instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseAudioContext::Uninitialize() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
if (!IsDestinationInitialized())
return;
if (destination_node_)
destination_node_->Handler().Uninitialize();
GetDeferredTaskHandler().FinishTailProcessing();
ReleaseActiveSourceNodes();
RejectPendingResolvers();
DidClose();
DCHECK(listener_);
listener_->WaitForHRTFDatabaseLoaderThreadCompletion();
RecordAutoplayStatus();
Clear();
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void entry_close_session(struct thread_smc_args *smc_args,
struct optee_msg_arg *arg, uint32_t num_params)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_ta_session *s;
if (num_params) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
plat_prng_add_jitter_entropy(CRYPTO_RNG_SRC_JITTER_SESSION,
&session_pnum);
s = (struct tee_ta_session *)(vaddr_t)arg->session;
res = tee_ta_close_session(s, &tee_open_sessions, NSAPP_IDENTITY);
out:
arg->ret = res;
arg->ret_origin = TEE_ORIGIN_TEE;
smc_args->a0 = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_OK;
}
Commit Message: core: ensure that supplied range matches MOBJ
In set_rmem_param() if the MOBJ is found by the cookie it's verified to
represent non-secure shared memory. Prior to this patch the supplied
sub-range to be used of the MOBJ was not checked here and relied on
later checks further down the chain. Those checks seems to be enough
for user TAs, but not for pseudo TAs where the size isn't checked.
This patch adds a check for offset and size to see that they remain
inside the memory covered by the MOBJ.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0004: "Unchecked parameters are passed through from
REE".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp)
{
struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_arg.head;
unsigned int base;
int n;
p = nfs2svc_decode_fh(p, &argp->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
argp->mask = ntohl(*p++);
if (argp->mask & ~NFS_ACL_MASK ||
!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
base = (char *)p - (char *)head->iov_base;
n = nfsacl_decode(&rqstp->rq_arg, base, NULL,
(argp->mask & NFS_ACL) ?
&argp->acl_access : NULL);
if (n > 0)
n = nfsacl_decode(&rqstp->rq_arg, base + n, NULL,
(argp->mask & NFS_DFACL) ?
&argp->acl_default : NULL);
return (n > 0);
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 55,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long validate_slab_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
int node;
unsigned long count = 0;
unsigned long *map = kmalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(oo_objects(s->max)) *
sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!map)
return -ENOMEM;
flush_all(s);
for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) {
struct kmem_cache_node *n = get_node(s, node);
count += validate_slab_node(s, n, map);
}
kfree(map);
return count;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_value(config_fn_t fn, void *data, char *name, unsigned int len)
{
int c;
char *value;
/* Get the full name */
for (;;) {
c = get_next_char();
if (config_file_eof)
break;
if (!iskeychar(c))
break;
name[len++] = c;
if (len >= MAXNAME)
return -1;
}
name[len] = 0;
while (c == ' ' || c == '\t')
c = get_next_char();
value = NULL;
if (c != '\n') {
if (c != '=')
return -1;
value = parse_value();
if (!value)
return -1;
}
return fn(name, value, data);
}
Commit Message: perf tools: do not look at ./config for configuration
In addition to /etc/perfconfig and $HOME/.perfconfig, perf looks for
configuration in the file ./config, imitating git which looks at
$GIT_DIR/config. If ./config is not a perf configuration file, it
fails, or worse, treats it as a configuration file and changes behavior
in some unexpected way.
"config" is not an unusual name for a file to be lying around and perf
does not have a private directory dedicated for its own use, so let's
just stop looking for configuration in the cwd. Callers needing
context-sensitive configuration can use the PERF_CONFIG environment
variable.
Requested-by: Christian Ohm <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Ohm <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned long size)
{
if (size > (1U << 31))
return 0;
/* Minimum pipe size, as required by POSIX */
if (size < PAGE_SIZE)
return PAGE_SIZE;
return roundup_pow_of_two(size);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void debugMutexEnter(sqlite3_mutex *pX){
sqlite3_debug_mutex *p = (sqlite3_debug_mutex*)pX;
assert( p->id==SQLITE_MUTEX_RECURSIVE || debugMutexNotheld(pX) );
p->cnt++;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GeometryMapper::ClearCache() {
GeometryMapperTransformCache::ClearCache();
GeometryMapperClipCache::ClearCache();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg)
{
int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
if (tg->cfs_rq)
kfree(tg->cfs_rq[i]);
if (tg->se)
kfree(tg->se[i]);
}
kfree(tg->cfs_rq);
kfree(tg->se);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool virtio_device_endian_needed(void *opaque)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = opaque;
assert(vdev->device_endian != VIRTIO_DEVICE_ENDIAN_UNKNOWN);
if (!virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1)) {
return vdev->device_endian != virtio_default_endian();
}
/* Devices conforming to VIRTIO 1.0 or later are always LE. */
return vdev->device_endian != VIRTIO_DEVICE_ENDIAN_LITTLE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaymentRequestState::RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rgb2bgr(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, float *dv, const float *sv)
{
dv[0] = sv[2];
dv[1] = sv[1];
dv[2] = sv[0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dummyrange(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *ptr)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncTest::AwaitQuiescence() {
return ProfileSyncServiceHarness::AwaitQuiescence(clients());
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionTtsPlatformImplLinux() {}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiscardableSharedMemoryManager::AllocateLockedDiscardableSharedMemory(
int client_id,
size_t size,
int32_t id,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* shared_memory_handle) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
MemorySegmentMap& client_segments = clients_[client_id];
if (client_segments.find(id) != client_segments.end()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid discardable shared memory ID";
*shared_memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
return;
}
size_t limit = 0;
if (size < memory_limit_)
limit = memory_limit_ - size;
if (bytes_allocated_ > limit)
ReduceMemoryUsageUntilWithinLimit(limit);
std::unique_ptr<base::DiscardableSharedMemory> memory(
new base::DiscardableSharedMemory);
if (!memory->CreateAndMap(size)) {
*shared_memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
return;
}
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> checked_bytes_allocated = bytes_allocated_;
checked_bytes_allocated += memory->mapped_size();
if (!checked_bytes_allocated.IsValid()) {
*shared_memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
return;
}
bytes_allocated_ = checked_bytes_allocated.ValueOrDie();
BytesAllocatedChanged(bytes_allocated_);
*shared_memory_handle = base::SharedMemory::DuplicateHandle(memory->handle());
memory->Close();
scoped_refptr<MemorySegment> segment(new MemorySegment(std::move(memory)));
client_segments[id] = segment.get();
segments_.push_back(segment.get());
std::push_heap(segments_.begin(), segments_.end(), CompareMemoryUsageTime);
if (bytes_allocated_ > memory_limit_)
ScheduleEnforceMemoryPolicy();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteGIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
c;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
RectangleInfo
page;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
delay,
imageListLength,
length,
one;
ssize_t
j,
opacity;
unsigned char
*colormap,
*global_colormap;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Allocate colormap.
*/
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(768UL,
sizeof(*global_colormap));
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(768UL,sizeof(*colormap));
if ((global_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
if (global_colormap != (unsigned char *) NULL)
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
if (colormap != (unsigned char *) NULL)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < 768; i++)
colormap[i]=(unsigned char) 0;
/*
Write GIF header.
*/
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if (LocaleCompare(write_info->magick,"GIF87") != 0)
(void) WriteBlob(image,6,(unsigned char *) "GIF89a");
else
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,6,(unsigned char *) "GIF87a");
write_info->adjoin=MagickFalse;
}
/*
Determine image bounding box.
*/
page.width=image->columns;
if (image->page.width > page.width)
page.width=image->page.width;
page.height=image->rows;
if (image->page.height > page.height)
page.height=image->page.height;
page.x=image->page.x;
page.y=image->page.y;
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) page.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) page.height);
/*
Write images to file.
*/
if ((write_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) &&
(GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
write_info->interlace=NoInterlace;
scene=0;
one=1;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
opacity=(-1);
if (IsImageOpaque(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
{
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType,exception);
}
else
{
double
alpha,
beta;
/*
Identify transparent colormap index.
