instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long shm_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
return sfd->file->f_op->get_unmapped_area(sfd->file, addr, len,
pgoff, flags);
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlattr_cleanup(struct xmlattr_list *list)
{
struct xmlattr *attr, *next;
attr = list->first;
while (attr != NULL) {
next = attr->next;
free(attr->name);
free(attr->value);
free(attr);
attr = next;
}
list->first = NULL;
list->last = &(list->first);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 61,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: import_new_stats_handle (void)
{
return xmalloc_clear ( sizeof (struct stats_s) );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::HandleServiceRequest(
const std::string& service_name,
service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest request) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_MEDIA_IN_BROWSER_PROCESS)
if (service_name == media::mojom::kMediaServiceName) {
service_manager::Service::RunUntilTermination(
media::CreateMediaService(std::move(request)));
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: service worker: Make navigate/openWindow go through more security checks.
WindowClient.navigate() and Clients.openWindow() were implemented in
a way that directly navigated to the URL without going through
some checks that the normal navigation path goes through. This CL
attempts to fix that:
- WindowClient.navigate() now goes through Navigator::RequestOpenURL()
instead of directly through WebContents::OpenURL().
- Clients.openWindow() now calls more ContentBrowserClient functions
for manipulating the navigation before invoking
ContentBrowserClient::OpenURL().
Bug: 904219
Change-Id: Ic38978aee98c09834fdbbc240164068faa3fd4f5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1345686
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610753}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 153,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cifs_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
int rc, xid;
xid = get_xid();
rc = cifs_revalidate_file(file);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Validation prior to mmap failed, error=%d\n",
rc);
free_xid(xid);
return rc;
}
rc = generic_file_mmap(file, vma);
if (rc == 0)
vma->vm_ops = &cifs_file_vm_ops;
free_xid(xid);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NaClProcessHost::EarlyStartup() {
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
NaClBrowser::GetInstance()->EnsureIrtAvailable();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorPaintImageEvent::Data(
Node* node,
const StyleImage& style_image,
const FloatRect& src_rect,
const FloatRect& dest_rect) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
if (node)
SetNodeInfo(value.get(), node, "nodeId", nullptr);
if (const ImageResourceContent* resource = style_image.CachedImage())
value->SetString("url", resource->Url().GetString());
value->SetInteger("x", dest_rect.X());
value->SetInteger("y", dest_rect.Y());
value->SetInteger("width", dest_rect.Width());
value->SetInteger("height", dest_rect.Height());
value->SetInteger("srcWidth", src_rect.Width());
value->SetInteger("srcHeight", src_rect.Height());
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setMargin(LayoutUnit p, LayoutUnit n) { ASSERT(!m_discardMargin); m_positiveMargin = p; m_negativeMargin = n; }
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_load_init( VipsForeignLoad *load )
{
load->disc = TRUE;
load->access = VIPS_ACCESS_RANDOM;
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 83,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Textfield::GetCompositionCharacterBounds(uint32_t index,
gfx::Rect* rect) const {
DCHECK(rect);
if (!HasCompositionText())
return false;
gfx::Range composition_range;
model_->GetCompositionTextRange(&composition_range);
DCHECK(!composition_range.is_empty());
size_t text_index = composition_range.start() + index;
if (composition_range.end() <= text_index)
return false;
gfx::RenderText* render_text = GetRenderText();
if (!render_text->IsValidCursorIndex(text_index)) {
text_index =
render_text->IndexOfAdjacentGrapheme(text_index, gfx::CURSOR_BACKWARD);
}
if (text_index < composition_range.start())
return false;
const gfx::SelectionModel caret(text_index, gfx::CURSOR_BACKWARD);
*rect = render_text->GetCursorBounds(caret, false);
ConvertRectToScreen(this, rect);
return true;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p +
CDF_GETUINT32(p, (i << 1) + 1)) - 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n", i,
inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p,
CDF_GETUINT32(p, (i << 1) + 1)));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements; j++, i++) {
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int virtcons_freeze(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
struct ports_device *portdev;
struct port *port;
portdev = vdev->priv;
vdev->config->reset(vdev);
virtqueue_disable_cb(portdev->c_ivq);
cancel_work_sync(&portdev->control_work);
cancel_work_sync(&portdev->config_work);
/*
* Once more: if control_work_handler() was running, it would
* enable the cb as the last step.
*/
virtqueue_disable_cb(portdev->c_ivq);
remove_controlq_data(portdev);
list_for_each_entry(port, &portdev->ports, list) {
virtqueue_disable_cb(port->in_vq);
virtqueue_disable_cb(port->out_vq);
/*
* We'll ask the host later if the new invocation has
* the port opened or closed.
*/
port->host_connected = false;
remove_port_data(port);
}
remove_vqs(portdev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScrollbarSet LayerTreeHostImpl::ScrollbarsFor(int scroll_layer_id) const {
return active_tree_->ScrollbarsFor(scroll_layer_id);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned int __inet_dev_addr_type(struct net *net,
const struct net_device *dev,
__be32 addr, u32 tb_id)
{
struct flowi4 fl4 = { .daddr = addr };
struct fib_result res;
unsigned int ret = RTN_BROADCAST;
struct fib_table *table;
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(addr) || ipv4_is_lbcast(addr))
return RTN_BROADCAST;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(addr))
return RTN_MULTICAST;
rcu_read_lock();
table = fib_get_table(net, tb_id);
if (table) {
ret = RTN_UNICAST;
if (!fib_table_lookup(table, &fl4, &res, FIB_LOOKUP_NOREF)) {
if (!dev || dev == res.fi->fib_dev)
ret = res.type;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOLEAN BTM_SecDeleteRmtNameNotifyCallback (tBTM_RMT_NAME_CALLBACK *p_callback)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < BTM_SEC_MAX_RMT_NAME_CALLBACKS; i++)
{
if (btm_cb.p_rmt_name_callback[i] == p_callback)
{
btm_cb.p_rmt_name_callback[i] = NULL;
return(TRUE);
}
}
return(FALSE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nohz_idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, enum cpu_idle_type idle)
{
int this_cpu = this_rq->cpu;
unsigned int flags;
if (!(atomic_read(nohz_flags(this_cpu)) & NOHZ_KICK_MASK))
return false;
if (idle != CPU_IDLE) {
atomic_andnot(NOHZ_KICK_MASK, nohz_flags(this_cpu));
return false;
}
/* could be _relaxed() */
flags = atomic_fetch_andnot(NOHZ_KICK_MASK, nohz_flags(this_cpu));
if (!(flags & NOHZ_KICK_MASK))
return false;
_nohz_idle_balance(this_rq, flags, idle);
return true;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind)
{
const struct sys_reg_desc *i1, *i2, *end1, *end2;
unsigned int total = 0;
size_t num;
/* We check for duplicates here, to allow arch-specific overrides. */
i1 = get_target_table(vcpu->arch.target, true, &num);
end1 = i1 + num;
i2 = sys_reg_descs;
end2 = sys_reg_descs + ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs);
BUG_ON(i1 == end1 || i2 == end2);
/* Walk carefully, as both tables may refer to the same register. */
while (i1 || i2) {
int cmp = cmp_sys_reg(i1, i2);
/* target-specific overrides generic entry. */
if (cmp <= 0) {
/* Ignore registers we trap but don't save. */
if (i1->reg) {
if (!copy_reg_to_user(i1, &uind))
return -EFAULT;
total++;
}
} else {
/* Ignore registers we trap but don't save. */
if (i2->reg) {
if (!copy_reg_to_user(i2, &uind))
return -EFAULT;
total++;
}
}
if (cmp <= 0 && ++i1 == end1)
i1 = NULL;
if (cmp >= 0 && ++i2 == end2)
i2 = NULL;
}
return total;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: [email protected] # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int preempt_count_equals(int preempt_offset)
{
int nested = preempt_count() + rcu_preempt_depth();
return (nested == preempt_offset);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct NntpData *nntp_data_find(struct NntpServer *nserv, const char *group)
{
struct NntpData *nntp_data = mutt_hash_find(nserv->groups_hash, group);
if (nntp_data)
return nntp_data;
size_t len = strlen(group) + 1;
/* create NntpData structure and add it to hash */
nntp_data = mutt_mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct NntpData) + len);
nntp_data->group = (char *) nntp_data + sizeof(struct NntpData);
mutt_str_strfcpy(nntp_data->group, group, len);
nntp_data->nserv = nserv;
nntp_data->deleted = true;
mutt_hash_insert(nserv->groups_hash, nntp_data->group, nntp_data);
/* add NntpData to list */
if (nserv->groups_num >= nserv->groups_max)
{
nserv->groups_max *= 2;
mutt_mem_realloc(&nserv->groups_list, nserv->groups_max * sizeof(nntp_data));
}
nserv->groups_list[nserv->groups_num++] = nntp_data;
return nntp_data;
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 79,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBufferData(uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::BufferData& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::BufferData*>(cmd_data);
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLsizeiptr size = static_cast<GLsizeiptr>(c.size);
uint32_t data_shm_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.data_shm_id);
uint32_t data_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.data_shm_offset);
GLenum usage = static_cast<GLenum>(c.usage);
const void* data = nullptr;
if (data_shm_id != 0 || data_shm_offset != 0) {
data = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(data_shm_id, data_shm_offset, size);
if (!data) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
}
buffer_manager()->ValidateAndDoBufferData(&state_, error_state_.get(), target,
size, data, usage);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PushRunlengthPacket(Image *image,const unsigned char *pixels,
size_t *length,PixelPacket *pixel,IndexPacket *index)
{
const unsigned char
*p;
p=pixels;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
*index=(IndexPacket) 0;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 32:
{
*index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,((size_t) *p << 24) |
((size_t) *(p+1) << 16) | ((size_t) *(p+2) << 8) | (size_t) *(p+3));
p+=4;
break;
}
case 16:
{
*index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p << 8) | *(p+1));
p+=2;
break;
}
case 8:
{
*index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
p++;
break;
}
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"ImageDepthNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
}
*pixel=image->colormap[(ssize_t) *index];
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
quantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&quantum);
pixel->opacity=ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
quantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
pixel->opacity=(Quantum) (quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
quantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
pixel->opacity=(Quantum) (quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
}
break;
}
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"ImageDepthNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
}
*length=(size_t) (*p++)+1;
return;
}
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
quantum;
p=PushCharPixel(p,&quantum);
SetPixelRed(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
SetPixelGreen(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
SetPixelBlue(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&quantum);
SetPixelGreen(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
p=PushCharPixel(p,&quantum);
SetPixelBlue(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&quantum);
SetPixelBlack(index,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&quantum);
SetPixelOpacity(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
quantum;
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelRed(pixel,quantum >> (image->depth-MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
SetPixelGreen(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
SetPixelBlue(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelGreen(pixel,quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelBlue(pixel,quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelBlack(index,quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelOpacity(pixel,quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
quantum;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelRed(pixel,quantum >> (image->depth-MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
SetPixelGreen(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
SetPixelBlue(pixel,ScaleCharToQuantum(quantum));
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelGreen(pixel,quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelBlue(pixel,quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelIndex(index,quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&quantum);
SetPixelOpacity(pixel,quantum >> (image->depth-
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH));
}
break;
}
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"ImageDepthNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
}
*length=(size_t) (*p++)+1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct crypto_instance *crypto_ecb_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
int err;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
alg = crypto_get_attr_alg(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return ERR_CAST(alg);
inst = crypto_alloc_instance("ecb", alg);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER;
inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
inst->alg.cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.max_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize;
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_ecb_ctx);
inst->alg.cra_init = crypto_ecb_init_tfm;
inst->alg.cra_exit = crypto_ecb_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.setkey = crypto_ecb_setkey;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.encrypt = crypto_ecb_encrypt;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.decrypt = crypto_ecb_decrypt;
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return inst;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: valid_host(cupsd_client_t *con) /* I - Client connection */
{
cupsd_alias_t *a; /* Current alias */
cupsd_netif_t *netif; /* Current network interface */
const char *end; /* End character */
char *ptr; /* Pointer into host value */
/*
* Copy the Host: header for later use...
