conceiving of origins consists in searching for starting points not as points in time marking the 'birth' and foundation of something, but rather as the circumstances that best explain the emergence, formation, and heritage of something. International legal scholars who rely on a (loosely) Foucauldian notion of 'genealogy' adopt this latter stance towards origins. A third way of engaging with history rejects such origin stories altogether, arguing that events, ideas, and people of the past have to be examined not for what they brought about but for the role they played in their own time. However, as Anne Orford has famously remarked, lawyers are typically trained to make meaning move through time.
Moreover, choosing a starting point for the history of international law one wants to write presupposes that one knows, at least roughly, what international law is. If international law is understood as the law that governs the relationship between sovereign States, then the starting point in the history of international law has to depict how States and sovereignty emerged and how and when they started to have relationships governed by law. If international law is, more broadly, understood as the law of global encounters, then one may conclude that the encounters that shaped the laws continuing to govern global encounters today emerged not (primarily and exclusively) in encounters between States, but between Empires such as the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and British Empire and between one or more of these Empires, the people living on the land these Empires sought to conquer, and the companies they sponsored to carry out these conquests.
[Reflections on origin stories of individual branches]
C. Turning Points in the History of International Law.
I. Portuguese and Spanish Colonial Conquest and the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494).
As pointed out above, one way of telling the history of international law is as a history of colonial encounter. The first period of European colonialism was marked by a rivalry between Portuguese and Spanish "conquistadores" (Portuguese and Spanish: 'conquerors'), who were sponsored by the respective monarchs to 'discover' and conquer the rest of the world. While the Portuguese, over the course of the fifteenth century, sailed the Atlantic coast of Africa and reached the Indian Ocean by these routes, the 'Catholic Monarchs' Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand the II of Aragon provided funds for Christopher Columbus' plan to find a way to the Indies by sailing westward through the Atlantic. Instead of India, Columbus reached the island named Ayiti or Quisqueya by its Taíno inhabitants, but which Columbus claimed to have 'discovered' and proceded to call 'Hispaniola', a Latinized way of saying 'Spanish'. The 'discovery' of this island and other islands in the Caribbean during Columbus' first expedition propmpted the Catholic Monarchs to seek the support of Pope Alexander VI for their claim to the 'New World' immediatley after Columbus' return in 1493. After ongoing colonial rivalries between the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs and respective papal bulls and treaties, the details of which cannot be recounted here, the Catholic Monarchs on one side and Joao II, King of Portugal, on the other side, divided up their speheres of influence in the Atlantic by agreeing on a new demarcation line in the Treaty of Tordesillas, which was signed on June 7th, 1494. The Treaty of Tordesillas marks an important turning point in the history of international law, not only because the spheres of influence outlined in this treaty established the division between Hispanic and Portuguese parts of the Americas - the latter constituting today's State of Brazil - but also because it marks an important step away from relying on purely Papal authority and grounding legal claims in inter-state agreements instead. In this sense, the Treaty of Tordesillas may be seen to be part of the origins of international law both as the law of inter-state relationships and as the law of colonial encounter. Other important steps in this development consist in the Treaty of Zaragoza, signed in 1529, which constitutes the first instance in which one of the colonising states formulated a legal claim to the land in the Americas based on so-called 'first discovery'. A synthesis between different sources of claims to land and authority is formulated by Francisco de Vitoria in 1537-1539 in his lectures "De Indis" (Latin: 'Of the Indies'), a work which Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) consider to be a decisive element of international law's origins.
II. Sovereignty and Secularism on the European Continent and in the Colonial Encounter.
As stated above - and as will be reiterated throughout the book - the dominant way of characterising international law is as the law that governs the relations between sovereign States. The end of the sixteenth and, more importantly, the seventeenth century, are crucial for the emergence of sovereignty as the paradigm governing the relationships between political entities. These political entities, on the European continent, merged from being mainly Empires, cities, leagues of trading posts such as the Hanseatic League, and other actors to being mainly organised as States. When Jean Bodin published his work titled "Six Livres de la République" (English: 'Six Books of the Republic') in 1576, which contained the now canonical definition of sovereignty as 'absolute and perpetual power' and of accountability of the sovereign Prince 'only to God', this description was still largely counterfactual. Over the course of the seventeenth century, sovereign States did, however, gain the ability to control their territory, as the grounds for authority shifted from an interpersonal to a territorial model. This provided sovereign States with the necessary authority and political continuity to commit themselves externally "as States" rather than as individual monarchs or other rulers.
Simultaneously, chartered companies like the Dutch East India Company, which was founded in 1602, exerted a slightly different kind of sovereignty on the territories and on the parts of the sea where they sought to establish trading monopolies or, where they lacked the necessary control to establish such a monopoly, to push for freedom of travel and trade. Among the influential figures who advocated for freedom of the seas and free trade in this sense and in the interest of the Dutch East India Company was Hugo Grotius, whose first work, "De mare liberum" (Latin: 'Of the free sea'), was, in its first version, commissioned by the Dutch East India Company. With his work "De jure belli ac pacis libri tres" (Latin: 'Three books on war and peace'), Grotius provided a comprehensive work on international law and a synthesis between naturalist conceptions of the law, i.e. conceptions that base the validity of the law on a source outside of the law like God or reason, and positivist conceptions that derive the validity of the law from legal rules themselves and from the will and consent of the sovereign. These two characteristics of "De jure belli ac pacis libri tres" - its comprehensive systematicity and its combination of naturalist and positivist concepttions of law - earned Grotius the title of 'father of international law', which will be problematised in the following sub-chapter on international law's founding myths. The second element that is, next to Grotius, part of most origin stories of international law is the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The peace treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which together form the Peace of Westphalia, marked the end of the Thirty Years War on the European continent, a war fought along religious lines between catholic and protestant rulers. In confirmation of the earlier Peace of Augsburg of 1555, which established the principle "cuius regio eius religio" (Latin: 'whose realm, their religion'), the Peace of Westphalia was the focal point of a longer development that resulted in the establishment of a system of sovereign States centered around territoriality and the prohibition of outside interference. 'Westphalia' is therefore also often used as a chiffre for describing an international system characterised by unfettered State sovereignty and little to no rules governing how States are to exercise their sovereignty - especially within their territories.
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434674
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46022
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434674
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Public International Law/History of International Law/Founding Myths
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Author:
Required knowledge: Link
Learning objectives: Understanding and contextualizing the debates on the origins of international law, particularly regarding the figures of Hugo Grotius and Francisco de Vitoria and the Peace of Westphalia.
A. Of Fathers and Birth Certificates: The Founding Myths and International Law's Institutional Anxiety.
International law as a discipline is famously riddled with its fair share of anxiety. "Does international law even exist?", "Does it "matter"?" "Is it "really" law?" and, perhaps most importantly, "Are we, international lawyers, the good guys or are we the baddies?" International law has been able to affirm its existence by grounding itself in a tradition that provided a 'birth certificate' - the Peace Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück or 'Peace of Westphalia' – and a 'father' – mainly Hugo Grotius. Together, the Peace of Westphalia and Grotius' work "De iure belli ac pacis libri tres (Three books on the law of war and peace)" established State sovereignty as the source of international law's binding force, thus establishing international law as "real" law that is distinguishable from religious and moral sources of normativity. Simultaneously, grounding its existence in peace treaties that ended a 30-year period of war and chaos on the European continent and casting Hugo Grotius as a secular, peace-loving humanitarian allowed international lawyers to see themselves as invested in a project that served humanity as a whole and that would bring peace, order, and justice to the world.
In recent decades, TWAIL scholars have drawn attention to international law's sustained and central role in legitimizing and maintaining the colonial project. These critical histories of international law draw a different line of continuity from the writings of Hugo Grotius and Francisco de Vitoria to the establishment of international law as a formalized discipline in the nineteenth century and to international law in its present form. Simultaneously, the debates about the place of people like Hugo Grotius and Francisco de Vitoria and of events like the Peace of Westphalia in the history of international law have to be seen against the backdrop of broader methodological debates. Contextualist historical methodologies reject linear narratives altogether and instead aim at placing people and events in the context of their times. In her recent book, Anne Orford responds to the rising influence of these contextualist approaches to the history of international law, insisting that scholars writing histories of international law always create meaning instead of merely finding it.
B. Disputed Parenthood.
I. Hugo Grotius, Francisco de Vitoria, and the Colonial Origins of International Law.
1. Hugo Grotius and the Grotian Tradition in International Law.
Hugo de Groot, whom we know by his Latinized name of Grotius, was born in Delft in 1583, at a time when the Dutch States General had just created the Dutch Republic by abjuring Philip II of Spain and Portugal as the ruler of the Low Countries. The newly founded Dutch Republic was looking to assert itself against Portugal and Spain, which, at the time, were the most important colonial powers. It was in this context that the asked Grotius to write a defense of the Company's privateering campaign in waters that Portugal had claimed as an "Estado de India" under Portuguese control. Grotius completed the resulting manuscript, "De Indis", in 1607-16-08 and, at the request of the VOC's Director, published chapter twelve of this manuscript in 1609 under the title "Mare Liberum (The Free See)". This first work of Grotius has long been neglected by mainstream histories of international law, which have focused almost exclusively on "De iure belli ac pacis", which is considered to be the first systematic treatise of international law. The myth of Grotius as the 'founding father' of international law is an invention of the late 19th century. Key events in this regard were a commemoration of the tercentenary of Grotius's birth in 1883 at the New Church in Delft, the unveiling of a Grotius statue in the Delft market square in 1886, a ceremonious reburial of Grotius' remains in 1889, and, most importantly, the 1899 Hague Peace Conference.
As scholars of international law and international relations sought to reinvigorate the project of a peaceful international order created and maintained by international law after the Second World War, they did so by reclaiming Grotius and sketching a 'Grotian tradition' of international law and international relations. In a 'Grotian' international community, the power of the sovereign State is supposed to be restricted by the rationality of the law, which is equivalent to its systematicity. Hedley Bull took up the idea of a 'Grotian tradition' and contrasted it with a 'Hobbesian' and a 'Kantian' conception of international relations. Bull and other authors of the English School tradition in International Relations Theory see the Grotian conception of international society as a middle-ground position between, on one hand, a 'realist' or 'Hobbesian' view of international relations based on the unfettered sovereignty of States and, on the other hand, a 'universalist' or 'Kantian' idea of a cosmopolitan world society as a global community of humankind, in which international institutions represent individual human beings and are based on common values and globally shared interests.
'Grotian' may be seen as shorthand for liberal internationalism, i.e. for the idea that ordered law can create order through law in a way that is opposed to unfettered power, and for a belief in progress from a state of war and turmoil to a more just and peaceful international order. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's invocation of a 'Grotian moment' after the end of the Cold War illustrates this way of referring to the Grotian tradition: 'The community of nations has entered a new era. The international system that sustained us in the past has yet to be replaced. We are in the process of building a new international system, and we are doing so under unprecedented conditions. The outset of the modern age, some three and a half centuries ago, was an uncertain time, filled with both promise and peril. The foundations for a stable and progressive system of relations among States were laid, at that time, by Hugo de Groot (1583-1645), known as Grotius, the father of international law. Perhaps we have come to another such 'Grotian moment' in history, one in which a renaissance of international law is needed to help transform the world scene in this new era that all States have entered'. International legal scholars have repeatedly invoked 'Grotian moments', inter alia, to promote an interpretation of state sovereignty that places human rights at the center of said concept and therefore of international law, to assess the role of international law after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, to argue for the emergence of instant customary law in the field of international criminal law, and to describe changes in the law of statehood. Invoking a 'Grotian moment' allows international legal scholars and representatives of international institutions simultaneously to argue for change and to ground their project in tradition.
Recent work focusing on the connection between Grotius's work and colonialism not only calls into question the flattering self-image of international law as a peace-seeking humanitarian discipline. It also challenges the assumption that the origins of modern international law can be found exclusively in Europe. Placing Grotius in the context of his role as legal advisor to the VOC shows that the questions he adressed in his work did not originate on the European continent but, outside Europe, through the colonial encounter.
2. Francisco de Vitoria.
Hugo Grotius' strongest competitor for the role of 'father of international law' is Francisco de Vitoria. The argument put forward in favour of granting Vitoria and not Grotius this title is that, while Grotius may have presented the first systematic exposition of what was then called the Law of Nations, Grotius was already writing in a tradition that was founded by the so-called School of Salamanca, of which Francisco de Vitoria was, in turn, the founder and most prominent member. Vitoria was the first scholar to adapt the Roman concept of "ius gentium" to what we recognize now as an international context. The context to which he applied the term and its legal implications was the encounter between the Spanish empire and indigenous peoples in what is now known as South America and the Caribbean. His two lectures in which he first applied "ius gentium" were titled "De Indis Noviter Inventis" ['On the Indians Lately Discovered'] and "De Jure Bellis Hispanorum in Barbaros" ['On the Law of War Made by the Spaniards on the Barbarians'], and they were obviously concerned with a colonial relationship. The question of whether Vitoria was using "ius gentium" to condemn or at least reign in colonial violence or whether he was actually justifying and thereby enabling it is a hotly debated question. This question is debated so fiercely, because it is equated with the question of whether international law has been, from the beginning, humanitarian or imperialist in nature.
3. Other Contendants for the Title of 'Father of International Law'.
Other figures on whom international legal scholars have relied as founders of include Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), Alberico Gentili (1552-1603), Emer de Vattel (1714-1767),and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), who coined the term 'public international law'.
II. Mothers of International Law?
As international law as a discipline is increasingly rallying around the goal of increased female representation not only in international institutions but also in the history of international (legal) thought, Christine de Pizan has emerged as the strongest contendant for the title of 'mother of international law'. Her claim to the title rests on the fact that she wrote a book on the laws of war and that she did so long before Grotius and even before Vitoria, Gentili, and Suárez. She is the author of the book titled "Livre de Faits d'armes et de chevalerie"(The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry), which is considered to be one of the first texts on the laws of war.
C. Birth Certificate: 'Westphalia' and the 'Westphalian System'.
The myth of ‘Westphalia’ is the familiar story according to which the peace settlements of Münster and Osnabrück established a system of sovereign States in which we still live today. The myth was created in the 19th century and consolidated in its current form mainly based on an article written by Leo Gross in 1948. Gross was not the first one to pinpoint the beginning of ‘modern international law’ to the Peace of Westphalia and he admitted that the peace treaties of Münster and Osnabrück constituted a step ‘in the gradual, though by no means uniform, process which antedates and continues beyond the year 1648’ rather than a radical break. However, Gross also states that ‘Westphalia, for better or worse, marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world’. Gross exerted significant influence by unfolding what scholars of international relations and international law came to describe as the ‘Westphalian System’, a chiffre employed to refer to a framework for political and legal thought rather than to a historical reality. He presents a narrative of continuity spanning from the Peace of Westphalia to the Charter of the United Nations. According to this narrative, the Peace of Westphalia as ‘the first great European or world charter’ represents ‘the first of several attempts to establish something resembling world unity on the basis of states exercising untrammeled sovereignty over certain territories and subordinated to no earthly authority’. Gross substantiates this claim by stating that regarding the principle of religious tolerance, the purpose of achieving international cooperation, the guarantee of peace, and the establishment of rules for peaceful settlement of disputes, the UN Charter can be seen as the latest step in a line of evolution that began with the Peace of Westphalia.
The treaties themselves and the political and social circumstances in 1648 do not warrant the characteristics of the ‘Westphalian System’ attributed to it. Attributing the establishment of modern international law as a system based on state sovereignty to the Peace of Westphalia is – at best – a simplification. The developments that are commonly associated with ‘Westphalia’ either started more than a century before 1648 or did not take place until the 19th and 20th centuries. Particularly, the notion of territorial sovereignty that is supposed to be the cornerstone of the ‘Westphalian System’ was not explicitly referenced in the treaties.The peace treaties did indeed presuppose the sovereignty of the Swedish and French kings in the sense that they were not subordinated to the authority of the Emperor or the Pope. This conception of sovereignty, however, differed from the characteristics of the respective nineteenth century conception. The latter is the conception commonly referred to with the chiffre of the ‘Westphalian System’ and it includes the sovereign authority to dispose of the law. In contrast, the kind of sovereignty to which the peace traties of Münster and Osnabrück referred was grounded in natural law ideas and in the ideal of solidarity among monarchs. Instead of introducing a system of abstract territorial sovereignty, the Peace of Westphalia 'maintained a period of personal relations of power [...] in a complex patchwork of imperial and princely sovereignties and quasi-sovereignties until the early-nineteenth century and the final breakdown of the Holy Roman Empire'.
The common simplifications of historical processes and the habitual reference to ‘classical’ international law or ‘classical’ notions of sovereignty as ‘Westphalian’ engenders consequences regarding the conditions of possibility of present-day arguments about international law. By serving as the founding myth of both the system of sovereign states as a political system and the system of international law based on State (note the uppercase) sovereignty, the myth of ‘Westphalia’ not only establishes a hierarchy in which arguments derived from sovereignty seem to ‘fit’ the system and arguments that encroach on this sovereignty have to be framed as justified exceptions to the rule, but it also makes this normative hierarchy seem ‘natural’. By making these conditions of possibility for making international legal arguments seem natural, the myth of 'Westphalia' and all that is associated with it obfuscates how international law functions as a language of power.
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434675
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46022
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434675
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Public International Law/History of International Law/Decolonization
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Author: Anam Soomro
Required knowledge: Link
Learning objectives: Understanding XY.
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A. What is Decolonisation?
The term ‘decolonisation’ most typically refers to the dissolution of European empires in the aftermath of the second world war— the time period between 1940’s-1970’s. This period is marked as a watershed moment in the history of international order when a large majority of former European colonies gained independence and became states in their own right. Concurrent to this, international law recognised a fundamental right to self-determination. The acquisition of sovereignty and rights of self-determination of non-European peoples in the mid-20th century marked the end of an epoch of explicitly racialist international law and politics. At the same time, scholars of third world sovereignty note important limitations to a state-centric theory of decolonisation. For instance, the newly independent states were born into a system, the rules of which had already been largely established against their favour. Scholars of sovereignty have noted the peculiar position of former colonies in the international order even since the dissolution of formal imperialism. Anthony Anghie has put it “the acquisition of sovereignty by the Third World was an extraordinarily significant event; and yet, various limitations and disadvantages appeared to be somehow peculiarly connected with that sovereignty”. Similarly, in his analysis of African independence, Grovogui notes that there is a common misunderstanding in theories of international order which “equate the transfer of political power, however limited, from the coloniser to the colonised, with African self-determination and an assumption of national sovereignty”. Grovogui’s analysis remains pertinent even today, and can be extended far beyond the African continent. The era of formal colonisation is over, nevertheless, the formerly occupied states still remain subordinated members of international order. The terms “global south”, “third world” or “developing countries” try to allude to this power differential. Accordingly, more and more scholars think of decolonisation as something further that needs to be done.
Today, there are at least two ways in which the term ‘decolonisation’ is deployed in the literature. First, decolonisation as the very concrete, legal and political practice whereby former colonies gained their independence, "i.e." they began to practice the right of self-determination. It is perhaps more fruitful to refer to this temporal aspect of decolonisation as the decolonisation era or the Independence era, because it is now quite well established that even though territorial empire is now over, western dominance continues in different forms through a number of issue areas including the doctrines, concepts and processes of international law. The second sense in which decolonisation is addressed in the literature really builds on the limitations of the first, and requires us to take stock of our history, ongoing power relations and epistemological practices. This chapter proceeds by first outlining the classical theory of decolonisation in international law and international relations and then considering some of the historical and contemporary critiques of this idea. The main goal is to highlight the different ways in which the term “decolonisation” is used in international law research ties into larger questions about how international legal scholarship either aligns with or ties into the practices of global power.
B. Decolonisation as ‘Inclusion’ into International Society: A State-Centric History of International Order.
International law scholars borrow their understandings of the term decolonisation from the sister disciplines of political theory and international relations. The classical understanding of decolonisation draws upon Hedley Bull’s 1984 exegesis on the ‘expansion of international society’. In this account of the history of international order, a sharp break is posited between the world during colonialism and the world after it.