*/
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteBilevelAlphaType,exception);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (image->colormap[i].alpha != OpaqueAlpha)
{
if (opacity < 0)
{
opacity=i;
continue;
}
alpha=fabs(image->colormap[i].alpha-TransparentAlpha);
beta=fabs(image->colormap[opacity].alpha-TransparentAlpha);
if (alpha < beta)
opacity=i;
}
if (opacity == -1)
{
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteBilevelAlphaType,exception);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (image->colormap[i].alpha != OpaqueAlpha)
{
if (opacity < 0)
{
opacity=i;
continue;
}
alpha=fabs(image->colormap[i].alpha-TransparentAlpha);
beta=fabs(image->colormap[opacity].alpha-TransparentAlpha);
if (alpha < beta)
opacity=i;
}
}
if (opacity >= 0)
{
image->colormap[opacity].red=image->transparent_color.red;
image->colormap[opacity].green=image->transparent_color.green;
image->colormap[opacity].blue=image->transparent_color.blue;
}
}
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (bits_per_pixel=1; bits_per_pixel < 8; bits_per_pixel++)
if ((one << bits_per_pixel) >= image->colors)
break;
q=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].red));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].green));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].blue));
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (one << bits_per_pixel); i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
}
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(write_info->adjoin == MagickFalse))
{
/*
Write global colormap.
*/
c=0x80;
c|=(8-1) << 4; /* color resolution */
c|=(bits_per_pixel-1); /* size of global colormap */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->colors; j++)
if (IsPixelInfoEquivalent(&image->background_color,image->colormap+j))
break;
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char)
(j == (ssize_t) image->colors ? 0 : j)); /* background color */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00); /* reserved */
length=(size_t) (3*(one << bits_per_pixel));
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,colormap);
for (j=0; j < 768; j++)
global_colormap[j]=colormap[j];
}
if (LocaleCompare(write_info->magick,"GIF87") != 0)
{
const char
*value;
/*
Write graphics control extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xf9);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x04);
c=image->dispose << 2;
if (opacity >= 0)
c|=0x01;
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
delay=(size_t) (100*image->delay/MagickMax((size_t)
image->ticks_per_second,1));
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) delay);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) (opacity >= 0 ? opacity :
0));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
size_t
count;
/*
Write comment extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xfe);
for (p=value; *p != '\0'; )
{
count=MagickMin(strlen(p),255);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) count);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) *p++);
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
}
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL) &&
(GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) &&
(image->iterations != 1))
{
/*
Write Netscape Loop extension.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","NETSCAPE2.0");
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x0b);
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) "NETSCAPE2.0");
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x03);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x01);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->iterations ?
image->iterations-1 : 0));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
}
if ((image->gamma != 1.0f/2.2f))
{
char
attributes[MagickPathExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Write ImageMagick extension.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","ImageMagick");
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x0b);
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) "ImageMagick");
count=FormatLocaleString(attributes,MagickPathExtent,"gamma=%g",
image->gamma);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) count);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) attributes);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
}
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for ( ; ; )
{
char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
if (name == (const char *) NULL)
break;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"ICC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"ICM") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"IPTC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"8BIM") == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(name,"gif:",4) == 0))
{
ssize_t
offset;
unsigned char
*datum;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x0b);
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"ICC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"ICM") == 0))
{
/*
Write ICC extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) "ICCRGBG1012");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","ICCRGBG1012");
}
else
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"IPTC") == 0))
{
/*
Write IPTC extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) "MGKIPTC0000");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","MGKIPTC0000");
}
else
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"8BIM") == 0))
{
/*
Write 8BIM extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *)
"MGK8BIM0000");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","MGK8BIM0000");
}
else
{
char
extension[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Write generic extension.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(extension,name+4,
sizeof(extension));
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) extension);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s",name);
}
offset=0;
while ((ssize_t) length > offset)
{
size_t
block_length;
if ((length-offset) < 255)
block_length=length-offset;
else
block_length=255;
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) block_length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) block_length,datum+offset);
offset+=(ssize_t) block_length;
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
}
}
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,','); /* image separator */
/*
Write the image header.
*/
page.x=image->page.x;
page.y=image->page.y;
if ((image->page.width != 0) && (image->page.height != 0))
page=image->page;
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (page.x < 0 ? 0 : page.x));
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (page.y < 0 ? 0 : page.y));
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
c=0x00;
if (write_info->interlace != NoInterlace)
c|=0x40; /* pixel data is interlaced */
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors); j++)
if (colormap[j] != global_colormap[j])
break;
if (j == (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
else
{
c|=0x80;
c|=(bits_per_pixel-1); /* size of local colormap */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
length=(size_t) (3*(one << bits_per_pixel));
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,colormap);
}
/*
Write the image data.
*/
c=(int) MagickMax(bits_per_pixel,2);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
status=EncodeImage(write_info,image,(size_t) MagickMax(bits_per_pixel,2)+1,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
scene++;
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (write_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,';'); /* terminator */
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 96,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cgm_get_nrtasks(void *hdata)
{
struct cgm_data *d = hdata;
int32_t *pids;
size_t pids_len;
if (!d || !d->cgroup_path)
return -1;
if (!cgm_dbus_connect()) {
ERROR("Error connecting to cgroup manager");
return -1;
}
if (cgmanager_get_tasks_sync(NULL, cgroup_manager, subsystems[0],
d->cgroup_path, &pids, &pids_len) != 0) {
NihError *nerr;
nerr = nih_error_get();
ERROR("call to cgmanager_get_tasks_sync failed: %s", nerr->message);
nih_free(nerr);
pids_len = -1;
goto out;
}
nih_free(pids);
out:
cgm_dbus_disconnect();
return pids_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int t220_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *d)
{
u8 obuf[3] = { 0xe, 0x87, 0 };
u8 ibuf[] = { 0 };
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x86;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x80;
obuf[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
msleep(50);
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x80;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0x51;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 1, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x51 transfer failed.");
d->fe_adap[0].fe = dvb_attach(cxd2820r_attach, &cxd2820r_config,
&d->dev->i2c_adap, NULL);
if (d->fe_adap[0].fe != NULL) {
if (dvb_attach(tda18271_attach, d->fe_adap[0].fe, 0x60,
&d->dev->i2c_adap, &tda18271_config)) {
info("Attached TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return 0;
}
}
info("Failed to attach TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[[email protected]: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool jsvHasStringExt(const JsVar *v) {
return jsvIsString(v) || jsvIsStringExt(v);
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hardware_enable(void)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
u64 old, test_bits;
if (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE)
return -EBUSY;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu));
spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
/*
* Now we can enable the vmclear operation in kdump
* since the loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list on this cpu
* has been initialized.
*
* Though the cpu is not in VMX operation now, there
* is no problem to enable the vmclear operation
* for the loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list is empty!