*/
strlcpy(con->clientname, httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_HOST),
sizeof(con->clientname));
if ((ptr = strrchr(con->clientname, ':')) != NULL && !strchr(ptr, ']'))
{
*ptr++ = '\0';
con->clientport = atoi(ptr);
}
else
con->clientport = con->serverport;
/*
* Then validate...
*/
if (httpAddrLocalhost(httpGetAddress(con->http)))
{
/*
* Only allow "localhost" or the equivalent IPv4 or IPv6 numerical
* addresses when accessing CUPS via the loopback interface...
*/
return (!_cups_strcasecmp(con->clientname, "localhost") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(con->clientname, "localhost.") ||
#ifdef __linux
!_cups_strcasecmp(con->clientname, "localhost.localdomain") ||
#endif /* __linux */
!strcmp(con->clientname, "127.0.0.1") ||
!strcmp(con->clientname, "[::1]"));
}
#if defined(HAVE_DNSSD) || defined(HAVE_AVAHI)
/*
* Check if the hostname is something.local (Bonjour); if so, allow it.
*/
if ((end = strrchr(con->clientname, '.')) != NULL && end > con->clientname &&
!end[1])
{
/*
* "." on end, work back to second-to-last "."...
*/
for (end --; end > con->clientname && *end != '.'; end --);
}
if (end && (!_cups_strcasecmp(end, ".local") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(end, ".local.")))
return (1);
#endif /* HAVE_DNSSD || HAVE_AVAHI */
/*
* Check if the hostname is an IP address...
*/
if (isdigit(con->clientname[0] & 255) || con->clientname[0] == '[')
{
/*
* Possible IPv4/IPv6 address...
*/
http_addrlist_t *addrlist; /* List of addresses */
if ((addrlist = httpAddrGetList(con->clientname, AF_UNSPEC, NULL)) != NULL)
{
/*
* Good IPv4/IPv6 address...
*/
httpAddrFreeList(addrlist);
return (1);
}
}
/*
* Check for (alias) name matches...
*/
for (a = (cupsd_alias_t *)cupsArrayFirst(ServerAlias);
a;
a = (cupsd_alias_t *)cupsArrayNext(ServerAlias))
{
/*
* "ServerAlias *" allows all host values through...
*/
if (!strcmp(a->name, "*"))
return (1);
if (!_cups_strncasecmp(con->clientname, a->name, a->namelen))
{
/*
* Prefix matches; check the character at the end - it must be "." or nul.
*/
end = con->clientname + a->namelen;
if (!*end || (*end == '.' && !end[1]))
return (1);
}
}
#if defined(HAVE_DNSSD) || defined(HAVE_AVAHI)
for (a = (cupsd_alias_t *)cupsArrayFirst(DNSSDAlias);
a;
a = (cupsd_alias_t *)cupsArrayNext(DNSSDAlias))
{
/*
* "ServerAlias *" allows all host values through...
*/
if (!strcmp(a->name, "*"))
return (1);
if (!_cups_strncasecmp(con->clientname, a->name, a->namelen))
{
/*
* Prefix matches; check the character at the end - it must be "." or nul.
*/
end = con->clientname + a->namelen;
if (!*end || (*end == '.' && !end[1]))
return (1);
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_DNSSD || HAVE_AVAHI */
/*
* Check for interface hostname matches...
*/
for (netif = (cupsd_netif_t *)cupsArrayFirst(NetIFList);
netif;
netif = (cupsd_netif_t *)cupsArrayNext(NetIFList))
{
if (!_cups_strncasecmp(con->clientname, netif->hostname, netif->hostlen))
{
/*
* Prefix matches; check the character at the end - it must be "." or nul.
*/
end = con->clientname + netif->hostlen;
if (!*end || (*end == '.' && !end[1]))
return (1);
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 1 | 169,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RunJavaScriptDialog(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const base::string16& message,
const base::string16& default_prompt,
const GURL& frame_url,
JavaScriptDialogType dialog_type,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
ExitFullscreen(true);
base::Callback<void(bool, bool, const base::string16&)> callback =
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed, base::Unretained(this),
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg);
bool suppress_this_message = ShowingInterstitialPage() || !delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs(this);
if (delegate_)
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
std::vector<protocol::PageHandler*> page_handlers =
protocol::PageHandler::EnabledForWebContents(this);
if (suppress_this_message || (!dialog_manager_ && !page_handlers.size())) {
callback.Run(true, false, base::string16());
return;
}
scoped_refptr<CloseDialogCallbackWrapper> wrapper =
new CloseDialogCallbackWrapper(callback);
callback = base::Bind(&CloseDialogCallbackWrapper::Run, wrapper);
is_showing_javascript_dialog_ = true;
for (auto* handler : page_handlers) {
handler->DidRunJavaScriptDialog(frame_url, message, default_prompt,
dialog_type, base::Bind(callback, false));
}
if (dialog_manager_) {
dialog_manager_->RunJavaScriptDialog(
this, frame_url, dialog_type, message, default_prompt,
base::Bind(callback, false), &suppress_this_message);
}
if (suppress_this_message) {
callback.Run(true, false, base::string16());
}
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual double GetGapWidth(int index) {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int list_drivers(void)
{
int i;
if (ctx->card_drivers[0] == NULL) {
printf("No card drivers installed!\n");
return 0;
}
printf("Configured card drivers:\n");
for (i = 0; ctx->card_drivers[i] != NULL; i++) {
printf(" %-16s %s\n", ctx->card_drivers[i]->short_name,
ctx->card_drivers[i]->name);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int clie_5_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port;
unsigned int pipe;
int j;
/* TH55 registers 2 ports.
Communication in from the UX50/TH55 uses bulk_in_endpointAddress
from port 0. Communication out to the UX50/TH55 uses
bulk_out_endpointAddress from port 1
Lets do a quick and dirty mapping
*/
/* some sanity check */
if (serial->num_ports < 2)
return -1;
/* port 0 now uses the modified endpoint Address */
port = serial->port[0];
port->bulk_out_endpointAddress =
serial->port[1]->bulk_out_endpointAddress;
pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(serial->dev, port->bulk_out_endpointAddress);
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(port->write_urbs); ++j)
port->write_urbs[j]->pipe = pipe;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: visor: fix null-deref at probe
Fix null-pointer dereference at probe should a (malicious) Treo device
lack the expected endpoints.