The state features as one of the most important basic units in the practice and study of international law and global politics. The history of the state is also vital to understanding the meanings, possibilities and limitations of ‘decolonisation’ in the contemporary age. The origins of the modern state are often narrated as beginning in Europe, with the Treaty of Westphalia 1648. Historians have shown that it is far too simplistic to argue that the modern state was born from the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century, and have shown a range of other historical genealogies in which its emergence can rightfully be placed. Nevertheless, the myth of Westphalia remains an important heuristic: a highly simplified analytical tool rather than factual record. As the basic political unit of international order, in international legal theory, a state is a recognised as a “sovereign”. During the longue durée of colonialism, the body of thought that today we will readily accept as international law operated with a pernicious eurocentric and racial bias. While European monarchs, and heads of state were readily accepted as legitimate and worthy members of international society, this was not the case for the rest of the world.
The legal and political theory status of European colonies —the majority world, was firmly organised around the racialised ‘standard of civilisation’. In the worldview of European jurists, non-white and non-Christian societies were seen as too backwards, childlike and savage to be considered complete legal and political subjects. Despite the development of ideas about liberty and equality in Enlightenment Europe, these noble ideas were not reserved for European men. Everybody else was still considered as lacking legal capacity for self-rule. Anghie has powerfully shown that international law imagined the world outside Europe as being devoid of “sovereignty”, an attribute that was solely reserved for European societies. Accordingly, it was posited that European colonial officers would govern these backwards people, and civilise them in the ways of the modern world. This was the infamous “white man’s burden” that continued well into the 20th century. It is an ugly feature of international law that 19th and 20th century doctrine only conferred juridical capacity on the basis of race and religion. Legal theory drew upon a self-serving worldview that placed Europe at the centre and apogee of world development and forced unequal and non-reciprocal relations on the rest of the world via the construct of perpetual and temporary legal burdens: “Permanent burdens encroached on the sovereignty of the other and created effects that impaired the other’s ability to act on its own behalf. Such burdens, designed to last in perpetuity, disallowed all future denunciations by the burdened party.”
Today, it is hardly a controversial claim to say that historically, international law facilitated and justified European colonial expansion and the domination through its theories and doctrine. This starkly unjust system of organising political power comes clearly into focus if we consider Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. After the first world war, the Allied powers seized the colonial holdings of the losing powers, namely the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Article 22 states: “To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.” The same provision further illustrates the racial principle underwriting international legal thought at the time. In article 22, it is further recognised that peoples’ belonging to the former Turkish Empire had reached a “stage of development” sufficient for them to be granted independence. By contrast, the people of Africa, South Pacific Islands and beyond were not yet considered competent for self-government. Subsumed under the sovereignty of Europeans, certain colonial holdings simply passed from one European sovereign to another, like war loot. Getachew stresses how even those exceptional regions that managed to avoid formal colonisation, such as Ethiopia, were similarly rendered into the actions of the League rendered “impossible” black sovereignty. This racial governance was, of course, contested: the problem was that international law itself had not yet acquired sufficient tools and vocabulary to address the problem of colonisation. The historian Erez Manela has shown, when Woodrow Wilson wrote his fourteen points charter for self-determination, it was not intended to apply to the whole world. Rather, Wilson’s campaign for self-determination only extended to peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Historically, in the eyes of international law, it was inconceivable for a non-European state to exist in relations of equality with their counterparts in Europe. The extension of racial worldviews into legal doctrine meant that non-Europeans could not be bearers of a right to self-determination. As James Crawford notes: “self-determination is, at the most basic level, a principle concerned with the right to be a State.” “Sovereignty” was an essential quality of statehood, which was basically unavailable to most non-European societies. The "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933" is today considered the formal criteria for statehood in international law. Article 1 lays out the requirement for a) government b) territory c) population and d) a capacity to enter into international relations. While it may very well be argued that numerous non-European polities fulfilled this criteria, racial dogma excluded them from ‘government’ and the ‘capacity to enter into international relations’. As Bull puts it “political entities were entitled to recognition as sovereign states only if they met certain formal criteria of statehood.” And as Anghie has further shown, this was historically considered exclusively the reserve of European peoples. A voluminous literature has highlighted the numerous issues at stake in the recognition of a new state in international law: the two major approaches to state recognition have been the doctrine of ‘constitutive recognition’ and the doctrine of ‘declarative recognition’. The first refers to the historical state practice, where it is not enough for a state to declare itself independent and sovereign, it also had to be accepted by international society. On this point, Bull notes: “the doctrine that states do not have sovereignty apart from recognition of it by others, the doctrine of so-called ‘constitutive recognition’ which European states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came to apply to Asian and African states is one which is widely viewed today as having been an instrument of European dominance.” The latter —the doctrine of declarative recognition of statehood, is today considered more important, but still, a tension between the two does continue to exist. To this end, we might say that the recognition of statehood remains essentially tied into global power politics.
The above described legal and political doctrines about sovereignty, self-determination and statehood had major implications for what international lawyers considered to be ‘the international’ of international law. During the centuries of colonial rule of the earth, the Westphalian state system only referred to Euro-American international affairs. In the 1950’s, Carl Schmitt, the European international lawyer, wrote that international law was the realm of European states, their practices of knowing and relating to each other. Despite these legal doctrines, and political violence of the colonial international order, ideas about self-determination were appropriated and demanded across the different continents. Throughout the early 20th century, independence movements were fomenting and culminated in the decolonisation era in the aftermath of the second world war. Between 1940-1970 the majority of European overseas colonies gained their independence from European Empires. In this regard, ‘decolonisation’ is understood as the recognition of right of self-determination of non-European peoples. In the post-1945 era, European powers recognised the statehood and sovereignty of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and this watershed moment in the history of international order is known as the era of “decolonisation”. The fact of decolonisation is marked as a momentous event in the history of international order. Whereas for centuries it was considered that the non-European world had nothing to do with international law, since the 1940’s there had been a steady stream of new additions joining the United Nations, thereby forever changing the composition of ‘the international’. Decolonisation can be best pictured if we consider the evolution of the world map over the past two centuries. Coggins notes that, in 1816, the international system comprised of only 25 members. Over the course of the 20th century, the international order witnessed the birth of 150 new states. Not all of these were born from the succession of colonial empires, but this does hold true for the vast majority of the new additions. The world went from being represented as a collection of European empires, to a system of neatly bordered, formally equal, political units— the Westphalian state system.
This was the context in which Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, scholars of International Relations wrote their theory of the "Expansion of International Society". This account has taken up a canonical status in the history and theory of international order. In their understanding, "a truly universal" international space only came into being at the time of the decolonisation era. Their main argument was that former colonies, who were up until the moment of their independence excluded from international society, came to be finally ‘included’ in the system of international relations once they gained Independence. In this way, the international realm, once only reserved for European states, transformed into a universal society of states. Today, when we speak of the Westphalian world system, we are alluding to the idea of formally, equal, sovereign states, co-existing together in a condition of anarchy. No legal authority governs over these.
The independence movements that swept the globe during the mid-late 20th century had profound effects on both the history and theory of “international order”. As Bull suggested, one way of charting the expansion of international society was the expanding membership of the United Nations, and the related fora of international law-making. The presence of an ever more diverse body of representatives at the international organisations, such as the United Nations General Assembly and other international platforms called for a renewed theorisation of these developments of international order. The changing composition of international society also stirred a change in the doctrines of international law. In 1960, General Assembly "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples". It declared: “all peoples have the right to self-determination” and to pursue the path of their own economic, social and cultural development. It further condemned and outlawed those historical narratives of colonial domination that posited non-European peoples as childlike and unprepared for self-government. This Declaration was widely pushed through by the African bloc at the United Nations, and Getachew has described it as a “radical rupture” in the history of international order. Within a very short period of time, anticolonial movements had hacked away at the assiduous idea that certain races of mankind were not prepared for self-government and replaced it with the idea that self-determination was a fundamental human right. For instance, the earlier "Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948", makes no mention of self-determination. This was an intentional framing to ensure no further challenges to European territorial empire. By the 1960’s colonialism was considered an international crime, and self-determination emerged as a fundamental human right. In the jurisprudence of international law, the idea was taken up and extended into more concrete principles of international law. Since the decolonisation era, the international court of justice has declared the principle of self-determination to be a general principle of international law as well as being of such a unique and special nature, as to having an "erga omnes" .
Watson and Bull’s ‘inclusion thesis’ posits that “the global south” was included in international society for the first time during the post-world war II era. By inclusion into international society, there is also a further, assumption about ‘the end of colonialism’ and the onset of a fair world system governed by human rights and the rule of law. As Grovogui noted, in the post-1945 order there is a strong assumption that "colonialism was over."We can all agree that the decolonisation era was in many respects a rupture from the old, explicitly racialised system of managing international law and politics. Not only were the international institutions undergoing a change with the admission of new states, but also, these new states were sparking new developments in the doctrines of international law. Above we have discussed the recognition and development of the principle of self-determination. By the same token, we should be wary of crediting the historical decades of the 1940’s-70’s, as symbolising a far greater or radical break from the past. Let us now consider some of the shortcomings and critiques of equating the decolonisation era with decolonisation as completed.
C. Thinking Beyond the ‘Inclusion Thesis’ and the Long Road to Decolonisation.
A number of problems open up when we take a closer look at this “inclusion thesis”. An enormous volume of international legal and political theory has addressed the shortcomings of taking the Westphalian Peace as our starting point for discussing international affairs. While it is beyond the scope of this essay to cover the breadth of this literature, I will limit my discussion to the problem of the state and the remaining problem of inequality within the international order since the Independence era. The ‘inclusion thesis’ narrates a progressive, eurocentric history of international order. It tells the history of international society as one of constant betterment, whilst also placing Euro-American or Western societies at the centre and the benchmark against which all others are gauged. The main point worth stressing here is that while it is largely assumed that once former colonies gained their status as independent states in their own right, colonialism was over. Instead, in recent years, a critical historiography of international order has highlighted the need to rethink what we mean when we talk about decolonisation. Rather than thinking in terms of a sharp break: a before and after colonialism, it makes more sense to talk about “decolonisation” as a more hopeful, forward-looking ideal. The recognition of statehood is just one, albeit crucially important step, in the long road to decolonisation.
Both postcolonial and decolonial traditions start from the recognition that inequality in the global order is tied into structural inequalities, formulated in law, reproduced through legal practice and international institutions. While these were born from the colonial era, they have certainly changed form over time. Additionally, in recent years, scholars of international law have started to recognise that international law scholars do not merely describe legal practice, they actively shape it too. To this end, our knowledge systems are equally important in shaping the normative content of international law. The ‘post’ in postcolonial or the ‘de’ in decolonial, as theoretical traditions do not stand for the temporal idea, "after" colonialism, signifying the end. Rather they point to a body of knowledge, that seeks to contest and highlight colonial domination and its legacies. Third World approaches to International Law (TWAIL) thus try to take on the role of critique and transformation through engaging with the colonial encounter. In the following section, I outline the disjuncture between the theories and practice of Statehood and non-western agency within international order. The objective of my discussion is to show that far from being over, decolonisation is an ongoing practice that involves the practice of reflexivity, critique, and eventually the hope of transformation. As Getachew has put it: “Rather than tether the idea of independent and equal states to the legacy of Westphalia, we should identify this vision of international order with an anti-imperialism that went beyond the demand for the inclusion of new states to imagine an egalitarian world order.”
I. Statehood: The End or the Beginning of Decolonisation?
The first line of critique is that the formal recognition of statehood did not go far enough to alter the relations of power flowing through the international system of states. There is a common misunderstanding that the post-1945 era somehow also marked the end of colonialism. “The proponents of these views have presumed decolonisation to be an end in itself.” Today we know very well, that the decolonisation era did not birth a perfect international order of equality and justice. While the legal-political theory concept of the Westphalian world system composed of equal, sovereign states is a useful heuristic, this could not be further from reality. Great powers continue to dominate the international order and the most disenfranchised communities of the world continue to suffer exploitation, low standards of living and are also expected to bear the harshest effects of impending environmental and climate disasters. To this end, a number of have argued that the power relations born from imperialism merely transformed or changed shape but the core issues of “civilisation” or essential difference between the west and rest is continually reproduced.
Watson and Bull’s account of the expansion of international society tells a progressive story about the state, as arising through purely European agency during the 17th century, Peace of Westphalia. The European origins of the state are then placed in a linear story of progress, where over time, the entire world would come to adopt this model of political organisation. As far as the newly independent states were concerned, their main role was to follow the model of Europe and emulate development through the guidance and voluntary charitable development aid of the west. This historical framing is eurocentric, to the extent, that it still places European societies as the universal benchmark, which all others should aspire to and are judged. Further, it leaves us with very limited analytical tools to understand and talk about the power differentials between the global north and south.
If it is true that European states emerged from the Peace of Westphalia in the 17th century, what role did colonialism play in the formation of these states? The Westphalian myth implies that these states arose endogenously out of purely European agency. When Vattel was writing about the family of European nations, each equal and sovereign, he was committing a quite problematic theoretical blunder by saying nothing about the same states’ overseas colonial holdings. Since the decolonisation era, different actors from the global south have seized upon this promise in their efforts to enact change. To answer the question of whether it even makes sense to talk about the “decolonisation” of international law, it must be admitted there are no clear answers to give. Perhaps it is misguided to try and fix an answer to this point here and now: it will rather, be the task of historians of international legal thought to conclude based on future developments. At the same time, we can talk about the limits and possibilities of decolonisation
By now it should be clear that when scholars, courts and international organisations invoke the term “decolonisation” they are not always talking about the same thing. In the above discussion I have discussed Bull and Watson’s "Expansion of International Society" as underwriting most conventional understandings of decolonisation in international law. This text, written nearly forty years ago provided the first major attempt at theorising the dissolution of European territorial empires, and along with it, a rejection of an explicitly racialised system of global order. Since the 1970’s, a rich discussion has unfolded at the intersections of legal and political theory about the limitations of the ‘inclusion thesis’. The main point worth stressing is that the inclusion thesis posits a strong discontinuity between the old world of imperialism and the new world of the Westphalian state system. It posits the acquisition of statehood and sovereignty as beings the marking the final end of colonialism. While in no way attempting to undermine the importance of the statehood of non-western territories, my purpose has been to highlight the more concrete problems of inequality that continue to mar international affairs. Building upon the insights of critical scholarship over the last three decades, a new usage of the term ‘decolonisation’ has today emerged in international law. In this regard, the call to “decolonise” international law, speaks to numerous activist and scholarly attempts to think beyond the state-centric inclusion theory as simply marking the end of colonisation and demands of us to reflexively approach concrete methods, legal, political and institutional arrangements which reproduce relations of inequality. This second understanding of “decolonisation” compels us to move beyond positivistic understandings of the social world and to engage complexity, and power in its many guises.
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434676
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3337005
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434676
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Public International Law/History of International Law/Eurocentrism
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Author: Jane Doe
Required knowledge: Link
Learning objectives: Understanding XY.
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434677
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1779740
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434677
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Public International Law/Nature and Purpose of International Law
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Author: Jane Doe
Required knowledge: Link
Learning objectives: Understanding XY.
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Public International Law/Methodology
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Author: Jane Doe
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434679
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846780
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434679
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Public International Law/Methodology/Case Analysis
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Author:
Required knowledge: Precedent in Domestic Law, Sources of International Law, Interaction
Learning objectives: Evaluating the relevance of cases in international law, researching international cases, applying cases depending on role and objective.
A. Introduction.
Cases are not only a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law" in international law according to article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute, but also an influential means of communication in the practice and research of law. For this reason, it is all the more surprising that all popular textbooks of public international law include a section on the relevance of cases, but no section on how to engage with judicial decision as a student, practitioner, or scholar of international law. The following chapter attempts to change that by discussing the relevance of cases, presenting tools to research cases, and introducing methods to use cases in international law. In doing so, this chapter aims to guide students through exams, term papers and moot courts in which case law analysis is key.
B. Relevance of Cases in International Law.
According to the traditional reading, cases are one of the four main sources to determine rules of international law. Both judges and scholars of international law deal extensively with prior domestic and international decisions in their publications. Finding and analyzing cases is therefore one of the main tasks of international lawyers.
I. Decisions of International Adjudicative Bodies.
On a strict reading of Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, judicial decisions are only subsidiary sources of international law. At first glance, this reserved importance is confirmed by the absence of precedents. As cases are generally binding only between the parties involved in the dispute, not against uninvolved parties, no formal concept of precedent exists in international law. This first glance, however, belies the actual realities of international law. Cases shape the modern international legal order at least as much as treaties and customary international law. Courts base their decisions on previous cases to build a coherent system, scholars use cases to adjust their approaches to the realities of international law, and commissions use cases as food for thought when codifying law. This applies not only to judicial decisions but also to communications of commissions, committees, and other quasi-judicial bodies.
International law cases can be differentiated according to different types of applicants and procedures. In most proceedings, two states are in dispute before an international court. This is particularly the case with the ICJ and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Private parties can also file complaints against states before international human rights courts and investment protection tribunals. Additionally, prosecutors can file cases against individuals before international criminal courts. Finally, international organizations and states can also seek advisory opinions from international tribunals.
Cases can consist of up to four different parts. Under preliminary objections, courts typically address the jurisdiction of the court, the ability of the plaintiff to bring the case to trial (so-called standing), and other admissibility requirements. Under merits, courts present their reasoning and the result of the case. Under reparations, most courts specify the consequences their judgement (e.g., reversal of measures, payment of reparations). Under interpretation, courts may, at the request of the applicant, clarify how a judgment is to be interpreted and whether the respondent has fulfilled its obligations.
II. Domestic Cases in International Law.
Domestic court decisions are also covered by 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute. It should be noted, however, that domestic decisions are rarely cited. While international decisions are usually cited to ensure a supposed uniformity of the international legal order, the use of domestic decisions often serves to prove customary international law and to secure acceptance by states. By discussing domestic decisions, courts signal to states that their legal traditions are being taken seriously. For this reason, a thorough research on domestic decisions should not only focus on decisions of the usual suspects, but should strive for representativeness.
Although citations are aimed at securing acceptance of international law by all states, studies on citation practices of international courts and textbooks show that primarily cases from Australia, Canada, China, France, Israel, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States are cited. Cases from jurisdictions outside the Global North are very rarely cited. For example, in Arrest Warrant, the ICJ deals solely with the UK House of Lords and French Cour de Cassation. In Jurisdictional Immunities, the ICJ cites decisions from 16 countries in the Global North (Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, United States, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland), one regional human rights organization of the Global North (Council of Europe) and only one country in the Global South (Egypt). The White & Case guide for Jessup Moot Court participants on “Researching International Law” echoes this practice and recommends considering decisions from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for factual matters involving indigenous rights as "those countries have significant indigenous populations", while ignoring Central and South African and South American experiences in addressing indigenous rights.
Admittedly, there are plausible reasons for this: In some cases, only decisions from certain jurisdictions will exist, decisions in English are easy to understand for most international lawyers, many databases contain only judgments from these jurisdictions, and the style of reasoning of these courts is similar to the style of reasoning taught in international law departments around the world. However, this prevalence of English-language decisions in citations is not inevitable, but the result of historical inequalities within the international system. Over the past 400 years, European states in particular have imposed their legal systems on countries on every continent of the world. Today, English is the working language in international institutions, and English-language publications are expected by international law scholars in many regions of the world. In light of these colonial roots of the bias in favour of English-language decisions, a thorough research on domestic decisions should not only try to use decisions of a certain group of states but instead should strive for representativeness. Since discussing domestic decisions serves to establish customary international law and to secure States’ acceptance of international law, the cases used for this must consider as many diverse countries as possible. Otherwise, international law will remain law of only well-recognized states and the international legal order could, with reasonable grounds, lose acceptance, especially in the countries of the Global South.
C. Researching Cases in International Law.
Generally, case law analyses have two different starting points: In the first type of question, the student is asked to respond to a general question of international law. The student can only answer this question convincingly if they also engages with international and domestic cases.
In the second type of question, the student must answer a case-specific question. Although this question seems to refer only to one case, the student can only answer this question persuasively if they also considers comparable cases.
Thus, for both types of questions, students must find the applicable case law for persuasive reasoning. For this, students can resort to libraries and online databases.