*/
crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old);
test_bits = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED;
test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
if (tboot_enabled())
test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
if ((old & test_bits) != test_bits) {
/* enable and lock */
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old | test_bits);
}
kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
ept_sync_global();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 62,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void file_free(struct file *f)
{
percpu_counter_dec(&nr_files);
file_check_state(f);
call_rcu(&f->f_u.fu_rcuhead, file_free_rcu);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Vec4::SetValues<GLfloat>(const GLfloat* values) {
DCHECK(values);
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < 4; ++ii)
v_[ii].float_value = values[ii];
type_ = SHADER_VARIABLE_FLOAT;
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 150,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmp_node(const struct archive_rb_node *n1, const struct archive_rb_node *n2)
{
const struct zip_entry *e1 = (const struct zip_entry *)n1;
const struct zip_entry *e2 = (const struct zip_entry *)n2;
if (e1->local_header_offset > e2->local_header_offset)
return -1;
if (e1->local_header_offset < e2->local_header_offset)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 55,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlHasFeature(xmlFeature feature)
{
switch (feature) {
case XML_WITH_THREAD:
#ifdef LIBXML_THREAD_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_TREE:
#ifdef LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_OUTPUT:
#ifdef LIBXML_OUTPUT_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_PUSH:
#ifdef LIBXML_PUSH_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_READER:
#ifdef LIBXML_READER_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_PATTERN:
#ifdef LIBXML_PATTERN_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_WRITER:
#ifdef LIBXML_WRITER_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_SAX1:
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_FTP:
#ifdef LIBXML_FTP_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_HTTP:
#ifdef LIBXML_HTTP_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_VALID:
#ifdef LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_HTML:
#ifdef LIBXML_HTML_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_LEGACY:
#ifdef LIBXML_LEGACY_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_C14N:
#ifdef LIBXML_C14N_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_CATALOG:
#ifdef LIBXML_CATALOG_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_XPATH:
#ifdef LIBXML_XPATH_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_XPTR:
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_XINCLUDE:
#ifdef LIBXML_XINCLUDE_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ICONV:
#ifdef LIBXML_ICONV_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ISO8859X:
#ifdef LIBXML_ISO8859X_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_UNICODE:
#ifdef LIBXML_UNICODE_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_REGEXP:
#ifdef LIBXML_REGEXP_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_AUTOMATA:
#ifdef LIBXML_AUTOMATA_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_EXPR:
#ifdef LIBXML_EXPR_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_SCHEMAS:
#ifdef LIBXML_SCHEMAS_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_SCHEMATRON:
#ifdef LIBXML_SCHEMATRON_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_MODULES:
#ifdef LIBXML_MODULES_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_DEBUG:
#ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_DEBUG_MEM:
#ifdef DEBUG_MEMORY_LOCATION
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_DEBUG_RUN:
#ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_RUNTIME
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ZLIB:
#ifdef LIBXML_ZLIB_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_LZMA:
#ifdef LIBXML_LZMA_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ICU:
#ifdef LIBXML_ICU_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
default:
break;
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
aesni_dec(ctx, dst, src);
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputType::ReceiveDroppedFiles(const DragData*) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BaseShadow::baseInit( ClassAd *job_ad, const char* schedd_addr, const char *xfer_queue_contact_info )
{
int pending = FALSE;
if( ! job_ad ) {
EXCEPT("baseInit() called with NULL job_ad!");
}
jobAd = job_ad;
if (sendUpdatesToSchedd && ! is_valid_sinful(schedd_addr)) {
EXCEPT("schedd_addr not specified with valid address");
}
scheddAddr = sendUpdatesToSchedd ? strdup( schedd_addr ) : strdup("noschedd");
m_xfer_queue_contact_info = xfer_queue_contact_info;
if ( !jobAd->LookupString(ATTR_OWNER, owner)) {
EXCEPT("Job ad doesn't contain an %s attribute.", ATTR_OWNER);
}
if( !jobAd->LookupInteger(ATTR_CLUSTER_ID, cluster)) {
EXCEPT("Job ad doesn't contain an %s attribute.", ATTR_CLUSTER_ID);
}
if( !jobAd->LookupInteger(ATTR_PROC_ID, proc)) {
EXCEPT("Job ad doesn't contain an %s attribute.", ATTR_PROC_ID);
}
if( ! jobAd->LookupString(ATTR_GLOBAL_JOB_ID, &gjid) ) {
gjid = NULL;
}
jobAd->LookupString(ATTR_NT_DOMAIN, domain);
if ( !jobAd->LookupString(ATTR_JOB_IWD, iwd)) {
EXCEPT("Job ad doesn't contain an %s attribute.", ATTR_JOB_IWD);
}
if( !jobAd->LookupFloat(ATTR_BYTES_SENT, prev_run_bytes_sent) ) {
prev_run_bytes_sent = 0;
}
if( !jobAd->LookupFloat(ATTR_BYTES_RECVD, prev_run_bytes_recvd) ) {
prev_run_bytes_recvd = 0;
}
MyString tmp_name = iwd;
tmp_name += DIR_DELIM_CHAR;
tmp_name += "core.";
tmp_name += cluster;
tmp_name += '.';
tmp_name += proc;
core_file_name = strdup( tmp_name.Value() );
MyString tmp_addr = ATTR_MY_ADDRESS;
tmp_addr += "=\"";
tmp_addr += daemonCore->InfoCommandSinfulString();
tmp_addr += '"';
if ( !jobAd->Insert( tmp_addr.Value() )) {
EXCEPT( "Failed to insert %s!", ATTR_MY_ADDRESS );
}
DebugId = display_dprintf_header;
config();
checkSwap();
if ( !init_user_ids(owner.Value(), domain.Value())) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "init_user_ids() failed as user %s\n",owner.Value() );
#if ! defined(WIN32)
if ( param_boolean( "SHADOW_RUN_UNKNOWN_USER_JOBS", false ) )
{
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "trying init_user_ids() as user nobody\n" );
owner="nobody";
domain=NULL;
if (!init_user_ids(owner.Value(), domain.Value()))
{
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "init_user_ids() failed!\n");
}
else
{
jobAd->Assign( ATTR_JOB_RUNAS_OWNER, "FALSE" );
m_RunAsNobody=true;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "init_user_ids() now running as user nobody\n");
}
}
#endif
}
set_user_priv();
daemonCore->Register_Priv_State( PRIV_USER );
dumpClassad( "BaseShadow::baseInit()", this->jobAd, D_JOB );
shadow_user_policy.init( jobAd, this );
if (sendUpdatesToSchedd) {
job_updater = new QmgrJobUpdater( jobAd, scheddAddr, CondorVersion() );
} else {
job_updater = new NullQmgrJobUpdater( jobAd, scheddAddr, CondorVersion() );
}
initUserLog();
if ( cdToIwd() == -1 ) {
EXCEPT("Could not cd to initial working directory");
}
if( jobAd->LookupInteger(ATTR_TERMINATION_PENDING, pending)) {
if (pending == TRUE) {
this->terminateJob(US_TERMINATE_PENDING);
}
}
int wantClaiming = 0;
jobAd->LookupBool(ATTR_CLAIM_STARTD, wantClaiming);
if (wantClaiming) {
MyString startdSinful;
MyString claimid;
jobAd->LookupString(ATTR_STARTD_IP_ADDR, startdSinful);
jobAd->LookupString(ATTR_CLAIM_ID, claimid);
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "%s is true, trying to claim startd %s\n", ATTR_CLAIM_STARTD, startdSinful.Value());
classy_counted_ptr<DCStartd> startd = new DCStartd("description", NULL, startdSinful.Value(), claimid.Value());
classy_counted_ptr<DCMsgCallback> cb =
new DCMsgCallback((DCMsgCallback::CppFunction)&BaseShadow::startdClaimedCB,
this, jobAd);
startd->asyncRequestOpportunisticClaim(jobAd,
"description",
daemonCore->InfoCommandSinfulString(),
1200 /*alive interval*/,
20 /* net timeout*/,
100 /*total timeout*/,
cb);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: id_sys(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, u16 code)
{
int n = ((code >> 8) & 0xf);
unsigned long *reg = (code & 0x0010) ? &FPUL : &FPSCR;
switch (code & 0xf0ff) {
case 0x005a:
case 0x006a:
Rn = *reg;
break;
case 0x405a:
case 0x406a:
*reg = Rn;
break;
case 0x4052:
case 0x4062:
Rn -= 4;
WRITE(*reg, Rn);
break;
case 0x4056:
case 0x4066:
READ(*reg, Rn);
Rn += 4;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int wc_ecc_gen_k(WC_RNG* rng, int size, mp_int* k, mp_int* order)
{
int err;
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
byte* buf;
#else
byte buf[ECC_MAXSIZE_GEN];
#endif
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
buf = (byte*)XMALLOC(ECC_MAXSIZE_GEN, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
if (buf == NULL)
return MEMORY_E;
#endif
/*generate 8 extra bytes to mitigate bias from the modulo operation below*/
/*see section A.1.2 in 'Suite B Implementor's Guide to FIPS 186-3 (ECDSA)'*/
size += 8;
/* make up random string */
err = wc_RNG_GenerateBlock(rng, buf, size);
/* load random buffer data into k */
if (err == 0)
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(k, (byte*)buf, size);
/* quick sanity check to make sure we're not dealing with a 0 key */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_iszero(k) == MP_YES)
err = MP_ZERO_E;
}
/* the key should be smaller than the order of base point */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_cmp(k, order) != MP_LT) {
err = mp_mod(k, order, k);
}
}
ForceZero(buf, ECC_MAXSIZE);
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(buf, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
#endif
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 169,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int http_sync_res_state(struct session *s)
{
struct channel *chn = s->rep;
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
unsigned int old_flags = chn->flags;
unsigned int old_state = txn->rsp.msg_state;
if (unlikely(txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))
return 0;
if (txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DONE) {
/* In theory, we don't need to read anymore, but we must
* still monitor the server connection for a possible close
* while the request is being uploaded, so we don't disable
* reading.
*/
/* channel_dont_read(chn); */
if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
goto wait_other_side;
if (txn->req.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_DONE) {
/* The client seems to still be sending data, probably
* because we got an error response during an upload.
* We have the choice of either breaking the connection
* or letting it pass through. Let's do the later.
*/
goto wait_other_side;
}
if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL) {
/* if any side switches to tunnel mode, the other one does too */
channel_auto_read(chn);
txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
chn->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
goto wait_other_side;
}
/* When we get here, it means that both the request and the
* response have finished receiving. Depending on the connection
* mode, we'll have to wait for the last bytes to leave in either
* direction, and sometimes for a close to be effective.
*/
if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL) {
/* Server-close mode : shut read and wait for the request
* side to close its output buffer. The caller will detect
* when we're in DONE and the other is in CLOSED and will
* catch that for the final cleanup.