Specifically, the Treo port-setup hack was dereferencing the bulk-in and
interrupt-in urbs without first making sure they had been allocated by
core.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FixedLengthEncoder::getChar() {
if (length >= 0 && count >= length)
return EOF;
++count;
return str->getChar();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
const unsigned long mmap_end = arch_get_mmap_end(addr);
if (len > mmap_end - mmap_min_addr)
return -ENOMEM;
if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
return addr;
if (addr) {
addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
vma = find_vma_prev(mm, addr, &prev);
if (mmap_end - len >= addr && addr >= mmap_min_addr &&
(!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma)) &&
(!prev || addr >= vm_end_gap(prev)))
return addr;
}
info.flags = 0;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
info.high_limit = mmap_end;
info.align_mask = 0;
return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_primary_gid (uid_t uid)
{
struct passwd *pw;
gid_t gid;
gid = (gid_t) - 1;
pw = getpwuid (uid);
if (pw == NULL)
{
g_warning ("Couldn't look up uid %d: %m", uid);
goto out;
}
gid = pw->pw_gid;
out:
return gid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_free_physmem(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int i;
struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm->memslots;
for (i = 0; i < slots->nmemslots; ++i)
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&slots->memslots[i], NULL);
kfree(kvm->memslots);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::internalSetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
return internalSetBitrateParams(
(const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)params);
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcType = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcType->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mEntropyMode = 0;
if (OMX_TRUE == avcType->bEntropyCodingCABAC)
mEntropyMode = 1;
if ((avcType->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) &&
avcType->nPFrames) {
mBframes = avcType->nBFrames / avcType->nPFrames;
}
mIInterval = avcType->nPFrames + avcType->nBFrames;
if (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLoopFilterDisable == avcType->eLoopFilterMode)
mDisableDeblkLevel = 4;
if (avcType->nRefFrames != 1
|| avcType->bUseHadamard != OMX_TRUE
|| avcType->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 != 0
|| avcType->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 != 0
|| avcType->bWeightedPPrediction != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bconstIpred != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bDirect8x8Inference != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bDirectSpatialTemporal != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->nCabacInitIdc != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (OK != ConvertOmxAvcLevelToAvcSpecLevel(avcType->eLevel, &mAVCEncLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::dirtyLineBoxes(bool fullLayout)
{
if (inlineBoxWrapper()) {
if (fullLayout) {
inlineBoxWrapper()->destroy();
ASSERT(m_rareData);
m_rareData->m_inlineBoxWrapper = 0;
} else {
inlineBoxWrapper()->dirtyLineBoxes();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void encode_delegation_type(struct xdr_stream *xdr, fmode_t delegation_type)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 4);
switch (delegation_type) {
case 0:
*p = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE);
break;
case FMODE_READ:
*p = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_OPEN_DELEGATE_READ);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE|FMODE_READ:
*p = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_OPEN_DELEGATE_WRITE);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ServiceManagerConnection* ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess() {
return g_connection_for_process.Get().get();
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMLRPC_VALUE XMLRPC_DupValueNew (XMLRPC_VALUE xSource) {
XMLRPC_VALUE xReturn = NULL;
if (xSource) {
xReturn = XMLRPC_CreateValueEmpty ();
if (xSource->id.len) {
XMLRPC_SetValueID (xReturn, xSource->id.str, xSource->id.len);
}
switch (xSource->type) {
case xmlrpc_int:
case xmlrpc_boolean:
XMLRPC_SetValueInt (xReturn, xSource->i);
break;
case xmlrpc_string:
case xmlrpc_base64:
XMLRPC_SetValueString (xReturn, xSource->str.str, xSource->str.len);
break;
case xmlrpc_datetime:
XMLRPC_SetValueDateTime (xReturn, xSource->i);
break;
case xmlrpc_double:
XMLRPC_SetValueDouble (xReturn, xSource->d);
break;
case xmlrpc_vector:
{
q_iter qi = Q_Iter_Head_F (xSource->v->q);
XMLRPC_SetIsVector (xReturn, xSource->v->type);
while (qi) {
XMLRPC_VALUE xIter = Q_Iter_Get_F (qi);
XMLRPC_AddValueToVector (xReturn, XMLRPC_DupValueNew (xIter));
qi = Q_Iter_Next_F (qi);
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return xReturn;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_decrypt_fn (const RIJNDAEL_context *ctx, unsigned char *b,
const unsigned char *a)
{
#define rk (ctx->keyschdec32)
int rounds = ctx->rounds;
int r;
u32 sa[4];
u32 sb[4];
sb[0] = buf_get_le32(a + 0);
sb[1] = buf_get_le32(a + 4);
sb[2] = buf_get_le32(a + 8);
sb[3] = buf_get_le32(a + 12);
sa[0] = sb[0] ^ rk[rounds][0];
sa[1] = sb[1] ^ rk[rounds][1];
sa[2] = sb[2] ^ rk[rounds][2];
sa[3] = sb[3] ^ rk[rounds][3];
for (r = rounds - 1; r > 1; r--)
{
sb[0] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sb[1] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sb[2] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sb[3] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[0] = rk[r][0] ^ sb[0];
sb[1] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sb[2] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sb[3] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sa[0] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[1] = rk[r][1] ^ sb[1];
sb[2] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sb[3] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sa[0] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sa[1] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[2] = rk[r][2] ^ sb[2];
sb[3] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sa[0] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sa[1] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sa[2] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[3] = rk[r][3] ^ sb[3];
r--;
sb[0] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sb[1] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sb[2] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sb[3] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[0] = rk[r][0] ^ sb[0];
sb[1] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sb[2] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sb[3] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sa[0] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[1] = rk[r][1] ^ sb[1];
sb[2] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sb[3] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sa[0] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sa[1] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[2] = rk[r][2] ^ sb[2];
sb[3] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sa[0] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sa[1] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sa[2] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[3] = rk[r][3] ^ sb[3];
}
sb[0] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sb[1] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sb[2] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sb[3] = rol(decT[(byte)(sa[0] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[0] = rk[1][0] ^ sb[0];
sb[1] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sb[2] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sb[3] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sa[0] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[1] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[1] = rk[1][1] ^ sb[1];
sb[2] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sb[3] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sa[0] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sa[1] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[2] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[2] = rk[1][2] ^ sb[2];
sb[3] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (0 * 8))], (0 * 8));
sa[0] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (1 * 8))], (1 * 8));
sa[1] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (2 * 8))], (2 * 8));
sa[2] ^= rol(decT[(byte)(sa[3] >> (3 * 8))], (3 * 8));
sa[3] = rk[1][3] ^ sb[3];
/* Last round is special. */
sb[0] = inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[0] >> (0 * 8))] << (0 * 8);
sb[1] = inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[0] >> (1 * 8))] << (1 * 8);
sb[2] = inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[0] >> (2 * 8))] << (2 * 8);
sb[3] = inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[0] >> (3 * 8))] << (3 * 8);
sa[0] = sb[0] ^ rk[0][0];
sb[1] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[1] >> (0 * 8))] << (0 * 8);
sb[2] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[1] >> (1 * 8))] << (1 * 8);
sb[3] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[1] >> (2 * 8))] << (2 * 8);
sa[0] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[1] >> (3 * 8))] << (3 * 8);
sa[1] = sb[1] ^ rk[0][1];
sb[2] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[2] >> (0 * 8))] << (0 * 8);
sb[3] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[2] >> (1 * 8))] << (1 * 8);
sa[0] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[2] >> (2 * 8))] << (2 * 8);
sa[1] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[2] >> (3 * 8))] << (3 * 8);
sa[2] = sb[2] ^ rk[0][2];
sb[3] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[3] >> (0 * 8))] << (0 * 8);
sa[0] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[3] >> (1 * 8))] << (1 * 8);
sa[1] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[3] >> (2 * 8))] << (2 * 8);
sa[2] ^= inv_sbox[(byte)(sa[3] >> (3 * 8))] << (3 * 8);
sa[3] = sb[3] ^ rk[0][3];
buf_put_le32(b + 0, sa[0]);
buf_put_le32(b + 4, sa[1]);
buf_put_le32(b + 8, sa[2]);
buf_put_le32(b + 12, sa[3]);
#undef rk
return (56+2*sizeof(int));
}
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 96,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t SoftAAC2::outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(INT_PCM *samples, int32_t numSamples) {
if (numSamples > mOutputDelayRingBufferFilled) {
ALOGE("RING BUFFER WOULD UNDERRUN");
return -1;
}
if (mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos + numSamples <= mOutputDelayRingBufferSize
&& (mOutputDelayRingBufferWritePos < mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos
|| mOutputDelayRingBufferWritePos >= mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos + numSamples)) {
if (samples != 0) {
for (int32_t i = 0; i < numSamples; i++) {
samples[i] = mOutputDelayRingBuffer[mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos++];
}
} else {
mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos += numSamples;
}
if (mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos >= mOutputDelayRingBufferSize) {
mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos -= mOutputDelayRingBufferSize;
}
} else {
ALOGV("slow SoftAAC2::outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples()");
for (int32_t i = 0; i < numSamples; i++) {
if (samples != 0) {
samples[i] = mOutputDelayRingBuffer[mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos];
}
mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos++;
if (mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos >= mOutputDelayRingBufferSize) {
mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos -= mOutputDelayRingBufferSize;
}
}
}
mOutputDelayRingBufferFilled -= numSamples;
return numSamples;
}
Commit Message: SoftAAC2: fix crash on all-zero adts buffer
Bug: 29153599
Change-Id: I1cb81c054098b86cf24f024f8479909ca7bc85a6
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t GPMF_ElementsInStruct(GPMF_stream *ms)
{
if (ms && ms->pos+1 < ms->buffer_size_longs)
{
uint32_t ssize = GPMF_StructSize(ms);
GPMF_SampleType type = GPMF_SAMPLE_TYPE(ms->buffer[ms->pos + 1]);
if (type != GPMF_TYPE_NEST && type != GPMF_TYPE_COMPLEX)
{
int32_t tsize = GPMF_SizeofType(type);
if (tsize > 0)
return ssize / tsize;
else
return 0;
}
if (type == GPMF_TYPE_COMPLEX)
{
GPMF_stream find_stream;
GPMF_CopyState(ms, &find_stream);
if (GPMF_OK == GPMF_FindPrev(&find_stream, GPMF_KEY_TYPE, GPMF_CURRENT_LEVEL))
{
char tmp[64] = "";
uint32_t tmpsize = sizeof(tmp);
char *data = (char *)GPMF_RawData(&find_stream);
int size = GPMF_RawDataSize(&find_stream);
if (GPMF_OK == GPMF_ExpandComplexTYPE(data, size, tmp, &tmpsize))
return tmpsize;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 88,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void *alloc_smp_req(int size)
{
u8 *p = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (p)
p[0] = SMP_REQUEST;
return p;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: chenqilin <[email protected]>
CC: chenxiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_delete_file(struct sc_card *card, const struct sc_path *path)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
const struct sc_acl_entry *entry = NULL;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
struct sc_file *file = NULL;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_print_cache(card);
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, path, &file);
if (rv == SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Cannot select file to delete");
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_DELETE);
if (!entry)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "Cannot delete file: no 'DELETE' acl");
sc_log(ctx, "DELETE method/reference %X/%X", entry->method, entry->key_ref);
if (entry->method == SC_AC_SCB && (entry->key_ref & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_SM)) {
unsigned char se_num = (entry->method == SC_AC_SCB) ? (entry->key_ref & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_MASK_REF) : 0;
rv = iasecc_sm_delete_file(card, se_num, file->id);
}
else {
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_1, 0xE4, 0x00, 0x00);
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Delete file failed");
if (card->cache.valid)
sc_file_free(card->cache.current_ef);
card->cache.current_ef = NULL;
}
sc_file_free(file);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::Load() {
if (GetLoadingState() != LifecycleUnitLoadingState::UNLOADED)
return false;
GetWebContents()->GetController().SetNeedsReload();
GetWebContents()->GetController().LoadIfNecessary();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SUB( FT_Long* args )
{
args[0] = SUB_LONG( args[0], args[1] );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AllSamplesPassedQuery::Destroy(bool have_context) {
if (have_context && !IsDeleted()) {
glDeleteQueriesARB(1, &service_id_);
MarkAsDeleted();
}
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_import_x963_ex(const byte* in, word32 inLen, ecc_key* key,
int curve_id)
{
int err = MP_OKAY;
int compressed = 0;