I. Finding Cases in Libraries.
The most obvious, but also the most challenging source for researching case law is printed law reports. The main advantage of law reports is that they are published either by the courts themselves or by distinguished individuals and institutions. Students can therefore be assured that law reports reflect the development of case law comprehensively and authentically. The major disadvantage, however, is their format. Law reports are often only available in print. Many universities and students cannot afford them. Furthermore, printed collections can only be scanned and skimmed in a very time-consuming and error-prone process. Students should therefore use them with great caution. Nevertheless, law reports remain a common source to research case law. The following list provides an overview of the most common law reports in international law:
Many international law journals also contain sections that summarize and assess cases. However, these journals are only suitable to a limited extent for researching cases. First, journals contain only a sample of current decisions, and second, they focus usually on analyzing individual aspects of the case and not on presenting the entire content of the decision. For this reason, journals are recommended resources for case law analysis only after students have already found the relevant cases for their analysis. Subsequently, contributions to journals can serve as a source of inspiration in one's own analysis of case law.
II. Finding Cases in Online Databases.
Nowadays, online databases exist for almost all international courts. Most of these databases enable machine-readable research and parsing of case law. This allows students to filter case law by terms, topics, rules, and years to find the most relevant cases as quickly as possible. For this reason, online databases should usually be the starting point for case law research. Students may use the court's own databases for citations and footnotes as they provide scanned, but original versions of decisions. In this way, students can avoid mistakes in quoting and citing. In contrast, third-party databases are better suited for initial research. These databases often contain more precise options for filtering, so students can use them to find more appropriate cases more quickly. The following list provides an overview of online databases for international courts, tribunals, commissions, and committees:
To use these databases most effectively, students may think of key phrases that describe the problem to be solved as concretely and as briefly as possible. In some cases, the relevant phrases already emerge from the questions. For instance, our first example asks about the legality of entry restrictions under international law. A student could search the databases for the keywords "entry restrictions" and synonyms. However, this is usually not sufficient to find all cases that are relevant to solving the problem. Instead, students may also search for secondary literature in parallel. In particular, students can use Google, Google Scholar, encyclopedias of international law, the search engines of the major international law publishers (esp. CUP and OUP), and international law blogs for the keywords. After reading suitable articles in journals, books, blogs, and encyclopedias, students should have a deeper understanding of the legal issues. The keywords for the databases can then be adjusted.
This literature review is also particularly important if the question does not contain specific phrases that can already be used as keywords for databases. For instance, our second example asks solely about the lack of state responsibility of Serbia and Montenegro. It would be very tedious to search the databases for "state responsibility," as the keywords are still too general. Instead, students may first read the relevant case (Bosnian Genocide Case) and literature to be able to identify the key legal issues. After reading the case and literature, students can recognize that, among other issues, the question of attribution of private acts is crucial for the state responsibility of Serbia and Montenegro. For this issue, the ICJ has been using the "effective control" test since "Nicaragua", whereas the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) uses the "overall control" test. These two phrases (“effective control” v. “overall control”) can be used as keywords for the literature review and databases to locate cases relevant to answer the question.
Some databases also offer to search cases by year, topic, and rule. This is particularly helpful in areas of law with many decisions to filter out the relevant cases. However, as international adjudicative bodies also draw inspiration from decisions outside their own system, students should not only search for cases in the field of law of the question but also look for comparable problems and decisions in other fields of international law. Students may repeat their research several times during the processing period using adjusted keywords to reflect their increased knowledge.
D. Using Cases in International Law.
In order to apply the cases found, students should understand the case in a first step and then determine the relevance of the case for their assignment and argument in a second step.
I. Understanding Cases.
After finding the relevant cases, students must understand these cases. The tools used to understand cases do not differ, but the way the tools are used does, depending on the role and objective. Every case analysis starts with reading the case as well as annotating and summarizing it (at least in thought). However, the reading, as well as the objects of markings and summaries, differ depending on the position and task of the analyzing student.
In international law, two distinct types of tasks exist in which the analysis of cases becomes relevant. In one case, students must analyze cases strictly doctrinally. This is particularly the case in moot courts and when students have to write a case brief or solve a case from the standpoint of the judge. In this type of task, the focus of analysis should be on locating the cases in the broader context of the relevant field of international law. Students can criticize decisions, provided that the judgments depart from the established canon of the field. In most instances, however, students should instead focus on distinguishing cases or establishing exceptions and qualifications of rules derived from judgments. In the other case, students can analyze cases not only doctrinally but also disruptively. This is particularly the case when students analyze cases not as (imaginary) members of an institution (be it as applicant/respondent or as a judge) but as external observers (e.g., in a critical case analysis). In this task, students should also locate the case in the broader context of the relevant field of international law. However, the primary analysis does not end there. Instead, students can analyze the case in light of decisions from other fields of international law, critical methodological approaches (e.g., Third World Approaches to International Law), or interdisciplinary insights. Nonetheless, students should be aware that these two types of tasks represent two extreme positions of case analyses. In between, there is a continuum of tasks that combine elements from both types.
Regardless of the type of assignment, any case analysis begins with understanding the cases provided or identified. In this respect, a two-tiered approach can significantly facilitate the understanding of cases: Students may first read and annotate the case and secondly summarize it. However, there is no universal approach to reading and summarizing a case, so students can compile their own method based on existing approaches.
1. Reading and Annotating a Case.
Before reading the case for the first time, students may make sure that they have understood the assignment as the type of task is crucial for the approach of case analyses. In a second step, students can use the techniques of "skimming” and "scanning" to obtain a first overview of the case. Skimming provides students with a first glimpse of the overarching content of the judgment. Students should not read the entire judgment or entire paragraphs but instead focus on the title and date of the decision, the parties, subheadings, and the first and last sentences of sections. Scanning is used to locate relevant passages within the judgment and then read it. For this purpose, students can be guided by subheadings as well as first and last sentences of sections from skimming and then read only those passages that seem relevant to answering the task. For example, if students are only interested in the legal reasoning, they may bypass all the parts of the judgment describing the facts and the proceedings to focus on the legal reasoning. In a third step, students may read and annotate the case. Annotations are used to visually structure the case and to be able to understand it with little effort even in retrospect.
In the final step of reading and annotating, students may consider rereading the case to review one's annotations and prevent mistakes or oversights. Depending on the assignment, it might be useful to read not only the case itself but also case summaries. Many courts provide these summaries themselves. But also journals or encyclopedias of international law contain case summaries. By supplementing one's own thoughts with thoughts from other lawyers, one's own idea of the case can be verified.
2. Summarizing a Case.
After several readings of the case, the case can be summarized at least in thoughts, and for some assignments, in writing. As a rule, this step is not relevant for examiners, but for students. The case summary should comprehensively, but briefly, present the most important aspects of the case. Only by this step can students verify whether they have really understood the case. In addition, it serves to recall the case later without much effort. Thus, the case summary, in addition to the case reading, is a key prerequisite for using cases in international law.
II. Determining the Relevance of a Case.
Before students ultimately apply the case, they should determine the relevance of the case for their assignment. The importance of cases for the international legal order was already explained at the beginning of this chapter. Although there is no formal doctrine of precedent in international law, cases shape both the determination of rules and their interpretation. However, this does not imply that judgments which at first glance support one's own argumentation should be used for one's own reasoning without hesitation. Likewise, cases that contradict one's own argumentation at first glance are not a final farewell to one's own reasoning. Instead, cases can be evaluated from both doctrinal and critical perspectives before they are finally presented. The appropriate balance between doctrinal and critical evaluation perspectives depends on the assignment at hand and cannot be determined in the abstract.
1. Approaching Cases Doctrinally.
From a doctrinal perspective, there are three elements in particular to consider when students want to determine the relevance of the case to their assignment and argument: First, the applicability of the case to the assignment must be determined. In addition, obiter dicta and individual opinions may be considered.
a) Distinguishing Cases.
Before classifying a case as being for or against their reasoning, students may answer two questions: Firstly, students can investigate whether the facts of the case under investigation correspond to the facts of the assignment (so-called factual distinguishing). It may well be that the result and reasoning of a case are clearly against one's own argument, but the cases are so different that the rule and reasoning cannot be transferred automatically. For this, students must closely examine the facts of the case and the assignment and identify similarities that allow the rule to be applied or differences that hinder the rule’s application. Second, the legal elaborations in the case may contain hidden qualifications or exceptions that preclude the application of a case that appears to fit or that justify the application of a case that does not appear to fit the assignment (so-called legal distinguishing). Finally, reasoning in old cases can also be displaced by new legal developments. For a persuasive argument, students should always acknowledge the cursory fit or lack of it in a first step, and then explain why the case actually does or does not fit in a second step. From a doctrinal perspective, it is usually unconvincing to frame a case as false. Instead, these two techniques of factual and legal distinguishing should be employed to exploit the case for one's own argument.
b) Obiter Dicta.
Legal interpretations of courts that are not relevant for deciding the case (so-called obiter dicta) may also be considered in analyzing cases. For example, the ICJ defined "opinio juris" in an obiter dictum in "North Sea Continental Shelf" and defined obligations "erga omnes" for the first time in an obiter dictum in "Barcelona Traction". In both instances, the legal reasoning was not relevant to the outcome of the case, and yet both obiter dicta continue to shape the international legal order to this day. However, it is disputed whether obiter dicta are "judicial decisions" or "teachings of publicists" in the sense of Art. 38(1)(d) Statute of the ICJ. For this reason, obiter dicta should be treated cautiously. For example, ITLOS in "Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal" refused to apply an obiter dictum of the ICJ in "Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea".
c) Individual Opinions.
Many domestic legal systems allow judges to attach individual opinions to the majority decision if they disagree with the majority’s reasoning (so-called concurring opinion) or result (so-called dissenting opinion). Likewise, almost all international adjudicative bodies permit judges to publish individual opinions.
Although individual opinions have not prevailed within the adjudicative body and are thus not enforceable, they can contribute to the development of legal standards. Individual opinions can assist in interpreting the majority opinion. Concurring opinions often clarify or generalize the court's reasoning. This facilitates the application of the court's reasoning to similar cases. Dissenting opinions not only reveal the rationale for the majority opinion but also criticize this majority opinion. Thereby, dissenting opinions are a good starting point for a critical engagement with majority opinions.
While the relevance of individual opinions should therefore not be underestimated, they should be treated cautiously. Firstly, they are just not part of the majority opinion and thus neither binding for the parties nor enforceable nor “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” according to Article 38(1)(d) Statute of the ICJ. Second, individual opinions are frequently results of national or amicable biases.
2. Approaching Cases Critically.
From a critical perspective, it is much more difficult to recommend generally accepted approaches. However, one common feature of many critical approaches is to view cases as social facts rather than legal ones. Critical perspectives are therefore not limited to the application of doctrinal standards. Instead, critical approaches address, among other aspects, the sociological conditions of human decision-making in adjudicative bodies, (post-)colonial imprints and effects of decisions, economic conditionalities of law, and ecological consequences of judgments. While the application of these perspectives requires an engagement with their basic methodological assumptions, they usually enrich a case law analysis enormously by unmasking the supposed neutrality of doctrinal methods. Examples of critical engagement with cases include the 'feminist judgment movement', 'trashing' in the sense of critical legal studies, and 'Reading Back, Reading Black'. In the following chapters, this textbook provides insights into how to employinterdisciplinary, (post-)colonial,feminist, andMarxist approaches to case law analyses.
E. Conclusion.
Cases are one of the four main sources to determine rules of international law. Despite this particular relevance, the ability of students to locate, understand, and apply cases in exams is often assumed. Many textbooks of international law do not teach case analysis skills, but only knowledge of the law. This chapter has attempted to provide students with an introduction to case analyses. (Un-)fortunately, it is up to these students, along with their teachers and practitioners of international law, to ensure that case analyses in the future no longer only consider decisions from colonising legal systems. This will require a challenging but also rewarding engagement with foreign legal systems, possibly including the learning of new languages (for this, Anglophone readers may feel particularly encouraged), and the critical questioning of traditional citation practices and case analysis techniques. While this process is time-intensive, it will not only promise novel insights but also serves to counteract the exclusion of the majority of states from the process of creating and developing international law, thereby contributing to fulfilling international law's universalist potential.
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434680
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434680
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Public International Law/Methodology/Interdisciplinarity
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Authors: Silvia Steininger, Tamsin Phillipa Paige
Required knowledge: none
Learning objectives: This chapter introduces law students to the basics of interdisciplinarity in public international law. Students will learn about the main strands of interdisciplinary scholarship and the most prominent methodological tools available. They will be able to fully grasp the benefits and challenges of adopting an interdisciplinary perspective on international law and receive helpful practical guidance in creating their own interdisciplinary legal research projects. This chapter introduces basic elements of interdisciplinarity in public international law. While the majority of international law scholarship is still dominated by doctrinal research, adopting interdisciplinary perspectives on the theory, history, and practice of international law has become increasingly important for students of international law. Students are requested to not only familiarize themselves with interdisciplinary methods, but also apply those insights to international law. However, most programs lack a thorough introduction to the conceptual toolbox of interdisciplinary research. This chapter aims to remedy this gap and show students why, when, and how to engage in interdisciplinary research projects.
A. Basics for Interdisciplinarity in Public International Law.
The call for 'interdisciplinarity' has become a staple in international legal research. It 'can be seen everywhere, ranging from funding calls, research agendas, grant applications, conference themes and internet blogs to rhetorical manoeuvres.' Yet, the more interdisciplinarity gained in popularity, the fuzzier its meaning actually became. To move between disciplines comes with benefits and challenges. In this section, we want to sketch out the basics for what interdisciplinarity means, why it is useful, and how to start an interdisciplinary research project.
I. What is Interdisciplinarity?
In general terms, interdisciplinarity denotes research projects that aim at synthesizing and harmonizing knowledge and methods between two or more disciplines into a coordinated and coherent whole. It stands opposite of intradisciplinarity, which describes working exclusively in the boundaries of one single discipline. Interdisciplinarity thus requires that the general, theoretical as well as empirical assumptions between two or more disciplines are not in contradiction to each other. Moreover, it necessitates a strong, substantial and methodological understanding of those disciplines, which often takes significant amount of time and exposure to the relevant scholarly communities and their writings. Most international legal scholarship takes the form of transdisciplinary or multidisciplinary research, the latter describing persons from different disciplines working together on a common project, each drawing on their own disciplinary knowledge and expertise. This is usually achieved by multidisciplinary teams of authors. Transdisciplinarity attempts to create a unitary common framework among two or more disciplines, to find common research questions, harmonize definitions, and identify explanations that stretch over the scope of just one disciplinary horizon.
Critics of interdisciplinary scholarship argue that the emergence of "x-disciplinarity" (inter-, intra-, trans- and multi-disciplinarity) dilutes disciplinary boundaries, threatens the idea of a specialized profession and challenges central understandings such as legal autonomy. In fact, disciplines are not academic silos but overlap and interact with each other constantly. International law suits itself to interdisciplinary approaches, as many research questions necessitate at least a contextual understanding of law. Nevertheless, this should not underestimate the politics behind the turn to interdisciplinarity. In the words of Jan Klabbers, 'interdisciplinarity is a politically charged activity in itself.' Interdisciplinary approaches might reproduce, disguise, or even strengthen existing power relations. Adopting an interdisciplinary research agenda and methodological toolbox further requires additional opportunity costs, for instance to get access to methodological training or resources such as specific programs, which might exacerbates structural inequalities in academia. Interdisciplinarity can thus rupture disciplinary gatekeeping and democratize the creation of new knowledge on fundamental questions of international law, but also create additional barriers and adopt a marketized logic, in which research is guided by the use of fancy methodologies rather than research questions.
II. Why do interdisciplinary research?
Classical, doctrinal scholarship in international law usually adopts an internal view on law. The internal viewpoint takes the perspective of an insider to law, a law student, a professor, or practitioner, who was trained and socialized into the legal community. They participate in the legal discourse, are preoccupied with legal arguments, and decision-oriented. In contrast, interdisciplinary scholarship promotes an external view of law. It usually take the perspective of the outsider, who observes the processes, structures, and norms of international law in action. Interdisciplinary research allows to ask questions which go beyond the internal logic of law. It does not limit itself to how the law is, but also why the law has been applied in a certain way, and how it should be in the future. Interdisciplinary approaches enable the identification of causalities or at least indicate possible explanations for certain situations or developments in international law. They can also illuminate underlying patterns and structures, which have been overlooked, thus benefiting critical engagement with international law and providing support for improvement via interpretation or further development of the law.
III. How to do interdisciplinary research?
Naturally, there are countless options to analyze international law from an interdisciplinary perspective and we will give you more insights in the following section. However, in general, interdisciplinary research requires a more structural approach to international legal research. One can generally distinguish between five steps:
First, you need to familiarize yourself with the respective approaches in depth before the start of the research project. This requires to understand the underlying epistemological considerations, fundamental concepts, and classic authors, who have shaped the particular approach. Moreover, it is helpful to map the existing interdisciplinary engagement with international law. This is important not only to assess the state of the discipline and the topics that are being discussed, but also to identify the respective community, which underpins the respective research project. One can thereby learn how to approach the same topic from different angles, how to transpose fundamental concepts to the study of international law, and to get socialized into the respective academic and writing style.
Secondly, in contrast to classical, doctrinal research, interdisciplinary research embraces a more transparent and open structure. In general, the scholar will first identify the research question(s) and possible hypotheses and counterhypotheses before analyzing the data. That does not not mean that the availability and access to source material cannot guide the respective research design, but it means that the data does not predetermine the research questions. This is different to doctrinal research, in which the identification of structures and the categorization of cases is a major research aim in itself.
Thirdly, it is important that the respective researcher openly and transparently justifies the respective research design. Interdisciplinary scholarship often includes an explicit methodology section. In this section, the author justifies, among others, why this particular approach is useful for the study of international law, how this influences the research question(s), which factors guide the identification of hypotheses, what were the criteria required for the selection of research units, which methodologies are going to be applied, how is the data being gathered, and what are the limitations of this particular method. In general, the various empirical methods can be grouped in either qualitative, focusing on the interpretation of words and meanings of texts, or quantitative, focusing on the interpretation of numbers and statistics. Advanced scholars sometimes also apply so-called 'mixed methods"'which can include a combination of several qualitative and quantitative methods. At this stage, the author can also identify how the project relates to existing research or conflicting approaches and clearly limit the research agenda.
Fourthly, the researcher gathers the necessary data. Again, a variety of options exist, ranging from comparative research designs, to archival work, as well as qualitative and quantitative approaches, which will be highlighted in section D. This step might take significant time and require additional resources such as travel, software etc. It is also heavily reliant on factors outside of the control of the respective researcher, such as access to sources, for instance archives and interview partners.
Finally, the data will be evaluated with respect to the aforementioned research question. This often includes giving a systematic overview and highlighting particularly interesting or unexpected factors. Hypotheses can be confirmed or refuted. Moreover, it is possible to consider some possible explanations for particular outcomes, reaffirm the limitations of the results or identify options to expand on the research in future projects.
B. Types of Interdisciplinary Scholarship in International Law.
Throughout the last decades, particular types of interdisciplinary scholarship have emerged in international legal research. This section provides a non-exhaustive overview of main strands and thinkers as a first gateway to glean inspiration for further engagement.
I. International Law and History.
Interdisciplinary study of international law and history is perhaps the most common form of interdisciplinarity in the study of international law. This is because it’s a form of study that ties deeply with what is done through doctrinal legal research. Because doctrinal legal research necessarily requires placing the principles espoused by legal instruments or relevant international court decisions in the context in which they were made, in order to understand how they would apply in a new context, the study of international law lends itself towards historical enquiry. Prime examples of this type of scholarship can be found in the work of Arnulf Becker Lorca, James Crawford, Martti Koskenniemi, and Anne Orford. The purpose of international law and history interdisciplinary enquiry is not to determine the 'true' or 'original' meaning of a piece of international law, in line with the originalism doctrine espoused in US Constitutional Law. Rather, scholars engaging historical enquiries of international law often aim to disrupt accepted narratives that established alleged 'legal truths'. The historigraphical turn in international law has also put significant emphasis on researching the history of international law in non-Western regions and peripheries. This includes not only a renewed emphasis on questions of imperialism and colonialism, but also on regional perspectives, for instance on international law and the history of ideas in Latin America, Africa, and Russia, as well inter-civilizational perspectives.