*/
if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTR_NOW)))
channel_shutr_now(chn);
}
else if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_CLO) {
/* Option forceclose is set, or either side wants to close,
* let's enforce it now that we're not expecting any new
* data to come. The caller knows the session is complete
* once both states are CLOSED.
*/
if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
channel_shutr_now(chn);
channel_shutw_now(chn);
}
}
else {
/* The last possible modes are keep-alive and tunnel. Tunnel will
* need to forward remaining data. Keep-alive will need to monitor
* for connection closing.
*/
channel_auto_read(chn);
chn->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_TUN)
txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
}
if (chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW)) {
/* if we've just closed an output, let's switch */
if (!channel_is_empty(chn)) {
txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CLOSING;
goto http_msg_closing;
}
else {
txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CLOSED;
goto http_msg_closed;
}
}
goto wait_other_side;
}
if (txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSING) {
http_msg_closing:
/* nothing else to forward, just waiting for the output buffer
* to be empty and for the shutw_now to take effect.
*/
if (channel_is_empty(chn)) {
txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CLOSED;
goto http_msg_closed;
}
else if (chn->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts++;
if (objt_server(s->target))
objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts++;
goto wait_other_side;
}
}
if (txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED) {
http_msg_closed:
/* drop any pending data */
bi_erase(chn);
channel_auto_close(chn);
channel_auto_read(chn);
goto wait_other_side;
}
wait_other_side:
/* We force the response to leave immediately if we're waiting for the
* other side, since there is no pending shutdown to push it out.
*/
if (!channel_is_empty(chn))
chn->flags |= CF_SEND_DONTWAIT;
return txn->rsp.msg_state != old_state || chn->flags != old_flags;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChooserContextBase::AddObserver(PermissionObserver* observer) {
permission_observer_list_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects.
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: Ia163d503a4207859cd41c847c9d5f67e77580fbc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1456080
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Marek Haranczyk <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629919}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 130,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayoutSVGTransformableContainer::isChildAllowed(LayoutObject* child, const ComputedStyle& style) const
{
ASSERT(element());
if (isSVGSwitchElement(*element())) {
Node* node = child->node();
if (!node->isSVGElement() || !toSVGElement(node)->isValid())
return false;
if (hasValidPredecessor(node))
return false;
} else if (isSVGAElement(*element())) {
if (isSVGAElement(*child->node()))
return false;
if (parent() && parent()->isSVG())
return parent()->isChildAllowed(child, style);
}
return LayoutSVGContainer::isChildAllowed(child, style);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void retrieveResourcesForFrame(LocalFrame* frame,
const WebVector<WebCString>& supportedSchemes,
Vector<LocalFrame*>* visitedFrames,
Vector<LocalFrame*>* framesToVisit,
Vector<KURL>* frameURLs,
Vector<KURL>* resourceURLs)
{
KURL frameURL = frame->loader().documentLoader()->request().url();
if (!frameURL.isValid())
return;
bool isValidScheme = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < supportedSchemes.size(); ++i) {
if (frameURL.protocolIs(static_cast<CString>(supportedSchemes[i]).data())) {
isValidScheme = true;
break;
}
}
if (!isValidScheme)
return;
if (visitedFrames->contains(frame))
return;
visitedFrames->append(frame);
if (!frameURLs->contains(frameURL))
frameURLs->append(frameURL);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<HTMLAllCollection> allElements = frame->document()->all();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < allElements->length(); ++i) {
Element* element = allElements->item(i);
retrieveResourcesForElement(element,
visitedFrames, framesToVisit,
frameURLs, resourceURLs);
}
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gss_accept_sec_context (minor_status,
context_handle,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings;
gss_name_t * src_name;
gss_OID * mech_type;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
OM_uint32 * ret_flags;
OM_uint32 * time_rec;
gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
{
OM_uint32 status, temp_status, temp_minor_status;
OM_uint32 temp_ret_flags = 0;
gss_union_ctx_id_t union_ctx_id = NULL;
gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_cred_id_t tmp_d_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_name_t internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_name_t tmp_src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_OID_desc token_mech_type_desc;
gss_OID token_mech_type = &token_mech_type_desc;
gss_OID actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
gss_OID selected_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
gss_OID public_mech;
gss_mechanism mech = NULL;
gss_union_cred_t uc;
int i;
status = val_acc_sec_ctx_args(minor_status,
context_handle,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* if context_handle is GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, allocate a union context
* descriptor to hold the mech type information as well as the
* underlying mechanism context handle. Otherwise, cast the
* value of *context_handle to the union context variable.
*/
if(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
if (input_token_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
/* Get the token mech type */
status = gssint_get_mech_type(token_mech_type, input_token_buffer);
if (status)
return status;
/*
* An interposer calling back into the mechglue can't pass in a special
* mech, so we have to recognize it using verifier_cred_handle. Use
* the mechanism for which we have matching creds, if available.
*/
if (verifier_cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
uc = (gss_union_cred_t)verifier_cred_handle;
for (i = 0; i < uc->count; i++) {
public_mech = gssint_get_public_oid(&uc->mechs_array[i]);
if (public_mech && g_OID_equal(token_mech_type, public_mech)) {
selected_mech = &uc->mechs_array[i];
break;
}
}
}
if (selected_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) {
status = gssint_select_mech_type(minor_status, token_mech_type,
&selected_mech);
if (status)
return status;
}
} else {
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
selected_mech = union_ctx_id->mech_type;
}
/* Now create a new context if we didn't get one. */
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
if (!union_ctx_id)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
union_ctx_id->loopback = union_ctx_id;
union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
status = generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech,
&union_ctx_id->mech_type);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(union_ctx_id);
return (status);
}
/* set the new context handle to caller's data */
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
}
/*
* get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct.
*/
if (verifier_cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
input_cred_handle =
gssint_get_mechanism_cred((gss_union_cred_t)verifier_cred_handle,
selected_mech);
if (input_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
/* verifier credential specified but no acceptor credential found */
status = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
goto error_out;
}
} else if (!allow_mech_by_default(selected_mech)) {
status = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
goto error_out;
}
/*
* now select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(selected_mech);
if (mech && mech->gss_accept_sec_context) {
status = mech->gss_accept_sec_context(minor_status,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
input_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name ? &internal_name : NULL,
&actual_mech,
output_token,
&temp_ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred ? &tmp_d_cred : NULL);
/* If there's more work to do, keep going... */
if (status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
/* if the call failed, return with failure */
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
map_error(minor_status, mech);
goto error_out;
}
/*
* if src_name is non-NULL,
* convert internal_name into a union name equivalent
* First call the mechanism specific display_name()
* then call gss_import_name() to create
* the union name struct cast to src_name
*/
if (src_name != NULL) {
if (internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
/* consumes internal_name regardless of success */
temp_status = gssint_convert_name_to_union_name(
&temp_minor_status, mech,
internal_name, &tmp_src_name);
if (temp_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
status = temp_status;
*minor_status = temp_minor_status;
map_error(minor_status, mech);
if (output_token->length)
(void) gss_release_buffer(&temp_minor_status,
output_token);
goto error_out;
}
*src_name = tmp_src_name;
} else
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
}
#define g_OID_prefix_equal(o1, o2) \
(((o1)->length >= (o2)->length) && \
(memcmp((o1)->elements, (o2)->elements, (o2)->length) == 0))
/* Ensure we're returning correct creds format */
if ((temp_ret_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) &&
tmp_d_cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
public_mech = gssint_get_public_oid(selected_mech);
if (actual_mech != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
public_mech != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
!g_OID_prefix_equal(actual_mech, public_mech)) {
*d_cred = tmp_d_cred; /* unwrapped pseudo-mech */
} else {
gss_union_cred_t d_u_cred = NULL;
d_u_cred = malloc(sizeof (gss_union_cred_desc));
if (d_u_cred == NULL) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto error_out;
}
(void) memset(d_u_cred, 0, sizeof (gss_union_cred_desc));
d_u_cred->count = 1;
status = generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status,
selected_mech,
&d_u_cred->mechs_array);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(d_u_cred);
goto error_out;
}
d_u_cred->cred_array = malloc(sizeof(gss_cred_id_t));
if (d_u_cred->cred_array != NULL) {
d_u_cred->cred_array[0] = tmp_d_cred;
} else {
free(d_u_cred);
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto error_out;
}
d_u_cred->loopback = d_u_cred;
*d_cred = (gss_cred_id_t)d_u_cred;
}
}
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = gssint_get_public_oid(actual_mech);
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = temp_ret_flags;
return (status);
} else {
status = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
}
error_out:
if (union_ctx_id) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements)
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type);
}
if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id && mech &&
mech->gss_delete_sec_context) {
mech->gss_delete_sec_context(&temp_minor_status,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
free(union_ctx_id);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (src_name)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (tmp_src_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
(void) gss_release_buffer(&temp_minor_status,
(gss_buffer_t)tmp_src_name);
return (status);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 1 | 168,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageGetClip (gdImagePtr im, int *x1P, int *y1P, int *x2P, int *y2P)
{
*x1P = im->cx1;
*y1P = im->cy1;
*x2P = im->cx2;
*y2P = im->cy2;
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLInputElement::selectionDirectionForBinding(
ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
if (!input_type_->SupportsSelectionAPI()) {
return String();
}
return TextControlElement::selectionDirection();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: partition_modify_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
ModifyPartitionData *data = user_data;
/* poke the kernel so we can reread the data */
device_generate_kernel_change_event (data->enclosing_device);
device_generate_kernel_change_event (data->device);
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
/* update local copy, don't wait for the kernel */
device_set_partition_type (device, data->type);
device_set_partition_label (device, data->label);
device_set_partition_flags (device, data->flags);
drain_pending_changes (device, FALSE);
dbus_g_method_return (context);
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error modifying partition: helper exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSObject* JSTestCustomNamedGetter::createPrototype(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
return JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototype::create(exec->globalData(), globalObject, JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototype::createStructure(globalObject->globalData(), globalObject, globalObject->objectPrototype()));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SimulateEnumerateResult(
int request_id,
const std::vector<ppapi::DeviceRefData>& devices) {
std::map<int, EnumerateDevicesCallback>::iterator iter =
callbacks_.find(request_id);
if (iter == callbacks_.end())
return false;
iter->second.Run(request_id, devices);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_array_grow(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj_array *obj)
{
int i;
int new_cap = (obj->cap * 3) / 2;
obj->items = fz_resize_array(ctx, obj->items, new_cap, sizeof(pdf_obj*));
obj->cap = new_cap;
for (i = obj->len ; i < obj->cap; i++)
obj->items[i] = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wait_on_node_pages_writeback(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t ino)
{
pgoff_t index = 0, end = ULONG_MAX;
struct pagevec pvec;
int ret2, ret = 0;
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
while (index <= end) {
int i, nr_pages;
nr_pages = pagevec_lookup_tag(&pvec, NODE_MAPPING(sbi), &index,
PAGECACHE_TAG_WRITEBACK,
min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE-1) + 1);
if (nr_pages == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
/* until radix tree lookup accepts end_index */
if (unlikely(page->index > end))
continue;
if (ino && ino_of_node(page) == ino) {
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(page, NODE, true);
if (TestClearPageError(page))
ret = -EIO;
}
}
pagevec_release(&pvec);
cond_resched();
}
ret2 = filemap_check_errors(NODE_MAPPING(sbi));
if (!ret)
ret = ret2;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline static status_t finish_flatten_binder(
const sp<IBinder>& /*binder*/, const flat_binder_object& flat, Parcel* out)
{
return out->writeObject(flat, false);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScrollbarOverlayChanged(pp::Scrollbar_Dev scrollbar, bool overlay) {
if (ppp_scrollbar_ != NULL) {
ppp_scrollbar_->OverlayChanged(plugin_->pp_instance(),
scrollbar.pp_resource(),
PP_FromBool(overlay));
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RootWindow::ToggleFullScreen() {
host_->ToggleFullScreen();
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void slab_destroy_debugcheck(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
struct page *page)
{
int i;
if (OBJFREELIST_SLAB(cachep) && cachep->flags & SLAB_POISON) {
poison_obj(cachep, page->freelist - obj_offset(cachep),
POISON_FREE);
}
for (i = 0; i < cachep->num; i++) {
void *objp = index_to_obj(cachep, page, i);
if (cachep->flags & SLAB_POISON) {
check_poison_obj(cachep, objp);
slab_kernel_map(cachep, objp, 1, 0);
}
if (cachep->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
if (*dbg_redzone1(cachep, objp) != RED_INACTIVE)
slab_error(cachep, "start of a freed object was overwritten");
if (*dbg_redzone2(cachep, objp) != RED_INACTIVE)
slab_error(cachep, "end of a freed object was overwritten");
}
}
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zend_object *spl_object_storage_new_ex(zend_class_entry *class_type, zval *orig) /* {{{ */
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern;
zend_class_entry *parent = class_type;
intern = emalloc(sizeof(spl_SplObjectStorage) + zend_object_properties_size(parent));
memset(intern, 0, sizeof(spl_SplObjectStorage) - sizeof(zval));
intern->pos = HT_INVALID_IDX;
zend_object_std_init(&intern->std, class_type);
object_properties_init(&intern->std, class_type);
zend_hash_init(&intern->storage, 0, NULL, spl_object_storage_dtor, 0);
intern->std.handlers = &spl_handler_SplObjectStorage;
while (parent) {
if (parent == spl_ce_SplObjectStorage) {
if (class_type != spl_ce_SplObjectStorage) {
intern->fptr_get_hash = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&class_type->function_table, "gethash", sizeof("gethash") - 1);
if (intern->fptr_get_hash->common.scope == spl_ce_SplObjectStorage) {
intern->fptr_get_hash = NULL;
}
}
break;
}
parent = parent->parent;
}
if (orig) {
spl_SplObjectStorage *other = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(orig);
spl_object_storage_addall(intern, orig, other);
}
return &intern->std;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cleanup_ipmi_si(void)
{
struct smi_info *e, *tmp_e;
if (!initialized)
return;
ipmi_si_pci_shutdown();
ipmi_si_parisc_shutdown();
ipmi_si_platform_shutdown();
mutex_lock(&smi_infos_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(e, tmp_e, &smi_infos, link)
cleanup_one_si(e);
mutex_unlock(&smi_infos_lock);
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ptaInsertPt(PTA *pta,
l_int32 index,
l_int32 x,
l_int32 y)
{
l_int32 i, n;
PROCNAME("ptaInsertPt");
if (!pta)
return ERROR_INT("pta not defined", procName, 1);
n = ptaGetCount(pta);
if (index < 0 || index > n)
return ERROR_INT("index not in {0...n}", procName, 1);
if (n > pta->nalloc)
ptaExtendArrays(pta);
pta->n++;
for (i = n; i > index; i--) {
pta->x[i] = pta->x[i - 1];
pta->y[i] = pta->y[i - 1];
}
pta->x[index] = x;
pta->y[index] = y;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __net_init int pppol2tp_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde;
int err = 0;
pde = proc_create("pppol2tp", S_IRUGO, net->proc_net,
&pppol2tp_proc_fops);
if (!pde) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <[email protected]>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MemTxResult address_space_read(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, MemTxAttrs attrs,
uint8_t *buf, int len)
{
return address_space_rw(as, addr, attrs, buf, len, false);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hub_port_wait_reset(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
struct usb_device *udev, unsigned int delay, bool warm)
{
int delay_time, ret;
u16 portstatus;
u16 portchange;
u32 ext_portstatus = 0;
for (delay_time = 0;
delay_time < HUB_RESET_TIMEOUT;
delay_time += delay) {
/* wait to give the device a chance to reset */
msleep(delay);
/* read and decode port status */
if (hub_is_superspeedplus(hub->hdev))
ret = hub_ext_port_status(hub, port1,
HUB_EXT_PORT_STATUS,
&portstatus, &portchange,
&ext_portstatus);
else
ret = hub_port_status(hub, port1, &portstatus,
&portchange);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/*
* The port state is unknown until the reset completes.
*
* On top of that, some chips may require additional time
* to re-establish a connection after the reset is complete,
* so also wait for the connection to be re-established.
*/
if (!(portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_RESET) &&
(portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION))
break;
/* switch to the long delay after two short delay failures */
if (delay_time >= 2 * HUB_SHORT_RESET_TIME)
delay = HUB_LONG_RESET_TIME;
dev_dbg(&hub->ports[port1 - 1]->dev,
"not %sreset yet, waiting %dms\n",
warm ? "warm " : "", delay);
}
if ((portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_RESET))
return -EBUSY;
if (hub_port_warm_reset_required(hub, port1, portstatus))
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Device went away? */
if (!(portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION))
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Retry if connect change is set but status is still connected.
* A USB 3.0 connection may bounce if multiple warm resets were issued,
* but the device may have successfully re-connected. Ignore it.