int keysize = 0;
byte pointType;
if (in == NULL || key == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
/* must be odd */
if ((inLen & 1) == 0) {
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
}
/* make sure required variables are reset */
wc_ecc_reset(key);
/* init key */
#ifdef ALT_ECC_SIZE
key->pubkey.x = (mp_int*)&key->pubkey.xyz[0];
key->pubkey.y = (mp_int*)&key->pubkey.xyz[1];
key->pubkey.z = (mp_int*)&key->pubkey.xyz[2];
alt_fp_init(key->pubkey.x);
alt_fp_init(key->pubkey.y);
alt_fp_init(key->pubkey.z);
err = mp_init(&key->k);
#else
err = mp_init_multi(&key->k,
key->pubkey.x, key->pubkey.y, key->pubkey.z, NULL, NULL);
#endif
if (err != MP_OKAY)
return MEMORY_E;
/* check for point type (4, 2, or 3) */
pointType = in[0];
if (pointType != ECC_POINT_UNCOMP && pointType != ECC_POINT_COMP_EVEN &&
pointType != ECC_POINT_COMP_ODD) {
err = ASN_PARSE_E;
}
if (pointType == ECC_POINT_COMP_EVEN || pointType == ECC_POINT_COMP_ODD) {
#ifdef HAVE_COMP_KEY
compressed = 1;
#else
err = NOT_COMPILED_IN;
#endif
}
/* adjust to skip first byte */
inLen -= 1;
in += 1;
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
#ifdef HAVE_COMP_KEY
/* adjust inLen if compressed */
if (compressed)
inLen = inLen*2 + 1; /* used uncompressed len */
#endif
/* determine key size */
keysize = (inLen>>1);
err = wc_ecc_set_curve(key, keysize, curve_id);
key->type = ECC_PUBLICKEY;
}
/* read data */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(key->pubkey.x, (byte*)in, keysize);
#ifdef HAVE_COMP_KEY
if (err == MP_OKAY && compressed == 1) { /* build y */
#ifndef WOLFSSL_SP_MATH
mp_int t1, t2;
int did_init = 0;
DECLARE_CURVE_SPECS(3)
if (mp_init_multi(&t1, &t2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) != MP_OKAY)
err = MEMORY_E;
else
did_init = 1;
/* load curve info */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = wc_ecc_curve_load(key->dp, &curve,
(ECC_CURVE_FIELD_PRIME | ECC_CURVE_FIELD_AF |
ECC_CURVE_FIELD_BF));
/* compute x^3 */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_sqr(key->pubkey.x, &t1);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_mulmod(&t1, key->pubkey.x, curve->prime, &t1);
/* compute x^3 + a*x */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_mulmod(curve->Af, key->pubkey.x, curve->prime, &t2);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_add(&t1, &t2, &t1);
/* compute x^3 + a*x + b */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_add(&t1, curve->Bf, &t1);
/* compute sqrt(x^3 + a*x + b) */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_sqrtmod_prime(&t1, curve->prime, &t2);
/* adjust y */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if ((mp_isodd(&t2) == MP_YES && pointType == ECC_POINT_COMP_ODD) ||
(mp_isodd(&t2) == MP_NO && pointType == ECC_POINT_COMP_EVEN)) {
err = mp_mod(&t2, curve->prime, &t2);
}
else {
err = mp_submod(curve->prime, &t2, curve->prime, &t2);
}
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_copy(&t2, key->pubkey.y);
}
if (did_init) {
mp_clear(&t2);
mp_clear(&t1);
}
wc_ecc_curve_free(curve);
#else
sp_ecc_uncompress_256(key->pubkey.x, pointType, key->pubkey.y);
#endif
}
#endif /* HAVE_COMP_KEY */
if (err == MP_OKAY && compressed == 0)
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(key->pubkey.y, (byte*)in + keysize, keysize);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_set(key->pubkey.z, 1);
#ifdef WOLFSSL_VALIDATE_ECC_IMPORT
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = wc_ecc_check_key(key);
#endif
if (err != MP_OKAY) {
mp_clear(key->pubkey.x);
mp_clear(key->pubkey.y);
mp_clear(key->pubkey.z);
mp_clear(&key->k);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cryp_dma_setup_channel(struct cryp_device_data *device_data,
struct device *dev)
{
struct dma_slave_config mem2cryp = {
.direction = DMA_MEM_TO_DEV,
.dst_addr = device_data->phybase + CRYP_DMA_TX_FIFO,
.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_2_BYTES,
.dst_maxburst = 4,
};
struct dma_slave_config cryp2mem = {
.direction = DMA_DEV_TO_MEM,
.src_addr = device_data->phybase + CRYP_DMA_RX_FIFO,
.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_2_BYTES,
.src_maxburst = 4,
};
dma_cap_zero(device_data->dma.mask);
dma_cap_set(DMA_SLAVE, device_data->dma.mask);
device_data->dma.cfg_mem2cryp = mem_to_engine;
device_data->dma.chan_mem2cryp =
dma_request_channel(device_data->dma.mask,
stedma40_filter,
device_data->dma.cfg_mem2cryp);
device_data->dma.cfg_cryp2mem = engine_to_mem;
device_data->dma.chan_cryp2mem =
dma_request_channel(device_data->dma.mask,
stedma40_filter,
device_data->dma.cfg_cryp2mem);
dmaengine_slave_config(device_data->dma.chan_mem2cryp, &mem2cryp);
dmaengine_slave_config(device_data->dma.chan_cryp2mem, &cryp2mem);
init_completion(&device_data->dma.cryp_dma_complete);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnCancelPendingPreviewRequest() {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(preview_ui_addr_str_, -1);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 170,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void php_rshutdown_session_globals(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
if (PS(http_session_vars)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PS(http_session_vars));
PS(http_session_vars) = NULL;
}
/* Do NOT destroy PS(mod_user_names) here! */
if (PS(mod_data) || PS(mod_user_implemented)) {
zend_try {
PS(mod)->s_close(&PS(mod_data) TSRMLS_CC);
} zend_end_try();
}
if (PS(id)) {
efree(PS(id));
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool isValidCueStyleProperty(CSSPropertyID id)
{
switch (id) {
case CSSPropertyBackground:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundAttachment:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundClip:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundColor:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundImage:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundOrigin:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundPosition:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundPositionX:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundPositionY:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundRepeat:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundRepeatX:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundRepeatY:
case CSSPropertyBackgroundSize:
case CSSPropertyColor:
case CSSPropertyFont:
case CSSPropertyFontFamily:
case CSSPropertyFontSize:
case CSSPropertyFontStyle:
case CSSPropertyFontVariant:
case CSSPropertyFontWeight:
case CSSPropertyLineHeight:
case CSSPropertyOpacity:
case CSSPropertyOutline:
case CSSPropertyOutlineColor:
case CSSPropertyOutlineOffset:
case CSSPropertyOutlineStyle:
case CSSPropertyOutlineWidth:
case CSSPropertyVisibility:
case CSSPropertyWhiteSpace:
case CSSPropertyTextDecoration:
case CSSPropertyTextShadow:
case CSSPropertyBorderStyle:
return true;
case CSSPropertyTextDecorationLine:
case CSSPropertyTextDecorationStyle:
case CSSPropertyTextDecorationColor:
return RuntimeEnabledFeatures::css3TextDecorationsEnabled();
default:
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int airo_set_rate(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
struct iw_param *vwrq,
char *extra)
{
struct airo_info *local = dev->ml_priv;
CapabilityRid cap_rid; /* Card capability info */
u8 brate = 0;
int i;
/* First : get a valid bit rate value */
readCapabilityRid(local, &cap_rid, 1);
/* Which type of value ? */
if((vwrq->value < 8) && (vwrq->value >= 0)) {
/* Setting by rate index */
/* Find value in the magic rate table */
brate = cap_rid.supportedRates[vwrq->value];
} else {
/* Setting by frequency value */
u8 normvalue = (u8) (vwrq->value/500000);
/* Check if rate is valid */
for(i = 0 ; i < 8 ; i++) {
if(normvalue == cap_rid.supportedRates[i]) {
brate = normvalue;
break;
}
}
}
/* -1 designed the max rate (mostly auto mode) */
if(vwrq->value == -1) {
/* Get the highest available rate */
for(i = 0 ; i < 8 ; i++) {
if(cap_rid.supportedRates[i] == 0)
break;
}
if(i != 0)
brate = cap_rid.supportedRates[i - 1];
}
/* Check that it is valid */
if(brate == 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
readConfigRid(local, 1);
/* Now, check if we want a fixed or auto value */
if(vwrq->fixed == 0) {
/* Fill all the rates up to this max rate */
memset(local->config.rates, 0, 8);
for(i = 0 ; i < 8 ; i++) {
local->config.rates[i] = cap_rid.supportedRates[i];
if(local->config.rates[i] == brate)
break;
}
} else {
/* Fixed mode */
/* One rate, fixed */
memset(local->config.rates, 0, 8);
local->config.rates[0] = brate;
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &local->flags);
return -EINPROGRESS; /* Call commit handler */
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int arcmsr_hbaA_polling_ccbdone(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb,
struct CommandControlBlock *poll_ccb)
{
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
struct CommandControlBlock *ccb;
struct ARCMSR_CDB *arcmsr_cdb;
uint32_t flag_ccb, outbound_intstatus, poll_ccb_done = 0, poll_count = 0;
int rtn;
bool error;
polling_hba_ccb_retry:
poll_count++;
outbound_intstatus = readl(®->outbound_intstatus) & acb->outbound_int_enable;
writel(outbound_intstatus, ®->outbound_intstatus);/*clear interrupt*/
while (1) {
if ((flag_ccb = readl(®->outbound_queueport)) == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
if (poll_ccb_done){
rtn = SUCCESS;
break;
}else {
msleep(25);
if (poll_count > 100){
rtn = FAILED;
break;
}
goto polling_hba_ccb_retry;
}
}
arcmsr_cdb = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)(acb->vir2phy_offset + (flag_ccb << 5));
ccb = container_of(arcmsr_cdb, struct CommandControlBlock, arcmsr_cdb);
poll_ccb_done |= (ccb == poll_ccb) ? 1 : 0;
if ((ccb->acb != acb) || (ccb->startdone != ARCMSR_CCB_START)) {
if ((ccb->startdone == ARCMSR_CCB_ABORTED) || (ccb == poll_ccb)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: scsi id = %d lun = %d ccb = '0x%p'"
" poll command abort successfully \n"
, acb->host->host_no
, ccb->pcmd->device->id
, (u32)ccb->pcmd->device->lun
, ccb);
ccb->pcmd->result = DID_ABORT << 16;
arcmsr_ccb_complete(ccb);
continue;
}
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: polling get an illegal ccb"
" command done ccb = '0x%p'"
"ccboutstandingcount = %d \n"
, acb->host->host_no
, ccb
, atomic_read(&acb->ccboutstandingcount));
continue;
}
error = (flag_ccb & ARCMSR_CCBREPLY_FLAG_ERROR_MODE0) ? true : false;
arcmsr_report_ccb_state(acb, ccb, error);
}
return rtn;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nlmsvc_same_owner(struct file_lock *fl1, struct file_lock *fl2)
{
return fl1->fl_owner == fl2->fl_owner && fl1->fl_pid == fl2->fl_pid;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void* start_handler(void* data)
{
struct fuse_handler* handler = data;
handle_fuse_requests(handler);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::cssText() const
{
String result("");
for (unsigned i = 0; i < numComputedProperties; i++) {
if (i)
result += " ";
result += getPropertyName(computedProperties[i]);
result += ": ";
result += getPropertyValue(computedProperties[i]);
result += ";";
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ENABLEAUTOALTREF, 1);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_MAXFRAMES, 7);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_STRENGTH, 5);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_TYPE, 3);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::UpdateCaptionButtonModel() {
auto model = std::make_unique<CaptionButtonModel>(frame_visible_button_mask_,
frame_enabled_button_mask_);
if (wide_frame_)
wide_frame_->SetCaptionButtonModel(std::move(model));
else
GetFrameView()->SetCaptionButtonModel(std::move(model));
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::DidFinish(
base::OnceCallback<void(base::File::Error)> callback,
base::File::Error error_code) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
std::move(callback).Run(error_code);
}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TriState StateOrderedList(LocalFrame& frame, Event*) {
return SelectionListState(frame.Selection(), olTag);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnInit(const PluginMsg_Init_Params& params, IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(modal_dialog_event_map_lock_);
if (modal_dialog_event_map_.count(params.containing_window)) {
modal_dialog_event_map_[params.containing_window].refcount++;
return;
}
WaitableEventWrapper wrapper;
wrapper.event = new base::WaitableEvent(true, false);
wrapper.refcount = 1;
modal_dialog_event_map_[params.containing_window] = wrapper;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ap_lua_load_request_lmodule(lua_State *L, apr_pool_t *p)
{
apr_hash_t *dispatch = apr_hash_make(p);
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "puts", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_puts, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "write", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_write, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "document_root", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_document_root, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "context_prefix", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_context_prefix, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "context_document_root", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_context_document_root, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "parseargs", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_parseargs, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "parsebody", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_parsebody, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "debug", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_debug, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "info", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_info, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "notice", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_notice, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "warn", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_warn, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "err", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_err, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "crit", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_crit, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "alert", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_alert, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "emerg", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_emerg, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "trace1", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_trace1, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "trace2", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_trace2, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "trace3", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_trace3, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "trace4", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_trace4, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "trace5", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_trace5, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "trace6", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_trace6, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "trace7", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_trace7, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "trace8", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_trace8, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "add_output_filter", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_add_output_filter, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "construct_url", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_construct_url, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "escape_html", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_escape_html, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "ssl_var_lookup", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_ssl_var_lookup, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "is_https", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_ssl_is_https_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_BOOLEAN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "assbackwards", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_assbackwards_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_BOOLEAN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "status", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_status_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_INT, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "protocol", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_protocol_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "range", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_range_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "content_type", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_content_type_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "content_encoding", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_content_encoding_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING,