II. International Law and Sociology.
The primary goal of legal sociology (as both a discipline and method) is 'to provide insight into an understanding of the law through an empirical study of its practice.' This particular field of interdisciplinary study of international law finds its origins in the work of Pierre Brourdieu, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber. In terms of empirical and theoretical studies into the practice of international law sociology is relatively small or niche when compared with International Law and International Relations (discussed in this section in conjunction with International Law and Political Science). This can be explained on methodological grounds. Sociology is a methods- and theory-based discipline which means that there is a battery of defined available methods, new methods need to be sufficiently tested, justified, and articulated to be considered valid included and social theory is directly informed by empirical observation of the world. Political science and international relations, however, are subject matter based disciplines and thus have more scope as they adopt the different methodologies from other disciplines such as sociology. In the last two decades, research on sociological perspectives in international law has particularly focused on the practice of international lawyers as a legal profession, the evolution, proliferation, and authority of international courts, the practices of international adjudicators, as well as the emergence and structure of legal fields, for instance in international economic law as well as international criminal law.
III. International Law and Political Science.
Political science perspectives on international law primarily focus on the 'development, operation, spread, and impact of international legal norms, agreements, and institutions.' They include theoretical and conceptual framework as well as political science methods, in particular qualitative and quantitative approaches. It expands the study of international law to investigate the role of political organization, government, and structures upon which international law relies. While its beginnings can be traced back to the early 20th century, the most prominent political science approach to international law is international relations. International relations theories usually highlight three facets of international law: power, international cooperation, and domestic politics. Yet, the relevance and understanding of those factors depends on the different strands of international relations theory. In general, one can distinguish between at least four dominant strands: realism (focusing on power), institutionalism (focusing on the role of institutions and regimes), liberalism (focusing on how domestic factors influence international affairs), and constructivism (focusing on the role of norms). Critical approaches such as Marxism, feminism, or post-structuralist strands are also applied. Historically, the disciplines of international law and international relations developed along related but usually not intersecting tracks. However, with the proliferation of international cooperation, the end of realist Cold War politics, and the rise of the US-backed liberal internationalist world order, a vocal community of IL-IR scholars emerged in the 1990s. They included, among others, Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, and, most prominently, Anne-Marie Slaughter. Prominent IL-IR research strands focus on the compliance with international law, questions of legality and legitimacy, the emergence of norms as well as their contestation, and the proliferation of international courts.
IV. International Law and Literature.
International Law and Literature as an interdisciplinary field of study follows the same paths and approaches as the Law and Literature movement more generally. The general goal of this type of interdisciplinary research is to use literature to advance understandings of international law in some way. While this is generally done through the pursuit of academic scholarship, it can also be done through the production of works of fiction. Classic examples of using works of fiction to discuss concepts of international law and justice are the work of China Miéville and "The Reader" by Bernhard Schlink. When engaging in academic approaches to International Law and Literature interdisciplinary work, authors tend to do one of three things with the literature aspect of this scholarship: 1) use works of fiction to explain and make accessible concepts of international law to non-experts or to illustrate a point of international law to fellow legal scholars; 2) use works of literature as conceptual data to explore societal responses to international law; or 3) use literature as a tool of jurisprudence in order to develop legal theory on particular issues. Often, the aim of international law and literature, as with all law and literature interdisciplinary studies, the tool of the literature is to help people understand international law in a new or more accessible way. The respective type of literature can also move with time, for instance historical-oriented works have focused on the role of world-making in early 20th century fiction while recent scholarship also discussed the depiction of international law in popular culture and modern fiction.
V. International Law and Economics.
The economic analysis of international law has emerged in the 2000s, but builds on the more established domestic Law and Economics literature starting from the 1960 in US academia. Its primary aim is to apply economic theory, in particular rational choice approaches, to problems of international law. The core assumption of the economic theory is the rational actor model. Economic analysis of international law thus assumes that states are self-interested and make decisions among alternatives to maximize their gains. They act according to the rational choice model in the design of international agreements and the creation of international law. Methodologically, international law and economics scholarship often applies quantitative methods based on large datasets, as well as experiments. International law and economics sheds lights on two facets of international law: the importance of self-interest for state behavior and how this affects how states design and comply with international law. The economic approach to international law has been focused on the different modes of treaty making, the design of specific clauses such as treaty exits, international dispute settlement, and the legitimacy of customary international law. Economic analyses also investigated how particular rules of institutional design might foster compliance. A more recent but rapidly growing strand of interdisciplinary analysis on the economic analysis of international law is formed under the umbrella of Law and Political Economy (LPE). Research on international law from an LPE perspective investigates how international law creates wealth and inequality and upholds neoliberal hegemony but also how it might 'contribute to understanding and transforming centre–periphery patterns of dynamic inequality in global political economic life.'
VI. International Law and Psychology.
International Law and Psychology has been developed in the 2010s and primarily adopts insights of behavioralism and cognitive psychology to international law. There are apparent overlaps between the emerging movement of behavioralist international law and the earlier economic analysis, not only amongst its main proponents but also its substantive questions and methods. Its main difference to economic analysis, however, concerns the rational choice paradigm. Psychological or behavioralist analyses do not assume perfect rationality, but rather want to empirical explore how the different actors in international law 'actually behave'. Behavioralism complements the economic approach by demonstrating that the action of individuals is often not determined by the maximum utility but influenced by several bias. To understand how those biases influence the behavior of individuals, behavioralist often rely on experiments. Yet, the application of experimental insights upon the behavior of states in international law is more challenging than to powerful individual decision-makers such as heads of state, diplomats, or judges. Behavioralist insights have been applied to a variety of international law issues, for instance, on treaty design, treaty interpretation, international trade disputes, bilateral investment treaties, legal theory, international humanitarian law or how to incentivize compliance via rewards.
VII. International Law and Anthropology.
Anthropological analysis of international law have been primarily developed after the 1990s, however, earlier works on human rights in socio-cultural contexts can be identified. Anthropology and international law thus attempts to understand the social and cultural contexts of international law, often via ethnographical fieldwork in various local socio-cultural settings. Today, anthropological perspectives are in particular applied to account for the developments in three different international law spaces: the expansion of human rights discourse, the globalization of law, and international organizations. Anthropological perspectives aim at understanding how international law is produced and how it works by focusing on the individuals and communities which create and are affected by international law. Anthropology thus highlights three overlooked facets of international law: First, it allows an anti-formalist approach to international law, i.e. it can be applied to legal norms notwithstanding if they take the form of hard or soft law, written text or oral order. Secondly, it goes against the state centrism of international law by focusing on how individuals and communities as well as non-state actors, corporations, organizations etc create and interact with international law also along transnational lines. Thirdly, it situates the development and function of international law in specific local contexts, thus rejecting the universalist view and allowing for an integration with postcolonial or critical theory. Anthropological perspectives have been applied to understand how human rights have spread globally while also being clearly affected by local dynamics, how social movements engaged with struggles over international law, interactions between indigenous law and international law, the role of professionals such as lawyers and judges, as well as case studies of different legal institutions and regimes, for instance in international criminal justice.
VIII. International Law and Linguistics.
International Law and Linguistics primarily focusses on the analysis of the language of international law and its discourses. Its main aim is to uncover the meaning of particular legal provisions by examining how it is being used or understood by different actors. This includes also the study of different languages as well as issues related to the translation of terms. Insights of the linguistic analysis of international law are thus used to understand the drafting, interpretation, and application of legal norms in treaties and jurisprudence. Discourse analysis and text linguistics examines the legal text and its surrounding context. Analysis of syntax focus on how different phrases are combined and connected to form part of text structures. Semantics and pragmatics aim to understand the meaning of terms for instance via their original meaning or by differentiating it from closely related provisions. Studies of historical linguistics and etymology investigate how particular terms have been historically developed and interpreted. Lexicography relies on the understanding of dictionaries. Corpus linguistics and computational linguistics aim at handling large amounts of texts to understand the use of certain words or collocations. Sociolinguistics emphasize how social factors such as class, gender, or age influence our language, while forensic linguistic studies how language is used as evidence in legal processes. In international law, linguistic insights have been applied to the interpretation of international legal norms, the use of references in the decisions of international courts and tribunals as well as self-citation practices in general. Another important strand of research critically reflects on the language(s) in which international law claims universality and challenges the English-centrism of international law.
IX. International Law and Other Approaches.
It is essential to point out that there are also a multitude of other types of interdisciplinary approaches to international law and legal research. Those have been particularly popular in new fields of legal research, for instance in the area of climate research, animal studies, or technology and data science. In general, for interactions with philosophy, you can find inspiration in the chapter on positivism, while critical approaches explained in this book such as TWAIL, Marxism, and Feminism & Queer Theory, also suit themselves to interdisciplinary research agendas.
C. Methods of Interdisciplinary International Law Scholarships.
While traditional legal scholarship mainly advocates for the doctrinal method, the toolbox of interdisciplinary approaches offers a much wider variety of methods to study international law. In the following, we propose the four main methodological "baskets": comparative method, archival research, qualitative method, and quantitative method. Those four methodological baskets are not mutually exclusive but can be combined and also complement each other, as well as classical doctrinal approaches.
I. Comparative Method.
Comparison has long been a staple in comparative legal research, also in international law. Comparison can be generally understood as a method which aims at contrasting two or more research units to identify parallels and differences. Interdisciplinary research puts significant emphasis on justifying the design of a comparison. After identifying the research question, the respective scholar generally justifies the comparability of the respective research units. The respective research units are called a case. The notion of case here is broader than its general use in international law (see Case Analysis). A 'case' in interdisciplinary scholarship can be a judgment, an institution, a court, or even a legal system as such. For instance, comparative international law has focused on understanding how and why national legal cultures differ in their engagement with international law. In particular when there is only a small number of research units, interdisciplinary scholars aim to provide a thick description of the respective institutions or legal regimes, highlighting similarities and differences, and, if possible, how the researcher aims to account for potential divergences.
In the social sciences, most comparisons adopt an inductive method, originally developed by John Stuart Mill in his 1843 book 'A System of Logic', to illustrate their causal research hypothesis. This means that they account for an outcome (the dependent variable) as well as possible explanatory factors (the independent variable(s)). This is also called the 'most different' or 'most similar' cases design. In the former, the two or more cases are different in every relevant characteristic except for the outcome and the explanatory factor, in the latter everything between the two cases is similar except for the explanation and the outcome. Charles Tilly further distinguishes four types of comparative analysis, namely individualizing, universalizing, variation-finding, and encompassing.
II. Archival Research.
Archival research is generally associated with forms of historical enquiry; however, given the overlap of historical enquiry to other forms of interdisciplinary research, references to archival material will often crop up in various types of interdisciplinary research and even doctrinal research. Primarily, the purpose of archival research is a search 'for materials that might flesh out the stories and histories of modern rhetoric and composition we were presenting.' Archives can be either physically located or online, but this primary purpose does not change with the venue of the archives. Because the goal of archival work is defined primary sources that flesh out, or improve our understanding of historical narrative, the biggest question related to archival research is the decision about what to include (and perhaps more importantly what to exclude) from a piece of research. Because this is an issue for all forms of empirical research this will be dealt with in more detail below; however, a general guide is that for something to be excluded there needs to be a defensible basis for that decision – if something is relevant to the topic, credible in terms of its origins, as within an acceptable tolerance of verifiability, it likely should be included in the work.
III. Qualitative Research Methods.
While quantitative research is an empirical research method grounded in numerically measurable data, qualitative research focuses on an often hermeneutical interpretation of subjective texts. These subjective texts could range from ethnographic observation, interviews (structured, semi-structured, or unstructured), free text answers in surveys, oral histories, historical transcripts (such as official meetings, or speeches), discourse analysis, or participant observations. Those different forms of texts are either created by the researcher, for instance by conducting interviews or surveys among the interested research units themselves, or assembled from existing texts, for instance records of debates of newspapers. The respective number of texts depends on the research question, that means a more specific question requires more specific information. In general, the gathered texts should at least constitute a representative sample to be able to guarantee validity, reliability, and objectivity of the resulting analysis. After a significant amount of text data is gathered, the texts will be analyzed in a structured and previously identified method to identify particular patterns, arguments, or frames in the respective texts. Qualitative research methods enable a researcher to understand "why" a phenomenon is occurring. This can be contrasted with quantitative based investigations that are more focused on establishing what is occurring. The value of qualitative studies as a supplement to doctrinal analysis is how it permits an understanding of why certain elements of doctrinal law have been developed, or how they play out when implemented on the ground.
IV. Quantitative Research Methods.
Quantitative research methods have been an essential element of the so-called empirical turn in international legal scholarship, which combines legal methodology with tools and techniques from the social sciences. Quantitative methods are based on numerical data, which generally means large numbers of texts or codes in international law, for instance from legislation, treaties or jurisprudence. The data is then analyzed to identify the conditions under which international law is formed and has effects. Hence, a major challenge of quantitative methods concerns the collection of data, either manually or through computational methods. For beginners, it is thus advisable to make use of existing databases, either from international courts, international organizations, or academic research projects. Quantitative research methods can be generally differentiated in four types: First, descriptive research, which aims at identifying patterns and structures in the data without necessarily having a hypothesis before data collection. Secondly, correlation-aimed research, which wants to determine the extent of a relationship between two or more variables using statistical data. Thirdly, causality-focused research that attempts to establish cause-effect relationships among the variables in the data. Fourthly, experimental research investigates the cause-effect relationship in a study situation in which an effort is made to control for all other variables except one. Those four types are not mutually exclusive but can be combined, however, they come with specific requirements for data collection, for instance most quantitative studies require at least a medium-N or large-N (N means the number of research units) sample size. Hence, in international law, quantitative methods have so far been applied to the jurisprudence of international courts, as well as legal regimes which feature a large number of legal instruments such as international human rights or investment law.
D. Pitfalls and Challenges.
Interdisciplinary research is exciting and illuminating, it demonstrates that a researcher can look beyond the traditional legal methods and, in the best case, find answers that help to understand, analyze, and, in certain instances, improve the functioning of international law. However, interdisciplinary research comes also with unexpected challenges. In the following section, we provide practical recommendations to overcome the most common pitfalls.
I. Finding the Right Method for Your Research Question.
Doctrinal law scholars are notoriously bad at articulating their methodology, often stating “I just read some stuff and then I analyse it.” In this dominantly doctrinal-positivist academic culture, interdisciplinary research in law is referred to under the broad umbrella of “socio-legal” research. One of the biggest hurdles faced by this broad and inclusive categorisation research is that it doesn’t provide clarity on what it is the interdisciplinary research is doing and which particular method should be applied. The range of methods that are available to interdisciplinary scholars are extensive and cannot be covered here in full. Interdisciplinary methods constitute a broad and diverse toolbox that can be applied to positivist as well as critical understandings of international law. The key to understanding what method is most appropriate for the question you are trying to address in your research is familiarizing yourself with the other discipline you are working with and the methods that are employed within that space. No method is inherently correct or incorrect for a particular research question – the key lies in how you justify both the theory and method you are bringing to your question and articulating why that method is being used and not a different one. That said, one should be wary of scholarship that defines itself by the method rather than the research question.
II. Selection Bias.
Selection bias is when, deliberately or accidentally, you use a dataset that is incomplete. It renders your argument void, because the data you used was not reliable or meaningful. Data-driven research must include all data, even data that may undercut the primary thesis, because otherwise it is incomplete and therefore is without value. This often goes against many legal researchers' instincts, because legal training still largely focuses on advocacy. In advocacy, focusing on the evidence that support your argument is fully appropriate and necessary. However, in data-driven research, it is critical to show that your data includes and accounts for cases that diverge from the pattern you are trying to demonstrate. This also reflects a wider shift needed when moving from a legal mindset to a data mindset: lawyers think in terms of absolute rules; data-driven research seeks to demonstrate tendencies.
III. Understanding External Data.
Particularly in interdisciplinary studies in international law, a researcher will use or rely upon an external (usually publicly accessible) data source. Broadly speaking, the data source is considered external if the data was not gathered by the researchers themselves. When using external data sources, it is important to establish the accuracy and integrity of the data, while also acknowledging (or highlighting) any weaknesses that may exist with the dataset. It is also important to justify why the use of an external dataset in this instance is the most appropriate approach to addressing the question at hand. An example of how to manage these questions can be found in the second part of Chapter 2 of Paige’s study on UN Security Council decision making in relation to threat to the peace.
IV. Personal Constraints (Time, Skills, Resources).
When setting out to do an interdisciplinary, data driven study in international law one of the first things to consider at the planning stage of the project is what personal constraints will exist and how that will impact your ability to produce a complete study. The most significant factor when considering personal constraints is time. In a 2013 seminar on doing interdisciplinary research, renowned sociologist of law Angela Melville noted that the best approach to assessing time constraints in empirical research was to generate a realistic timeline and then triple it. Her justification for this was that no planning ever accounts for all the unexpected hurdles that crop up when doing empirical work. The other main constraint to consider is access: Will you have access to the dataset? Will you have access to sufficient interview participants to have a complete dataset? Will you have access to enough resources to continue data gathering until you have reached data saturation? Will you physically be able to get access to the relevant participants themselves? All of these questions need to be considered in the research design phase, and all of the complications that arise around these issues are why any empirical work will take three times longer than you expect.
V. Do’s and Don’ts of Publishing Interdisciplinary Scholarship.
There are a significant number of dos and don’ts when it comes to doing data driven interdisciplinary research in international law. In summary, you should be open about the biases you bring to the project and how they have impacted your analysis. You do this for the sake of transparency, and to allow the reader to read your analysis in light of your biases. You should not allow your biases to shape what data gets included or excluded from your study (see the above section on selection bias). You should also not allow your biases to dictate how you read the data – they may always inform your analysis but they should not drive your analysis; good researchers are open to their hypothesis being proven wrong by the data. You should make clear why the method you are using is the most appropriate one to address the research question you have in front of you. You should not shape your research question to fit it in to a preferred methodology – research methodologies are simply tools in a researcher's toolbox and you should choose the right one for the project, not choose the project for the tool. Do acknowledge any weaknesses that exist within your dataset, and factor that into your analysis of the dataset. Do not try and explain away or mitigate those weaknesses, rather you should highlight how they demonstrate and need more data gathering and studying on an issue.
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434681
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4300466
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434681
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Public International Law/Approaches/Positivism
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Author: Başak Etkin & Alex Green
Required knowledge: Link
Public International Law/History of International Law/Founding Myths
Public International Law/History of International Law/Nineteenth Century
Public International Law/Nature and Purpose of International Law
Public International Law/Approaches
Learning objectives: Understanding analytical and normative positivism and their differences from international legal positivism, identifying the major critiques of positivism.
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A. Positivism as Method and Ideology.
Legal positivism is a theory about law determination. Law determination concerns what it means for the content of the law to be 'fixed' or 'made what it is', (e.g. the threat of use of force is unlawful because art. 2.4 of the UN Charter forbids it). Legal positivism asserts that legal facts are determined by social facts, and all law is posited/positive. In this framework, law’s existence and content are determined by the social facts alone (i.e. value-neutral descriptions of social behaviour, e.g. the fact that people take their hats off when entering a church) recognized by the officials of a legal system, independently of its moral (or other) merits (the ‘social thesis’). Legal positivism first emerged as a reaction to natural law theories in the 18th century. Its roots are in the works of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), who sought to criticise and reform natural law theories. Analytical legal positivism is and has been, if not the most, one of the more influential theories on modern legal theory and on international law, though some use 'positivism' to describe with the 'mainstream' doctrinal approach to international law.
I. Analytical Positivism.
As their main point of convergence, all legal positivists agree upon the separability thesis (i.e. that law and morality are not necessarily linked) as it is what defines them, despite other differences. It is thanks to the separation of law and morality imposed by positivism that criticising the content of law is a possibility. However, to what degree law and morality are separated has been a point of contention between inclusive (soft) and exclusive (hard) positivists. Inclusive positivists allow for moral elements (e.g. widespread moral beliefs in a society) to be included directly or indirectly in the rule of recognition. Exclusive legal positivists, on the other hand, reject all moral element in the rule of recognition as they defend that this would make the problem of uncertainty remain unsolved. Both sides of the argument agree that when the rule of recognition does not give a clear answer to the question ‘what is the law?’, courts create law.