*/
if (!hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev) &&
(portchange & USB_PORT_STAT_C_CONNECTION)) {
usb_clear_port_feature(hub->hdev, port1,
USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION);
return -EAGAIN;
}
if (!(portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE))
return -EBUSY;
if (!udev)
return 0;
if (hub_is_superspeedplus(hub->hdev)) {
/* extended portstatus Rx and Tx lane count are zero based */
udev->rx_lanes = USB_EXT_PORT_RX_LANES(ext_portstatus) + 1;
udev->tx_lanes = USB_EXT_PORT_TX_LANES(ext_portstatus) + 1;
} else {
udev->rx_lanes = 1;
udev->tx_lanes = 1;
}
if (hub_is_wusb(hub))
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_WIRELESS;
else if (hub_is_superspeedplus(hub->hdev) &&
port_speed_is_ssp(hub->hdev, ext_portstatus &
USB_EXT_PORT_STAT_RX_SPEED_ID))
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS;
else if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_SUPER;
else if (portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_HIGH_SPEED)
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_HIGH;
else if (portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_LOW_SPEED)
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_LOW;
else
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_FULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_stack_boundary(struct verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed)
{
struct verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
regs[regno].type == CONST_IMM &&
regs[regno].imm == 0)
return 0;
verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
off = regs[regno].imm;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size <= 0) {
verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int init_uinput (void)
{
char *name = "AVRCP";
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
uinput_fd = uinput_create(name);
if (uinput_fd < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s AVRCP: Failed to initialize uinput for %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, name, uinput_fd);
} else {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s AVRCP: Initialized uinput for %s (fd=%d)",
__FUNCTION__, name, uinput_fd);
}
return uinput_fd;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RilSapSocket::sOnUnsolicitedResponse(int unsolResponse,
const void *data,
size_t datalen) {
RilSapSocket *sap_socket = getSocketById(RIL_SOCKET_1);
sap_socket->onUnsolicitedResponse(unsolResponse, (void *)data, datalen);
}
Commit Message: Replace variable-length arrays on stack with malloc.
Bug: 30202619
Change-Id: Ib95e08a1c009d88a4b4fd8d8fdba0641c6129008
(cherry picked from commit 943905bb9f99e3caa856b42c531e2be752da8834)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String preloadTypeToString(WebMediaPlayer::Preload preloadType) {
switch (preloadType) {
case WebMediaPlayer::PreloadNone:
return "none";
case WebMediaPlayer::PreloadMetaData:
return "metadata";
case WebMediaPlayer::PreloadAuto:
return "auto";
}
NOTREACHED();
return String();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: reactor_object_t *reactor_register(reactor_t *reactor,
int fd, void *context,
void (*read_ready)(void *context),
void (*write_ready)(void *context)) {
assert(reactor != NULL);
assert(fd != INVALID_FD);
reactor_object_t *object = (reactor_object_t *)osi_calloc(sizeof(reactor_object_t));
if (!object) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate reactor object: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
object->reactor = reactor;
object->fd = fd;
object->context = context;
object->read_ready = read_ready;
object->write_ready = write_ready;
pthread_mutex_init(&object->lock, NULL);
struct epoll_event event;
memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
if (read_ready)
event.events |= (EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDHUP);
if (write_ready)
event.events |= EPOLLOUT;
event.data.ptr = object;
if (epoll_ctl(reactor->epoll_fd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &event) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to register fd %d to epoll set: %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno));
pthread_mutex_destroy(&object->lock);
osi_free(object);
return NULL;
}
return object;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 159,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XScopedCursor::XScopedCursor(::Cursor cursor, Display* display)
: cursor_(cursor),
display_(display) {
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cleanup)
ctx->cleanup(ctx);
if (ctx->param != NULL) {
if (ctx->parent == NULL)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
ctx->param = NULL;
}
X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
ctx->tree = NULL;
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
ctx->chain = NULL;
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
}
Commit Message: Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 44,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Block* Track::EOSBlock::GetBlock() const { return NULL; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MergeIncludedCompatMaps(CompatInfo *into, CompatInfo *from,
enum merge_mode merge)
{
if (from->errorCount > 0) {
into->errorCount += from->errorCount;
return;
}
into->mods = from->mods;
if (into->name == NULL) {
into->name = from->name;
from->name = NULL;
}
if (darray_empty(into->interps)) {
into->interps = from->interps;
darray_init(from->interps);
}
else {
SymInterpInfo *si;
darray_foreach(si, from->interps) {
si->merge = (merge == MERGE_DEFAULT ? si->merge : merge);
if (!AddInterp(into, si, false))
into->errorCount++;
}
}
if (into->num_leds == 0) {
memcpy(into->leds, from->leds, sizeof(*from->leds) * from->num_leds);
into->num_leds = from->num_leds;
from->num_leds = 0;
}
else {
for (xkb_led_index_t i = 0; i < from->num_leds; i++) {
LedInfo *ledi = &from->leds[i];
ledi->merge = (merge == MERGE_DEFAULT ? ledi->merge : merge);
if (!AddLedMap(into, ledi, false))
into->errorCount++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't crash on no-op modmask expressions
If we have an expression of the form 'l1' in an interp section, we
unconditionally try to dereference its args, even if it has none.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 78,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_cgroup_defer_enabled(struct perf_event *event)
{
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long btrfs_ioctl_add_dev(struct btrfs_root *root, void __user *arg)
{
struct btrfs_ioctl_vol_args *vol_args;
int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (atomic_xchg(&root->fs_info->mutually_exclusive_operation_running,
1)) {
pr_info("btrfs: dev add/delete/balance/replace/resize operation in progress\n");
return -EINPROGRESS;
}
mutex_lock(&root->fs_info->volume_mutex);
vol_args = memdup_user(arg, sizeof(*vol_args));
if (IS_ERR(vol_args)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(vol_args);
goto out;
}
vol_args->name[BTRFS_PATH_NAME_MAX] = '\0';
ret = btrfs_init_new_device(root, vol_args->name);
kfree(vol_args);
out:
mutex_unlock(&root->fs_info->volume_mutex);
atomic_set(&root->fs_info->mutually_exclusive_operation_running, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::CanCaptureVisiblePage(const GURL& page_url,
int tab_id,
std::string* error) const {
if (tab_id >= 0) {
scoped_refptr<const PermissionSet> tab_permissions =
GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
if (tab_permissions.get() &&
tab_permissions->explicit_hosts().MatchesSecurityOrigin(page_url)) {
return true;
}
}
if (HasHostPermission(page_url) || page_url.GetOrigin() == url())
return true;
if (error) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kCannotAccessPage,
page_url.spec());
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cleanup_single_sta(struct sta_info *sta)
{
int ac, i;
struct tid_ampdu_tx *tid_tx;
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = sta->sdata;
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
struct ps_data *ps;
if (test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_PS_STA)) {
if (sta->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
sta->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN)
ps = &sdata->bss->ps;
else if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif))
ps = &sdata->u.mesh.ps;
else
return;
clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_PS_STA);
atomic_dec(&ps->num_sta_ps);
sta_info_recalc_tim(sta);
}
for (ac = 0; ac < IEEE80211_NUM_ACS; ac++) {
local->total_ps_buffered -= skb_queue_len(&sta->ps_tx_buf[ac]);
ieee80211_purge_tx_queue(&local->hw, &sta->ps_tx_buf[ac]);
ieee80211_purge_tx_queue(&local->hw, &sta->tx_filtered[ac]);
}
if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif))
mesh_sta_cleanup(sta);
cancel_work_sync(&sta->drv_unblock_wk);
/*
* Destroy aggregation state here. It would be nice to wait for the
* driver to finish aggregation stop and then clean up, but for now
* drivers have to handle aggregation stop being requested, followed
* directly by station destruction.