p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "ap_auth_type", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_ap_auth_type_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "unparsed_uri", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_unparsed_uri_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "user", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_user_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "filename", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_filename_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "canonical_filename", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_canonical_filename_field,
APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "path_info", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_path_info_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "args", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_args_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "handler", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_handler_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "hostname", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_hostname_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "uri", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_uri_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "the_request", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_the_request_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "log_id", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_log_id_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "useragent_ip", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_useragent_ip_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "method", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_method_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "proxyreq", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_proxyreq_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "headers_in", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_headers_in, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_TABLE, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "headers_out", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_headers_out, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_TABLE, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "err_headers_out", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_err_headers_out, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_TABLE, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "notes", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_notes, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_TABLE, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "subprocess_env", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_subprocess_env, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_TABLE, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "flush", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_rflush, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "port", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_ap_get_server_port, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_INT, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "banner", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&ap_get_server_banner, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "options", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_options, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "allowoverrides", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_allowoverrides, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "started", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_started, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_INT, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "basic_auth_pw", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_basic_auth_pw, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "limit_req_body", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_limit_req_body, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_INT, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "server_built", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&ap_get_server_built, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "is_initial_req", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_is_initial_req, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_BOOLEAN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "remaining", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&req_remaining_field, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_INT, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "some_auth_required", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_some_auth_required, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_BOOLEAN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "server_name", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_get_server_name, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "auth_name", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_auth_name, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_STRING, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "sendfile", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_sendfile, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "dbacquire", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_db_acquire, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "stat", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_stat, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "get_direntries", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_getdir, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "regex", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_regex, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "usleep", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_usleep, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "base64_encode", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_b64encode, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "base64_decode", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_b64decode, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "md5", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_md5, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "sha1", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_sha1, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "htpassword", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_htpassword, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "touch", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_touch, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "mkdir", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_mkdir, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "mkrdir", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_mkrdir, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "rmdir", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_rmdir, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "date_parse_rfc", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_apr_date_parse_rfc, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "escape", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_escape, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "unescape", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_unescape, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "mpm_query", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_mpm_query, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "expr", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_expr, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "scoreboard_process", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_scoreboard_process, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "scoreboard_worker", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_scoreboard_worker, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "clock", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_clock, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "requestbody", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_requestbody, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "add_input_filter", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_add_input_filter, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "module_info", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_module_info, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "loaded_modules", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_loaded_modules, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "runtime_dir_relative", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_runtime_dir_relative, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "server_info", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_server_info, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "set_document_root", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_set_document_root, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "set_context_info", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_set_context_info, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "os_escape_path", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_os_escape_path, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "escape_logitem", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_escape_logitem, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "strcmp_match", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_strcmp_match, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "set_keepalive", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_set_keepalive, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "make_etag", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_make_etag, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "send_interim_response", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_send_interim_response, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "custom_response", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_custom_response, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "exists_config_define", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_exists_config_define, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "state_query", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_state_query, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "get_server_name_for_url", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_get_server_name_for_url, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "ivm_get", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ivm_get, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "ivm_set", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ivm_set, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "getcookie", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_get_cookie, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "setcookie", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_set_cookie, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "wsupgrade", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_websocket_greet, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "wsread", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_websocket_read, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "wspeek", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_websocket_peek, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "wswrite", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_websocket_write, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "wsclose", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_websocket_close, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "wsping", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_websocket_ping, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "config", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_get_config, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
apr_hash_set(dispatch, "activeconfig", APR_HASH_KEY_STRING,
makefun(&lua_ap_get_active_config, APL_REQ_FUNTYPE_LUACFUN, p));
lua_pushlightuserdata(L, dispatch);
lua_setfield(L, LUA_REGISTRYINDEX, "Apache2.Request.dispatch");
luaL_newmetatable(L, "Apache2.Request"); /* [metatable] */
lua_pushvalue(L, -1);
lua_setfield(L, -2, "__index");
luaL_register(L, NULL, request_methods); /* [metatable] */
lua_pop(L, 2);
luaL_newmetatable(L, "Apache2.Connection"); /* [metatable] */
lua_pushvalue(L, -1);
lua_setfield(L, -2, "__index");
luaL_register(L, NULL, connection_methods); /* [metatable] */
lua_pop(L, 2);
luaL_newmetatable(L, "Apache2.Server"); /* [metatable] */
lua_pushvalue(L, -1);
lua_setfield(L, -2, "__index");
luaL_register(L, NULL, server_methods); /* [metatable] */
lua_pop(L, 2);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ContextualSearchFieldTrial::GetIcingSurroundingSize() {
return GetIntParamValueOrDefault(
kContextualSearchIcingSurroundingSizeParamName,
kContextualSearchDefaultIcingSurroundingSize,
&is_icing_surrounding_size_cached_, &icing_surrounding_size_);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NavigateParams::~NavigateParams() {
}
Commit Message: Fix memory error in previous CL.