Analytical positivism was first popularised by John Austin (1790-1859), who developed the command theory, the concept that law consists of ‘orders backed by threats’. Here, the ‘order’ represents the command of the sovereign; this will is habitually obeyed and disobedience is sanctioned by a ‘threat’.
H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), an English legal philosopher, inclusive legal positivist and a prominent critic of Austin, offered a comprehensive critique of the command theory in his 1961 influential book, ‘"The Concept of Law"’, and refined legal positivism further. Hart’s rebuttal demonstrated three main issues with the command theory: that it did not include customary law, that not all laws commanded or prohibited specific actions, and the impossibility of identifying a sovereign with unlimited law-making powers. Hart proposed an alternative framework, summarised as ‘a union of primary and secondary rules’. Primary rules establish obligations and confer powers to guide human conduct (e.g. it is forbidden to cross the street when the red light is on). In some communities, described by Hart as ‘primitive’, law consists solely of these primary rules, but primary rules alone do not make a legal system, which also requires secondary rules, which serve as organisational meta-rules, or rules that govern the primary rules. According to Hart, these secondary rules address three main shortcomings: (1) the uncertainty around which rules are valid in this system, (2) the static character of the rules, and (3) the inefficiency of the rules. These problems are solved by, respectively, (1) the rule of recognition, providing the criteria of legal validity and answering the question 'what is the law?', (2) the rule of change establishing the procedures for introducing new primary rules, modifying existing ones, and abolishing old ones, answering the question 'how does the law change?', and (3) the rule of adjudication determining those with the authority to adjudicate and defining the procedure to follow, answering the question 'how to implement the law?'. All secondary rules can be classified under one of these three categories.
Hart is often presented in opposition to his continental counterpart Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), an Austrian jurist, who was more influential in civil law systems. Kelsen was closer to Austin’s look than Hart, as in his view laws were norms addressed to officials and not at subjects – i.e. norms to be applied by courts if an offence was committed. Another point of divergence between Hart and Kelsen was legal validity; for Hart legal validity depended on social recognition but for Kelsen legal validity was a normative ('ought' not 'is') question. He argued that legal rules are deemed valid only when formally grounded in higher norms, following the prescribed procedural frameworks. This stepped construction ("Stufenbau") culminates in the concept of the "Grundnorm" (basic norm), as Kelsen presented in ‘"Reine Rechtslehre"’. The "Grundnorm" is the presupposed legal proposition at the foundation of any legal system, a simple fiction to uphold validity.
Another prominent figure in legal positivism is the Israeli legal philosopher Joseph Raz (1939-2022). In his 1979 book ‘"The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality"’, Raz developed a more modern take on the social thesis and the sources thesis (i.e., that law is identified by reference to its sources), asserting that law’s existence and content cannot rely on moral arguments, but can only be derived from social sources. As an exclusive positivist, Raz further explored the normative aspects of legal systems in ‘"Practical Reasons and Norms"’ and makes the case that legal rules offer a practical justification for carrying out an obligation while excluding other justifications.
Most recently, the American legal philosopher Scott Shapiro’s book ‘Legality’ offered a new and alternative approach to legal positivism. Shapiro’s planning theory of law advances the idea that legal systems are compulsory planning organizations, and his moral aim thesis suggests that law provides content-independent normative guidance to bypass moral disagreements.
II. International Legal Positivism and Normative Positivism.
Normative positivism, perhaps more prevalent in international law than analytical positivism, defends the idea that positivism is not only true, but also valuable. Therefore analytical positivism, which does the intellectual heavy lifting, has to be true for normative positivism to even be considered. It should not be confused with normative approaches, such as Kelsen’s, as seen above. Jeremy Waldron argues that this take is more faithful to positivism’s origins, as Bentham’s intention was not to conceptually separate law and morality but to coordinate conflict resolution between the society’s laws and personal judgments about morality. Lassa Oppenheim (1858-1919) also defended this point of view, suggesting that positivism was the best suited concept to advance moral and political values, as demonstrated by his advocacy of international society. Also adopted by Prosper Weil, this has been a particularly influential approach in international law.
Some aspects of analytical positivism could seem incompatible with international law, such as Austin’s command theory that could cast a doubt on its validity of, given the lack of an almighty sovereign in the international arena. Another such potential issue is around pluralism and Kelsen’s account of legal validity based on normativity that favours monism (i.e. that the different branches of international law and all domestic legal systems taken together make a unified regime). International law is a highly fragmented domain with numerous regional and international regimes, and it is often difficult to establish which are the hierarchically superior norms in a given situation. However, modern legal positivism has evolved quite significantly and has developed sophisticated answers to questions that arise within international law.
International legal positivism (i.e. positivism as understood and upheld by international lawyers), much like its analytical counterpart explained above, is far from being a monolith, and in some ways it diverges from legal positivism. Most notably, international legal positivism is, partially because of the weight given to state will in international law, more often confused with consensualism or voluntarism. However, treaties are the only consent-based source of international law, in the strict and explicit understanding of consent. Therefore, the rule of recognition of international law (which, despite some confusion, is not Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice) does not include consent and the sources thesis applied to international law does not paint a consensualist picture. While neo-voluntarists survive, many contemporary international legal positivists separate the objective international legal order and the subjective will of states.
International law’s compatibility with positivism is also called into question regarding "jus cogens". These peremptory norms are ‘accepted and recognized […] as a norm from which no derogation is permitted’ according to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, thus the criteria does not breach the separability thesis, but one can easily identify the moral undertone once a series of examples are given: prohibitions of genocide, torture and slavery. Some exclusive legal positivists believe that acknowledging the existence of jus cogens undermines the separability thesis, but this problem can be solved by saying that the moral belief or judgment shared by states is a social fact, and that is what makes "jus cogens", not its inherent moral value.
B. Critiques of Positivism.
Legal positivism, as we have seen, is the view that the content of international legal norms is made what it is (that is, determined or ‘fixed’) by social facts alone. These social facts typically relate to the 'pedigree' of those norms: their historical roots in particular social sources, such as treaty texts or expressions of "opinio juris". The inverse view, held by ‘non-positivists’, is that international legal norms are necessarily determined "not only" by social facts "but also" by facts about political morality, which include moral values, genuine normative principles, and practical reasons that govern how individuals should 'live together', organise themselves, and behave at the collective levels of national and international society.
What, then, distinguishes "non"-positivists from "normative" positivists? Non-positivists, whilst agreeing that facts about political morality partly determine the content of the law, "disagree" that moral reasoning should be excluded from the identification of international legal norms at a more concrete level. Normative positivists, as noted above, argue that international law should be identified with recourse to social facts alone. According to their view, excluding moral considerations from legal reasoning tends to produce international stability, insofar as it avoids the proliferation of inter-state disputes. For the non-positivist, however, the exclusion of moral considerations from legal reasoning is wrongheaded, either because they believe normative positivists to be mistaken about the allegedly destabilising effects of moral reasoning, or because they believe identifying international legal norms to be impossible on the basis of social facts alone. In what follows, we examine a few reasons why one might reject legal positivism wholesale, as it were, and adopt a non-positivist approach instead.
I. Insufficient Consensus.
As we have seen, central to the positivism of Hart, Raz, and others, is the notion that legal validity turns on the existence of one or more rules of recognition. This claim can also be put in the following terms. Within any given legal order, the norms of that order are ultimately determined exclusively in relation to the convergent behaviours and attitudes of law applying officials. The social facts that such officials treat as being sources of law "become" sources "for that reason". Within international law, the relevant legal officials include state representatives and international adjudicative bodies, to name but two examples. One possible reason for rejecting this kind of positivism at the international level is that international law lacks sufficient convergence in official attitude or behaviour, meaning that no rule of recognition can be said to exist within that legal order. So, for instance, although it might be true that the text of a particular bilateral investment treaty is binding on its State Parties because of their consent to be bound by that text, it nonetheless remains the case that the binding force of "pacta sunt servanda" requires explaining and there is little to no consensus at the international level as to the precise status of that principle (for example, whether it is a general principle of law or custom).
This view about the absence of a rule of recognition, interestingly enough, is close to the view that Hart himself professed about international law, even if it has become unpopular amongst positivist international lawyers. Recent scholarship has renewed attacks against positivism within international law along these lines. Importantly, such criticisms raise issues not just for analytical positivism but also for normative varieties. This is so because if international law possesses no rules of recognition (or some set of norms fulfilling the same function and determined both ultimately and exclusively by social facts) then legal reasoning in a fully positivist mode is impossible, no matter how advantageous it might be in principle.
II. ‘Rational’ Determination and Social Facts.
Another doubt one may have about rules of recognition concerns the mechanics, as it were, of how such rules supposedly 'fix' the content of international law. Even if sufficiently the attitudes and behaviours of international legal officials are sufficiently convergent for one or more rules of recognition to exist, it is unclear "why" these attitudes and behaviours alone should be treated as determining the content of international law. Why, in other words, should rules of recognition function in the way that positivists claim that they do? According to a broadly Hartian view of legal validity, the cumulative attitudes and behaviours of legal officials fix to the content of international law "by definition". However, given what many non-positivists consider to be the plausible assumption that there must be a "rational explanation" for why legal norms exist in the way and with the content that they do, it is not obvious "why" official attitudes and behaviour should be treated this way. For example, if we are asked to explain why "pacta sunt servanda" holds within international relations, it seems highly unsatisfactory to answer, 'because the relevant people believe that it does'. Positivism, understood in this way, fails to provide a sufficiently rational explanation for the existence of international law. This concern arises because the attitudes and practices of legal officials are social facts, with no necessary normative implications, and therefore cannot provide reasons why international law should be viewed one way, rather than another. Importantly, this critique is inapplicable to normative positivism, which holds that facts about political morality can explain why ultimate and exclusive recourse to a particular set of social facts should be observed. Nonetheless, concerns about the ‘rationality’ of positivism remain applicable to its purely analytical variants, notwithstanding this fact.
III. The ‘Positive’ Non-Positivist Case.
Finally, one might wish to appeal directly to political morality within legal reasoning for more positive reasons. In the first place, on the assumption that either of the first two critiques presented above are true, then reliance upon more than just social facts alone is inevitable when identifying international law. This being so, there is no point, or so the argument might go, in pretending otherwise. It is preferable to be transparent about one’s reliance upon political morality, instead of obscuring it behind a positivist veneer. Alternatively, one might believe that direct recourse to moral considerations within legal reasoning would be conducive to the promotion of global justice, if for no other reason than it focuses attention on the most morally salient aspects of a given international dispute. Considerations of this sort have motivated a range of contemporary non-positivist scholarship, both in relation to international law in general, and as regards more discrete regimes, such as the law of statehood, international trade law, or the law of human rights.
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434682
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8680
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434682
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Public International Law/Approaches/TWAIL
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Authors: Shubhangi Agarwalla, Sué González Hauck, Thamil Venthan Ananthavinayagan
Required knowledge: Link
Learning objectives: Understanding XY.
B. Points of Departure and TWAIL Trajectories.
I. Introduction to the Concepts of the Third World and the Global South.
The term ‘Third World’ originates from the time of the bipolar Cold War opposition between the First World, comprised of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Second World, organized in the Warsaw Pact, in the second half of the 20th century. The Third World rallied not only around the idea of non-alignment but also around a shared history of being subjected to European colonialism. As a politically institutionalised project, the Third World took shape in several conferences, of which the Afro-Asian meetings in Bandung in 1955 and in Cairo in 1961, the inaugural conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in 1961, and the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966 stand out. Today, the term ‘Third World’ has been partially replaced by the term ‘Global South’. This latter term bears less direct links to the Cold War bloc opposition and points instead at a critique of the kind of neoliberal globalization that gained traction in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
II. Engaging with the Colonial Legacies of International Law.
The main aspect that unites TWAIL scholarship despite the heterogeneity of the movement is the shared endeavour of grappling with international law's colonial legacies. Several influential TWAIL authors, including Antony Anghie, Sundhya Pahuja, and, most recently, Ntina Tzouvala have examined the structure of international legal arguments through history to show how colonial and racist thought animates international law. Anghie argues that it is the 'dynamic of difference' which generates the concepts and dichotomies that are fundamental to the formation of international law. With the term 'dynamic of difference', Anghie refers to the conceptual tools positivist international lawyers deployed to, first, postulate a gap between the civilised European and the uncivilised non-European world and, second, to construct and employ techniques to bridge this gap, i.e. to civilise the uncivilised, to engage in the civilising mission. The civilising mission, the idea that non-European peoples are savages, barbaric, backward, violent and that European peoples thus must educate, convert, redeem, develop, pacify – in short, cilivise – them has been used to justify continues intervention by European countries and other countries of the Global North – the West – in Third World countries.
Pahuja emphasises that international law constructs its own subjects and objects. It does not merely rely on a number of foundational notions, such as the state, the international, or the law. Nor does it merely apply to objects external to it, like the economy. Rather, through definitions that make categorial cuts between what is inside and outside certain categories, international law produces these categories even though it is deemed to be founded on them. As the production of international law's foundational concepts has occurred through the colonial encounter and through the particular contexts of several imperial and post-imperial projects, the shape these concepts gained is determined by these very particular contexts. Simultaneously, however, international law posits the legal categories it produces as universally true. It is the interplay between international law's self-formation in (post)colonial contexts and international law's universalising gestures that produce what Pahuja calls international law's 'critical instability'. 'The instability is ‘critical’ in both senses of the word, for it is simultaneously a threat to the reach and existence of international legality and an essential, generative dimension of it'. Pahuja's work has focused on how the potential offered by this critical instability, a potential of pointing out international law's shortcomings in terms of its own aspirations towards universal justice and thus using international law in emancipatory ways, has been repeatedly contained by a ruling rationality. A key dimension of that rationality is the position of development and economic growth vis-à-vis international law. The combination of the promise offered by international law’s critical instability and the subsumption by the ruling rationality of efforts to take up that promise explains international law’s dual quality, or its puzzling tendency to exhibit both imperial and counter-imperial dimensions.Ntina Tzouvala focuses on the standard of civilisation as a set of argumentative patterns, which oscillate between two modes of distinguishing between 'the West and the rest'. The first is what she calls the 'logic of biology'. It is based on biological racism and the isurmountable barriers it erects against colonised and formerly colonised peoples gaining equal rights and obligations under international law. The second, the 'logic of improvement' in Tzouvala's terminology, replaces definitive exclusion with conditional inclusion, offering peoples of the 'Third World' a prospect for gaining equal rights and obligations. The condition for gaining such equal recognition, as Tzouvala argues, has been capitalist transformation.
III. History of TWAIL as a Movement.
TWAIL as a rubric for an academic movement emerged in Harvard in 1996. To acknowledge the intellectual tradition within which scholars who started calling themselves TWAIL scholars in the 1990s were working, Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni coined the term ‘TWAIL I’ and ‘TWAIL II’. With the term TWAIL I, Anghie and Chimni referred to scholars like Georges Abi-Saab, F. Garcia-Amador, R.P. Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, and Taslim O. Elias, the first generation of international law scholars from newly independent states, who grappled with the exclusions that a Eurocentric and colonial international law had produced. TWAIL II scholars started building on the legacy of the aforementioned scholars while further developing the analytical tools necessary to engage with international law from a Third World perspective. This meant taking a critical stance towards some of the main tenets of TWAIL I thought. TWAIL II scholars shifted their attention and normative commitment from the post-colonial state to the people living in the Third World, which allowed for analyses that could take into account the violence within post-colonial states as well as conflicts generated by class, race, and gender. Additionally, the shift from TWAIL I to TWAIL II meant a shift in general attitudes regarding the role of colonialism in international law. While TWAIL I scholars had treated colonialism as an aberration, which could be broken with and remedied by using and slightly modifying the techniques of the existing international legal order, TWAIL II scholars turned to the history and theory of international law to show how colonialism has been a central and defining feature of the formation of international law.
D. TWAIL Methodologies.
I. TWAIL and the Turn to History.
Methodologically, one of the main characteristics of TWAIL scholarship is its focus on history. 'History matters', as Luis Eslava reaffirms as the first of five TWAIL coordinates, which characterise the movement. The particular appreciation of history stems from TWAIL's aim of transforming international law. Understanding the past is a necessary prerequisite for transforming the present and the future. TWAIL histories have pointed out the Eurocentric nature of existing histories of international law. They have focused on the co-constitution of international law and imperialism as well as on histories of Third World resistance, of alternative projects and movements.
III. TWAIL and Critical Scholarship on Race and Racism.
Critical scholarship on race and racism, which includes but is not limited to Critical Race Theory (CRT), is mainly concerned with the social construction of races and racial hierarchies and with how these hierarchies have been used to justify exclusion, exploitation, and domination.
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434683
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4490807
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434683
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Public International Law/Approaches/Feminism & Queer Theory
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Author: /Tamsin Paige
Required knowledge: Approaches to International Law History of International Law Beneficial: Women in International Law
Learning objectives: Understanding feminist and queer approaches and their particular relevance for public international law.
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A. Introduction.
This chapter serves as an introduction to feminist and queer theory and its particular relevance for capturing the underpinnings of public international law. One of the main goals of this contribution is therefore to point out the added value that feminist and queer approaches to international law as forms of de- and reconstruction contribute to existing schools of thought. To this end, the chapter departs from the male and heterosexual standard and a gender-biased international legal order as the common baseline for queer and feminist deconstruction. By pointing out the commonalities of both feminist and queer theory, the contribution underscores the utility and necessity of a consolidated approach. Common terms and concepts of feminist and queer theory are then connected to some of the manifestations and specific examples of feminist and queer theory in the realm of international law. Nonetheless, this chapter should not be understood as an exhaustive overview of research and practice of queer and feminist approaches to international law. Rather it provides first insights into a school of thought, which serves as a tool of deconstruction that can be applied to each area of public international law.
I. Feminist and Queer Theory as Forms of Deconstruction.
Feminist and queer approaches form part of a diverse field of schools of thought, which observe, analyze and criticize public international law from a particular perspective and, coming from this specific theoretical foundation, seek to deconstruct its object of analysis. Deconstruction in this sense can be understood as a never ending process of questioning existing and accepted structures of dominance, which are perceived as objective, neutral or natural. As a result, it reveals the existence of other competing forms of interpretation, alternative views, which have been ignored, overshadowed or suppressed, thereby opening the door to new possibilities and structures. The concept of deconstruction therefore rejects the idea of an absolute truth or natural referent, but rather searches for 'the tensions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity.' In its ability to show pluralities and different options, deconstruction creates space for (ongoing) transformation and reconstruction. With this in mind, '[it] is only through this element of endless analysis, criticism and deconstruction that we can prevent existing structures of dominance from reasserting themselves.' In this regard, feminist and queer theory aims at the deconstruction of a perceived neutral or natural international legal order that rests on a dominating masculine and heterosexual standard.
II. The Male and Heterosexual Standard.
Although neither one nor 'the one' feminist and queer approach to international law exists, all of these different approaches in the realm of feminist and queer theory share a common baseline: International law has been predominantly developed and shaped by (white, cis, heterosexual) men and has been built on the assumption that men and masculinity are the (societal) norm. While this norm and, as a consequence, public international law, have largely been perceived as neutral, they neglect all those categories that deviate from this standard. In this sense, it is not just women and femaleness that are excluded as 'the other'. Rather, all deviations relating to sex, gender or sexuality, which are considered as different from or opposed to the norm, eke out a shadowy existence as their perspectives and interests are constantly ignored and bypassed.This includes, but is not reduced to, persons identifying as women, lesbian, homosexual, bisexual, transgender or intersexual, thereby expanding categories of sex, gender and sexuality far beyond a mere binary understanding. In essence, public international law, just like domestic law, suffers from a clear gender bias, some of whose manifestations are described further below. This gender bias of international law, elevating the masculine to the norm, functions like a 'veiled representation and projection of a masculine which takes itself as the unquestioned norm, the ideal representative without any idea of the violence that this representational positioning does to its others.'