*/
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
kfree(sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_start_tx[i]);
tid_tx = rcu_dereference_raw(sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]);
if (!tid_tx)
continue;
ieee80211_purge_tx_queue(&local->hw, &tid_tx->pending);
kfree(tid_tx);
}
sta_info_free(local, sta);
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qreal OxideQQuickWebView::viewportWidth() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
if (!d->proxy_) {
return 0.f;
}
return const_cast<OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate*>(
d)->proxy_->compositorFrameViewportSize().width();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::Rect PDFiumEngine::GetPageScreenRect(int page_index) const {
return GetScreenRect(pp::Rect(
0,
pages_[page_index]->rect().y() - kPageShadowTop,
document_size_.width(),
pages_[page_index]->rect().height() + kPageShadowTop +
kPageShadowBottom + kPageSeparatorThickness));
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::DecodeRequest::NotifyDecodeDispatched() {
DCHECK_EQ(state_, kPendingLoad);
state_ = kDispatched;
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int alloc_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, struct task_group *parent)
{
struct rt_rq *rt_rq;
struct sched_rt_entity *rt_se;
int i;
tg->rt_rq = kzalloc(sizeof(rt_rq) * nr_cpu_ids, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tg->rt_rq)
goto err;
tg->rt_se = kzalloc(sizeof(rt_se) * nr_cpu_ids, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tg->rt_se)
goto err;
init_rt_bandwidth(&tg->rt_bandwidth,
ktime_to_ns(def_rt_bandwidth.rt_period), 0);
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
rt_rq = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct rt_rq),
GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(i));
if (!rt_rq)
goto err;
rt_se = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct sched_rt_entity),
GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(i));
if (!rt_se)
goto err_free_rq;
init_tg_rt_entry(tg, rt_rq, rt_se, i, parent->rt_se[i]);
}
return 1;
err_free_rq:
kfree(rt_rq);
err:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FileUtilProxy::RecursiveDelete(
scoped_refptr<MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
const FilePath& file_path,
StatusCallback* callback) {
return Start(FROM_HERE, message_loop_proxy,
new RelayDelete(file_path, true, callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_connectx3(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_getaddrs_old param;
sctp_assoc_t assoc_id = 0;
int err = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (in_compat_syscall()) {
struct compat_sctp_getaddrs_old param32;
if (len < sizeof(param32))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(¶m32, optval, sizeof(param32)))
return -EFAULT;
param.assoc_id = param32.assoc_id;
param.addr_num = param32.addr_num;
param.addrs = compat_ptr(param32.addrs);
} else
#endif
{
if (len < sizeof(param))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(¶m, optval, sizeof(param)))
return -EFAULT;
}
err = __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(sk, (struct sockaddr __user *)
param.addrs, param.addr_num,
&assoc_id);
if (err == 0 || err == -EINPROGRESS) {
if (copy_to_user(optval, &assoc_id, sizeof(assoc_id)))
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(sizeof(assoc_id), optlen))
return -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VideoCaptureImpl::RequestRefreshFrame() {
DCHECK(io_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
GetVideoCaptureHost()->RequestRefreshFrame(device_id_);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int firstarg;
config.hostip = sdsnew("127.0.0.1");
config.hostport = 6379;
config.hostsocket = NULL;
config.repeat = 1;
config.interval = 0;
config.dbnum = 0;
config.interactive = 0;
config.shutdown = 0;
config.monitor_mode = 0;
config.pubsub_mode = 0;
config.latency_mode = 0;
config.latency_dist_mode = 0;
config.latency_history = 0;
config.lru_test_mode = 0;
config.lru_test_sample_size = 0;
config.cluster_mode = 0;
config.slave_mode = 0;
config.getrdb_mode = 0;
config.stat_mode = 0;
config.scan_mode = 0;
config.intrinsic_latency_mode = 0;
config.pattern = NULL;
config.rdb_filename = NULL;
config.pipe_mode = 0;
config.pipe_timeout = REDIS_CLI_DEFAULT_PIPE_TIMEOUT;
config.bigkeys = 0;
config.hotkeys = 0;
config.stdinarg = 0;
config.auth = NULL;
config.eval = NULL;
config.eval_ldb = 0;
config.eval_ldb_end = 0;
config.eval_ldb_sync = 0;
config.enable_ldb_on_eval = 0;
config.last_cmd_type = -1;
pref.hints = 1;
spectrum_palette = spectrum_palette_color;
spectrum_palette_size = spectrum_palette_color_size;
if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)) && (getenv("FAKETTY") == NULL))
config.output = OUTPUT_RAW;
else
config.output = OUTPUT_STANDARD;
config.mb_delim = sdsnew("\n");
firstarg = parseOptions(argc,argv);
argc -= firstarg;
argv += firstarg;
/* Latency mode */
if (config.latency_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
latencyMode();
}
/* Latency distribution mode */
if (config.latency_dist_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
latencyDistMode();
}
/* Slave mode */
if (config.slave_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
slaveMode();
}
/* Get RDB mode. */
if (config.getrdb_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
getRDB();
}
/* Pipe mode */
if (config.pipe_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
pipeMode();
}
/* Find big keys */
if (config.bigkeys) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
findBigKeys();
}
/* Find hot keys */
if (config.hotkeys) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
findHotKeys();
}
/* Stat mode */
if (config.stat_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
if (config.interval == 0) config.interval = 1000000;
statMode();
}
/* Scan mode */
if (config.scan_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
scanMode();
}
/* LRU test mode */
if (config.lru_test_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
LRUTestMode();
}
/* Intrinsic latency mode */
if (config.intrinsic_latency_mode) intrinsicLatencyMode();
/* Start interactive mode when no command is provided */
if (argc == 0 && !config.eval) {
/* Ignore SIGPIPE in interactive mode to force a reconnect */
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
/* Note that in repl mode we don't abort on connection error.
* A new attempt will be performed for every command send. */
cliConnect(0);
repl();
}
/* Otherwise, we have some arguments to execute */
if (cliConnect(0) != REDIS_OK) exit(1);
if (config.eval) {
return evalMode(argc,argv);
} else {
return noninteractive(argc,convertToSds(argc,argv));
}
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 81,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_krb5_salttype(XDR *xdrs, krb5_int32 *objp)
{
if (!xdr_int32(xdrs, (int32_t *) objp))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32 GetLinearSlideUpTable (const CSoundFile *sndFile, uint32 i) { MPT_ASSERT(i < CountOf(LinearSlideDownTable)); return sndFile->m_playBehaviour[kHertzInLinearMode] ? LinearSlideUpTable[i] : LinearSlideDownTable[i]; }
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChildProcessLauncherHelper::OnChildProcessStarted(
JNIEnv*,
const base::android::JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
jint handle) {
DCHECK(CurrentlyOnProcessLauncherTaskRunner());
scoped_refptr<ChildProcessLauncherHelper> ref(this);
Release(); // Balances with LaunchProcessOnLauncherThread.
int launch_result = (handle == base::kNullProcessHandle)
? LAUNCH_RESULT_FAILURE
: LAUNCH_RESULT_SUCCESS;
ChildProcessLauncherHelper::Process process;
process.process = base::Process(handle);
PostLaunchOnLauncherThread(std::move(process), launch_result);
}
Commit Message: android: Stop child process in GetTerminationInfo
Android currently abuses TerminationStatus to pass whether process is
"oom protected" rather than whether it has died or not. This confuses
cross-platform code about the state process.
Only TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING is treated as still running, which
android never passes. Also it appears to be ok to kill the process in
getTerminationInfo as it's only called when the child process is dead or
dying. Also posix kills the process on some calls.
Bug: 940245
Change-Id: Id165711848c279bbe77ef8a784c8cf0b14051877
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1516284
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ssid <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Bo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639639}
CWE ID: CWE-664 | 0 | 151,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double filter_hermite(const double x1)
{
const double x = x1 < 0.0 ? -x1 : x1;
if (x < 1.0) return ((2.0 * x - 3) * x * x + 1.0 );
return 0.0;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromePluginServiceFilter::ProcessDetails::ProcessDetails() {
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::UnregisterLayer(Layer* layer) {
DCHECK(LayerById(layer->id()));
DCHECK(!in_paint_layer_contents_);
if (layer->element_id()) {
mutator_host_->UnregisterElement(layer->element_id(),
ElementListType::ACTIVE);
}
RemoveLayerShouldPushProperties(layer);
layer_id_map_.erase(layer->id());
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> DOMWindow::AssociateWithWrapper(
v8::Isolate*,
const WrapperTypeInfo*,
v8::Local<v8::Object> wrapper) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Local<v8::Object>();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t srpt_tpg_attrib_srp_max_rsp_size_store(struct config_item *item,
const char *page, size_t count)
{
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg = attrib_to_tpg(item);
struct srpt_port *sport = container_of(se_tpg, struct srpt_port, port_tpg_1);
unsigned long val;
int ret;
ret = kstrtoul(page, 0, &val);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("kstrtoul() failed with ret: %d\n", ret);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (val > MAX_SRPT_RSP_SIZE) {
pr_err("val: %lu exceeds MAX_SRPT_RSP_SIZE: %d\n", val,
MAX_SRPT_RSP_SIZE);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (val < MIN_MAX_RSP_SIZE) {
pr_err("val: %lu smaller than MIN_MAX_RSP_SIZE: %d\n", val,
MIN_MAX_RSP_SIZE);
return -EINVAL;
}
sport->port_attrib.srp_max_rsp_size = val;
return count;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 eb;
eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
(1u << NM_VECTOR) | (1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
if ((vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) ==
(KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP))
eb |= 1u << BP_VECTOR;
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active)
eb = ~0;
if (enable_ept)
eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR); /* bypass_guest_pf = 0 */
if (vcpu->fpu_active)
eb &= ~(1u << NM_VECTOR);
/* When we are running a nested L2 guest and L1 specified for it a
* certain exception bitmap, we must trap the same exceptions and pass
* them to L1. When running L2, we will only handle the exceptions
* specified above if L1 did not want them.