BUG=100315
BUG=99016
TEST=Memory bots go green
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8302001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@105577 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 97,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_map_range_to_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, int out)
{
add_range(ctx, cmap, low, high, out, 1, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_pgsql_get_link_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int entry_type)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
int id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
PGconn *pgsql;
char *msgbuf;
char *result;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "|r", &pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc == 0) {
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
switch(entry_type) {
case PHP_PG_DBNAME:
result = PQdb(pgsql);
break;
case PHP_PG_ERROR_MESSAGE:
result = PQErrorMessageTrim(pgsql, &msgbuf);
RETVAL_STRING(result);
efree(result);
return;
case PHP_PG_OPTIONS:
result = PQoptions(pgsql);
break;
case PHP_PG_PORT:
result = PQport(pgsql);
break;
case PHP_PG_TTY:
result = PQtty(pgsql);
break;
case PHP_PG_HOST:
result = PQhost(pgsql);
break;
case PHP_PG_VERSION:
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_string(return_value, "client", PG_VERSION);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION
add_assoc_long(return_value, "protocol", PQprotocolVersion(pgsql));
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3) {
/* 8.0 or grater supports protorol version 3 */
char *tmp;
add_assoc_string(return_value, "server", (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version"));
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_encoding");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "server_encoding", tmp);
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "client_encoding");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "client_encoding", tmp);
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "is_superuser");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "is_superuser", tmp);
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "session_authorization");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "session_authorization", tmp);
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "DateStyle");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "DateStyle", tmp);
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "IntervalStyle");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "IntervalStyle", tmp ? tmp : "");
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "TimeZone");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "TimeZone", tmp ? tmp : "");
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "integer_datetimes");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "integer_datetimes", tmp ? tmp : "");
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "standard_conforming_strings");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "standard_conforming_strings", tmp ? tmp : "");
tmp = (char*)PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "application_name");
add_assoc_string(return_value, "application_name", tmp ? tmp : "");
}
#endif
#endif
return;
default:
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (result) {
RETURN_STRING(result);
} else {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
/* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
#endif
default:
break;
}
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::InstanceWasDeleted() {
Resource::InstanceWasDeleted();
loader_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Remove possibility of stale user_buffer_ member in PPB_URLLoader_Impl when FinishedLoading() is called.
BUG=137778
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10797037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@147914 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RestoreForeignTab(const SessionTab& tab) {
StartTabCreation();
Browser* current_browser =
browser_ ? browser_ : BrowserList::GetLastActiveWithProfile(profile_);
RestoreTab(tab, current_browser->tab_count(), current_browser, true);
NotifySessionServiceOfRestoredTabs(current_browser,
current_browser->tab_count());
FinishedTabCreation(true, true);
}
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EglRenderingVDAClient::SetState(ClientState new_state) {
note_->Notify(new_state);
state_ = new_state;
if (!remaining_play_throughs_ && new_state == delete_decoder_state_) {
CHECK(!decoder_deleted());
DeleteDecoder();
}
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus,
u16 portchange)
{
int status, i;
unsigned unit_load;
struct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev;
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(hdev->bus);
struct usb_port *port_dev = hub->ports[port1 - 1];
struct usb_device *udev = port_dev->child;
static int unreliable_port = -1;
/* Disconnect any existing devices under this port */
if (udev) {
if (hcd->usb_phy && !hdev->parent)
usb_phy_notify_disconnect(hcd->usb_phy, udev->speed);
usb_disconnect(&port_dev->child);
}
/* We can forget about a "removed" device when there's a physical
* disconnect or the connect status changes.
*/
if (!(portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION) ||
(portchange & USB_PORT_STAT_C_CONNECTION))
clear_bit(port1, hub->removed_bits);
if (portchange & (USB_PORT_STAT_C_CONNECTION |
USB_PORT_STAT_C_ENABLE)) {
status = hub_port_debounce_be_stable(hub, port1);
if (status < 0) {
if (status != -ENODEV &&
port1 != unreliable_port &&
printk_ratelimit())
dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "connect-debounce failed\n");
portstatus &= ~USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION;
unreliable_port = port1;
} else {
portstatus = status;
}
}
/* Return now if debouncing failed or nothing is connected or
* the device was "removed".
*/
if (!(portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION) ||
test_bit(port1, hub->removed_bits)) {
/*
* maybe switch power back on (e.g. root hub was reset)
* but only if the port isn't owned by someone else.
*/
if (hub_is_port_power_switchable(hub)
&& !port_is_power_on(hub, portstatus)
&& !port_dev->port_owner)
set_port_feature(hdev, port1, USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER);
if (portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE)
goto done;
return;
}
if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
unit_load = 150;
else
unit_load = 100;
status = 0;
for (i = 0; i < SET_CONFIG_TRIES; i++) {
/* reallocate for each attempt, since references
* to the previous one can escape in various ways
*/
udev = usb_alloc_dev(hdev, hdev->bus, port1);
if (!udev) {
dev_err(&port_dev->dev,
"couldn't allocate usb_device\n");
goto done;
}
usb_set_device_state(udev, USB_STATE_POWERED);
udev->bus_mA = hub->mA_per_port;
udev->level = hdev->level + 1;
udev->wusb = hub_is_wusb(hub);
/* Only USB 3.0 devices are connected to SuperSpeed hubs. */
if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_SUPER;
else
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
choose_devnum(udev);
if (udev->devnum <= 0) {
status = -ENOTCONN; /* Don't retry */
goto loop;
}
/* reset (non-USB 3.0 devices) and get descriptor */
usb_lock_port(port_dev);
status = hub_port_init(hub, udev, port1, i);
usb_unlock_port(port_dev);
if (status < 0)
goto loop;
if (udev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT)
msleep(1000);
/* consecutive bus-powered hubs aren't reliable; they can
* violate the voltage drop budget. if the new child has
* a "powered" LED, users should notice we didn't enable it
* (without reading syslog), even without per-port LEDs
* on the parent.
*/
if (udev->descriptor.bDeviceClass == USB_CLASS_HUB
&& udev->bus_mA <= unit_load) {
u16 devstat;
status = usb_get_status(udev, USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0,
&devstat);
if (status) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "get status %d ?\n", status);
goto loop_disable;
}
if ((devstat & (1 << USB_DEVICE_SELF_POWERED)) == 0) {
dev_err(&udev->dev,
"can't connect bus-powered hub "
"to this port\n");
if (hub->has_indicators) {
hub->indicator[port1-1] =
INDICATOR_AMBER_BLINK;
queue_delayed_work(
system_power_efficient_wq,
&hub->leds, 0);
}
status = -ENOTCONN; /* Don't retry */
goto loop_disable;
}
}
/* check for devices running slower than they could */
if (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.bcdUSB) >= 0x0200
&& udev->speed == USB_SPEED_FULL
&& highspeed_hubs != 0)
check_highspeed(hub, udev, port1);
/* Store the parent's children[] pointer. At this point
* udev becomes globally accessible, although presumably
* no one will look at it until hdev is unlocked.
*/
status = 0;
mutex_lock(&usb_port_peer_mutex);
/* We mustn't add new devices if the parent hub has
* been disconnected; we would race with the
* recursively_mark_NOTATTACHED() routine.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&device_state_lock);
if (hdev->state == USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED)
status = -ENOTCONN;
else
port_dev->child = udev;
spin_unlock_irq(&device_state_lock);
mutex_unlock(&usb_port_peer_mutex);
/* Run it through the hoops (find a driver, etc) */
if (!status) {
status = usb_new_device(udev);
if (status) {
mutex_lock(&usb_port_peer_mutex);
spin_lock_irq(&device_state_lock);
port_dev->child = NULL;
spin_unlock_irq(&device_state_lock);
mutex_unlock(&usb_port_peer_mutex);
} else {
if (hcd->usb_phy && !hdev->parent)
usb_phy_notify_connect(hcd->usb_phy,
udev->speed);
}
}
if (status)
goto loop_disable;
status = hub_power_remaining(hub);
if (status)
dev_dbg(hub->intfdev, "%dmA power budget left\n", status);
return;
loop_disable:
hub_port_disable(hub, port1, 1);
loop:
usb_ep0_reinit(udev);
release_devnum(udev);
hub_free_dev(udev);
usb_put_dev(udev);
if ((status == -ENOTCONN) || (status == -ENOTSUPP))
break;
}
if (hub->hdev->parent ||
!hcd->driver->port_handed_over ||
!(hcd->driver->port_handed_over)(hcd, port1)) {
if (status != -ENOTCONN && status != -ENODEV)
dev_err(&port_dev->dev,
"unable to enumerate USB device\n");
}
done:
hub_port_disable(hub, port1, 1);
if (hcd->driver->relinquish_port && !hub->hdev->parent)
hcd->driver->relinquish_port(hcd, port1);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionSystemImpl::Shared::~Shared() {
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
[email protected]
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rds_free_mr(struct rds_sock *rs, char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
struct rds_free_mr_args args;
struct rds_mr *mr;
unsigned long flags;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct rds_free_mr_args))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&args, (struct rds_free_mr_args __user *)optval,
sizeof(struct rds_free_mr_args)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Special case - a null cookie means flush all unused MRs */
if (args.cookie == 0) {
if (!rs->rs_transport || !rs->rs_transport->flush_mrs)
return -EINVAL;
rs->rs_transport->flush_mrs();
return 0;
}
/* Look up the MR given its R_key and remove it from the rbtree
* so nobody else finds it.
* This should also prevent races with rds_rdma_unuse.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
mr = rds_mr_tree_walk(&rs->rs_rdma_keys, rds_rdma_cookie_key(args.cookie), NULL);
if (mr) {
rb_erase(&mr->r_rb_node, &rs->rs_rdma_keys);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mr->r_rb_node);
if (args.flags & RDS_RDMA_INVALIDATE)
mr->r_invalidate = 1;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
if (!mr)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* call rds_destroy_mr() ourselves so that we're sure it's done by the time
* we return. If we let rds_mr_put() do it it might not happen until
* someone else drops their ref.