III. Commonalities of Feminist and Queer Theory.
Since international law builds on a masculine and heterosexual standard that is confronted with a great diversity of systematically overlooked deviations, a joint presentation and consideration of feminist and queer approaches to international law is not only a legitimate and useful unification of perspectives in the de- and reconstruction of public international law. Instead, this holistic approach virtually imposes itself in view of common structural experiences of discrimination and injustice. Otherwise, the picture drawn by an analysis of public international law from either a feminist or a queer perspective would remain incomplete. Using a holistic approach does also justice to the principle of intersectionality and may, at least to a certain extent, counteract an oversimplification of categories and distinguishing features, such as male/female or hetero-/homosexual, even if avoiding them completely may not always succeed. In this sense, combining feminist and queer theory also means not to remain 'within the closed fields of these oppositions' and thereby perpetuate the inherent hierarchy, but rather move beyond binary structures.
B. Common Terms and Concepts.
I. Sex and Gender man.
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Two main concepts, which are deeply interrelated and essential to feminist and queer theory are 'sex' and 'gender'. The term 'sex', on the one hand, is regularly used to describe biological differences between men and women construed as binary categories related to bodies.'Gender', on the other hand, is often used as an opposite term in the way that it describes cultural and social imprinting of distinctions made on the basis of sex. With this in mind, the notion of 'gender' has been described as a fluid and unstable concept and is often understood as a rejection of the biological determinism embodied in the concept of 'sex'. It is also used to relativize and break down the dichotomy and binary associated with the (biological) sex and thus to open it up to categories that go beyond woman and man. Gender identity is therefore much more complex due to the 'dynamic relationship between the body and identity which gives rise to multiple possible alignments, which can change over time, or even from moment to moment.' However, the same complexity applies to the oversimplified category of 'sex', as biology itself unveils the existence of a variety of sexes that go far beyond the socially constructed dualism. In addition, the idea that 'sex' is a natural and immutable characteristic has been increasingly challenged, for having constructed, contingent and political dimensions. As a result, the distinction between sex and gender itself has been questioned.
gender identity is “the internal and individual experience of gender as each person feels it, which may or may not correspond to the sex assigned at birth,”so that “recognition of gender identityis necessarily linked to the idea that sex and gender should be perceived as being part of the constructed identity that is the result of the free and autonomous decision of each and without this having to be subject to their genitalia.”
In this spirit, attempts have been made within queer and feminist approaches to denaturalize both sex and gender, assuming that categories of sex and gender do not exist prior to normative discourse and regulation, which is why they 'should both be understood as the effects of performative and reiterative gender norms [...] which materialise, naturalise, regulate, and discipline sexed bodies and identifications.' It follows that the wording itself creates identity. Put in the words of Judith Butler, ‘[t]here is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its result.’
Despite this intention to show a more inclusive and diverse picture beyond traditional understandings of masculinity and femininity, 'gender' has often been and still is frequently used as a synonym for 'women', also whithin the realm of public international law. A prominent example is the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, which in its Art. 1 and 5 in particular shows, to begin with, no real distinction between 'sex' and 'gender' at all and furthermore reveals a commitment to the traditional dualism of men/women. As a consequence, the male standard becomes once more the 'normal' standard for every individual, sticking to a gender binary and hierarchy in the realm of an international project whose intention was to endorse the full humanity of women. Such international protection mechanisms where women's experience is only measured against the male standard are much to the detriment of women worldwide, but particularly those of the Global South, reinfocring gender and cultural essentialism through their definition of the female subject as 'victim subject'.
Gender-based analyses have therefore to a large extent focused primarily on women as a seemingly stable (biological) category, thereby neglecting gender discrimination suffered by the many other individuals of very diverse forms of gender identity. In defiance of attempts in international law to deconstruct the category of 'women' in order to 'better reflect the racial, cultural, religious and other forms of diversity, troubling the category of women, and concomitantly, the concept of gender from within', according to Brenda Cossman 'the troubling of sex and gender, and crisis of categories [...] has not yet permeated feminist international law scholarship, let alone international law. [...] Indeed, as gender comes to be instantiated at the international level, its meaning has become rather more rigid and fixed.' International Law's predominant and persisting recognition of and holding on to dominant binary and oversimplified categories therefore ignores the many signs of gender and bodily diversity that have been present across centuries, continents, and cultures.
II. Feminist and Queer Theory.
1. Feminism and Feminist Theory.
Although the feminist discourse is shaped by multiple controversies and disagreement, the common aim is to describe, analyze, explain, challenge and change gendered power relations in all spheres of life to achieve human liberty for all genders. In this sense, 'feminism is a mode of analysis, a method of approaching life and politics, a way of asking questions and searching for answers, rather than a set of political conclusions about the oppression of women.' Through the study of gender, gaining 'critical distance on existing gender arrangements' becomes possible and creates space for reassessment and alteration. While visible feminism and feminist theory have for a long time ignored the diversity and intersectionality of discrimination experiences suffered by women worldwide, it is particularly the merit of black, revolutionary feminists, such as bell hooks, Barbara Smith, Patricia Hill Collins and Kimberlé Crenshaw, who have contributed to a holistic and more inclusive (re)definition of feminism and feminist theory. Further importance should also be assigned to , putting a spotlight on decolonization, indigenous souvereignty and indigenous women's rights within traditional indigenous life and culture.Building on these redefinitions, nowadays many if not most feminists seek to embrace the diversity of voices in the feminist discourse. As a consequence, Sandra Harding asks feminists to give up 'the goal of telling "one true story"', but instead embrace 'the permanent partiality of feminist inquiry', thereby seeking 'a political and epistemological solidarity in our oppositions to the fiction of the naturalized, essentialized, uniquely "human" and to the distortions, perversions, exploitations, and subjugations perpetrated on behalf of this fiction.'
2. Feminist Approaches to International Law.
With regard to international law, feminist approaches use feminist theory as a tool for critical analysis in order 'to show how the structures, processes, and methodologies of international law marginalize women by failing to take account of their lives or experiences.' In this sense, feminist approaches to international law seek to lift the veil of an international legal order perceived as neutral and objective and reveal its underlying and omnipresent male standard constructed as the 'norm' and the 'normal' which results in a power imbalance and hierarchy between men and women and materializes in the silence of international law regarding women's experiences and interests. They therefore continue to demonstrate that international law is a 'thoroughly gendered system'. According to Charlesworth and Chinkin, feminist analyses of international law fulfill two main tasks: On the one hand, feminist approaches aim at the deconstruction of the values upon which the international legal system is constructed and thereby challenge their claim to rationality and objectivity. On the other hand, feminist approaches seek to reconstruct international law in a sense that it rebuilds 'the basic concepts of international law in a way that they do not support or reinforce the domination of women by men.' Importantly, voices in feminist approaches to international law have diversified, with many leading icons stemming from the Global South.
3. Queerness and Queer Theory.
Queerness, as a term, has a complex history that centres around positioning as outsiders those who do not conform to norms and expectations of society. This led to it being a pejorative term to describe people who did not appropriately perform heterosexuality. Consequently, the term queer has been reclaimed by the QUILTBAG+ community (Queer, Unsure, Intersex, Lesbian, Trans*, Bisexual, Asexual/Aromantic/Agender, Gay, plus others outside these categories and heteronormative classification) as both a generalised shorthand for the community at large and an individualised identity for those within the community who do not feel comfortable with the constraints of more specific identity descriptors. In this way, queer acts as a generalised or collective (descriptive) noun, but also an individualised (identity) noun. This becomes more complex linguistically when considering that queer also operates as a verb, in that ‘queering’ is an action that can be taken that is underpinned by a questioning and interrogation of underlying (heteronormative) assumptions that underpin the subject of enquiry and the normative approach to the thing that is being queered. Technically, queer can also be used as an adjective; however, as the adjective use of queer is irreversibly tied to the use of queer as a pejorative this use of the word has rightly fallen out of common vernacular. While queer theory often has a focus upon queer subjects (then noun form of queer), queer theory itself is predominantly focused at a form or method level with the verb approach to queer.
4. Queer Approaches to International Law.
In general, queer approaches to international law seek to include experiences and identities into the international legal discourse and the normative framework that are distinct from the 'cis/het' standard, particularly illustrated in the granting of equal rights and prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexuality and sexual identity. In addition, Dianne Otto understands 'queering of international law' more broadly than traditional approaches of norm inclusion. In this sense, queer theory fundamentally challenges and criticizes the regime of what is considered as 'normal' with regard to human sexuality, thereby moving beyond the dominant dualism of heterosexuality and homosex. In the words of Otto, queer theory to international law is '"taking a break" from the politics of hetero-normative injury, and imagines human sexuality as much more diverse and shifting.' Quite similarly to the deconstrutionist approach of feminism, queer theory makes 'visible the [hetero] sexual ordering that is taken for granted as an underpinning of the "normal" system of international law' and discloses heterosexuality as the 'basic model for all dominant systems of societal relations.' Queering international law therefore also means to uncover the different layers of presumed 'normality' in international law and beyond: When heterosexuality is seen as the preferred, natural, normal form of sexuality, it not only shapes how society considers '"normal" interpersonal and familial relationships', but it also forms the (presumed) basis for our perception of community in general and thereby dictates our understanding of 'all forms of "normal" community, including that encompassed by the "normal" nation-state, international law's primary subject.' In essence, queer approaches to international law unveil how international law 'provides a conduit for the micromanagement and "disciplining" of everyday lives, including sexual pleasure, despite its many rules purporting to leave these matters in the domestic realm of jurisdiction.'
5. Frictions and Intersections of Feminist and Queer Theory to International Law.
As outlined above, there is much to be said for a joint presentation of feminist and queer approaches to international law. Especially in light of the open, fluid concept of gender and the need to break down and overcome the heteronormative binary of both sex and gender, a critical analysis of international law from a one-sided feminist or queer perspective would remain patchy and incomplete. However, this is less about adding up different perspectives, but about choosing an integrative approach that attempts to map the complexity of situations and experiences of discrimination and to develop adequate methods that go beyond describing a specific issue, but respond to it by exploring possible solutions. Still, constructive dialogues between feminist and queer theory have rather been the exception than the rule, which is – according to Gina Heathcote – also due to the fact that 'mainstream feminist approaches to international law are yet to incorporate queer and trans scholarship into feminist accounts' and have mostly ignored the dialogue commenced by queer approaches to international law. Instead, feminist approaches have – intentionally or unintentionally, for pragmatic or other reasons – largely built on the heteronormativity and cisgenderism inherent in the structures they seek to criticize, resulting in the 'invisibility of individuals who do not neatly fit into the normalized gender binary' and reproducing the 'fear of undermining heteronormative social structures.' In contrast, moving beyond dualism and asymmetry would allow 'to tell a story of marginality that has not yet been told’, drawing an inclusive picture of discriminatory experiences without 'losing the precarious spaces that have been carved out for addressing women’s human rights abuses.'
III. Structural Discrimination.
During the last two decades, international human rights institutions have increasingly made reference to the phenomenon of structural injustices through the lens of the concept of structural discrimination. Structural discrimination is distinct from individual discrimination which refers to the behavior of an individual belonging to a specific group that is intended to have differential and/or harmful effects on the members of another group. Typically, the differential and/or harmful behavior stems from individuals belonging to the dominant group that represents (or perceives itself as) the majority and is directed against individuals that due to specific characteristics are considered as minority or distinct which has also been described above as 'the other'.
In contrast to individual discrimination, structural discrimination refers to discrimination rooted in grown and therefore pre-existing structures and inequalities of society. It occurs when the rules, norms and policies of a society's major(ity) institutions impose and produce disproportionately disadvantageous and unjust outcomes for the members of certain salient social groups. Discrimination is thereby introduced into often unconscious societal routines and patterns of attitudes and behavior that create and maintain discriminatory practice. The applied rules, norms and policies as well as societal routines and patterns are largely perceived as neutral, because their negative outcome – the differential and/or harmful effect on certain groups – is usually not intended. As Pincus highlights the 'key element in structural discrimination is not the intent but the effect of keeping minority groups in a subordinate position.' In this sense, members of a certain group that due to the application of these rules and policies are denied equal opportunities and suffer from unjust disadvantages are put in a vulnerable position exposing them to exploitation and domination. In the context of gender inequality, MacKinnon has described structural discrimination as 'the systematic relegation of an entire group of people to a condition of inferiority.'
There are multiple forms of structural discrimination present in the realm of international law that often, but not only, mirror corresponding patterns at the domestic level. The invisibility and underrepresentation of persons belonging to or identifying as a different than the cis male gender in international adjudicating, monitoring and law-developing institutions, structural gender-based violence or persisting racism in international law (education) are some of the multiple expressions of structural discrimination in the international legal sphere, which are closely linked but not always analized in their connection to intersectionality and complex forms of discrimination. As a consequence, there is a need for more investigation and quantative as well as qualitative data on structural discrimination in international law that also goes beyond monolithic categories of their subjects, however, without ignoring the significant hurdles intersectional research faces.
IV. Intersectionality.
While bell hooks had already described interlocking webs of oppression beforehand, it was Kimberlé Crenshaw who coined and finally introduced the concept of intersectionality into feminist theory. Her work 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics' can be read as a critique of both feminist and anti-racist movements for their one-sided focus on the most privileged members of the respective group. According to Crenshaw, the 'single-axis analysis' results in anti-racist strategies that tend to focus on gender privileged persons – men – and a women's movement which puts a spotlight on class-privileged women associated with a certain race, namely white, Western, heterosexual, middle- and upper-class women. This blindness towards other groups that suffer from structural discrimination, particularly at the intersection of different categories upon which subordination and discrimination is based, leads to the marginalization of 'those who are multiply burdened and obscures claims that cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination.' Building upon this, intersectionality has been commonly defined as 'the complex, cumulative way in which the effects of multiple forms of discrimination [...] combine, overlap, or intersect especially in the experiences of marginalized individuals or groups.' As a result, intersectional approaches of feminist and queer theory seek to include perspectives and experiences of individuals and groups where several forms of discrimination based on different categories, such as gender, race, sexual orientation, class, age, disability or belonging to an indigenous community, just to name a few, overlap.
The Bejing Declaration as an outcome of the Fourth World Conference of Women in 1995 can be seen as an early beginning of intersectionality feeding into international law. Both concept and terminology of intersectionality found their way into international documents particularly at the intersection of gender and race, examples of which are the adoption of the Durban Declaration and Action Programme of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia Related Intolerance in 2001 and General Recommendation No. 25 of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Also Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has endorsed intersectionality in several of its General Recommendations. In the following, intersectionality as a feminist approach has therefore also come to play a vital role in the adjudication of international human rights law, particularly with regard to violations of anti-discrimination norms, and has consequently found its way into the jurisprudence of regional human rights monitoring bodies.
C. Problems that Feminist and Queer Theory Seeks to Address.
Broadly speaking, feminism and queer theory seek to address the same problem: equality within society. This goal is one that is shared with most marginalised-peoples-focused theories within law, social sciences, and the humanities. The key differences here (and elsewhere) are which marginalised group is the focus in its quest for equality, and how this quest for equality is positioned strategically and tactically.
I. Feminist Engagement with International Law.
There is a valid argument to suggest that the drafting and entry into force of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 and 1981 respectively is the starting point of feminist approaches to international law; however, academic scholarship from the feminist tradition did not gain traction until a decade later. The consideration of international law as an area of concern for feminism began in earnest in 1991 with the foundational article ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ by Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright. While this began at the same time as what is seen as third wave feminism (most distinctively characterised by the work of Butler and incorporating intersectionality following Kimberlé Crenshaw’s work), the approach taken was shaped by the education in second wave feminism of the academics championing this important moment in International Law. This approach to seeking equality being grounded in the framework of second wave feminism can be seen in how CEDAW has been constructed and in how Charlesworth et al. construct the goal of feminism as being “to capture the reality of women’s experience or gender inequality.”
This tendency of the feminist tradition in international law to follow second wave feminism, which is much more grounded in biological determinism than third wave feminism, is most evident in the way we see the UN’s gender mainstreaming programs (which seek to normalise considerations of the perspectives and impacts of women in UN activities). It is also evident in fantastic programs such as the Gender Legislative Index, which seeks to assess how well states domestic laws are complying with CEDAW obligations. In this construction, the object of feminist interventions and international law is grounded in cisgender women being the subject of arguments for equality, rather than on the cultural social structures, such as the heteropatriarchy, that cause inequality.
The outcome of this focus on women as subjects rather than social structures when conducting feminist interventions in international law lends results in broadly to two separate approaches. The first, and arguably more common approach (and definitely more theoretically sound approach), is one that embraces Crenshaw’s call for intersectionality in its analysis. This is a feminism that acknowledges, and embraces, the fact that women’s lived experiences of the impacts of law is not universal and is also shaped by other defining characteristics of marginalisation (such as inter alia race, class, sexuality, and disability). While this feminism is still predominantly focused upon equality for women, it acknowledges that women’s equality is contingent upon equality for all marginalised groups and the need for feminism to engage in dialogue with these groups. The other approach, often criticised as ‘White Woman Feminism’, embraces the call spearheaded by Catherine MacKinnon that women need to be considered a single unified and universal political category that disregards questions of race, class, et cetera when advocating for equality. Proponents of this approach believe that it creates a stronger argument for women’s equality, but ignore that the focus of the approach is often the interests of white, straight, western women. This second approach has also been plagued by notion of zero-sum games around the question of equality and has pushed back against a broad and inclusive feminism that seeks to advocate for equality for all out of fear that it will come at the expense of equality gains made for women.
Some of the notable achievements of feminist interventions into international law were how advocacy was able to get International Criminal Law and international humanitarian law to treat armed conflict sexual violence as a crime against the personhood of the victim, rather than as a crime against military discipline (as it had historically been treated). Building upon this success in the 90s we have seen the development of the UN Security Council’s Women, Peace, and Security agenda and the growth in the work of UN Women as a sub agency of the UN to specifically consider the impact of international law on the lives of women. Some of the impacts around how women have been characterised, and often essentialised, through the work of engaging in direct consideration of the impact of international law on women has been strongly criticised; however, even those criticising this work acknowledge that it’s an improvement for women than when they were being utterly ignored.
II. How Queer Theory in International Law Differs from Feminism.
Queer theory grew out of third wave feminism, in particular the work of Butler and Sedgwick, with a much less cohesive equality agenda than feminism. When looking at questions of equality queer theory is inherently broad (and is mostly inclusive but not without its problems) but has a tendency to focus upon QUILTBAG+ subjects. There is also a strong tendency to explore advocating for equality through an intersectional lens by examining the normative assumptions that are being brought to law and situations that generate inequality. Queer theory, at its core, is an embrace of curiosity and questioning – generally from a framework of understanding that the law and normative assumptions that are brought to law and social practice are culturally dependent social constructions rather than natural and inevitable.The easiest space to see this distinction between feminist approaches to international law and queer theory approaches to international law is in examination of the project of gender mainstreaming within UN projects. Feminist approaches to international law, while often critical of the details taken through gender mainstreaming, have treated this introduction of idea and process into every UN body (and numerous state foreign affairs and defence departments) as a net good. Queer theory approaches to international law, while acknowledging the improvements that adding gender mainstreaming has produced, have heavily critiqued how the process of gender mainstreaming has led to the use of gender being an euphemism for women, how it has normalised and reinforced the (white) cis/het masculine subject as the un-gendered normal to which all other expressions of humanity must be compared, and how the process has reproduced bio essentialist views of sex and gender along regressive heteronormative lines within international legal discourse.
There is a tension created within feminist and queer theory approaches to international law where the perfect can be the enemy of the good. This tension is often referred to as the ‘double-bind’. This idea of the ‘double-bind’ broadly posits that advocates for change and equality suffer pressures from those outside governmental institution to not compromise in questions of equality, while also suffering pressures from within the institution that require accepting an improvement that is less than ideal in the alternative to no improvement. It is because of these competing pressures that feminism and queer theory requires advocates inside governmental institutions to push for change and accept compromise, and advocates outside of governmental institutions to hold those inside the institutions to account and drive them to continue advocating for better equality.
Overall feminism and queer theory seek the same thing: equality. This is achieved better by marginalised groups working together for the betterment of all, and that is something that is known and acknowledged by the majority of feminist and queer theory advocates in international law.