*/
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CL_UpdateGUID( const char *prefix, int prefix_len )
{
fileHandle_t f;
int len;
len = FS_SV_FOpenFileRead( QKEY_FILE, &f );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
if( len != QKEY_SIZE )
Cvar_Set( "cl_guid", "" );
else
Cvar_Set( "cl_guid", Com_MD5File( QKEY_FILE, QKEY_SIZE,
prefix, prefix_len ) );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vnc_unlock_queue(VncJobQueue *queue)
{
qemu_mutex_unlock(&queue->mutex);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uarb_copy(uarb to, uarb from, int idigits)
/* Copy a uarb, may reduce the digit count */
{
int d, odigits;
for (d=odigits=0; d<idigits; ++d)
if ((to[d] = from[d]) != 0)
odigits = d+1;
return odigits;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sched_rr_get_interval, pid_t, pid,
struct timespec __user *, interval)
{
struct task_struct *p;
unsigned int time_slice;
unsigned long flags;
struct rq *rq;
int retval;
struct timespec t;
if (pid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
retval = -ESRCH;
rcu_read_lock();
p = find_process_by_pid(pid);
if (!p)
goto out_unlock;
retval = security_task_getscheduler(p);
if (retval)
goto out_unlock;
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &flags);
time_slice = 0;
if (p->sched_class->get_rr_interval)
time_slice = p->sched_class->get_rr_interval(rq, p);
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
rcu_read_unlock();
jiffies_to_timespec(time_slice, &t);
retval = copy_to_user(interval, &t, sizeof(t)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
return retval;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::SetContentViewCore(
ContentViewCoreImpl* content_view_core) {
if (content_view_core_ && is_layer_attached_)
content_view_core_->RemoveLayer(layer_);
content_view_core_ = content_view_core;
if (content_view_core_ && is_layer_attached_)
content_view_core_->AttachLayer(layer_);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netdev_state_change(struct net_device *dev)
{
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGE, dev);
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, dev, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::willReleaseScriptContext(WebFrame* frame,
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context,
int world_id) {
GetContentClient()->renderer()->WillReleaseScriptContext(
frame, context, world_id);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType DecodeImage(Image *image,const size_t compression,
unsigned char *pixels,const size_t number_pixels)
{
int
byte,
count;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(pixels != (unsigned char *) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_pixels*sizeof(*pixels));
byte=0;
x=0;
p=pixels;
q=pixels+number_pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; )
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
if ((p < pixels) || (p > q))
break;
count=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (count == EOF)
break;
if (count > 0)
{
/*
Encoded mode.
*/
count=(int) MagickMin((ssize_t) count,(ssize_t) (q-p));
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
break;
if (compression == BI_RLE8)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) byte;
}
else
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char)
((i & 0x01) != 0 ? (byte & 0x0f) : ((byte >> 4) & 0x0f));
}
x+=count;
}
else
{
/*
Escape mode.
*/
count=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (count == EOF)
break;
if (count == 0x01)
return(MagickTrue);
switch (count)
{
case 0x00:
{
/*
End of line.
*/
x=0;
y++;
p=pixels+y*image->columns;
break;
}
case 0x02:
{
/*
Delta mode.
*/
x+=ReadBlobByte(image);
y+=ReadBlobByte(image);
p=pixels+y*image->columns+x;
break;
}
default:
{
/*
Absolute mode.
*/
count=(int) MagickMin((ssize_t) count,(ssize_t) (q-p));
if (compression == BI_RLE8)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
break;
*p++=(unsigned char) byte;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
if ((i & 0x01) == 0)
{
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
break;
}
*p++=(unsigned char)
((i & 0x01) != 0 ? (byte & 0x0f) : ((byte >> 4) & 0x0f));
}
x+=count;
/*
Read pad byte.
*/
if (compression == BI_RLE8)
{
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
else
if (((count & 0x03) == 1) || ((count & 0x03) == 2))
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
break;
}
}
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* end of line */
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
return(y < (ssize_t) image->rows ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Prevent infinite loop
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 75,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetTextInputFlags() const {
if (text_input_manager_ && text_input_manager_->GetTextInputState())
return text_input_manager_->GetTextInputState()->flags;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
{
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, htype, len, 0, len);
s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off = 0;
/* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
const char *objname)
{
struct filename_trans ft;
struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
/*
* Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
* like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
* if the ttype does not contain any rules.
*/
if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
return;
ft.stype = stype;
ft.ttype = ttype;
ft.tclass = tclass;
ft.name = objname;
otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
if (otype)
newcontext->type = otype->otype;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: begin_softmask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, softmask_save *save)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_xobject *softmask = gstate->softmask;
fz_rect mask_bbox;
fz_matrix tos_save[2], save_ctm;
fz_matrix mask_matrix;
fz_colorspace *mask_colorspace;
save->softmask = softmask;
if (softmask == NULL)
return gstate;
save->page_resources = gstate->softmask_resources;
save->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
save_ctm = gstate->ctm;
pdf_xobject_bbox(ctx, softmask, &mask_bbox);
pdf_xobject_matrix(ctx, softmask, &mask_matrix);
pdf_tos_save(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
if (gstate->luminosity)
mask_bbox = fz_infinite_rect;
else
{
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &mask_matrix);
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &gstate->softmask_ctm);
}
gstate->softmask = NULL;
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
gstate->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
mask_colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, softmask);
if (gstate->luminosity && !mask_colorspace)
mask_colorspace = fz_device_gray(ctx);
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_begin_mask(ctx, pr->dev, &mask_bbox, gstate->luminosity, mask_colorspace, gstate->softmask_bc, &gstate->fill.color_params);
pdf_run_xobject(ctx, pr, softmask, save->page_resources, &fz_identity, 1);
}
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, mask_colorspace);
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* FIXME: Ignore error - nasty, but if we throw from
* here the clip stack would be messed up. */
/* TODO: pass cookie here to increase the cookie error count */
}
fz_end_mask(ctx, pr->dev);
pdf_tos_restore(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->ctm = save_ctm;
return gstate;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 164,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageFetched(const ContentSuggestion::ID& id,
const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const base::string16& text,
base::Time timeout_at,
const gfx::Image& image) {
if (!ShouldNotifyInState(app_status_listener_.GetState())) {
return; // Became foreground while we were fetching the image; forget it.
}
DVLOG(1) << "Fetched " << image.Size().width() << "x"
<< image.Size().height() << " image for " << url.spec();
if (ContentSuggestionsNotificationHelper::SendNotification(
id, url, title, text, CropSquare(image), timeout_at)) {
RecordContentSuggestionsNotificationImpression(
id.category().IsKnownCategory(KnownCategories::ARTICLES)
? CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_ARTICLE
: CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_NONARTICLE);
}
}
Commit Message: NTP: cap number of notifications/day
1 by default; Finch-configurable.
BUG=689465
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691023002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450389}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 172,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gboolean BrowserWindowGtk::OnFocusOut(GtkWidget* widget,
GdkEventFocus* event) {
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: netdutils::Status XfrmController::flushSaDb(const XfrmSocket& s) {
struct xfrm_usersa_flush flushUserSa = {.proto = IPSEC_PROTO_ANY};
std::vector<iovec> iov = {{NULL, 0}, // reserved for the eventual addition of a NLMSG_HDR
{&flushUserSa, sizeof(flushUserSa)}, // xfrm_usersa_flush structure
{kPadBytes, NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(flushUserSa)) - sizeof(flushUserSa)}};
return s.sendMessage(XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA, NETLINK_REQUEST_FLAGS, 0, &iov);
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | 0 | 162,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nullableStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::nullableStringAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetWindowOrientationAngle() {
int angle;
ExecuteScriptAndGetValue(shell()->web_contents()->GetMainFrame(),
"window.orientation")->GetAsInteger(&angle);
return angle;
}
Commit Message: Tests for CL 647933003.
BUG=424453
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653283007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#302374}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,433 |
Subsets and Splits