*/
rds_destroy_mr(mr);
rds_mr_put(mr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map
This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was
attempted without any underlying transport being loaded.
Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR
(2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.
Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0
IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4
dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp
coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd
iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd
shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2
mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect
sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm
crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000
RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580
RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580
R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc
FS: 00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]
rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]
? __fget_light+0x25/0x60
? __fdget+0x13/0x20
SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9
RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b
RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860
R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021
Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48
89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48>
83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08
The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in
__rds_rdma_map().
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GDataFile::FromProto(const GDataEntryProto& proto) {
DCHECK(!proto.file_info().is_directory());
if (!GDataEntry::FromProto(proto))
return false;
thumbnail_url_ = GURL(proto.file_specific_info().thumbnail_url());
alternate_url_ = GURL(proto.file_specific_info().alternate_url());
content_mime_type_ = proto.file_specific_info().content_mime_type();
file_md5_ = proto.file_specific_info().file_md5();
document_extension_ = proto.file_specific_info().document_extension();
is_hosted_document_ = proto.file_specific_info().is_hosted_document();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btrfs_invalidate_inodes(struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct rb_node *node;
struct rb_node *prev;
struct btrfs_inode *entry;
struct inode *inode;
u64 objectid = 0;
WARN_ON(btrfs_root_refs(&root->root_item) != 0);
spin_lock(&root->inode_lock);
again:
node = root->inode_tree.rb_node;
prev = NULL;
while (node) {
prev = node;
entry = rb_entry(node, struct btrfs_inode, rb_node);
if (objectid < btrfs_ino(&entry->vfs_inode))
node = node->rb_left;
else if (objectid > btrfs_ino(&entry->vfs_inode))
node = node->rb_right;
else
break;
}
if (!node) {
while (prev) {
entry = rb_entry(prev, struct btrfs_inode, rb_node);
if (objectid <= btrfs_ino(&entry->vfs_inode)) {
node = prev;
break;
}
prev = rb_next(prev);
}
}
while (node) {
entry = rb_entry(node, struct btrfs_inode, rb_node);
objectid = btrfs_ino(&entry->vfs_inode) + 1;
inode = igrab(&entry->vfs_inode);
if (inode) {
spin_unlock(&root->inode_lock);
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count) > 1)
d_prune_aliases(inode);
/*
* btrfs_drop_inode will have it removed from
* the inode cache when its usage count
* hits zero.
*/
iput(inode);
cond_resched();
spin_lock(&root->inode_lock);
goto again;
}
if (cond_resched_lock(&root->inode_lock))
goto again;
node = rb_next(node);
}
spin_unlock(&root->inode_lock);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
{
char **xattrname;
int namelen;
int found = 0;
namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
if ((strlen(*xattrname) == namelen)
&& (strncmp(req_xattr_name, *xattrname, namelen) == 0)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
*xattrname + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
return found;
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 55,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void uv__process_close_stream(uv_stdio_container_t* container) {
if (!(container->flags & UV_CREATE_PIPE)) return;
uv__stream_close((uv_stream_t*)container->data.stream);
}
Commit Message: unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid
Partial fix for #1093
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *nested_svm_map(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 gpa, struct page **_page)
{
struct page *page;
might_sleep();
page = gfn_to_page(svm->vcpu.kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(page))
goto error;
*_page = page;
return kmap(page);
error:
kvm_inject_gp(&svm->vcpu, 0);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_da3_root_join(
struct xfs_da_state *state,
struct xfs_da_state_blk *root_blk)
{
struct xfs_da_intnode *oldroot;
struct xfs_da_args *args;
xfs_dablk_t child;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr oldroothdr;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree;
int error;
struct xfs_inode *dp = state->args->dp;
trace_xfs_da_root_join(state->args);
ASSERT(root_blk->magic == XFS_DA_NODE_MAGIC);
args = state->args;
oldroot = root_blk->bp->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&oldroothdr, oldroot);
ASSERT(oldroothdr.forw == 0);
ASSERT(oldroothdr.back == 0);
/*
* If the root has more than one child, then don't do anything.
*/
if (oldroothdr.count > 1)
return 0;
/*
* Read in the (only) child block, then copy those bytes into
* the root block's buffer and free the original child block.
*/
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(oldroot);
child = be32_to_cpu(btree[0].before);
ASSERT(child != 0);
error = xfs_da3_node_read(args->trans, dp, child, -1, &bp,
args->whichfork);
if (error)
return error;
xfs_da_blkinfo_onlychild_validate(bp->b_addr, oldroothdr.level);
/*
* This could be copying a leaf back into the root block in the case of
* there only being a single leaf block left in the tree. Hence we have
* to update the b_ops pointer as well to match the buffer type change
* that could occur. For dir3 blocks we also need to update the block
* number in the buffer header.
*/
memcpy(root_blk->bp->b_addr, bp->b_addr, state->blocksize);
root_blk->bp->b_ops = bp->b_ops;
xfs_trans_buf_copy_type(root_blk->bp, bp);
if (oldroothdr.magic == XFS_DA3_NODE_MAGIC) {
struct xfs_da3_blkinfo *da3 = root_blk->bp->b_addr;
da3->blkno = cpu_to_be64(root_blk->bp->b_bn);
}
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, root_blk->bp, 0, state->blocksize - 1);
error = xfs_da_shrink_inode(args, child, bp);
return(error);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_format_cpio_read_data(struct archive_read *a,
const void **buff, size_t *size, int64_t *offset)
{
ssize_t bytes_read;
struct cpio *cpio;
cpio = (struct cpio *)(a->format->data);
if (cpio->entry_bytes_unconsumed) {
__archive_read_consume(a, cpio->entry_bytes_unconsumed);
cpio->entry_bytes_unconsumed = 0;
}
if (cpio->entry_bytes_remaining > 0) {
*buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_read);
if (bytes_read <= 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if (bytes_read > cpio->entry_bytes_remaining)
bytes_read = (ssize_t)cpio->entry_bytes_remaining;
*size = bytes_read;
cpio->entry_bytes_unconsumed = bytes_read;
*offset = cpio->entry_offset;
cpio->entry_offset += bytes_read;
cpio->entry_bytes_remaining -= bytes_read;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
} else {
if (cpio->entry_padding !=
__archive_read_consume(a, cpio->entry_padding)) {
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
cpio->entry_padding = 0;
*buff = NULL;
*size = 0;
*offset = cpio->entry_offset;
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
}
}
Commit Message: Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 52,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserContextIOData::GetTemporarySavedPermissionContext() const {
return temporary_saved_permission_context_.get();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_exit ip6mr_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
remove_proc_entry("ip6_mr_cache", net->proc_net);
remove_proc_entry("ip6_mr_vif", net->proc_net);
#endif
ip6mr_rules_exit(net);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lookup_journal_in_cursum(struct f2fs_journal *journal, int type,
unsigned int val, int alloc)
{
int i;
if (type == NAT_JOURNAL) {
for (i = 0; i < nats_in_cursum(journal); i++) {
if (le32_to_cpu(nid_in_journal(journal, i)) == val)
return i;
}
if (alloc && __has_cursum_space(journal, 1, NAT_JOURNAL))
return update_nats_in_cursum(journal, 1);
} else if (type == SIT_JOURNAL) {
for (i = 0; i < sits_in_cursum(journal); i++)
if (le32_to_cpu(segno_in_journal(journal, i)) == val)
return i;
if (alloc && __has_cursum_space(journal, 1, SIT_JOURNAL))
return update_sits_in_cursum(journal, 1);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t PPB_URLLoader_Impl::Open(PP_Resource request_id,
scoped_refptr<TrackedCallback> callback) {
if (main_document_loader_)
return PP_ERROR_INPROGRESS;
EnterResourceNoLock<PPB_URLRequestInfo_API> enter_request(request_id, true);
if (enter_request.failed()) {
Log(PP_LOGLEVEL_ERROR,
"PPB_URLLoader.Open: invalid request resource ID. (Hint to C++ wrapper"
" users: use the ResourceRequest constructor that takes an instance or"
" else the request will be null.)");
return PP_ERROR_BADARGUMENT;
}
PPB_URLRequestInfo_Impl* request = static_cast<PPB_URLRequestInfo_Impl*>(
enter_request.object());
int32_t rv = ValidateCallback(callback);
if (rv != PP_OK)
return rv;
if (request->RequiresUniversalAccess() && !has_universal_access_) {
Log(PP_LOGLEVEL_ERROR, "PPB_URLLoader.Open: The URL you're requesting is "
" on a different security origin than your plugin. To request "
" cross-origin resources, see "
" PP_URLREQUESTPROPERTY_ALLOWCROSSORIGINREQUESTS.");
return PP_ERROR_NOACCESS;
}
if (loader_.get())
return PP_ERROR_INPROGRESS;
WebFrame* frame = GetFrameForResource(this);
if (!frame)
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
WebURLRequest web_request;
if (!request->ToWebURLRequest(frame, &web_request))
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
request_data_ = request->GetData();
WebURLLoaderOptions options;
if (has_universal_access_) {
options.allowCredentials = true;
options.crossOriginRequestPolicy =
WebURLLoaderOptions::CrossOriginRequestPolicyAllow;
} else {
options.untrustedHTTP = true;
if (request_data_.allow_cross_origin_requests) {
options.allowCredentials = request_data_.allow_credentials;
options.crossOriginRequestPolicy =
WebURLLoaderOptions::CrossOriginRequestPolicyUseAccessControl;
} else {
options.allowCredentials = true;
}
}
is_asynchronous_load_suspended_ = false;
loader_.reset(frame->createAssociatedURLLoader(options));
if (!loader_.get())
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
loader_->loadAsynchronously(web_request, this);
RegisterCallback(callback);
return PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING;
}
Commit Message: Remove possibility of stale user_buffer_ member in PPB_URLLoader_Impl when FinishedLoading() is called.