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Public International Law/Approaches/Marxism
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Author: Kanad Bagchi
A. Introduction.
Marxism is a broad church. Its traditions are as old as they are contested. “…Splits, disagreements, and denunciations…” within it are routinely common. No wonder that many of its tenets have been hopelessly misinterpreted by both Marxists as well as non-Marxist scholars, associating Marxist thought with abject reductionism, crude economic determinism and a certain complicity in authoritarian and dictatorial rule. Ironically enough, Marx himself had vehemently decried being called a ‘Marxist’. To write about a Marxist legal approach is equally difficult, given that Marx and Engels did not have much to say about the law, let alone international law.
Yet, Marxism is not simply about the words and writings of Marx or Engels alone. Generations of Marxist scholars have drawn from Marx’s larger insights into society and history to explain a number of propositions about law and, more recently, about international law. Resisting, alongside a number of other critical movements, including TWAIL, Feminist and Queer theory, critical legal studies and post-colonial approaches, Marxists have challenged international law’s fundamental claims about promoting peace, prosperity, equality or progress. Even while maintaining this critique, Marxist legal theory has pointed to ways in which law can and should be instrumentalized towards progressive ends mindful of both the reifying structures of the system and its limits for emancipation. Having said that, Marxist legal theory still has much ground to cover, several blinkers to shed and the continuing need to open its discursive space to other critical voices. In what follows, I reflect upon five distinct perspectives that Marxist scholars have brought to the disciplinary understandings of the history and present of international law. Additionally, I also highlight some of the blindspots within Marxist legal theory and how recent scholarship has made important strides to fill those voids. My account is necessarily going to be partial and incomplete. Yet, I hope it is readable, accessible, but most crucially, provides a starting point for further debate and revision.
B. Marxism as 'Perspective' and 'Critique'.
The use of ‘perspective’ rather than ‘method’ is a conscious choice. Marxist theory rarely conforms to the idea of a singular method of approaching law. For the most part, Marx and the larger Marxist tradition is a theory about the "totality" of social forms and relationships among individuals, rather than a specific set of propositions about the law. To invoke a Marxist lens is to view the world and society as an endless set of inter-relationships, where one phenomenon is always connected to the other. This means that ideas, institutions and human agency needs to be understood as part of an “integrated whole” that is both dynamic and also beholden to history and past structures. As Marx had insightfully claimed “[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” How we think about the law then, will depend on how we think about the determining elements of social relationships more broadly. This is where one’s intellectual framework, i.e, theory about the world, collapses into the narrow question of method. Moreover, Marxism continues to evolve, even as it registers critique, new ways of thinking and a continuing push against its own traditions. Confining Marxist theory to a pre-determined set of propositions or institutional boundaries is not only misguided but also deeply depoliticizing. ‘Perspectives’ in this sense keeps that space open to be constantly revisited and challenged.
Broadly stated, a Marxist critique is a structural critique, not aimed at individual instances of exploitation or subjugation alone, but at a reflection on the material structures of society at a "systemic" level, which make such exploitation part of the ordinary and mundane. It is also an ‘internal’ critique of the system, which exposes the inner contradictions of its operating logic. Law then is to be viewed as a social practice with its own internal formal logic containing a set of argumentative structures that give stability to dominant interests and power. It probes us to think about law and international law not as a fragmented, insular and detached body of rules, but as part of a larger social and economic infrastructure, within which it is embedded and takes its form. Finally, Marxism is not simply a set of theoretical escapades, but a call for radical political action to "change" existing structures of political economy. It is inherently an emancipatory ‘praxis’ the aim of which is to “create space for interpretive rules and strategies that contribute to the welfare of the subaltern classes”. Marxism therefore, does not draw an overtly strict boundary between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, acknowledging that one is necessarily dependent on the other.
C. ‘Five’ Marxist Perspectives on International Law.
Despite having a rather long and influential pedigree, Marxist approaches to law and international law in particular, largely remained in the margins of the discipline, even within critical circles. Yet, in the last decades, Marxist scholarship in international law has witnessed somewhat of a ‘revival’. This is not least due to the fact that many of our contemporary crises, whether that be the ‘War on Terror’, rising inequality, financial crisis, climate change, racial injustice, violence against women and indigenous communities, and the rise of authoritarian populism, has brought to the fore capitalism’s worse consequences. Alongside that, many of the contemporary social movements, whether that be the farmer’s protests in India, the Black Lives Matter movement or the Palestinian struggle against imperialist violence, have been mobilized using Marxist language, even if not explicitly. Increasingly, the visible inter-connectedness of ‘local’ events with the global structures of political economy have called into question the role of international law in the (re)production of worldwide dispossession and alienation. Marxist concepts such as ‘class’ ‘ideology’ ‘economic base’ ‘commodification’ carry tremendous explanatory potential in laying bare the systemic forces at work, which naturalizes the historical legacies of this unequal and violent order of things.
I. International law as a Material Phenomenon.
Marxist theory often begins with the fundamental claim that all social relations need to be understood in its ‘historical-material’ context. This means that law, like any other social form of regulation cannot be studied in isolation, but as having its roots in “the material conditions of life”, which then are the “real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure.” Legal relations correspond to and are a reflection of the larger economic processes within society. It is important to remember, however, that the relationship between law and the economic structure is neither static nor unidirectional. To the contrary, the relationship of the ‘base/superstructure’ is highly contingent, co-constitutive and even contradictory – a point that is routinely forgotten. The task of Marxist legal scholarship, then, is to ask how this relationship plays out in concrete situations.
Unlike liberal accounts of the discipline, a ‘historical-material’ perspective locates the rise of international law to the consolidation of global capitalism. In this, the story of capital, although it begins in Europe, travels to the rest of the world through colonial expansion and imperial violence. "Primitive accumulation" - the resolutely violent and coercive enterprise of “divorcing the producer from the means of production” becomes the chief means of encounter between capitalist Europe and the non-capitalist world. For Marx, colonial expansion and the “extirpation, enslavement and entombment” of the native population was not only indispensable for capitalist accumulation, but was a natural consequence of it. International law including its rules concerning trade and commerce, the doctrine of sovereignty and the legal standard of ‘civilization’ become central to this project of worldwide domination and subjugation.
Thus, from a Marxist perspective, imperialism and colonial expansion is a "material" phenomenon at the heart of which lies the need for capital to constantly expand “over the whole surface of the globe”. This not only requires forcibly robbing native populations of their subsistence, but also wholesale transformation of non-capitalist societies into the image of capitalist modernity. As Rosa Luxemburg had argued, “Capitalism must always and everywhere fight a battle of annihilation against every non-capitalist form that it encounters.” Imperialism in a Marxist sense, then, is “the political expression of the accumulation of capital" which works to efface all traditional forms of economic and cultural organization and turn them into social spaces that would be safe and productive for capital. Similarly, the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ and corresponding denial of ‘sovereignty’ to the latter from the realm of 19th century European international law was not only about racial supremacy or domination, but was centrally rooted in the logic of capitalism. Equal sovereignty for the colonies could only come through Western capital, the creation of a centralized bureaucracy and through ‘modern’ forms of political organization. Realization of ‘statehood’ under international law became synonymous with violent capitalist transformation.
Viewing international law through a materialist lens points to the several ways in which the civilizing mandate continues to the present day, even when the language of racial difference has witnessed a relative decline. It allows us to witness modern international law as a continuation of past practices of “exclusion and conditional inclusion” of the non-Western world. The post-WWII international legal order which was purportedly based on international rule of law and self-determination did not fundamentally alter the imperial nature of international law, but marked the beginning of “imperialism without colonies”. Imperialism gave way to "the grip of neo-colonialism", tying the third world to the economic dependence of former colonial powers and the institutions that they controlled. The disciplining effect of international law and international institutions manifest itself in the large scale remodeling of the Global South through instruments of structural adjustment and conditionality, market liberalization, promotion of rule of law and protection of foreign investment. The IMF and the World Bank, among others, promote monetary stability, free capital mobility, disciplined finance, and a shrinking of the public sector, under the pretext of the seemingly innate and neutral concept of ‘good governance’. David Harvey calls this “accumulation by dispossession” to refer to the accelerated ways in which capital inhabits every non-capitalist space, leaving in its wake mass poverty, social stratification, forced migration, and land dispossession. Accumulation by dispossession is primitive accumulation in the neo-liberal age aided by the privatization and commodification of natural resources. Modern international investment law, especially BITs, entrench the power of foreign capital, while the WTO prescribes harmonized rules, subjects state autonomy to international adjudication, and legalizes the international protection of property rights.
The logic of Marx’s ‘primitive accumulation’ as a gateway to both imperial expansion and capitalist transformation is also writ large in the continuing forms of settler-colonial practices across the world, where dispossession and expropriation of indigenous land and territory is legally and constitutionally sanctioned. It allows us to conceptualize the relationship between international law, capitalism and imperialism as a permanent process and not one that ought to be confined simply to the ‘pre-history’ of the discipline. International law as a material phenomenon contests many of the ‘idealistic’ portrayals of the discipline, which trace its contours to mythical accounts of benign trade between private individuals, ideas about denouncing ‘war’, ‘human rights’ or ‘peace’. Instead, Marxist accounts of the field have spent considerable efforts in grounding these ‘ideas’ about international law within a historically specific and materially influenced conception of evolution, where it is indistinguishable from violence and expropriation. Here, as Antony Anghie had argued, international law is imperialism all the way down and much like the birth of capital in Marx’s analysis, international law also comes into the world dripped in “blood and dirt”.
II. International Law as a Class Project.
‘Class’ is the organizing principle of society in the Marxist tradition. Marx had famously remarked that “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” between those who own the means of production and those whose only means of subsistence is their labour power. What he meant was that all aspects of social relationships, including those that make up the economic base, are never a constant, but continuously evolve through the struggle between different groups within society. These struggles are often expressed through the law: “[e]very struggling class must therefore formulate its demands as legalistic demands…”. The law becomes crucial here as the means through which class conflict is not only mediated, but, more fundamentally, it is in the process of engaging with the law that class consciousness takes its concrete form. So even while law and legal structures reflect, reify and consolidate the interests of the dominant classes, it also simultaneously shapes the form and content of the struggle itself. The outcomes are therefore never pre-determined.
‘Classes’ however, are not simply confined to the domestic borders of a given political community. With the consolidation of the neo-colonial project in the 1970s and the accelerating trend towards hyper-globalization, class formations too acquired a different dimension. The monolith identity of the ‘state’ as an actor in international law was superseded by rise and prominence of international institutions and loose coalitions of networks. Almost all aspects of state sovereignty were transferred, even as domestic policy space became ever more constrained. More fundamentally, the state found itself enmeshed within the capitalist global economy, aided by the rise of a new social formation – an emerging "transnational class fraction" – which pushed against national borders and territorial delimitations. Capital accumulation now relied on a “globalized regime of exploitation and waged labour".
Marxist scholars, especially Rasulov and Chimni, argued for a class approach that visibilizes the role and significance of different social groups and classes, which materially influence and shape the formation of international law. They pointed to the emergence and consolidation of a transnational capitalist class (TCC) - a dispersed, yet influential fraction of capitalist classes from advanced capitalist countries and the Third World. Even while situated in different geographic spaces, the TCC was global and had as its primary objective the facilitation of capital accumulation. TCC works closely with international institutions to advance their interests and to create a “functional unified global economic space” where restrictions to capital movement could be flattened. On the flipside, an emerging transnational oppressed class (TOC) comprised of social groups who are disenfranchised from the means of production came to be gradually consolidated. Newer forms of exploitation, corporate abuse, in-formalization and displacement greased the wheels of capital. Much like their counterpart, the TOC operate transnationally, building coalitions with different oppressed groups and use both legal and political means to push against the TCC.
In this constellation, international law becomes a site of class struggle between the TCC and TOC and thus promotes both class consciousness and provides its constitutive structure. This is most visible in the struggle for environment, bio-diversity, development related displacement and the like, where interests of capital compete with rights of labour, indigenous communities, and agricultural workers. These antagonisms play out through overtly capitalist institutions such as the WTO, World Bank and the IMF, but also through institutions such as the International Labour Organization, which one might otherwise think works to correct the imbalance of power between capital and labour. What we have then is an “emerging bourgeois imperial international law”, which speaks in the language and uses the rhetoric of universal human rights and ‘rule of law’, even while entrenching material and ideational primacy of capitalist classes.
A class approach to international law helps navigate through the black box of the state and international institutions by identifying the dominant groups, which benefit from the system of international law. It also helps foreground a more granular story of resistance by TOC to capitalist accumulation and directs our focus to new actors in the global arena. From social movements to civil society organizations espousing the cause of TOC, international law is made and re-made in a number of different terrains.
III. International Law, Ideology and the Critique of Universality.
A sensitivity towards class structures demystifies liberal claims concerning the ‘universality’ of international law in the sense that many of its proclaimed values such as human rights are susceptible to selective interests and open to co-option by dominant groups and classes. Law then becomes a means to sustain and stabilize particular interests as universal ones. In the Marxist tradition, this is law acting as an “ideological form”, which domesticates resistance and class conflict, by depoliticizing legal relationships and rationalizing conceptual categories. Ideology in the words of Susan Marks, plays a “key role in legitimating exploitation” precisely by representing capitalist social relations as natural and permanent. Relationships of domination and exploitation are delineated as pertaining to the individual sphere rather than as systemic outcomes. In other words, a focus on ideology exposes the abstracting character of the law, which flattens differences of power, even while projecting exchange as transpiring between ‘free and equal’ participants.
It is not difficult to see how ideology critique provides a useful lens to the work of international law, especially in the context of deeply political conflicts. From humanitarian intervention to economic conditionalities as well as the ‘war on terror’, capitalist states and international institutions have routinely invoked international law to justify a particular idea of ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom’. Sundhya Pahuja for instance, has shown that notions of ‘development’, when prescribed in universalistic terms, carry with it the prescription for particular kinds of economic and political arrangements, which mirrors the Western bureaucratic-state apparatus essential for capital accumulation. International law, by focusing on domestic roots of ‘poverty’ and ‘conflict’ in the ‘third world’, detracts attention from the systemic patterns of capitalist exploitation and violence at the heart of ‘core-periphery’ relationships. Similarly, the growing infrastructure of international adjudication and the increase in specialized forums of dispute resolution add another layer of depoliticization to social conflicts concerning land, environment, and property. Even the concept of ‘democracy’ promoted by international law sidesteps crucial questions of entrenched social hierarchy and inter-group domination, while privileging a narrow set of indicators and benchmarks to assess participation.
To point to the ideological character of international law is to make apparent what is made invisible and lay claim to the ‘false necessity’ of existing structures. It probes us to think about the contingency of social arrangements and about the fact that they need not be the way they are. Yet, if existing social relations seem inevitable or natural, it is but the result of repeated “ideas and rhetorical processes” that legitimizes and orders such structures. But one should also be mindful of the fact that even though historical relations are contingent, they are not always open to change. Quoting Susan Marks once again, “just as things do not have to be as they are, so too history is not simply a matter of chance and will”, meaning that human agency, while paramount for resistance and change, always operate within the “logics of a system". In other words, as much as one ought to be skeptical of historical necessity, meaningful transformation can only transpire through a clear-headed understanding of the ‘false contingency’ and limits of individual action.
IV. International Law as Commodity Form.
For Marx, capital makes ‘commodities’ out of everything, but, most crucially, capital expands by commodifying labour power. The process entails both abstracting the individual from the product of its own labour for surplus value and also alienating labour from the very means of production. With the spread of capitalism, commodification extends to every aspect of life mediated, of course, though legal relationships. Capitalist relations, then, are marked by an endless collection of commodities connected through an endless set of legal relations. Capital and law exhibit a structural relationship in the Marxist tradition.
Commodification and the abstracting/individualizing character of the law was central to the work of soviet jurist Evgeny Pashukanis, one of the most influential Marxist theorists of law. Drawing from Marx’s insight that ‘commodities’ are but the elementary form of wealth, Pashukanis argued that, in a capitalist society, relations between individuals based on property rights are homologous to abstract commodities, which are traded. Just like for commodities to be exchanged, each party much recognize the other as an equal owner of property in an abstract sense, so too does the law treat those parties as equal bearer of rights. In other words, the “legal subject is thus the abstract commodity owner elevated into the heavens" and the legal form mirrors this commodity form. One of the fundamental insights of the commodity form theory is that law treats individuals as abstract, neutral entities, detached from the material conditions in which they exist. This makes it seem like exchange is between two equals, even while the law invisibilizes and “permits real inequality” among individuals. Much in the same way, Pashukanis illustrated that sovereign entities in their relationship to one another precisely operate as owners of property (read territory) with each possessing equal rights and obligations. This formal equality in status eludes however, the reality “that they are unequal in their significance and their power”. It is in this context that Pashukanis characterized international law as “the legal form of the struggle of the capitalist states among themselves for domination over the rest of the world”.
The crucial question that arises is how are disputes then resolved between two formally equal sovereigns? What is the nature of the legal form that makes certain claims trump over others? This is where China Miéville in his highly provocative book, "Between Equal Rights" extended Pashukani’s commodity theory to argue that the legal form inherent in international law is that of coercion. Exchange implies ownership and ownership is primarily about the right, mostly exercised through the law, to exclude others. Since international law does not have a centralized system of enforcement, sovereign entities themselves resolve disputes to the interpretation of rules. In a deeply unequal world, what this means is that powerful states are able shape the order and content of legal norms through economic and military force. Because “coercion is at the heart of the commodity form" and international law mediates commodity exchange, violence is central to it – ‘Between Equal Rights, force decides’.
The commodity form theory as explained by Miéville illustrates precisely how international law not only bore a structural relationship to capitalist accumulation through the commodification of social relationships, but also sustained imperial relations of domination. The very legal form of international law based on “juridical equality” makes violence and coercion in the hands of the ruling classes the chief means of law-making and resolution of legal disputes. To suggest, then, that international law furthers a rules-based order and is counterpoised to power and brute force is misleading. Instead, as Miéville poignantly put it, “[t]he chaotic and bloody world around us is the rule of law".
The commodity form theory of Pashukanis has found tremendous purchase in Marxist international legal scholarship, even beyond Miéville’s path-breaking reconstruction. The biggest reason for this is that it provides a singularly persuasive historical account of why and how ‘law’ developed the way it did and what makes legal relations the perfect infrastructure for capitalism’s expansion. Claire Cutler has applied the commodity form theory to illustrate the nature of the WTO and GATS in the commodification of public commons, while Grietje Baars reflects on the nature of law as a ‘congealing’ devise for capitalist relations. Their work also centers the role of ‘corporation’ as a tool for imperialist expansion.
V. International Law as Emancipation.
And yet, China Miéville’s conclusion that there can be no international law without imperialism and that only through “eradicate[ing] the forms of law” altogether can one even think of emancipation left an enduring mark on Marxist international legal scholarship. Hegemonic quarters within the discipline started to associate the general project of Marxism in international law with legal nihilism, ignoring how Marxist legal scholars themselves have mounted the loudest critique to Miéville. This was accompanied with a certain strand of Marxist scholarship, which saw a fundamental incompatibility between Marxism and the support for human rights. Law and international law in this constellation was essentially part of the problem and not the solution to human freedom.
Crucially, these interventions ignored the centrality of capitalism as an inherently conflictual and contradictory system. For Marx, legal struggles and the pursuit of human rights although conditioned by capitalist relations did not mean that they ought to be repudiated. Indeed, Marx expended considerable attention to the law as a means of working class struggle in his elaborate description on the length of the working day, which was won on a legal terrain. Law was important in providing the oppressed classes with the means to push back against capitalist expansion. Similarly, in his work ‘On the Jewish Question’, which is often cited to bring home the point that Marx was disillusioned with the potential of equal rights, Marx had only advanced a limited critique of "formal" legal quality. For him, political emancipation through law and legal rights was deeply ‘individualizing’ and ‘alienating’ and thus cannot be an end in itself, but only a means towards engendering larger social changes beyond what the law could provide.