BUG=137778
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10797037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@147914 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SVGStyleElement::disabled() const {
if (!sheet_)
return false;
return sheet_->disabled();
}
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 154,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IRCView::appendAction(const QString& nick, const QString& message)
{
QString actionColor = Preferences::self()->color(Preferences::ActionMessage).name();
QString line;
QString nickLine = createNickLine(nick, actionColor, false);
if (message.isEmpty())
{
if (!QApplication::isLeftToRight())
line += LRE;
line += "<font color=\"" + actionColor + "\">%1 * " + nickLine + "</font>";
line = line.arg(timeStamp(), nick);
emit textToLog(QString("\t * %1").arg(nick));
doAppend(line, false);
}
else
{
QChar::Direction dir;
QString text(filter(message, actionColor, nick, true,true, false, &dir));
bool rtl = (dir == QChar::DirR);
if (rtl)
{
line = RLE;
line += LRE;
line += "<font color=\"" + actionColor + "\">" + nickLine + " * %1" + PDF + " %3</font>";
}
else
{
if (!QApplication::isLeftToRight())
line += LRE;
line += "<font color=\"" + actionColor + "\">%1 * " + nickLine + " %3</font>";
}
line = line.arg(timeStamp(), nick, text);
emit textToLog(QString("\t * %1 %2").arg(nick, message));
doAppend(line, rtl);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreatePersistentHistogramAllocator() {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(
kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, "HistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 172,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bdrv_set_io_limits(BlockDriverState *bs,
ThrottleConfig *cfg)
{
int i;
throttle_config(&bs->throttle_state, cfg);
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
qemu_co_enter_next(&bs->throttled_reqs[i]);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void crypto_skcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = __crypto_skcipher_cast(tfm);
struct skcipher_alg *alg = crypto_skcipher_alg(skcipher);
alg->exit(skcipher);
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 64,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pit_get_out(struct kvm *kvm, int channel)
{
struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *c =
&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[channel];
s64 d, t;
int out;
WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock));
t = kpit_elapsed(kvm, c, channel);
d = muldiv64(t, KVM_PIT_FREQ, NSEC_PER_SEC);
switch (c->mode) {
default:
case 0:
out = (d >= c->count);
break;
case 1:
out = (d < c->count);
break;
case 2:
out = ((mod_64(d, c->count) == 0) && (d != 0));
break;
case 3:
out = (mod_64(d, c->count) < ((c->count + 1) >> 1));
break;
case 4:
case 5:
out = (d == c->count);
break;
}
return out;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 37,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __page_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *symname, int len, int nofs)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct page *page;
void *fsdata;
int err;
unsigned int flags = AOP_FLAG_UNINTERRUPTIBLE;
if (nofs)
flags |= AOP_FLAG_NOFS;
retry:
err = pagecache_write_begin(NULL, mapping, 0, len-1,
flags, &page, &fsdata);
if (err)
goto fail;
memcpy(page_address(page), symname, len-1);
err = pagecache_write_end(NULL, mapping, 0, len-1, len-1,
page, fsdata);
if (err < 0)
goto fail;
if (err < len-1)
goto retry;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return 0;
fail:
return err;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 51,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stringAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setStringAttr(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void xhci_dma_write_u32s(XHCIState *xhci, dma_addr_t addr,
uint32_t *buf, size_t len)
{
int i;
uint32_t tmp[len / sizeof(uint32_t)];
assert((len % sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0);
for (i = 0; i < (len / sizeof(uint32_t)); i++) {
tmp[i] = cpu_to_le32(buf[i]);
}
pci_dma_write(PCI_DEVICE(xhci), addr, tmp, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_studio_vol_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
int width, height;
int bits_per_raw_sample;
skip_bits(gb, 4); /* video_object_layer_verid */
ctx->shape = get_bits(gb, 2); /* video_object_layer_shape */
skip_bits(gb, 4); /* video_object_layer_shape_extension */
skip_bits1(gb); /* progressive_sequence */
if (ctx->shape != BIN_ONLY_SHAPE) {
ctx->rgb = get_bits1(gb); /* rgb_components */
s->chroma_format = get_bits(gb, 2); /* chroma_format */
if (!s->chroma_format) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal chroma format\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
bits_per_raw_sample = get_bits(gb, 4); /* bit_depth */
if (bits_per_raw_sample == 10) {
if (ctx->rgb) {
s->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10;
}
else {
s->avctx->pix_fmt = s->chroma_format == CHROMA_422 ? AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10 : AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10;
}
}
else {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "MPEG-4 Studio profile bit-depth %u", bits_per_raw_sample);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = bits_per_raw_sample;
}
if (ctx->shape == RECT_SHAPE) {
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "before video_object_layer_width");
width = get_bits(gb, 14); /* video_object_layer_width */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "before video_object_layer_height");
height = get_bits(gb, 14); /* video_object_layer_height */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after video_object_layer_height");
/* Do the same check as non-studio profile */
if (width && height) {
if (s->width && s->height &&
(s->width != width || s->height != height))
s->context_reinit = 1;
s->width = width;
s->height = height;
}
}
s->aspect_ratio_info = get_bits(gb, 4);
if (s->aspect_ratio_info == FF_ASPECT_EXTENDED) {
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num = get_bits(gb, 8); // par_width
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den = get_bits(gb, 8); // par_height
} else {
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio = ff_h263_pixel_aspect[s->aspect_ratio_info];
}
skip_bits(gb, 4); /* frame_rate_code */
skip_bits(gb, 15); /* first_half_bit_rate */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after first_half_bit_rate");
skip_bits(gb, 15); /* latter_half_bit_rate */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after latter_half_bit_rate");
skip_bits(gb, 15); /* first_half_vbv_buffer_size */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after first_half_vbv_buffer_size");
skip_bits(gb, 3); /* latter_half_vbv_buffer_size */
skip_bits(gb, 11); /* first_half_vbv_buffer_size */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after first_half_vbv_buffer_size");
skip_bits(gb, 15); /* latter_half_vbv_occupancy */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after latter_half_vbv_occupancy");
s->low_delay = get_bits1(gb);
s->mpeg_quant = get_bits1(gb); /* mpeg2_stream */
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 2);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_pcm_loopback(int argc, char **argv) {
if (argc != 1) {
printf("PCM loopback mode not specified.\n");
return 1;
}
if (strcmp(argv[0], "true") && strcmp(argv[0], "false")) {
printf("Invalid PCM mode '%s'.\n", argv[0]);
return 2;
}
uint8_t packet[] = { 0x24, 0xFC, 0x01, 0x00 };
if (argv[0][0] == 't')
packet[ARRAY_SIZE(packet) - 1] = 0x01;
return !write_hci_command(HCI_PACKET_COMMAND, packet, ARRAY_SIZE(packet));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 159,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cdc_ncm_get_sset_count(struct net_device __always_unused *netdev, int sset)
{
switch (sset) {
case ETH_SS_STATS:
return ARRAY_SIZE(cdc_ncm_gstrings_stats);
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::updateNotificationPermission(const BlackBerry::Platform::String& requestId, bool allowed)
{
#if ENABLE(NOTIFICATIONS) || ENABLE(LEGACY_NOTIFICATIONS)
d->notificationManager().updatePermission(requestId, allowed);
#else
UNUSED_PARAM(requestId);
UNUSED_PARAM(allowed);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT5(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
MagickSizeType
alpha_bits;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
a0,
a1;
size_t
alpha,
bits,
code,
alpha_code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, MagickMin(4, dds_info->width - x),
MagickMin(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
a1 = (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
alpha_bits = (MagickSizeType)ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
alpha_bits = alpha_bits | ((MagickSizeType)ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 32);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/* Extract alpha value */
alpha_code = (size_t) (alpha_bits >> (3*(4*j+i))) & 0x7;
if (alpha_code == 0)
alpha = a0;
else if (alpha_code == 1)
alpha = a1;
else if (a0 > a1)
alpha = ((8-alpha_code) * a0 + (alpha_code-1) * a1) / 7;
else if (alpha_code == 6)
alpha = 0;
else if (alpha_code == 7)
alpha = 255;
else
alpha = (((6-alpha_code) * a0 + (alpha_code-1) * a1) / 5);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
return(SkipDXTMipmaps(image,dds_info,16,exception));
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 65,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *dbg_get_reg(int regno, void *mem, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (regno == GDB_ORIG_AX) {
memcpy(mem, ®s->orig_ax, sizeof(regs->orig_ax));
return "orig_ax";
}
if (regno >= DBG_MAX_REG_NUM || regno < 0)
return NULL;
if (dbg_reg_def[regno].offset != -1)
memcpy(mem, (void *)regs + dbg_reg_def[regno].offset,
dbg_reg_def[regno].size);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
switch (regno) {
case GDB_SS:
if (!user_mode_vm(regs))
*(unsigned long *)mem = __KERNEL_DS;
break;
case GDB_SP:
if (!user_mode_vm(regs))
*(unsigned long *)mem = kernel_stack_pointer(regs);
break;
case GDB_GS:
case GDB_FS:
*(unsigned long *)mem = 0xFFFF;
break;
}
#endif
return dbg_reg_def[regno].name;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestingAutomationProvider::IsEnterpriseDevice(
DictionaryValue* args, IPC::Message* reply_message) {
AutomationJSONReply reply(this, reply_message);
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector* connector =
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector();
if (!connector) {
reply.SendError("Unable to access BrowserPolicyConnector");
return;
}
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> return_value(new DictionaryValue);
return_value->SetBoolean("enterprise", connector->IsEnterpriseManaged());
reply.SendSuccess(return_value.get());
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const ScrollPaintPropertyNode* PaintPropertyTreeBuilderTest::DocScroll(
const Document* document) {
if (!document)
document = &GetDocument();
return document->GetLayoutView()->FirstFragment().PaintProperties()->Scroll();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_linux_md_add_spare (Device *device,
char *component,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
if (!device->priv->device_is_linux_md)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Device is not a Linux md drive");
goto out;
}
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.linux-md",
"LinuxMdAddSpare",
TRUE,
device_linux_md_add_spare_authorized_cb,
context,
2,
g_strdup (component),
g_free,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
out:
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,648 |
Subsets and Splits