Law and the legal form, therefore, in the Marxist tradition exhibit a dual character, which, even while constraining the possibility of deep structural transformation, provides an important, albeit limited, form of social emancipation through concrete legal struggles. These legal struggles, then, must go hand in hand with more demanding political interventions. It is not a choice between ‘Reform’ or ‘Revolution’ but about how these two paths can have always co-existed. Understanding the role of law in the reproduction of capitalist relations and also as a means to resist some of its worst excesses alludes to its ‘relative autonomy’. Both Chimni and Susan Marks thus hold on to the possibility of international law acting as a ‘shield’ against powerful states. Chimni argues for a ‘radicalism with rules’ where international law should be viewed as a site of contestation rather a mere reflection or consolidation of the interests of dominant classes. Bill Bowring goes one step further in situating human rights and international law’s relationship to past revolutions as evidence of the emancipatory role that law can play.
Robert Knox provides a useful lens to navigate through this duality of rejection and embrace of international law. Given that the use of legal means comes with the danger of legitimizing the existing order of social relations, law should only be used for short-term "tactical" purposes, as a “mere tool to be discarded when not useful." Knox terms this engagement with the law as “principled opportunism” to put forth the point that international law should be pursued for progressive purposes not because it is ‘law’ but because it aids a larger political commitment to fundamentally transform existing society. This would eventually provide the path for what Marina Veličković calls the “planned obsolescence of international law” i.e, the law’s gradual disappearance altogether. But before that happens, the task of radical critique and practise through international law must continue, even when we realize that any utopian hopes of wholesale transformation are ultimately constrained by the legal form.
D. Blindspots, Exclusions and Absences in Marxist Legal Scholarship.
Despite the growing cohort of scholars who are writing within the Marxist tradition in international law and sharpening its conceptual tools, the general project of Marxism has been unable to fully shed its blinkers and unwilling sometimes to reorient its own constitutive categories in the light of other modes of struggles that cut across various axis of social divisions. The project of building solidarity across different resistance movements has not always been forthcoming.
This is perhaps most visible in the way Marxist legal scholars have privileged the category of ‘class’ as the most important marker of social division, ignoring how race, gender, sexuality and caste play an equally important role in the chain of production, distribution and thus also exploitation. Marxism has maintained a distance with other critical tradition such as TWAIL, CLS, critical race theory and also feminist approaches to international law in its singular focus that material conditions are unrelated to how cultural or gender stratifications co-constitute the capitalist mode of production. Despite its emphasis on the "totality" of social relations, Marxist scholars have themselves advanced an understanding of individuals abstracted from deep structural and social markers of community. As Knox points out, within the Marxist discourse, race and racism “tend to be understood as counterposed to processes of capitalist accumulation". No wonder that these exclusions are reflected in some of the ‘mainstream’ iterations of Marxist legal scholarship (including this one) which are produced by men, with a relative absence of women, trans or even black writings on the subject.
Equally, this dissonance is sustained by critical scholars in other traditions who mechanically associate the writings of Marx and the Marxist project with that of structural determinism and Eurocentrism. In some influential quarters of TWAIL, for instance, Marx is portrayed to be “irrelevant” to Third World decolonial struggles. These musings, of course, overlook not just the fact that Marx himself was alive to the conditions of colonialism and expropriation of native peoples as central to Western capitalist expansion, but also generations of Third World Marxist scholars and anti-colonial movements which applied, modified and even ‘stretched’ Marxist theory to local conditions and experiences of domination and imperialist expansion. For the latter, reading Marx has always been about how under conditions of capitalist accumulation, racialization, gender and caste based stratifications are crucial determinants of what constitutes the material conditions of life.
In contemporary times however, many Marxists and equal number of TWAILers, feminist theorists and critical race scholars have moved beyond traditional class variants of historical materialism to underscore the multifaceted nature of capitalist oppression, which straddles through race, patriarchy, and culture. For instance, Knox’s recent scholarship has highlighted that the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘race’ are but two side of the same coin and that any materialist mode of analysis needs to consider them together. Similarly, Chimni’s “integrated” Marxist analysis supplements issues of class with that of social feminist and post-colonial theory has been received approvingly both within the TWAIL and Marxist community. Tzouvala, in her materialist history of the concept of ‘civilization’, addresses how particular conceptions of race, gender, and sexuality operated as tropes for European international lawyers to infantilize, racialize, and feminize non-Western communities while laying the groundwork for capitalist expansion. Her work is also instrumental in bringing together insights from ‘indeterminacy’ in the CLS tradition with a Marxist framework of capitalism and its contradictions. Ruth Fletcher’s work is equally inspiring in thinking through Pashukanis’s commodity form theory from a feminist perspective to foreground the role of social reproduction within notions of value in commodity exchange. These and many other voices have in some sense made Marxist analysis of law and international law respond to and reflect on the many dimensions of social relationships that continue to change, evolve and transform under the conditions of global capitalist accumulation. Here the emphasis is not that 'class' analysis ought to be displaced, but that "class realizes itself and becomes embodied through gender, race, sexuality...". This is the direction that future Marxist international legal scholarship must embrace.
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434685
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3337005
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434685
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Public International Law/Approaches/New Haven School
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Author: Jane Doe
Required knowledge: Link
Learning objectives: Understanding XY.
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434686
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4294283
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https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki?curid=434686
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Public International Law/Interaction/Interaction within International Law
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Author: Adamantia Rachovitsa
Required knowledge: Link
Learning objectives: Understanding XY.
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A. Introduction.
I. The Expanding Scope of International Law and the Multiplication of (semi-)Judicial Bodies.
Scope of the international law of judicial bodies and the multiplication
the Scope of Expanding Multiplication and International law of Judicial bodies
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434687
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248949
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Public International Law/Interaction/International Law and Domestic Law
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Author: Raffaela Kunz
Required knowledge: Link
Learning objectives: Understanding XY.
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A. Introduction.
The relationship between international and domestic law (or the synonyms national or municipal law) is an evergreen topic featuring in every textbook on public international law. What is the background? Since International law in the majority view is considered to be an autonomous legal system independent of domestic legal systems, the question arises how the two systems relate to and interact with one another. Even though the relationship between international and domestic law is thus a classic question, having been discussed and theorized extensively, it has not lost any of its currency. In recent years, with some high-profile cases of domestic courts contradicting or "resisting" international law and international courts (see in more detail below C.II.), the question has even gained renewed significance.
There is no simple answer to the question how international law and domestic law relate to one another. The starting point is that, while international law asserts its primacy over domestic law and requires to be followed and implemented, it is usually left to the states to decide about the concrete modalities to do so. Sometimes the term "obligations of result" is used to describe this circumstance. In other words, international obligations stop "short at the outer boundaries of the State machinery". In this sense, international law may „(...) insert its demands in the box, requiring certain results to come out of it; however, it cannot determine how these results are reached within the box.“ States thus retain a certain degree of freedom in the choice of means to implement their international obligations in the domestic legal sphere. This "freedom of implementation" is limited by the fact that states cannot invoke their domestic law to justify the non-fulfillment of their obligations. Article 3 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts makes clear that the "characterization of an act as internationally wrongful "is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law." Article 27 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties furthermore states that a state "may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." The non-achievement of the required result thus leads to the responsibility of the state on the international plane (see also chapter on state responsibility).
What makes the situation even more complex is that in the decentralized international legal order, to large extents lacking centralized enforcement mechanisms, it is up to domestic actors to implement and enforce international law, with a primordial role in this regard played by domestic courts. Over the last decades, with international regulation more and more overlapping with subjects also regulated under domestic law, from human rights to the environment and health, conflicts between the two bodies of law have become more frequent.
B. Conceptualizing the Relationship.
I. The Classic Theories and Their Limits.
1. Preliminary Remarks.
There are two theories that give different answers as to how international and domestic law relate to each other: monism and dualism. Following the above-described freedom in the means to implement international law, it is up to states to decide whether they follow a monist or dualist model. One may argue that this prerogative of states supports the view that the legal reality rather corresponds to a dualist model. It is, however, important to clearly state from the outset that today neither of the two theories is ever fully realized in practice. Even dualist states often foresee exceptions for certain monist "exceptions"; and in monist states courts often reserve the right not to apply international law in certain cases (see in more detail below, C.II.).
The main question the theories seek to answer is how international law becomes "valid" within the domestic legal system, i.e. how it becomes law that is legally binding within the domestic sphere. Monism and dualism foresee different answers to this question, the main difference being the level of involvement of parliament in the approval of international law. This question of validity is distinct from the question of the position of international law in the "norm" "hierarchy" or the question whether or not international law is "directly applicable" or "self-executing" by domestic courts and authorities (see on these questions below C.I). Given that, in practice, these latter questions are more relevant than the formal validity of international law, the monism/dualism controversy has already in the 1950s been criticized as "unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point". Nonetheless, the theories continue to play a role in international legal practice and discourse. Today, a major point of discussion concerns the democratic legitimization of international law (see below II.).
2. Dualism.
Dualism starts from the idea that international law and domestic law are two distinct legal orders and highlights the autonomy of both legal orders. As Heinrich Triepel, one of the main dualist theorists, has put it, international and domestic law are like "two circles that at most touch, but never intersect". According to this dualist view, for an international legal norm to become valid in the domestic system, it needs to be "translated" to the domestic sphere through an act of "transformation". Prominent states following a dualist model are Germany, the United Kingdom, India and Israel.
Among the dualist states, a further distinction is necessary. In the first group of states, including Germany, for international law to be transformed a formal parliamentary approval though a legislative act is sufficient. In Germany this act takes the form of a "Zustimmungsgesetz" in line with Art. 59(2) of the Basic Law. After the approval, the treaty can be applied as such, i.e. as international law. In the second group, a treaty can only be applied after having been implemented through substantive legislation. An example is the "Human Rights Act" in the United Kingdom implementing the European Convention of Human Rights (currently again subject to reform discussions). In this case, the law that will be applied domestically is not anymore the treaty, but the domestic implementing legislation.
3. Monism.
Contrary to dualism, monism considers international and domestic law to be one single legal order. According to Hans Kelsen, the most prominent theorist of monism, both international and domestic law derive their validity from one basic norm ("Grundnorm"). The main difference between monism and dualism in practice is that in the monist states, international law does not need to be transformed into domestic law in order to acquire validity. In other words, international norms become automatically valid upon ratification. But Kelsen went even further, considering that any domestic rule contradicting international law is void. While Dualism can therefore be described with Triepel as two separate circles, monism according to Kelsen can be described with the form of a pyramid with international law on top.
Examples of monist states include the Netherlands, Switzerland, China and many Latin American Countries.
II. Current Debates: Is Dualism more Democratic than Monism?
The main actor in the conclusion of treaties is the executive, a major difference to the domestic realm, where for democratic reasons parliament is the central law-making body. The involvement of parliament before a treaty becomes domestically binding law is thus to some extent a compromise to involve the democratically elected parliament before the law becomes binding domestically. However, many consider that in light of the important structural changes international law underwent, this is not sufficient anymore. While classic international law was very state-centered and regulated mainly inter-state issues, this has significantly changed, with today virtually no area not touched upon by international regulation. This process has famously been described by Wolfgang Friedman as a transformation from a "law of coexistence" to a "law of cooperation". This development has increased concerns about the democratic or "political deficit" of big parts of the law governing today's societies.
Dualism, which entails a stronger involvement of parliament, is thus sometimes considered to be more democratic than monism. In light of the increased relevance of international law, in some countries with a strong monist tradition a shift to dualism has been discussed in recent years. By way of example, in Switzerland, a country with a strong direct democratic tradition, a (not successful) parliamentary motion in 2014 requested to consider a shift from monism to dualism. It argued that this would strengthen the Swiss legal order and its democratic legitimacy. In the United Kingdom, in earlier discussions about the legal modalities of the UK's exit from the European Union, it was argued that dualism "may save the United Kingdom from Brexit". The core of the argument was that exiting the Union would alter the UK's domestic law, making parliamentary involvement indispensable. Also some domestic courts have manifested a certain "dualist reflex" in recent years (see in more detail below C.II.).
However, dualism's democratic potential is overrated. Legislation transforming treaties of course needs to mirror the corresponding international obligations, in line with the basic principle that states are not allowed to invoke their domestic norms to deviate form international law (see above A.). The leeway parliament has is thus necessarily and inherently limited. And also in monist states such as Switzerland, the question wether parliament needs to be involved in the withdrawal from treaties, at least in the case of important treaties, is being discussed. Neither dualims nor monism thus seem to offer answers to the challenges and tensions arising in times of global governance and increased concerns for the legitimacy of the law. Some voices have thus argued that in the face of these challenges, especially domestic courts should be granted a certain flexibility when applying international law and facing unsolvable conflicts with domestic law. This will be addressed in more detail below (C.II and E.).
C. International Law in Domestic Courts.
I. Questions Determining the Role of International Law.
Because of the decentralized nature of the international legal system, in practice it is often domestic actors and, among those, chiefly domestic courts that apply and implement international law. Until not so long ago, domestic courts were considered to be quite reluctant when it came to the application of international law. The reason was that the international arena was considered to be the exclusive realm of the executive branch. This prompted the "Institut de Droit International" in 1993 to state that it was necessary "to strengthen the independence of national courts in relation to the Executive and to promote better knowledge of international law by such courts". This situation has changed - due to the massive increase of international regulation leading to substantial overlaps with issues previously solely regulated under domestic law, domestic courts now regularly decide on cases involving international law. Today, domestic courts are considered to play an important role in filling gaps in the existing international legal order by applying international law. Since the international order lacks centralized law enforcement bodies, domestic courts play an important role in this regard and to some extent fill this gap. The idea is that by applying international law in domestic cases, courts "bring to life" international law and in this sense contribute to enforcing it. In line with George Scelle’s theory of "dédoublement fonctionnel", domestic judges thus not only fulfill a judicial function at the domestic level; they also have an international judicial function. In light of this, it has been argued that courts contribute to strengthen the international rule of law. In recent years, due to the increased activety of international courts and tribunal and the regulatory activities of international organisations, domestic courts not only deal with international treaties and custom, but increasingly also have to decide cases in which international judicial decisions or secondary rules play a role (see on this chapter XY). As will be discussed below (II.), recently, cases make headlines in which domestic courts contradict their international counterparts or refuse to apply international law.
In the practice of domestic courts applying international law, the monism/dualism controversy hardly plays any role. More relevant are the questions whether international law in a given case is directly applicable or self-executing (synonym) and, in cases of a norm conflict, whether it prevails over conflicting domestic law. Put differently, the validity of international law is the necessary precondition for domestic actors to apply international law, but in practice the problems lie elsewhere. Another question that still plays some role is the political questions doctrine. These three issues shall be briefly discussed in the following.
II. Recent Developments: "Backlash" Against International Law?
Often, in the decentralized international legal system, great hope is being placed in domestic courts. Domestic judges are considered to play an important role in applying and enforcing international law in the absence of more centralized law enforcement mechanisms. While in the 1990s it was still believed that domestic courts were reluctant to apply international law and even more so to take a stance that might contradict their domestic governments, it has been shown that over time, the application of international law by domestic courts has become quite normal (see above C.I.). Today, we might be witnessing yet another shift. Over the last years, there seems to be an increasing number of cases in which domestic courts explicitly refuse to apply international law and/or follow judgments of international courts. These cases have sometimes been called cases of "principled resistance". To be sure, it is not a new phenomenon that domestic courts make clear that while they are open to international law and willing to contribute to its enforcement, there are certain limits. In Europe, many high courts have reserved the right to "defend" a certain constitutional core against the "intrusion" of European and international law, with the German Federal Constitutional Court being a well-known example.
Yet, the number and diversity of these cases seems to be growing. Today, they seem to span most jurisdictions and issue areas of international law. Much-discussed examples include the Italian Constitutional Court which in 2014 decided that the implementation of the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the jurisdictional immunities case (Germany v. Italy) would violate the Italian constitution. It declared the law implementing the judgment to be unconstitutional, and, as a consequence, the ICJ judgment has not been implemented to this date . In human rights law, examples include the Argentinian Supreme Court, which in 2017 refused to follow the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Fontevecchia and D'Amico, and the Russian Constitutional Court, which even developed a certain "control of constitutionality" of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (later translated into legislation).
Interestingly, domestic courts often rely on constitutional values, including fundamental rights, when refusing to follow international law. Rather than violating the rule of law, they thus seem to believe that they act in the interest of the rule of law. While these cases are often perceived as a setback or "backlash" against international law, this suggests that the reality is more complicated. To be sure, in some cases the invocation of constitutional values and principles might be more of a pretext not to follow an undesired international norm. Overall, however, it is undeniable that with the massive growth of international regulation in quantitative terms and the proliferation of international courts, clashes between legal orders have simply become more likely. Domestic courts can thus find themselves in a dilemma: on the one hand, they are "servants" to international law within the domestic realm and act as pivotal safeguards for its effectiveness. On the other hand, they remain "answerable to the dictates of applicable domestic law" and, therefore, can be – and, in times of global governance and much increased activity of international courts, probably will be – increasingly torn between the sometimes conflicting commands of domestic and international law. Of course there are no clear and simple answers to this dilemma. The question how these conflicts can be solved and how courts should accommodate to today's complex legal reality will be taken up again in the last section.
D. Domestic Law in International Courts.
If domestic courts are regularly applying international law, what does the reverse case look like - how do international courts deal with domestic law? Here, the starting point is of course different. Even though domestic courts are not automatically bound by international law (whether they are depends on whether the state in question follows a monist/dualist system, whether the norm in question is directly applicable, etc.), it is clear that ultimately the obligations are binding on the state and need to be implemented (even though the concrete modalities are left to the states). In other words, domestic courts applying international law contribute to fulfill the international legal duties of their states. International courts, on the other hand, are not bound by domestic law and cannot be said to contribute to fulfilling a broader duty. Against this background, it is not surprising that international courts have been reluctant when it comes to the application of domestic law. The Permanent Court of International Justice had expressed a very narrow view by stating that "[f]rom the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States".
Today, it is, however, well recognized that domestic law also plays a role on the international plane. This is obvious when it comes to the formation of international law: domestic legislation plays a role in the formation of general principles of international law, and the decisions of domestic courts are seen as reflecting state practice, thus contributing to the formation of customary international law. It has furthermore been argued that "(...) domestic law is sometimes a necessary component in the functioning of an international rule itself: the determination of nationality for the purposes of diplomatic protection or the definition of the rights of a shareholder are prime examples."
But the relevance of domestic law on the international plane does not end there. It has been shown that the structural changes of international law, moving away from purely inter-state issues towards more and more areas previously only regulated by domestic law, has not only led to a more frequent application of international law by domestic actors, but more generally has had the consequence that "(...) the line between domestic and international law is increasingly blurred, with legal concepts, rules and principles crossing freely between the two spheres." Today, just as international law plays a role when domestic courts apply and interpret the law, the same is true the other way around. While inter-state courts, such as the ICJ, are still cautious in relying on domestic law in their judgments, in other areas of law, domestic law is an inherent part of the legal system, such as in the "margin of appreciation"/consensus doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights has furthermore made clear in its jurisprudence that the interpretation and development of the Convention standards is a joint endeavor, a "shared responsibility" between domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights. In some cases, it has even been criticized that the European Court of Human Rights in the face of political pressure coming from some state and political actors, has "given in" and overadjusted to domestic actors, risking its credibility.
E. Conclusion: Accommodating Orders in a Complex Legal Reality.
The previous sections have shown that today, domestic and international law are not neatly separated legal orders, but rather strongly intertwined and mutually influential. With the body of international law growing quantitatively and expanding into more and more issue areas previously regulated solely by domestic law, it is clear that the legal reality has become more complex. It is thus not so surprising that clashes between norms have become more frequent. The question how the relationship between domestic law and international law should be theorized, and how concrete cases of conflict between the two bodies of law should be solved, in a way has become more timely than ever. Confronted with this complex legal reality, some domestic courts have started to develop criteria on how to solve legal conflicts. A pattern we can observe over the last years is that a seemingly growing number of domestic courts has started to make explicit that the domestic constitution, or at least a certain core of the domestic constitution, in case of conflict with international law, would prevail (see above C.II.). While it seems to be too far-reaching to see these cases as cases of "backlash", undermining the relevance of international law, it might well be questionable whether in times of global governance and strong overlap between legal orders, such at first sight simple and clear conflict solutions are the right way to go. A more flexible approach, allowing to balance the different rights and interests at stake in a given case, even though less clear than strict conflict rules and hierarchies, might better fit today's complex legal reality.
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